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PRESENTED BY 



A DEFENCE OF 
FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH. 




AN EXAMINATION OF MR. J. S. MILL'S 
PHILOSOPHY 



A DEFENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL TRUTH. 



BY 



JAMES M'COSH, LL.D. 

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS, QUEEN'S COLLEGE, BELFAST ; AUTHOR OF ' THE 
METHOD OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT,' ' INTUITIONS OF THE MIND,' ETC. 



MACMILLAN AND CO. 
186 6. 

[The right of Translation is reserved.] 






?>v 




Gift 
MR, HUTCHFSON, 
10 0*00 



EDINBURGH I T. CONSTABLE. 
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN. AND TO THE UNIVERSITY. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTEK I. 

PAGE 

Introduction— Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mill, . . 1 



CHAPTER H. 
The Method of Investigation, 24 

CHAPTER III. 
Mr. Mill's Admissions, 50 

CHAPTER IV. 
Sensations, 70 

CHAPTER V. 

Mind, Personality, Personal Identity, Substance, . . 79 

CHAPTER VI. 
Body, .101 

CHAPTER VII. 
The Physiology of the Senses, 146 



VI CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

PAGS 

Memory, Association of Ideas, Belief, and Unconscious 

Mental Operations, . . 173 



CHAPTER IX. 
Judgment or Comparison, 200 

CHAPTER X. 
Relativity of Knowledge, 216 

CHAPTER XI. 
Man's Power of Conception as a Test of Truth, . . . 235 

CHAPTER XII. 

Self-Evidence and Necessity the Tests of Intuition, . . 242 

CHAPTER XIII. 
Causation, 256 

CHAPTER XIV. 
The Logical Notion, 267 

CHAPTER XV. 
Logical Judgment, 285 

CHAPTER XVI. 
Reasoning, 298 



CONTENTS. Vll 



CHAPTER XVII. 

PAGE 

Secondary Logic ; or Thought as Directed to Particular 

Classes op Objects, 317 



CHAPTER XVIII. 
Logical Discussions : The Province of Logic, .... 327 

CHAPTER XIX. 

What is Truth ? Criteria of Truth, 348 

CHAPTER XX. 
Utilitarianism, 358 

CHAPTER XXI. 
Natural Theology, 388 

APPENDIX. 

Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 405 



CHAPTEE I. 

INTRODUCTION — SIR W. HAMILTON AND MR. MILL. 

If any one competent to offer an opinion on such a 
subject were asked, \Vho are the most influential philo- 
sophic thinkers of Britain, in this the third quarter of 
the nineteenth century ? he would at once and unhesi- 
tatingly name Sir William Hamilton and Mr. John 
Stuart Mill. For the last twenty or thirty years the 
former has had great authority in Scotland, and con- 
siderable power in Oxford and among the Dissenting 
colleges of England ; has been much admired in the 
United States of America ; has been favourably known 
in France, and heard of even in Germany, where few 
British metaphysicians attain a name. Mr. Mill has 
qualities which specially recommend him to the English 
mind, and of late years he has got a firm hold of the 
rising thought of Oxford and Cambridge, where young 
minds, in the recoil from the attempt to impose the 
mediaeval forms upon them, have taken refuge in the 
Empiricism and Utilitarianism so lucidly expounded by 
him ; while writers bred at the great English Univer- 

A 



2 INTRODUCTION. 

siti.es have, in certain portions of the London press, 
been constantly and apparently systematically quoting 
him, or referring to him, as possibly the only philo- 
sopher known to them, or at least appreciated by them. 
It should be added that he is known in France as the 
English representative of their own Positive School ; 
and his clear logical expositions have been esteemed 
by not a few in Germany, anxious to escape from the 
inextricable toils of Kant and Eichte, Schellino- and 
Hegel. 

These two men are alike in the greatness of their 
intellectual power, and in the range of their attain- 
ments. But they differ widely in their peculiar mental 
endowments and predilections, in the manner in which 
they have been trained, and the influences under which 
their opinions have been formed. Hamilton is known 
to have received a thoroughly complete collegiate edu- 
cation in classics and philosophy ; to have afterwards 
had his logical powers sharpened by the study of law, 
and his extensive information widened by his researches 
when Professor of History ; while his pursuits were 
made finally to centre in mental science by his ap- 
pointment as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in 
the University of Edinburgh. Eeceiving his early col- 
lege training in Glasgow, where the influence of Eeid 
was predominant, he retained through life a profound 
reverence for the common sense philosopher. Com- 
pleting his academic education at Oxford, he fell under 
the sway of Aristotle, and found in him much that was 
congenial to his own intellectual nature, and was led to 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 3 

study his philosophy not only in his own writings, but 
in the pages of his commentators, and in the modifica- 
tion of his logic constructed by the schoolmen. In the 
course of his multifarious reading he could not but fall 
in with constant references to Emmanuel Kant as a pro- 
found thinker, and, as he entered upon the study of his 
works, could not but be impressed with the vast logical 
power of the German metaphysician. These three, 
Eeid, Aristotle, and Kant, are the men who have 
exercised the greatest influence on the studies and the 
thoughts of the Scottish philosopher. But in his vast 
and rare reading he delighted to find truth scattered 
like gold dust in the pages of forgotten writers of all 
ages and countries, and, rejoicing in the discovery, he 
often magnified its value as he hastened to bring it 
forth to the public view in an age and country which 
seemed to him greatly deficient in scholarship. 

His intellectual features stand out very prominently. 
A discerning eye might have seen from the beginning 
that his independent and impetuous mind would impel 
him to follow a course of his own ; and that, while pro- 
bably destined to lead, he would not be led— certainly 
would not be driven by others. He is evidently moved 
by a strong internal appetency to master all learning, 
and he spent his life in accumulating stores which, after 
all, fell immeasurably beneath his high ambition. Along 
with this he has a masterly capacity of retention and 
power of arrangement. His skill in seizing the opinions 
of the men of all ages and countries : the ancient Greeks, 
the philosophic fathers of the Church, the schoolmen, 



4 IFTROLUGTIOX. 

the thinkers of the age of the Eevival of Letters, — such 
as Scaliger, and of the continental metaphysicians from 
the days of Descartes to about the year 1830, has never 
been equalled by any British philosopher. His powers 
of logical analysis, generalization, and distribution are 
scarcely surpassed by those of Aristotle or Thomas 
Aquinas or Kant. I have to add, that while he has 
also superior powers of observation, he has, like most 
metaphysicians, often overridden and overwhelmed 
them by logical processes, and hastened by dissection, 
division, and criticism to construct prematurely a com- 
pleted system of philosophy — such as is to be built 
up, only as systems of physical science are formed, by 
the careful inductions of successive inquirers conducting 
their work through successive ages. In this respect he 
has imbibed the spirit of Kant, and has not followed 
the examples set by the more cautious school of Reid 
and Stewart. 

His manner and style are very decided and very 
marked. Any man of sharp discernment could easily 
recognise him at a great distance, and detect him under 
the most rigid incognito. To some ears his nomencla- 
ture may sound uncouth and crabbed, being coined out 
of the Greek or borrowed from the Germans ; but these 
persons forget that chemistry and geology and anatomy 
have all been obliged to create a new terminology, in 
order to embody the distinctions which they have 
established. Hamilton is certainly without the power 
of poetical or oratorical amplification for which Brown 
and Chalmers of the same University were distinguished; 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 5 

and he is deficient in the aptness of illustration in which 
such writers as Paley and Whately excel ; still his 
manner of writing has attractions of its own. His 
phraseology, if at times it sounds technical or pedantic, 
is always carefully explained and defined, and is ever 
scholarlike in its derivation and articulate in its mean- 
ing. His style is never loose, never tedious, never dull : 
it is always clear, always terse, always masculine, and 
at times it is sententious, clinching, and apothegmatic. 
In reading his works the reader need entertain no fear 
of being led into a Scotch mist, or being met by a fog 
from the German Ocean. Not unfrequently dogmatic, 
at times oracular, resolute in holding by his opinions 
when attacked, and on certain occasions, as in his 
assaults on Luther, Brown, Whately, and De Morgan, 
giving way to undue severity and passion, he is ever 
open, manly, and sincere. He uses a sharp chisel and 
strikes his hammer with a decided blow, and his ideas 
commonly stand out before us like a clean cut statue 
standing firmly on its pedestal between us and a clear 
sky. Indeed we might with justice describe his style 
as not only accurate, but even beautiful in a sense, from 
its compression, its compactness, its vigour, and its point. 
His thoughts, weighty and solid as metal, are ever made 
to shine with a metallic lustre. At the places at which 
his speculations are the most abstract and his words 
the baldest, he often surprises us by an apt quotation 
from an old and forgotten author ; or a sudden light is 
thrown upon the present topic by rays coming from a 
hundred points. If we have not the flowers or the riches, 



6 INTRODUCTION. 

we are at the same time without the sultriness of a 
tropical climate ; and in the arctic region to which he 
carries us, if the atmosphere feels cold at times, it is 
always healthy and bracing, and the lights in the sky 
have a bright and scintillating lustre. 

Mr. Mill's characteristics are of a different kind. It 
is understood that he received no collegiate education ; 
but it is clear that he has been instructed with care, and 
I should suppose upon a system, in the various branches 
even of academic learning. If not so technically erudite 
as Hamilton, it is evident that he is well acquainted 
with the various departments of physical science ; that 
he is extensively read in all historical and social 
questions ; and that he is competently conversant with 
the opinions of philosophers and logicians in different 
ages. His thinking has many of the qualities of a self- 
educated man : that is, it is fresh and independent, but, 
at the same time, it is often exclusive and angular, in 
consequence of its not being rubbed and polished and 
adjusted by being placed alongside of the philosophic 
and religious wisdom of the great and good men of the 
past. Taught to think for himself from his boyhood, 
he has prepared opinions on all subjects ; he has pub- 
lished many of these in his writings, and has evidently 
many more to advance in due time, as circumstances 
may seem to require, and the world is able to bear 
them. He received, I rather think, his first intellec- 
tual impulse from his own father, of whom lie always 
speaks with profound reverence — a circumstance credit- 
able alike to the father and the son. But Mr. James 



HAMILTON AXD MILL. 7 

Mill, though a clear and independent, was by no means 
(so I think) a comprehensive or profound thinker. The 
title of his philosophical work, Analysis of the Pheno- 
mena of the Human M hid, indicates its character and 
its contents ; it is an analysis of the operations of the 
mind into as few elements as possible, and preceded by 
no careful observation of the nature and peculiarities of 
the mental phenomena which he seeks to decompose. 
One so trained could not but have his attention drawn 
to the speculations of Dr. Thomas Brown, who, largely 
following the Sensational School of France, had shown 
his ingenuity in deriving the complex phenomena of the 
mind from a few ultimate laws. Like the older Mr. 
Mill (in this respect unlike Dr. Brown), the younger 
Mr, Mill delights to trace ideas to sensations ; like 
Brown and James Mill, he represents all our mental 
states as "feelings," and like them he generates our 
ideas by means of suggestion or association. 

These are evidently Mr. Mill's immediate predecessors 
in psychology. In historical speculation he was early 
seized with an admiration of the general principles of 
the philosophy of M. Auguste Comte, who was becoming 
known to a select few at the time when the character 
of the young Englishman was being formed ; and M. 
Littre claims Mr. John Mill as the first who gave " a 
public adhesion to the method of the positive phi- 
losophy." Xot that he has followed the founder of the 
Positive School in every respect ; in particular, he has 
been prevented by his adherence to his father's meta- 
physics from following M. Comte in his denunciations 



8 INTRODUCTION. 

of all attempts to study the human mind by conscious- 
ness. But he was' led by the influence of this teacher 
to regard it as impossible for the mind to rise to first or 
final causes, or to know the nature of things ; and to 
adopt his favourite method of procedure, which is by 
deduction from an hypothesis, which he endeavours to 
show explains all the phenomena. Though a fairly 
informed man in the history of philosophy, he has 
attached himself to a school which thinks it has entirely 
outstripped the past ; and so he has no' sympathy with, 
and no appreciation of, the profound thoughts of the 
men of former times : these are supposed to belong to 
the theological or metaphysical ages, which have for 
ever passed away in favour of the positive era which 
has now dawned upon our world. Bred thus in a 
revolutionary school of opinion, his predilections are in 
all things in favour of those who are given to change, 
and against those who think that there is immutable 
truth, or who imagine that they have discovered it. 
His expressed admiration of Coleridge may seem to 
contradict this statement, but it does so only in appear- 
ance, for he has no partiality for any of the favourite 
principles of that defender of transcendental reason ; it is 
clear that he delights in him chiefly because his specu- 
lations have been acting as a solvent to melt down the 
crystallized philosophical and theological opinions of 
England. The school of Comte has hitherto had no 
analyst of the mind (the founder of it was a phrenolo- 
gist, and studied the mind through the brain) ; and Mr. 
Mill may be regarded as, for the present, the recognised 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 9 

metaphysician of the school, and will hold this place 
till he is superseded by the more comprehensive system, 
and the bolder speculative grasp of Mr. Herbert Spencer. 

With an original clearness of intellectual apprehen- 
sion, his whole training has disposed him towards dis - 
tinct enunciations and practical results. Engaged for 
many years in a public office, he has acquired habits 
which enable him to understand the business of life 
and the condition of society. He is particularly fitted 
to excel in the exposition of those media axiomata upon 
which, according to Bacon, " depend the business and 
fortune of mankind." With an English love of the 
concrete, he has a French skill in reducing a complex 
subject into simple elements, and a French clearness of 
expression. He is ever able to bring out his views in 
admirable order, and his thoughts lie in his style like 
pebbles at the bottom of a transparent stream, so that 
we see their shape and colour without noticing the 
medium through which we view them. I have to add, 
that in his love of the clear, and his desire to translate 
the abstract into the concrete, he often misses the deep- 
est properties of the objects examined by him ; and he 
seems to me far better fitted to co-ordinate the facts of 
social science than to deal with the first principles of 
fundamental philosophy. As to his spirit, there are 
evidences of a keen fire, of enthusiasm, perhaps of 
passion, burning within, but the surface is ever still 
and ever green. 

These two eminent men, whose systems evidently 
stood all along so widely apart from each other, have 



10 IXTRODUCTIOX. 

now been brought into violent collision by the publica- 
tion of Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton? s 
Philosophy. Such a collision was inevitable. Hamilton 
was the ablest and most learned, I do not think the 
wisest or most consistent, defender of intuitive or a 
priori truth in our country in the past age. It was 
felt to be absolutely necessary, in these circumstances, 
by the British section of the school of M. Comte, that 
the fundamental positions of Hamilton should be re- 
moved out of the way of the advancing deductive 
empiricism. I rejoice that the attack has been made 
by Mr. Mill himself, so that we see all that can be ad- 
vanced by the acutest representative of the experiential 
or sensational philosophy in our age and country. It 
is to be hoped that the formidable assault will be met 
by some disciple of Hamilton who has caught the spirit 
and who understands the system of his master. As the 
result, the student of philosophy will be in circumstances 
to decide what he should receive with gratitude, and 
what he should refuse or reject with regret, in the philo- 
sophy of the last of the great Scottish metaphysicians. 

In the title of his work, Mr. Mill announces it as an 
examination of " the principal philosophical questions 
discussed in his writings ;" and in his introductory re- 
marks he declares, " My subject, therefore, is not Sir 
W. Hamilton, but the questions which Sir W. Hamilton 
discussed." It is this circumstance which makes the 
work so important in the view of the students of mental 
science generally, and which has induced me to review 
it. In examining his opponent, Mr. Mill has taken the 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 11 

opportunity of developing his own philosophic system, 
and has put us in a position to judge of its principles 
and results. It is true that we had the germs of that 
system embedded in his treatise on Logic, and ger- 
minating there. No doubt he is continually telling us 
in that work that he avoids metaphysics, but there is a 
metaphysical system underlying and running through- 
out all the deeper discussions. He refers, and evidently 
adheres to a large extent, to a sensational theory of the 
origin of our ideas in his chapter, " Of the Things de- 
noted by Names ;" he seeks to undermine all intuitive 
truth in his chapters on " Demonstration" and " Causa- 
tion ;" and he has exposed with a special zest the errors 
of the a priori school in his book on " Fallacies." He 
has thus been preparing those who have studied his logic 
for accepting his metaphysics. In these circumstances 
I rejoice that in his recent work he has furnished us 
with the means of thoroughly estimating his theory of 
the mind, of which we had only hints and glimpses in 
his logical treatise. It is this theory which I profess 
to examine in this volume. 

In performing this special task it is not necessary to 
enter into the controversy between Mill and Hamilton. 
Far more important questions than the merits of the 
individuals have been started. I certainly do not feel 
that it is a duty devolving on me to offer a defence of 
the philosophy of Hamilton. Since the year 1854, 
when I reviewed his doctrines of the " Eelativity of 
Knowledge " and of " Causation," in an appendix to 
the fourth edition of my work on the Method of the 



12 IXTRODUCTIOX. 

Divine Government, I have been opposing certain of 
his favourite principles. I offered my strictures with 
excessive reluctance, as feeling a profound reverence for 
the vast erudition and logical power of the Edinburgh 
professor, and cherishing a lively gratitude for the 
services he had rendered to philosophy in refuting old 
and widely-received errors and establishing important 
truth. I advanced my criticisms wdiile he was yet 
alive, and I have continued them in articles in reviews, 
and in my work on The Intuitions of the Mind, while 
his reputation was at its greatest height, and his dis- 
ciples were indignant at any attempt to dispute the 
infallibility of their master. 

Hamilton, as it appears to me, was never able to 
weld into a consistent whole the realistic matter he got 
from Eeid with the subjective forms he took from Kant. 
In his review of M. Cousin, he took up a negative posi- 
tion, which did not leave him free to follow thoroug^hlv 
the positive revelations of consciousness. In his Dis- 
cussions he developed a theory of causation which pre- 
vented him from rising from the phenomena of the 
world to a belief in the existence of Deity; and he ex- 
pounded a doctrine as to the relativity of knowledge 
which makes us perceive objects under forms, and with 
additions imposed by the perceiving mind, which landed 
him avowedly in a system of nescience. Kant is claimed, 
with some truth, by M. Littre as in fact a precursor of 
the school of Comte. I have felt all along that Hamilton 
adopted principles from the Critical Philosophy, which 
made it impossible for him to stand up for the trust- 



HAM IL TUX AND MILL. 13 

worthiness of our faculties and the reality of things, 
which yet as a follower of Eeid he seemed to be esta- 
blishing. I declared openly and repeatedly, and in a 
number of places, that the admissions he made would 
sooner or later be followed to their logical eonsequen ses ; 
that without meaning it, he was preparing the way for 
a nihilist philosophy ; and that it would be seen that 
he had not left himself ground from which successfully 
to repel the attacks of scepticism. ^Yhen Dr. Mansel 
published his famous Bampton Lectures, On the Limits 
of E Thought, notwithstanding my great rever- 

ence for his erudition, his acuteness, and his high 
character, I immediately opposed his application of 
Hamilton's doctrine of the unconditioned to our know- 
ledge of God and of good and evil, which I represented 
as being fraught with disastrous logical consequences. 
As having anticipate'! Mr. Mill in many of his objec 
tions to Hamilton's philosophy, and having advanced 
others against doctrines which Mr. Mill applauds and 
turns to his own uses, and believing it to be impossible 
to defend fundamental truth from the positions assumed 
by Hamilton, I feel that it is not for me to propose to 
defend the philosophy of the Scottish metaphysician 
front the assaults of Mr. Mill. 1 

At the same time, I cannot give my adherence : 
many of the objections which have been taken by 
his new opponent. Notwithstanding incongruities in 
some parts of his system, he has furnished more valu- 

1 I have placed in an Appendix to this volame a summary of the objec- 
tions I have taken to Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

able contributions to speculative philosophy than any 
other British writer in this century. ISTo man has ever 
done more in clearing the literature of philosophy of 
commonplace mistakes, of thefts and impostures. He 
has shown that it is dangerous to quote without con- 
sulting the original, or to adopt without examination 
the common traditions in philosophy ; that those who 
borrow at second-hand will be detected, and that those 
who steal without acknowledgment will sooner or 
later be exposed. He seems to experience a delight in 
stripping modern authors of their borrowed feathers, 
and pursuing stolen goods from one literary thief to 
another, and giving them back to their original owner. 
More than any other Englishman, Scotchman, or Irish- 
man, for the last two centuries, he has wiped away 
the reproach from British philosophy that it is narrow 
and insular. For years past ordinary authors have 
seemed learned, and for years to come will seem learned, 
by drawing from his stores. In incidental discussions, 
in foot-notes, and notes on foot-notes, he has scattered 
nuts which it will take many a scholar many a day to 
gather and to crack. It will be long before the rays 
which shine from him will be so scattered and diffused 
through philosophic literature— as the sunbeams are 
through the atmosphere — that they shall become com- 
mon property, and men will cease to distinguish the 
focus from which they have come. By his admirable 
powers of division and subdivision he has placed the , 
philosophic systems of various ages and countries, into 
appropriate compartments, which enable us at once to 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 15 

see the form and the nature of each. Mr. Mill regrets 
that he " did not write the history of philosophy." I am 
not sure whether the Scottish professor had all the quali- 
fications necessary for such a work ; whether, in parti- 
cular, he could always enter sympathetically into the 
spirit of the times in which the philosopher lived, and 
whether he could have given us an easy and continuous 
narrative. But every student should be grateful to him 
for what he has actually performed ; for arranging under 
proper heads, and stating, always with admirable brevity, 
and commonly with unimpeachable accuracy, the 
opinions of philosophers, ancient and modern, on most 
of the topics of speculative interest which still continue 
to be agitated. Looking to his original contributions to 
philosophy, his defence of the principles of common 
sense is characterized at once by extensive learning, by 
unsurpassed logical acumen and consummate judgment. 
His immediate theory of sense-perception, if it does not 
remove all difficulties, appears to me to be more consis- 
tent than any other with the facts both of psychology 
and of physiology. His logic is too Kantian in its 
manner and spirit, and will require to be carefully 
sifted ; but I believe it is the most important addition 
made in our day to the analytic of the laws of thought. 
I am persuaded that his distribution of the mental 
faculties, given in the second volume of his Metaphysics, 
is upon the whole the best we yet have, and any 
one who would improve it must make extensive use 
of it. Nor is it to be forgotten that he has intro- 
duced fresh topics into British philosophy, and has 



10 INTRODUCTION. 

always thrown light upon them even when he has not 
succeeded in settling them. 

I am sure Mr. Mill means to be a just critic of his 
rival. But from having attached himself to a narrow 
and exclusive school of philosophy and of history, he 
is scarcely capable of comprehending, he is certainly 
utterly incapable of appreciating some of Hamilton's 
profounder discussions. It could be shown that not a 
few of the alleged inconsistencies of Hamilton arise 
from misapprehensions on the part of Ms critic. I have 
observed that some of the supposed contradictions are 
merely verbal, and originate in his using a phrase in its 
usual acceptation, perhaps to a promiscuous class in one 
place, and employing it ina more technical sense after 
explanation in another. Xor is it to be forgotten that 
the writings published by himself appeared in the form 
of articles in reviews, and of notes and appendices to 
works edited by him; and that his Lectures, which 
contain his complete system, though carefully edited 
by Professors Mansel and Yeitch, had not the advan- 
tage of being reduced to thorough consistency by him- 
self. It has to be added, that, being wulling to take a 
thought that struck him as true or important from any 
quarter, he was not always able to join the materials 
he had gathered into a harmonious structure. Hence 
his philosophy takes the appearance of a squared and 
diamonded mosaic, in which it is not always easy to dis- 
cover the unity of the plan. But I verily believe that 
Hamilton had after all a complete system, which, with 
some hiatuses and incongruities, and some fatal errors 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 17 

adopted from Kant, is, as a whole, consistent, and con- 
tains valuable truth. His critic, from his training and 
sectarian predilections, is incapacitated for forming a due. 
estimate of many of his higher excellences, and every- 
where examines him from his own standpoint, which 
is very narrow, and by his own experiential system, 
which is lamentably defective. But I leave the work 
of defending Hamilton to his pupils and disciples, and 
I rejoice to believe that in many points, and these very 
important ones, their defence will be triumphantly 
successful. 

In that curious retribution which we often discover 
in the affairs of this world, we find that those who are 
severe in judging others, may come in the end to be 
severely judged themselves. 1 The late Sir W. Hamilton 
was often harsh, at times I think unjust (not intention- 
ally) in his censures on those who had possession of the 
philosophic ear of the country at the time when he was 
forcing himself into public notice in opposition to the 
spirit of the age. In saying so, I do not refer so much 
to his able and manly, though not altogether successful, 
criticism of M. Cousin, or to his non-recognition of any 
special merit in Mr. James Mill (of which his son com- 

1 Have we an illustration of this in the manner in which Plato, who is 
supposed to have treated the Sophists with injustice, is himself treated in 
his turn by Mr. Grote, in his Plato and the other Companions of Socrates ? 
The exposition of the Search Dialogues in that able and learned work is 
admirable, but the positive doctrines of Plato are examined from the stand- 
point of M. Comte, Mr. Mill, and Professor Bain ! Is there no living 
Archer Butler among British scholars to defend Plato's high aspirations, 
and to show that he had glimpses of great verities which have never 
disclosed themselves to the view of the ancient Sophists or modern 
Positivists ? 

B 



18 IXTRODUCTIOX. 

plains), so much as to the censorious manner in which 
lie refers to Dr. Brown and Archbishop Whately, who, 
if not very profound or erudite, were certainly fresh, 
acute, and honest thinkers. He has now been repaid 
for all this in his own coin, by one who has a great 
admiration of Whately, and who has sprung from the 
school of Brown and Mill, and who writes as if he had 
public wrongs to avenge, and an accumulation of ac- 
cepted errors to scatter. The time will come, I doubt 
not, when the avenger may himself have to suffer for 
the excess of punishment he has inflicted. But I beg 
to say that this is not the spirit in which I have written 
this review. I have really no pleasure in exposing the 
inconsistencies, the misunderstandings, and mistakes, 
to be found in Mr. Mill's Examination, or any of his 
other works. Acuter minds, or more pugnacious spirits, 
or earnest souls irritated as they see the evils which 
must arise from the prevalence of a philosophy which 
undermines fundamental truth, will, I suspect, rejoice 
to do this, and may be tempted to do it in excess. But 
I have no personal antipathies to gratify, no wrongs to 
avenge. The deepest feeling which I entertain towards 
Mr. Mill is that of admiration of his talents, and grati- 
tude for the clear exposition which he has given of 
many important principles. 1 My aim in this work is 
simply to defend a portion of primary truth which has 

1 Simply to illustrate this, I may mention that the part of his Logic 
which treats of induction, has a place in my college classes, and on my 
recommendation, joined to that of the corresponding professors in Cork 
and Galway, has a place in the examination for the Bachelor's and Master's 
degree in the Queen's University in Ireland. 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 19 

been assailed by an acute thinker who has extensive 
influence in England. 

Some of his admirers claim for Mr. Mill, that he is 
the genuine philosophical descendant of Locke. I ac- 
knowledge that in some respects he resembles our 
great English metaphysician. He is like him in his 
clearness of thought and diction. Both are careful to 
avoid, as far as possible, abstruse arguments and tech- 
nical phrases. Both have a name in other departments 
as well as mental philosophy, — Locke having thought 
profoundly on political questions, and Mr. Mill having 
given us one of the best works we have on political 
economy. Both have written on toleration or liberty, 
and defended views in advance of those generally enter- 
tained in their own times. I am inclined further to 
admit that Mr. Mill has quite as much influence in our 
day in England as Locke had in his. But with these 
points of likeness there are important points of differ- 
ence. Locke had an originality, a shrewdness, a saga- 
city, and a high-principled wisdom and caution which 
have not been equalled by the later speculator. Locke 
avows extreme enough views in opposing the doctrines 
of professed metaphysicians, but he is saved by his 
crowning sense, and his religious convictions, acquired 
in Puritan 'times, from taking up positions adverse to 
the sound sense of mankind. Vehement enough in 
opposing a doctrine of innate ideas supposed to be held 
by philosophers, and labouring in vain to derive all our 
ideas from sensation and reflection, we do not find him 
tailing back on such extreme positions as those of Mr. 



20 INTRODUCTION. 

Mill, when lie endeavours to draw our higher ideas out 
of sensation by means of association, and maintains that 
we can know nothing of mind except that it is a series of 
sensations, aware of itself, or of matter, except that it is 
a possibility of sensations. I believe that Locke aban- 
doned, without knowing it, some important fundamental 
truths ; but he resolutely held by many others, as that 
man has high faculties working on the original materials, 
and that in particular he has an intuitive knowledge 
" which is irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces 
" itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever 
" the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room 
" for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but the mind is 
" presently filled with the clear light of it" {Essay, B. iv. 
c. 2). Mr. J. S. Mill is the successor and the living 
representative of an important British school, but it is 
that of Hobbes, of Hartley, of Priestley, of David Hume, 
and of James Mill. I have studiously left Thomas 
Brown out of this list, because, while adopting much 
from Hume, he carefully separates from him on the 
subject of intuition, maintaining that we have original 
and irresistible beliefs in our personal identity, and in 
causation. It will be seen as we advance how close the 
philosophy of Mr. J. S. Mill comes to that of Hume. I 
rather think Mr. Mill is scarcely aware himself of the 
extent of the resemblance, as he seems to have wrought 
out his conclusions from data supplied him to some ex- 
tent by Brown, but to a greater extent by Mr. James 
Mill, both of whom drew much from the Treatise of 
Human Nature. But even on the supposition that Mr. 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 21 

Mill is the Locke of the nineteenth century, it would be 
necessary to examine and correct his views. Tor while 
the Essay on the Human Understanding evolved much 
truth, and exercised, upon the whole, a healthy influence, 
it contained very grave defects and errors, which issued 
in very serious consequences both in France and in this 
country ; in the former landing speculation in a miser- 
able sensationalism, and in the latter originating the 
wire-drawn attempts to fashion all our ideas out of one 
or two primitive sources by means of association. I 
have already intimated that I believe the errors of Mr. 
Mill to be far more numerous and fundamental than 
those of Locke ; and should his sensational and nescient 
system come to be adopted, it will be followed, both in 
theory and in practice, with far more fatal results than 
any that ensued from the combined idealistic and rea- 
listic philosophy expounded in Locke's great work. 

Among a considerable portion even of the reading 
and thinking people of England, there is a strong aver- 
sion to all professedly metaphysical speculation, — which 
they regard as a net of sophistry spread out to catch 
them. But in avoiding an avowed and elaborate dis- 
cussion of fundamental truth, it often happens that they 
are taken in by a plausible smartness, which is really 
metaphysics, but bad metaphysics, — treating every pro- 
found subject in a superficial way. In this respect 
some of our countrymen act very much like those ex- 
cessively cautious and suspicious persons to be met 
with in the world, who are so afraid of everybody 
cheating them, that they become the dupes of those 



22 INTRODUCTION. 

more designing schemers who are ever warning them 
against the dishonesty of others. There are readers of 
Hobbes, who, on perceiving how free he is from mysticism, 
and how readily he seems to explain all our ideas by 
sensation, and all our actions by selfishness, are tempted 
to think that this man who speaks so clearly and dog- 
matically must be speaking truly. They are about as 
wise as the excessively far-sighted individuals who so 
easily account for all extraordinary actions on the simple 
principle that all mankind are fools, or rogues, or mad- 
men ! The Englishman is thus often led astray by a 
deception which pretends to be simplicity itself. I 
abhor as much as any man the introduction of meta- 
physics into the discussion of commonplace or practical 
subjects. But there is another error, quite as common, 
and to be equally dreaded, and that is the introduction 
of superficial metaphysics furtively, by those who would 
gain your confidence by telling you that they avoid 
metaphysics. If we are to have metaphysics, let them 
avow that they are metaphysics, and let the investiga- 
tion be conducted scientifically and systematically. By 
all means let us have clear metaphysics, just as we 
would wish to have clear mathematics and clear physics. 
But clearness to the extent of transparency is of no value, 
provided it be attained, as in the case of the French sen- 
sational school, only by omitting all that is high or deep 
in man's nature. I certainly do not look on Mr. Mill 
as a superficial writer. On the contrary, on subjects 
on which he has not been led to follow Mr. James Mill 
or M. Comte, his thoughts are commonly as solid and 



HAMILTON AND MILL. 23 

weighty as they are clearly expressed. But, speaking 
exclusively of his philosophy of first principles, I believe 
he is getting so ready an acceptance among many for 
his metaphysical theories, mainly because, like Hobbes 
and Condillac, he possesses a delusive simplicity which 
does not account for, but simply overlooks, the dis- 
tinguishing properties of our mental nature. 



CHAPTEE II. 

THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

M. Cousin brings it as a charge against Locke, that 
in his Essay on the Human Understanding, he treats of 
the origin of ideas before inquiring into their nature. 
Locke thus announces his method : " 1st, I shall in- 
" quire into the original of those ideas, notions, or what- 
" ever else you please to call them, which a man observes, 
" and is conscious to himself he has in his mind, and the 
" ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished 
" with them" (Introd. s. 3.) Upon this, his French critic 
remarks that there are here " two radical errors in regard 
" to method : 1st, Locke treats of the origin of ideas be- 
" fore having sufficiently studied these ideas ; Idly, he 
" does more, he not only puts the question of the origin 
" of ideas before that of the inventory of ideas, but he en- 
" tirely neglects this last question" (Lectures on Locke, ii.) 
M. Cousin seems to lay down an important principle 
here, and to be so far justified in blaming the English 
philosopher for neglecting it. In order to be able to 
settle the very difficult question of the origin of our 
ideas, we must begin, and, I believe, end, with a careful 
inspection of their precise nature. In the very passage 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 25 

in which Locke proclaims his mode of procedure, he 
speaks of inquiring into the original of those ideas which 
a man "observes, and is conscious to himself." The 
observation by consciousness should certainly precede 
any attempt to furnish a theoretical decomposition of 
ideas. I am convinced that in the construction of his 
theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensation and 
reflection, Locke did not patiently and comprehensively 
contemplate all that is in certain of the deepest and 
most characteristic ideas of the human mind. I do not 
ground this charge so much on the fact that he treats, in 
the First Book, of the Origin of Ideas, before coming, in 
the Second Book, to discuss the Nature of Ideas, as on 
the circumstance that in the Second Book he is obliged 
to overlook some of the profoundest properties of our 
ideas, in order to make them fit into his preconceived 
system. But we find Mr. Mill justifying Locke, and con- 
demning Cousin. " I accept the question as M. Cousin 
" states it, and I contend that no attempt to determine 
" what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be 
" successful or entitled to regard, unless preceded by 
" what M. Cousin says ought to follow it — an inquiry 
" into the origin of our acquired ideas" (Exam. p. 145). 
Mr. Mill at this place examines Sir W. Hamilton's 
constant appeals to consciousness. Sir William would 
often settle by consciousness alone questions wdiich I 
suspect must be solved by a more complicated and 
difficult process. It is thus, for instance — that is, by an 
appeal to consciousness — that he would determine that 
we know immediatelv an external or material world. 



26 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

In language often of terrible severity, he charges Brown, 
and nearly all philosophers, with disregarding conscious- 
ness : " But it is thus manifestly the common interest of 
" every scheme of philosophy to preserve intact the inte- 
" grity of consciousness. Almost every scheme of philo- 
" sophy is only another mode in which this integrity has 
" been violated " {Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 283). Mr. Mill 
shows successfully (as I think) that the question between 
Hamilton and his opponents is often not one of the tes- 
timony of consciousness, but of the interpretation of con- 
sciousness : " We have it not in our power to ascertain, 
" by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the 
" time when its revelations were in their primitive purity. 
" It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, 
" when these original revelations are overlaid and buried 
" under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and per- 
" ceptions" (pp. 145, 146). Mr. Mill then goes on to ex- 
plain his own method, which he calls the Psychological : 
" And here emerges the distinction between two different 
" methods of studying the problems of metaphysics, form- 
" ing the radical difference between the two great schools 
" into which metaphysicians are fundamentally divided. 
" One of these I shall call for distinction the Introspective 
" method, the other the Psychological." He rejects the 
Introspective method : " Introspection can show us a 
" present belief or conviction, attended with a greater or 
" less difficulty in accommodating the thoughts to a dif- 
" ferent view of the subject ; but that this belief or con - 
" viction or knowledge, if we call it so, is intuitive, no 
" mere introspection can ever show." He therefore re- 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGAT10X. 2 7 

sorts to the other method : " Being unable to examine 
" the actual contents of our consciousness until our 
" earliest, which are necessarily our most firmly knit 
" associations, those which are most intimately inter- 
" woven with the original data of consciousness, are fully 
" formed, we cannot study the original elements of mind 
" in the facts of our present consciousness. Those origi- 
" nal elements can only come to light as residual pheno- 
" mena, by a previous study of the modes of generation 
" of the mental facts which are confessedly not original, 
" — a study sufficiently thorough to enable us to apply 
" its results to the convictions, beliefs, or supposed in- 
" tuitions which seem to be original, and determine 
" whether some of them may not have been generated 
" in the same modes, so early as to have become insepar- 
" able from our consciousness before the time at which 
" memory commences. This mode of ascertaining the 
" original elements of mind I call Psychological, as 
" distinguished from the simply Introspective mode " 
(pp. 147, 148). These quotations furnish a sufficiently 
clear view of his account of the two methods, and of his 
reasous for rejecting the one and adopting the other. 

I have long been of opinion, and I have endeavoured 
to show elsewhere, 1 that Sir William Hamilton's use of 
" consciousness" is very unsatisfactory. He avows that 
he employs the phrase in two distinct senses or appli- 
cations. First, he has a general consciousness, discussed 
largely in the first volume of his Metaphysics. This he 

1 Particularly in a review of Hamilton's Metaphysics in the Dublin 
University Magazine for August 1859. 



28 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

tells us cannot be defined (vol. i. p. 158) ; " but it com- 
prehends all the modifications, all the phenomena of the 
thinking subject" (p. 183). " Knowledge and belief are 
both contained under consciousness " (p. 191). Again, 
" consciousness is co-extensive with our cognitive 
faculties;" "our special faculties of knowledge are 
only modifications of consciousness" (p. 207). He 
shows that consciousness implies discrimination, judg- 
ment, and memory (pp. 202-206). This is wide enough ; 
still he imposes a limit, for consciousness " is an • im- 
mediate, not a mediate knowledge" (p. 202). Already, 
as it seems to me, inconsistencies are beginning to creep 
in ; for whereas he had before told us that conscious- 
ness includes " all the phenomena of the thinking sub- 
ject," now he so modifies it as to exclude "mediate 
knowledge," which is surely a modification of the think- 
ing subject. Throughout these passages he uses the 
phrase in the wide, loose sense given to the German 
Bewusstsein by the school of Wolf. He stoutly main- 
tains, what no one will deny, that this general conscious- 
ness is not a special faculty ; but when he comes to 
draw out a list of mental powers, in the second volume 
of his Metaphysics, he turns to the Scottish use of the 
phrase, and he includes among them a special faculty 
which he calls consciousness, but to which, for distinc- 
tion's sake, he prefixes self, and designates it self- 
consciousness. It is the office of this special faculty to 
" afford us a knowledge of the phenomena of our minds" 
(vol. ii. p. 192). It is an inevitable result of using the 
phrases in such ambiguous senses, that we are ever in 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 29 

danger of passing inadvertently from the one meaning 
to the other, and making affirmations in one sense 
which hold good only in another. Hamilton is ever 
appealing to consciousness, as Locke did to idea, as 
Brown did to suggestion, and as Mr. Mill does to asso- 
ciation, but without our being always sure that the 
various affirmations are made in the same sense of the 
term. His appeal to consciousness, both in establishing 
some of his own positions and in summarily setting 
aside those of his opponents, is often far too rapid and 
dogmatic. He represents the principles of common 
sense as being emphatically " facts of consciousness," 
whereas they are not so any more specially than our 
acquired and derived beliefs, which are equally under 
consciousness. In fact, these principles are not before 
the consciousness as principles. The individual mani- 
festations are of course before the consciousness (though 
not more so than any other mental exercise), but not 
the principles themselves, which are derived from the 
individual exercises by a reflex process of abstraction 
and generalization. Consciousness cannot decide directly 
which of our convictions are intuitive. Consciousness 
reveals only the present state of mind, and it cannot 
say whether it is original or derived. That state is pro- 
bably a very complex one, and may embrace secondary 
beliefs mixed up with the primary ones ; and if we are 
to separate these and fix on the true primitive convic- 
tions, we must subject the whole to a process of analysis. 
Again, consciousness can reveal to us only the singular, 
only the present state as an individual perception ; but 



30 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

in psychology, as in every other science, we are in search 
of the principle, and if we would gather the law out of 
the particulars we must generalize. In order, then, to 
the discovery even of an " intuitive principle," there 
must be what Bacon calls " the necessary rejections and 
exclusions," or what Dr. Whewell calls the " decompo- 
sition of facts," and then the co-ordination of the facts 
into a law by induction. In order, then, to the con- 
struction of metaphysics, more is required than a simple 
exercise of consciousness or introspection ; there is need 
of discursive processes to work the facts into a science. 1 
It is of the utmost moment to remove these misappre- 
hensions out of the way, as Mr. Mill, with his usual 
acuteness, has taken advantage of them ; and after he 
has shown that introspection cannot do everything, he 
leaves upon us the impression that it can do nothing. 

But consciousness, after all, is the main instrument 
in determining what are first principles. Let us en- 
deavour to ascertain its precise province. The method 
followed by Mr. Mill in his psychology (and also in his 
political economy) is evidently what he calls the de- 
ductive, and which he represents in his Logic (B. iii. 
chap. xi. sect, i.) as consisting of three operations : 
" The first one of direct induction ; the second of ratio- 
cination ; and the third of verification." Now, of these 
three steps the first and the third are, properly speak- 
ing, inductive ; they depend entirely on observed facts. 
In physical science the agent of observation is the 

1 I may be permitted to mention that I have fully wrought out these 
cautionary rules in The Intuitions of the Mind, Part First. 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 31 

senses, aided, it may be, by artificial instruments, and 
corrected by careful methods as enjoined by modern 
accuracy. In mental science the observing agent is 
consciousness. We bend back the mental eye, and 
observe what is passing within as it passes. As this 
is often a very difficult and delicate operation, more 
particularly when thought is rapid and feeling intense, 
we must resort to other operations, but in which con- 
sciousness is still the main instrument. We must by 
memory bring up the past as much as possible in its en- 
tirety, and notice all that is in it. Not only so ; in order 
to correct the narrowness of our personal observations, 
we must look to external quarters ; we must gather 
what are the convictions of other men from their deeds, 
ever passing under our notice, and as recorded in his- 
tory ; and from their conversation and their writings, as 
the expression of human thought and sentiment. This 
may not be introspection in the narrow sense of the 
term ; still it is inspection of the soul of man, and it 
may be referred in a general way to self- consciousness, 
for it is by what we feel within ourselves that we are 
enabled upon evidence to comprehend the experience 
of others. 

But let it be observed that consciousness, understood 
in this enlarged sense, has to take the first step, and the 
final step in the process. It has to observe and gather 
the original facts which suggest the law. It has again 
to collect and notice the verifying facts which establish 
the law. In comparison with these, the intermediate 
step, the ratiocination, is a subordinate and a dependent 



32 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

one. If the commencing and closing inductions are 
conducted improperly, the reasoning which issues from 
them or leads to them will only bind the blunders 
more closely together. Thus, if in the original obser- 
vations part of the light has been obstructed, conse- 
quential deductions will only widen the shadow, — as the 
mistake of a wrong datum is only increased by multi- 
plying it. We see this strikingly illustrated in most of 
our rational systems of philosophy, — as, for instance, in 
that of Spinoza, who began with an ill-observed account 
of substance, and ended in the bogs of a horrid pan- 
theism. Again, if in the final observations the facts are 
mutilated in order to fit them into an ingenious hypo- 
thesis, the error is thereby confirmed, and the system- 
builders feel themselves justified in adhering the more 
resolutely to a creation of their own minds. We see 
this exhibited in the history of most of those systems 
of empiricism which, as Bacon characterizes them, leap 
and fly at once from particular facts to universal prin- 
ciples, which are supposed to explain all the phenomena, 
and can easily get instances quoted to support them, 
found by " a vague and ill-built" observation. 

In conducting this work of observation by conscious- 
ness, there is a constant temptation to oversight, to 
hasty conclusions and distorted representations. In 
physical investigation there is less room for conscious 
or unconscious deception, as modern research insists on 
having the phenomena weighed or measured in some 
way : that we cannot apply such a corrective to the 
alleged facts of consciousness, constitutes one of the 



THE METHOD OF IXVESTIGATIOX. 33 

disadvantages under which psychology labours. Xo 
doubt, we have immediate access at once to the facts as 
being in our minds — and this seems to entitle every man 
to be a metaphysician ; but, from the impossibility of 
employing a numerical test, there is room for great 
looseness in the observation and inaccuracy in the 
statement, and these issue in augmented errors in the 
results reached by deduction. In these circumstances, 
there is great need in mental science of intellectual 
shrewdness, to keep us from mistaking one fact for 
another, and still greater need of high moral quali- 
ties, such as a spirit of self-restraint and caution, of 
integrity and candour. In particular, great pains must 
be adopted to guard against taking a part, and over- 
looking and rejecting the rest, because it may not fit 
into a pre-conceived theory to which the individual 
may have committed himself. In order to secure this 
we must as it were go round the mental phenomena 
and view them on all sides, and in all their aspects, 
both hi our own minds and in those of others. AVe 
must mark their various properties, adding none and 
subtracting none, lessening none and magnifying none, 
disguising none and correcting none, but making each 
stand out in its own form, in its proper action, and with 
its natural accompaniments. We ought, as Hamilton 
expresses it, to exhibit each "- in its individual integrity, 
neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative 
place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination" (Ap- 
pendix to RcicVs Works, p. 747). Till this careful and 
candid observation has been completed, we are not at 

c 



34 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

liberty to begin to analyse or theorize. When we 
venture on these processes, all we can do is to dissect 
the concrete, to generalize the individual, or find out the 
producing cause. But the errors will only multiply 
upon us in these steps if we have not commenced with 
accurate observations. 

Sir W. Hamilton says, " Philosophy is wholly depen- 
dent on consciousness" (Reid's Works, p. 746). This 
is going too far, as philosophy cannot be constructed 
without discursive processes. But Mr. Mill has com- 
mitted a far more serious error, when he says that 
" Locke was therefore right in believing that the origin 
of our ideas is the main stress of the problem of mental 
science, and the subject which must first be considered 
in forming the theory of the mind" (p. 147). M. Cousin 
seems to me to be altogether right when he lays it down 
as a rule, that in psychology we must begin with a 
painstaking inquiry into the actual nature of our ideas. 
Mr. Mill has thus reversed the order of things, placing 
that which is first last, and that which is last first — 
putting the theory of ideas before the observation of the 
ideas, which evidently holds out great temptations to 
him to determine their nature by his theory. 

Not that we are precluded from making an inquiry 
into the origin of ideas. This is a very fair subject of 
investigation, provided always that we acknowledge its 
difficulties and its uncertainties, and proceed in a 
cautious manner, and in the proper method. But even 
here the main agent must be consciousness, in the sense 
which has been explained, that is, as giving us directly 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 35 

a knowledge of our own mental operations, and in- 
directly an acquaintance with those of others. In order 
to the successful resolution of ideas into their originals, 
we have two objects, or classes of objects, to look at. 
We have first to consider the ideas or convictions which 
we would seek to account for, and, secondly, the ele- 
ments into which we would resolve them. The first of 
these operations must be done by consciousness exclu- 
sively. Even in the other and more complicated and 
perplexing inquiry, introspection must be the main 
agent. No doubt, it is possible that some light may be 
thrown on the origin of certain ideas by the brain and 
nerves, and in this physiological investigation the in- 
struments must be the eye and the microscope. But 
no unconscious action can account for conscious ideas. 
The attempt to explain ideas must always proceed by 
deriving the more complex from the simpler mental 
phenomena. But in the determination of the precise 
nature of the simpler mental affections, we are again 
thrown back on consciousness. Suppose that the at- 
tempt be, as in the school of Mr. Mill, to get our ideas 
from sensations, and associations of sensation, we must 
begin to determine what sensations are, and what the 
laws of association are, by the internal sense. I am quite 
willing to adopt Mr. Mill's psychological method, but 
only on the condition that we take introspection as our 
main instrument of observation. 

Mr. Mill tells us that "the proof that any of the 
alleged Universal Beliefs or principles of Common Sense 
are affirmations of consciousness, supposes two things — 



36 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

that the beliefs exist, and that they cannot possibly have 
been acquired" (p. 147). I have no objection to accept 
these two conditions, with an explanation of the one 
and a correction of the other. 

As to the first rule, there are some points which con - 
sciousness can settle at once. It lets us know what is 
our present idea or conviction. This is altogether com- 
petent to it, this in fact is its office ; its revelations 
carry their own evidence with them, and from them 
there is no appeal. This is admitted by Mr. Mill : 
" Introspection can show a present belief or conviction." 
" If consciousness tells me that I have a certain thought 
or sensation, I assuredly have that thought or sensation" 
(p. 141). Now, in the mature mind there are a vast 
number and variety of ideas and convictions. We have 
perceptions, apprehensions, and beliefs, about matter and 
mind, about time and space, about things changing and 
things abiding, about the near and the remote, the past 
and the future, about activity and efficiency, about 
priority and succession, about cause and effect, about 
right and wrong, eternity and immensity. Now, it is 
the office of consciousness to reveal all that is in these 
ideas, and psychology should begin with attending to 
its revelations. Mr. Mill refers particularly to the al- 
leged universal beliefs. The word "belief" is unfortu- 
nately a very vague one, and may stand for a number of 
very different mental affections. When I am speaking 
of first or intuitive principles, I use the term to signify 
our conviction of the existence of an object not now 
present, and thus I distinguish " primitive faith " from 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 37 

" primitive knowledge," in which the object is present. 
But however wide we may make the application of the 
phrase, it does not embrace all that is before conscious- 
ness. Thus we are capable of immediate knowledge ; 
w x e have such in every exercise of self-consciousness, 
and I maintain also in all perception through the senses. 
The mind, also, is ever pronouncing judgments, declaring, 
for instance, that things agree, or that they differ, or 
that this change indicates a cause. We have not only 
intellectual operations, we form moral perceptions, and 
pronounce moral judgments, — as when we decide that 
kindness is a virtue and cruelty a sin. If we would 
construct a science of psychology, we must survey care- 
fully these apprehensions, beliefs, and decisions. If we 
would establish or dis-establish any metaphysical point, 
we must view, firstly and finally, and all throughout, 
what is in the mind's notion and conviction. Or if, 
what is more to our present review, we would resolve 
any idea into simpler elements, we must determine all 
that is in the idea by a searching introspection. Con- 
sciousness has thus not only to settle that certain ideas 
or beliefs, or convictions " exist," but ascertain for us all 
that is in them. Now, it has been repeatedly brought 
as a charge against the school to which Mr. Mill belongs, 
that, so far as the deeper notions and beliefs of the 
mind are concerned, they have never carefully observed, 
weighed, and measured the phenomenon which they seek 
to explain by means of such elements as sensations. I 
believe that this accusation is just, and I hope to sub- 
stantiate it in the course of this review. 



38 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATIOX. 

Mr. Mill's second rule of proof can be admitted only 
with a restriction. I allow that it is not so easy a 
matter as Sir W. Hamilton imagines to determine what 
is a first principle ; and that this cannot be done by an 
immediate introspection. But is it not demanding too 
much to require that we are not to accept any beliefs 
as universal till it has been shown " that they cannot 
possibly have been acquired"? The burden of proof 
seems rather to lie on those who maintain they are 
acquired. AVere any man of science to affirm that 
hydrogen is not an element, chemists would be quite 
prepared to listen to him, but they would insist, as a con- 
dition of their giving a positive assent, that he should 
decompose the substance, and until this is accomplished 
they would continue to regard hydrogen as at least 
provisionally an elementary body. On a like principle, 
we should be quite ready to attend to Mr. Mill when he 
maintains that he can resolve our idea of moral good 
into simpler elements, but until he brings forward his 
components, and shows them to be quite sufficient to 
produce the result, we may surely be allowed to hold 
that our sense of duty is an ultimate principle. 

But instead of thus throwing the onus iirobandi from 
one side to another, I think it better to avow broadly that 
the question is not to be settled by possibilities or im- 
possibilities, by may he or cannot he, but by the ordinary 
rules of evidence. On the one hand, persons are not to 
be allowed to imagine that they have resolved an alleged 
fundamental idea into something else, unless they can 
explain all that is in the idea by means of some principle 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 39 

competent to produce the idea with all its peculiarities. 
On the other hand, we are not to assume a conviction to 
be ultimate till it has been tried by clear and sufficient 
tests. Such tests, I believe, can be had. Almost all 
philosophers have appealed to them. We shall find Mr. 
Mill implicitly admitting them. "We shall be able, I hope, 
to reach a precise expression of them as we advance. 
Following these general principles, the following rules of 
proof may help at once to guide and guard inquiry : — 

I. No one is to be allowed to imagine that he has made 
a successful resolution into simpler elements, of an idea, 
belief, or conviction, unless lie can explain all that is in 
tlie mental phenomenon. It is necessary to enunciate 
this rule, from the circumstance that it has so often been 
violated. Hobbes, and the sensational school of France, 
were able to derive all our ideas from sensation, simply 
by refusing to look at and to weigh such ideas as those 
which we have of substance and power, moral good and 
infinity, so different from mere sensitive affections. It 
has been shown again and again against Hume, that all 
our ideas are not copies of impressions, — that we have 
convictions of the existence of things, of personal identity, 
and of power, which cannot be traced to impressions, 
whatever be the meaning attached to that vague phrase. 
I am convinced Mr. Mill has been guilty of like over- 
sights, when he would draw all our ideas, even those 
we have of mind and body, extension, personal identity, 
causation and moral obligation, from sensations, and 
associations of sensations : he can appear to himself and 
his admirers to be successful, solely by not noticing the 



40 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

characteristic qualities of these profound and peculiar 
ideas. In these dissections, this school of mental anato- 
mists destroys the life, and then declares that it never 
existed. Mr. Mill defines mind as a series of sensations : 
we shall see that the phenomenon to be explained is the 
consciousness of self; that even in sensation we are 
conscious of self. He describes our conviction of per- 
sonal identity as a series of sensations, with the mind 
being aware of itself as a series : I shall show that we 
know in consciousness a present self and in memory a 
past self, and that in comparing the two we declare them 
to be the same. He makes body the possibility of sen- 
sations : it will be proven, that in his hypothetical ex- 
planation, he utterly fails to render any account of that 
idea of externality which we attack to matter. He re- 
solves our idea of extension into length of time, and 
length of time he makes identical with a series of 
muscular sensations : it will not be difficult to establish 
the essential difference of the three phenomena which are 
thus confounded. In treating of ethical questions, he 
shows that we might be led to do good by motives de- 
rived from pleasure and pain : but he has failed to 
account for the very peculiar ideas involved in such 
phrases as " duty," " ought," " obligation," " sin," and 
" reproach." 

It has been resolutely maintained by the profoundest 
philosophers of all ages, that there are certain convic- 
tions in the mind which have the characters of self- 
evidence and necessity. These constitute the " residual 
phenomena," which cannot be explained by a gathered 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 41 

experience, and to account for which we must call in a 
new cause. We know, or believe, or judge so and so, on 
the bare contemplation of the objects ; we must do so, 
we cannot do otherwise. Mr. Mill has looked at this 
mental phenomenon, and lias endeavoured to account 
for it in accordance with his general theory by two 
principles, which it can be shown miss, and utterly fail 
to account for, the peculiarities of our conviction. We 
may here look at these for a moment, as illustrating the 
importance of our rule, reserving the more thorough dis- 
cussion of them to future chapters. 

It is alleged by the whole school, that our belief in 
certain general principles, supposed to be ultimate, can 
be accounted for by experience. But the word " ex- 
perience" is a very uncertain one, and may cover a 
number of very different mental actions and affections. 
Everything that has been within our consciousness, all 
that we have seen or felt, may be said in a vague general 
sense to have fallen under experience. In this sense our 
intuitions of sense and consciousness, our original be- 
liefs and primitive judgments, all come within our ex- 
perience. But thus understood, experience can explain 
nothing, can be the cause of nothing;-. The thing' ex- 
perienced may, but not the experience, that is, the mere 
consciousness or feeling. As to the thing experienced, 
it should not be called experience ; and as to what it 
may produce, we must determine this by looking at the 
nature of the thing, and not at our experience of it. 
But there is a sense, and this a very important one, in 
which experience can furnish us with a principle, and 



42 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

this may be mistaken for an intuitive one. Thus we 
have observed, not once, or twice, or thrice, or ten 
times, but a hundred, a thousand times, that our friends 
have been in the habit of speaking the truth, and we 
expect them to do so in time to come as they have done 
in time past. There have been metaphysicians who 
regarded our trust in testimony as an original instinct 
of our nature. But it is surely quite competent for 
persons to attempt to show that the conviction can 
be explained by an early, a lengthened, and a uniform 
observation ; and they may be allowed to be successful 
when they have proven that the experience is capable 
of producing the conviction entertained. Let it be 
observed, that when thus employed experience means 
an induction of instances to establish a general rule or 
law. And I take this opportunity of stating, that when 
I have occasion to refer to this power of experience, I 
call it a gathered experience, to distinguish it from a mere 
individual feeling. I admit freely that a gathered ex- 
perience can generate a strong conviction, such as the 
trust we put hi testimony, and our belief in the uni- 
formity, or rather uniformities, of nature ; that is, it will 
account for all the marks of our convictions on these 
subjects, for their gradual formation, for their extent 
and their limits, — as when we allow that our friends 
may at times commit mistakes in their testimony, or 
that there may have been miraculous occurrences in 
the midst of the regularities of nature. But then, it is 
said that there are, and I hope to show that there are, 
convictions of a verv different nature, which are as strong 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 43 

in early youth, and in early stages of society, as in later 
life and in more advanced communities, and which 
allow of no limitation or exception. As examples, we 
may give mathematical axioms, as that two straight 
lines cannot enclose a space, and moral maxims, as that 
ingratitude for favours deserves reprobation. Our con- 
victions of this description spring up on the bare con- 
templation of the objects, and need not a wide collection 
of instances ; and their necessity and universality can- 
not be accounted for by a gathered experience. The 
school to which Mr. Mill belongs explains the pheno- 
mena only by failing to distinguish between two sorts 
of convictions, and neglecting to mark the characteristics 
of those which announce themselves as self-evident, 
necessary, and universal. 

But Mr. Mill has another principle, by which he thinks 
he can explain the necessity 7 and the unlimited expec- 
tation ; this is the law of the association of ideas. 
When we have often thought of two things together, 
the idea of the one comes invariably, in the end neces- 
sarily, to call up the other. Thus Martinus Scriblerus, 
having never seen a lord mayor without his fur gown 
and gold chain, could never think of a lord mayor 
without also thinking of his appendages. But here 
again Mr. Mill has missed the characteristic of the 
mental phenomenon. " If we find it impossible by any 
trial to separate two ideas, we have all the feeling of 
necessity the mind is capable of" (p. 264). But this is 
to confound two things which are very different, the 
association of two ideas, so that the one calls up the 



44 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

other, with the judgment, which declares that the two 
things are necessarily related. When he heard the lord 
mayor named, Martin could not but think of his gown 
and chain ; but he did not therefore decide that the 
mayor and his wig had always been together, that they 
would always be together, that it had never been other- 
wise, and could not be otherwise. The laws of associa- 
tion may account for the rise of one idea along with 
another, or immediately after another, but they do not 
come near explaining the self-evidence and necessity of 
certain cognitions, beliefs, and judgments, which may rise 
on the contemplation of single objects perceived for the 
first time, or on the immediate comparison of two 
objects. 

II. In resolving an alleged fundamental idea or con- 
viction into certain elements, we must assume only known 
elements, and ive must not ascribe to them more than can 
be shown to be in them. To illustrate what I mean : It 
is quite competent to any one to attempt to explain 
chemical action by mechanical causes, or vital action by 
mechanical and chemical forces. But if he understand 
the problem which he hopes to solve, and grapple with 
it fairly, he must not give to mechanical action, or 
mechanical and chemical action combined, more than 
is in them. The whole attempt would be denounced 
as a mere pretence if he gave a chemical affinity to 
the mechanical power, or a power of assimilation and 
absorption to the mechanical and chemical action. 
Now we are surely entitled to impose a like restriction 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 45 

upon the analyst of the human mind. It is perfectly 
competent to him to attempt to resolve such convic- 
tions as those of identity, causation, and moral good, into 
any other principle. But we can require of him to 
specify the principle, to prove that it actually works in 
the mind, to unfold its nature and its laws, and to show 7 
from its ascertained action that it is quite sufficient to 
produce the conviction. In particular, he must not be 
allowed, when he starts with an element, to add new 
properties to suit his purpose as he goes along. Or if 
he does so, he must formally announce the introduction 
of the new power, specify its nature, and honestly avow 
it to be a new element. 

This is a rule wdiich has been habitually neglected by 
that school of metaphysicians who delight to reduce all 
the operations of the mind to a very few principles. 
Locke succeeded, to his own satisfaction, in deriving all 
our ideas from sensation and reflection, but it has been 
shown by distinguished philosophers, British and Con- 
tinental, that in accounting thus for such ideas as 
substance, and time, and power, he changed, wuthout 
perceiving it, the sensations and reflex perceptions 
into something entirely different. It can be proven 
that Mr. Mill is ever falling into a like error. The 
operation by which he derives all our ideas and beliefs 
from a few elements, is a sort of jugglery, in which he 
alters the elements without its being discovered ; and it 
may be added, that in the product which he shows, he 
has not the real phenomenon which he professes to 
have explained. 



46 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

The main elements which he employs are sensa- 
tions and associations of sensation. But he works up 
sensations into convictions of mind and body, of space 
and time, of personality and personal identity, of infinity 
and obligation to clo good, which are not contained in 
the nature of sensations, and which could be imparted 
to them only by a new power superinduced, which 
power would require to have a place allotted to it in his 
system, and its laws enunciated, and its significance 
estimated. Again, it will be shown that Mr. Mill has 
made an unwarrantable use and application of the laws 
of association. These are the laws of the succession of 
our ideas, and nothing more. Give us two ideas, 
and place these two ideas together in the mind, and 
association will tend to bring them up once more in 
union. But it is not the office of association to give us 
the ideas which must first be furnished to it. We shall 
see that Mr. Mill is for ever giving to association a 
power, which does not belong to it, of generating new 
ideas by an operation in which we see sensations go in, 
and a lofty idea coming out, solely by the idea being 
surreptitiously introduced, without any person being 
expected to notice it. The process carried on by this 
whole school of analysts is like that of the alchemists, 
who, when they put earth into the retort, never could 
get anything but earth, and could get gold only by in- 
troducing some substance containing gold. The philo- 
sopher's stone of this modern psychology is of the same 
character as that employed in mediaeval physics. If we 
jjut in only sensations, as some do, we have never any 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 47 

thing but sensations, and a " dirt philosophy," as it 
has been called, is the product. If we get gold (as cer- 
tainly Mr. Mill does at times), it is because it has been 
quietly introduced by the person who triumphantly 
exhibits it. 

III. Tests may he furnished to try intuitive truths. 
From the days of Aristotle down to the present time, it 
has been asserted that there are first truths, the support 
of other truths, while they themselves require no sup- 
port. Profound thinkers have systematically or inci- 
dentally been striving to give us the marks of such 
truths. Amidst considerable difference of nomenclature 
and confusion of thought and statement (such as we 
might expect in the first efforts to catch and express the 
exact truth in so difficult an investigation), there has 
been all along a wonderfully large amount of agreement 
in the criteria fixed on. These have been such as self- 
evidence, necessity, and universality. Some have fixed 
on one, and some on another of these, as their favourite 
testing principle, and have overlooked the others. Some 
have employed two, overlooking the third. But these 
three are, in fact, the tests which, in a loose or more 
stringent form, have been announced or applied by the 
great body of deep and earnest thinkers. It could be 
shown that Aristotle had at least glimpses of all of them. 
In modern times, Locke formally propounded the self- 
evidence, referring incidentally from time to time to 
the necessity and universality. Eeid was in the way 
of referring, not always in a very clear or satisfactory 



48 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 

way, to all the three. Leibnitz brought out prominently 
the necessity ; and Kant, followed by Sir W. Hamilton, 
conjoined necessity and universality — all three over- 
looking the self- evidence, in consequence of their keep- 
ing away very much from realities, and dwelling among 
mental forms. 1 We shall find Mr. Mill employing all of 
them, without, however, fully apprehending their char- 
acter or seeing their significance. 

As we proceed, we shall gather these tests into heads, 
and establish their validity, and give them their proper 
expression. We shall show that association of ideas, 
which is supposed to work such wonders, cannot give 
these characters to any apprehension or proposition. 
"No experiential or derived truth can stand any one, or 
at least the whole of these tests. A general truth dis- 
covered by a gathered experience, as that night succeeds 
day, cannot be said to be self-evident. Nor can it be 
represented as having any necessity in thought, for we 
can easily apprehend it to be otherwise. Nor can it be 
described as universal, for the time may come when, in 
consequence of a change of mundane arrangements, the 
day or the night may cease. 

Following out these principles, I mean, in discussing 
the questions started by Mr. Mill, to proceed in the 
following method : — 

(1.) I allow him to try his power of analysis, according 
to his psychological method, on all alleged fundamental 
truth, without reserving any exception. This is what 

1 These tests will be considered, infra, Chap. xii. A. historical and 
critical review of them will be found in The Intuitions of the Mind, 
Part i. B. ii. c. 3. 



THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 49 

Sir W. Hamilton would not have done, as he regarded 
consciousness as deciding the whole question at once, and 
authoritatively and conclusively. I hold that conscious- 
ness has a most important part to act. It has to disclose 
to us what are the ideas and convictions in the mind 
when it begins to reflect, and what is the precise nature 
of the elements into which we would resolve them. 
But I admit that in the mature man all is not intuitive 
that is spontaneous and apparently instantaneous. And 
so I freely permit Mr. Mill to attempt to decompose any 
idea into simpler composites. But as he does so, I claim 
the right to sit by and watch him, lest he unconsciously 
change the elements in the process ; and at the close I 
carefully inquire whether he has explained all the char- 
acteristics of the idea and conviction. 

(2.) When he fails, as I believe it will be found that 
he does fail, in regard to certain mental principles, then 
I hold that these principles which the acute intellect of 
Mr. Mil] cannot decompose may be regarded as ele- 
mentary, at least provisionally so ; that is, till some 
abler man (which is not likely to happen) makes the 
attempt and succeeds. 

(3.) I bring the alleged first truths to the test of self- 
evidence, necessity, and universality, and when they can 
stand these criteria, I pronounce them conclusively to 
be original and primary and fundamental* 



CHAPTER III. 

MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

The common impression regarding Mr. Mill's phi- 
losophy is that it needs no intuitive principles ; that 
the author of it does not presuppose or allow that there 
is anything innate in the mind. Some of his admirers 
give him credit for weaving a rich fabric without any 
material except sensations, and with no machinery 
except experience. Mr. Mill's cavils against those who 
support fundamental truth, and the manner in which 
he expounds his own system, are fitted to leave this 
impression. He begins the construction of his theory 
with sensations; he goes on to fashion them into various 
forms by association of sensations ; he allows among 
the series of sensations a memory of the past, an expec- 
tation of the future, and a power of observing coexist- 
ences and successions, resemblances and differences 
between sensations ; and he makes the mind as it ad- 
vances receive powerful aid from the artificial instru- 
mentality of language. These seem, at least to a cursory 
observer, to constitute the matter and the agency by 
which he ingeniously constructs the ideas, many of 



MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 51 

tliem so grand and far-ranging, which the mind of man 
is capable of forming. But while these seem to be the 
original furniture of the mind and the sum of the 
assumptions he has to make, we find if we look more 
carefully that in rearing his fabric he is ever and anon 
calling in other principles, some of them openly and 
avowedly, and others unconsciously and furtively ; and 
that these form when placed together a huge but ill- 
fashioned and incongruous body of what are in fact, 
whatever he may call them, intuitive principles or 
metaphysical truth. 

It will be found, indeed, that the mental analysts, 
whose ambition it has been to reduce the original 
capacities of the mind to a very small number, have 
been obliged to bring in a vast body of assumptions 
and new elements as they advance. Locke satisfied 
himself that he had derived all our ideas from sensa- 
tion and reflection, but then he called in faculties to 
work upon the materials thus furnished ; he finds ideas 
" suggested " as these powers operate ; he gives an im- 
portant function to " intuition," and supposes the mind 
capable of discovering " necessary " relations. Even 
Hume, who of all metaphysicians is disposed to make 
fewest admissions, remarks in criticising Locke, " I 
" should desire to know what can be meant by asserting 
" that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or passion be- 
" tween the sexes, is not innate" (Works, vol. iv. p. 23). 
The Sensational School made all our ideas transformed 
sensations ; but in order to get such ideas as those 
of personal identity, power, and duty, they quietly gave 



52 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

the transforming act a power of transmuting one thing 
into another. I am now to show how many principles 
Mr. Mill has been obliged to call in, as he goes along, 
in order to explain the actual phenomena of the mind 
on his hypothesis. I must give considerable extracts in 
order to do justice at once to his views and my argument. 
The admissions are no doubt candidly made, and they 
are always clearly stated. Our readers must judge as 
to how far they affect the apparent simplicity and 
modify the logical consistency of his system. As I 
may have occasion to refer to them in the course of 
the discussion, I number and designate them by the 
letters of the Greek alphabet 

a. There is an immediate and intuitive knowledge. 
His language is express. " We do know some things 
" immediately and intuitively" (p. 126). 

/3. From the truths known by intuition, others are 
inferred. " Truths are known to us in two ways ; some 
" are known directly and of themselves, and some 
" through the medium of other truths. The former are 
" the subject of intuition or consciousness, the latter of 
" inference. The truths known by intuition are the 
" original premisses from which all others are inferred" 
(Logic, Introd. § 4). 

<y. Reasoning carries us hack to intuition, from which 
it derives its ultimate premisses. He thus follows up the 
passage last quoted : " Our assent to the conclusion 
" being grounded upon the truth of the premisses, we 
" never could arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, 
" unless something could be known antecedently to 



MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 53 

" reasoning." And in the work more immediately nnder 
review : " Unless, therefore, we knew something imme- 
" diately, we could not know anything mediately, and 
" consequently could not know anything at all" (p. 126). 
Elsewhere he says First Principles cannot be proven : 
" To be incapable of proof by reasoning is common to all 
" first principles : of our knowledge as well as of our 
"conduct" (Utilitarianism, 1 ^. 51). 

These statements are very satisfactory as to the exist- 
ence of intuition, and the place occupied by it, and the 
purpose served by it. He does not in these passages 
state the grounds on which he admits intuition, nor the 
tests by which he would try it. These, however, may 
come out incidentally as we advance. Let us inquire 
what he represents as exercises of intuition. 

8. Consciousness is a form of intuition. This is im- 
plied throughout, and will be shown to be so by the 
passages quoted under other heads. 

e. Whatever consciousness reveals is to he received. 
" According to all philosophers the evidence of con- 
" sciousness, if only we can obtain it pure, is con- 
" elusive " (p. 1 2 6). " If consciousness tells me that I 
" have a certain thought or sensation, I assuredly have 
" that thought or sensation" (p. 141). 

f. Consciousness and intuitive convictions are arbiters 
from which there is no appeal. " The verdict of con- 
" sciousness, or, in other words, our immediate and 
" intuitive conviction, is admitted on all hands to be a 
" decision without appeal" (p. 12 7). 

7). The truth revealed by consciovtsness rests on its oura 



54 MB. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 

evidence. " All the world admits, with our author, that 
" it is impossible to doubt a fact of internal conscious- 
" ness. To feel, and not to know that we feel, is an 
" impossibility. But Sir William Hamilton is not 
" satisfied to let this truth rest on its own evidence. 
" He w T ants a demonstration of it. As if it were not suf- 
" ficiently proved by consciousness itself, he attempts to 
" prove it by a reductio ad absurdum " (p. 132). He then 
criticises, I think justly, Sir William Hamilton's proof, 
which he says carries us " round a long circuit to return 
" to the point from which w r e set out." " He has deduced 
" the trustworthiness of consciousness from the veracity 
" of the Deity ; and the veracity of the Deity can only be 
" known from the evidence of consciousness" (p. 138). 
Mr. Mill himself would have the truth " rest on its own 
" evidence." I rejoice in this appeal. Tor what is this 
ultimate test but that of Self - Evidence, so often enun- 
ciated, or at least referred to and implied in the writings 
of profound thinkers, from Aristotle downwards, and 
among others, very expressly by Locke ? Nothing can 
be clearer or more satisfactory than Mr. Mill's language : 
" We know intuitively what we know by its own evi- 
" dence — by direct apprehension of the fact." 

6. It is impossible to doubt or deny the facts made 
known by consciousness. " A real fact of consciousness 
" cannot be doubted or denied" (p. 134). What is this 
but the other famous test of first truths, the test of 
Necessity appealed to by Plato, Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, 
and so many other profound thinkers of ancient and 
modern times ? Already, then, we have the two tests of 



MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 55 

Self-Evidence and Necessity sanctioned. In the passage 
quoted under last head he had, as most philosophers 
have done, mixed them up together as being intimately 
connected. " It is impossible to doubt a fact of internal 
" consciousness. To feel, and not to know that we feel, 
" is an impossibility :" and so he would have the truth 
" rest on its own evidence." The law of necessity is 
repeatedly appealed to. " The facts which cannot be 
" doubted are those to which the word consciousness is 
" by most philosophers confined; the facts of internal 
" consciousness ; the mind's own acts and affections. 
" What we feel, we cannot doubt that we feel. It is 
" impossible for us to feel, and to think perhaps that 
" we feel not, or to feel not, and think perhaps that we 
"feel" (p. 132). Sir William Hamilton has nowhere 
made a more decisive use of the law of necessity and 
principle of contradiction than Mr. Mill has done in 
these passages. 

i. JS T o man ever doubted of the facts of consciousness. 
" Consciousness in the sense usually attached to it by 
" philosophers, consciousness of the mind's own feelings 
" and operations, cannot, as our author truly says, be 
" disbelieved. The inward fact, the feeling in our 
" minds, was never doubted, since to do so would be to 
" doubt that we feel what we feel " (p. 141). As in a 
passage previously quoted, the tests of self- evidence and 
necessity were joined, so in this the tests of Necessity 
and Universality (universality of conviction) are com 
bined, and the universality is traced to. the necessity. 
The fact " was never doubted," since to do so would be 



56 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

to doubt that we feel what we feel, which is represented 
as impossible. We thus find the tests of intuition, as I 
cursorily sketched them in last chapter, and mean to 
unfold them more fully in a future chapter, employed 
by Mr. Mill, and in the very logical order in which I 
have placed them. He makes an appeal to self-evi- 
dence ; the truth " rests on its own evidence." He tests 
this by the principle that " to feel, and not to know that 
" we feel, is an imposibility." And now we find him 
appealing to catholicity or common consent, and found- 
ing it on necessity, the fact " was never doubted," since 
it " cannot be disbelieved." 

k. In arguing with the sceptic ice cere entitled to call in 
the assurance of immediate knowledge as a test. " I put 
" to him (the sceptic) the simplest case conceivable of 
" immediate knowledge, and ask, if we ever feel any- 
" thing ? If so, then, at the moment of feeling, do we 
" know that we feel ? Or if he will not call this 
" knowledge, will he deny that we have a feeling, we 
" have at least some sort of assurance, or conviction, of 
" having it ? This assurance or conviction is what 
" other people mean by knowledge. If he dislikes the 
" word, I am willing, in discussing with him, to employ 
" some other. By whatever name this assurance is 
" called, it is the test to which we bring all our convic- 
" tions " (p. 126). This passage has not the logical 
power of some of Hamilton's arguments, but it is alto- 
gether after his manner. I have quoted it to show, that 
Mr. Mill thinks himself justified in appealing to the as- 
surance of consciousness as an ultimate and decisive test. 



MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 57 

A. The revelations of consciousness, together with what 
can be inferred from them, constitute the sum of our know- 
ledge. "What consciousness directly reveals, together 
" with what can be legitimately inferred from its reve- 
" lations, composes, by universal admission, all that we 
" know of the mind, or indeed any other thing " (p. 107). 
I do not admit that this statement is correct, unless he 
make consciousness synonymous with intuition, and 
include the senses and our primitive beliefs, which also 
contribute, and this largely, to what we know. I quote 
it to show how deep a place our author allots to the 
revelations of consciousness. 

These admissions all relate to Consciousness, the word 
being used, however, now in a wider and now in a 
narrower sense ; sometimes being coextensive with intui- 
tion, as when (see £.) he speaks of " consciousness, or in 
" other words, immediate and intuitive conviction ;" and 
in other passages meaning (see i.) " consciousness of the 
" mind's own feelings and operations." In the heads 
that follow, his admissions relate to facts it may be 
attested by consciousness, but not beyond it. 

fi. We may be sure of what we see as well as of what we 
feel " What one sees or feels, whether bodily or men- 
" tally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels " 
(Logic, Introcl. § 4). This is a satisfactory statement, 
but he afterwards detracts from it by observing that we 
often suppose that we see what we do not see, and he 
is evidently doubtful whether we see anything beyond 
ourselves. This topic will require to be carefully 
examined in a future chapter. Meanwhile I bring 



58 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 

forward the statement to show, that if it can be proven 
that we do intuitively see external objects, and that 
our intuitions of externality and extension are not 
resolvable into anything simpler, then we must be 
prepared to grant that the objects exist. Speaking 
elsewhere of the " first premisses of our knowledge," he 
says, that " being matters of fact they may be the sub- 
" ject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of 
" fact, namely, our senses and our internal conscious - 
" ness" (Utilitarianism, p. 51). 

v. We know existence, and make assertions aoout exist- 
ence. Thus he places existence among his categories, 
and does not attempt to resolve it into anything else. 
" Besides the propositions which assert sequence or Co- 
" existence, there are some which assert simple exist- 
" ence," etc. {Logic, B. I. v. § 5, 6). 

(■. We are capable of experiencing and knowing sen- 
sations. We need not produce passages or references 
to prove this, for the evidence of it runs throughout his 
works. 

o. Pleasure and pain a,re what we feel them to he, and 
nothing else. Speaking of these he says of Hamilton, 
that " he is not so much the dupe of words as to sup- 
" pose that they are anything else than what we feel 
" them to be'"' (p. 479). 

ir. Extension is an essential part of the concept of hody. 
" The truth is, that the condition of space cannot be 
" excluded ; it is an essential part of the concept of body, 
" and of every kind of bodies" (p. 327). This is not an 
adequate statement, but it implies that man has at least 



MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 59 

one necessary concept as to body, and I shall endeavour 
to show that this cannot "be resolved into sensation or 
association. 

p. There is evidently an ultimate fact in memory. 
" Our belief in the veracity of Memory is evidently ulti- 
" mate : no reason can be given for it which does not pre- 
" suppose the belief, and assume it to be well-grounded" 
(p. 174). This statement appears in a foot-note, 1 and 

1 Mr. Mill makes the admission frankly and candidly, but he was driven 
to it by a criticism of Dr. Ward : — "I would ask of these philosophers 
" (those who build wholly upon Experience), do they mean by ' experience ' 
" the experience of the present moment, or do they include past experi- 
" ence also? If they say the former, I reply it is obviously false that 
" they do in any sense build their philosophy wholly or chiefly on experi- 
" ence. But if they answer (as they most certainly will) that they do in- 
" elude past experience as well as present, then again I deny their allega- 
" tion, that they build their philosophy wholly on experience." "How 
" can you even guess what your past experience has been ? By trusting 
" memory. But how do you prove that those various intuitive judgments, 
" which we call acts of memory, can rightly be trusted ? So far from this 
" being provable by past experience, it must be in each case assumed and 
" taken for granted before you can have any cognizance whatever of your 
" past experience." " As it is most desirable to bring this point quite 
" clearly home, I will cite and apply a passage in which Mr. Stuart Mill 
" states his own philosophical doctrine. ' There is no knowledge a priori; 
" no truths cognizable by the mind's inward light, and grounded on in- 
" tuitive evidence. Sensation and the mind's consciousness of its own 
" acts are not only the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our 
" knowledge.' Let us test, then, by these principles an act of memory. 
" I am at this moment comfortably warm ; but I call to mind with great 
" clearness the fact, that a short time ago I was very cold. What datum 
" does ' sensation' give me ? Simply that I am now warm. What datum 
"does 'consciousness' give? that I have the present impression of 
" having been cold a short time ago. But both these data are altogether 
" wide of the mark. The question which I would earnestly beg Mr. Mill 
" to ask himself is this : — What is my ground for believing that I was 
" cold a short time ago ? ' I have the present impression of having been 
" cold a short time ago ;' this is one judgment. ' I was cold a short time 
" ago ; ' this is a totally distinct and separate judgment. There is no 
" necessary, nor even any probable, connexion between these two judg- 
" ments, — no ground whatever for thinking that the truth of one follows 
" from the truth of the other, — except upon the hypothesis that my mind is 



60 J/i?. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

our author does not even try to show how it fits info i 
his system. The justification of the principle will fall 
under our notice under another head. Meanwhile I 
call attention to the admission. He declares that 
memory carries with it its own veracity, and that our 
belief in that veracity is li ultimate," and " evidently 
ultimate." I shall endeavour to show that the full facts 
of memory are not embraced in this brief statement. 
But there is much stated, and there is more implied. 
He here concedes fully that there is a " veracity" in 
at least one other faculty of the mind besides internal 
consciousness, that there is a " belief" that can be trusted, 
and that this belief is " ultimate," is in fact " evidently 
ultimate." He who allows so much might have in- 
quired whether there may not be other beliefs of the 
same kind, and equally veracious, involved in the exer- 
cise of other faculties of the mind. Mr. Mill is con- 
stantly and terribly severe in his strictures on the 
Intuitive School of Philosophy ; but it is clear he him- 
self belongs to an intuitive school, without knowing or 
at least avowing it. Admitting an intuitive conscious- 
ness and an ultimate belief, he makes no attempt to 
show how far they modify his empirical philosophy, 
and he enters upon no scientific investigation of the 

1 ' so constituted as accurately to represent past facts. But how will either 
" ' sensation ' or ' consciousness,' or the two combined, in any way suffice 
" for the establishment of any such proposition ? " (On Nature and G 
1860, pp. 26-28). The Philosophical Introduction is the work of a 
mind of extraordinary acuteness, and has unfolded many important philo- 
sophical truths. Published at the same time as the first edition of my work 
on The Intuitions of the Mind, both Dr. Ward and myself have noticed 
curious coincidences in the two works. 



MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 61 

nature, the laws, or the mode of operation of these ele- 
ments of our nature. 

a. The mind, whatever it be, is aware of itself, is 
aii-are of itself as a series of feelings, is aware of itself 
as past and present. The statements he makes are very 
curious : " Our notion of Mind, as well as of Matter, is 
" the notion of a permanent something, contrasted with 
" the perpetual flux of the sensations and other feelings 
" or mental states which we refer to it" (p. 205). " If 
" we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are 
" obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series 
" of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future." 
Again, if but a series of feelings, it " can be aware of 
itself as a series" (pp. 212, 213). I shall have to sub- 
ject this language to a sifting examination in the two 
next chapters, where it will be shown that it does not 
fairly or fully embody the facts of which we are con- 
scious. I quote it at present to show that Mr. Mill is 
obliged to allow that there is something permanent in 
mind, and that the mind is in a sense aware of itself 
and of this permanence. 

The above seem to be very much of the nature of 
those first or original principles which the Intuitive 
School of Metaphysicians, to which Mr. Mill is so much 
opposed, are in the way of putting forward. Those 
that I am now to state seem to be of the nature of 
laws or faculties operating in the mind. No doubt, 
as we are ever being told, we prove that they exist 
by observation. But while it is by experience we 
discover them and learn their nature, they must 



62 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 

operate prior to our experience, and independent 
of it. 

t. There is a native law of expectation. He tells us 
that the psychological method which he adopts " postu- 
" lates, first, that the human mind is capable of Expec- 
" tation. In other words, that after having had actual 
" sensations, we are capable of forming the conception 
" of Possible sensations ; sensations which we are not 
" feeling at the present moment, but which we might 
" feel, and should feel if certain conditions were present, 
" the nature of which conditions we have, in many cases, 
" learnt by experience" (p. 190). Almost all meta- 
physicians have postulated, that the mind has a capacity 
and a tendency which prompt it to look forward from 
the past and present to the future. They have done so 
because internal observation shows that there must be 
some such principle, and they have endeavoured to give 
the proper expression of it : some describing it (unfor- 
tunately, as I think) as an expectation that the future 
will resemble the past ; others (also unfortunately, as I 
think) as a belief in the uniformity of nature ; by 
others, more philosophically, as a belief in the identity 
of self and of other objects, together with a conviction 
that the same agents, acting as a cause, will produce 
the same effects. But it does not concern us at present 
to inquire what is the accurate and adequate expression 
of the law (this discussion will be taken up as we 
advance) ; only, I may remark, that Mr. Mill's version 
seems to me to be about the most defective and con- 
fused I have met with, experience being the arbiter, for 



MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 63 

lie makes a series of feelings, each one of which must 
pass away before another appears, expect something of 
itself. It is satisfactory, however, to find him crrantino- 
that there is such a law ; and surely he cannot object 
to others making a like postulate, and endeavouring to 
give an account of it which they regard as being more 
in accordance with our conscious experience. 

v. There are original laios of association. The psycho- 
logical theory " postulates, secondly, the laws of the 
" Association of Ideas." Then follows an enumeration of 
these laws. It is unnecessary to give it at this place ; 
it will subsequently fall under our notice and review. 
It does not seem to me to be the best in our language ; 
and we shall find that he enormously exaggerates the 
power of association. I refer to it at present to show 
that he is admitting at this place a new law, or rather 
group of laws operating in the mind. 

cf). The mind can form very lofty ideas as to the Infinite 
and the Absolute, In this respect he adopts deeper and 
in some respects juster views than those of Hamilton. 
" Something infinite is a conception which, like most 
" of our complex ideas, contains a negative element, 
" but which contains positive elements also. Infinite 
" space for instance : is there nothing positive in that ? 
" The negative part of this conception is the absence of 
" bounds. The positive are, the idea of space, and of 
" space greater than any finite space, so of infinite 
" duration," etc. Again, " Absolute, in reference to any 
" given attribute, signifies the possession of that attri- 
" bute in finished perfection and completeness. A being 



64 ME. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

" absolute in knowledge, for example, is one who knows, 
" in the literal meaning of the term, everything. Who 
" will pretend that this conception is negative or un- 
" meaning to us" (pp. 45, 47). This is a very just account, 
so far as -it goes, of our apprehension of the infinite and 
perfect 1 - — a better phrase than the absolute. Mr. Mill 
does not say that this conception implies any intuitive 
capacity ; in fact, he neglects to tell us how it is 
formed. Whether ultimate or not, it is acknowledged 
that the mind has such a conception ; and Mr. Mill, if 
he account for it on his psychological theory, will re- 
quire to bring in something much deeper than the sen- 
sations and associations of sensation, from which he 
seems to draw our ideas. 

We have yet to look at some other laws which look 
excessively like the first or ultimate truths, which 
metaphysicians of the Intuitive School have been in the 
way of enunciating and employing. 

%. Beliefs are ultimate when no reason can he given for 
them which does not imply their existence and veracity. 
I have already (see p.) given the passage which autho- 
rizes this law. After stating that belief in the veracity 
of memory is evidently ultimate, he adds, " No reason 
" can be given for it which does not presuppose the 
" belief, and assume it to be well grounded." After an- 
nouncing this principle, he might have been expected 
to inquire whether it does not sanction other cognitions 

1 I have endeavoured to show {Intuitions of the Mind, Pt. n. B. ii. c. 3) 
that we have a positive notion of some thing as infinite, say space or time, 
or Deity, and that we regard that thing as (1.) ever exceeding our widest 
image or notion, and (2.) such that nothing can be added to it. 



MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 65 

and beliefs, such as those which we have of the externality 
and extension of bodies, and the existence of time and 
of an abiding self. It can be shown that every attempt 
to derive these from other elements presupposes the 
ideas and the convictions. 

-^r. There are truths implied in other truths necessarily, 
unci according to cm ultimate law, internal or external 
He is speaking of logical Proprium, and of its being in- 
volved in the attribute which the name ordinarily or 
specially connotes ; and he affirms, that " whether a 
" Proprium follows by demonstration or by causation, it 
" follows necessarily ; that is to say, it cannot out follow 
" consistently with some law which we regard as a part 
" of the constitution either of our thinking facultv or of 
" the universe" {Logic, B. I. c. vii. § 7). As I under- 
stand this statement, it implies that when a Proprium 
follows by demonstration, it does so according to a law 
which is part of the " constitution " of our " thinking- 
faculty." The language reminds us of that of Eeid and 
Hamilton. 

co. Any assertion lulvich conflicts with the Fundamental 
Laics of Thought is to us unbelievable, and this may very 
possibly proceed from the native structure of the mind. 
His language is very remarkable. He is speaking of 
the three Fundamental Laws of Thought, — those of 
Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, and he 
thus comments upon them : " Whether the three so- 
" called Fundamental Laws are laws of our thoughts by 
" the native structure of the mind, or merely because 
" we perceive them to be universally true of observed 

E 



60 MR. MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 

" phenomena, I will not positively decide : but they are 
" laws of our thoughts, now and invincibly so. They 
" may or may not be capable of alteration by experi- 
" ence, but the conditions of our existence deny to us 
" the experience which woidd be required to alter them. 
:: Any assertion, therefore, which conflicts with one of 
" these laws — any proposition, for instance, which 
" asserts a contradiction, though it were on a subject 
" wholly removed from the sphere of our experience, is 
" to us unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition 
" is, in the present constitution of nature, impossible as 
"a mental fact" (p. 418). The language is cautious 
and hesitating. It is evident that he woidd fain explain 
the incapacity of believing contradictory propositions 
by his favourite law of association. We shall see as we 
advance that this law cannot explain our peculiar con- 
viction, but meanwhile it is interesting to notice that 
he will not decide whether these fundamental principles 
mav not be " laws of our thoughts by the native struc- 
ture of the mind." The hesitation implies a doubt of 
the whole system of empiricism. 

Some of my readers in looking at these passages thus 
brought into convenient (or inconvenient) juxtaposition, 
may require to be assured that I have not taken them 
from Hamilton's works, instead of the Easamination of 
Ham ilton and other works of Mr. Mill. And were it not 
that in the expression of them they have not the homeli- 
ness and depth of Eeid, nor the clinching logical grasp 
of Hamilton,, they might be mistaken for utterances of 



MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 67 

the two great Scottish metaphysicians. I have allowed 
Mr. Mill to speak for himself. All that I have done is 
to cull out the scattered statements as to ultimate truth, 
and present them in relievo, that students of philosophy 
may mark their significance. I mean to refer to them 
from time to time in the coming discussion ; but I do 
not make use of them simply as concessions by Mr. 
Mill. I would not think it worth while employing a 
mere argumentum ad hominem. I feel no pleasure in 
pointing out real or seeming incongruities in the meta- 
physical system of an eminent thinker, who, in other 
departments, such as political economy and inductive 
logic, has done so much to advance knowledge. I employ 
these admissions because they contain important truth, 
not always in the best form, but capable of being fully 
vindicated. 

Mr. Mill, I believe, would urge that many of the 
admissions thus made are not separate and distinct 
from each other, and that several of them might be in- 
eluded under one head. Be it so, it is nevertheless of 
advantage to haA r e them spread out in the several shapes 
in which they are presented, the more so that some of 
these imply very important principles with far-looking 
results. 

The first principles thus avowed in the course of his 
exposition should have had a formal place allotted them 
in the system, say at the commencement or the close. 
Had this been done it would have utterly destroyed the 
apparent simplicity, and I believe also the symmetry of 
his system, which would have been seen to be a very 



08 MR. MILLS ADMISSIONS. 

complex and heterogeneous one. Seemingly a continu- 
ation of the philosophies of Hobbes, Condillac, and 
Hume, it contains as many assumptions as are de- 
manded by the Scottish metaphysicians, who appeal 
to fundamental laws of thought, or by the German 
metaphysicians, who stand up for a priori forms. 

It will not be difficult to show, as we proceed to take 
up one special topic after another, that these admissions 
logically imply vastly more than is conceded in the 
metaphysical system constructed. In particular, it will 
be proven that they are made on avowed or implied 
principles, such as those of the veracity of conscious- 
ness, and of ultimate beliefs, such as those of self-evi- 
dence, necessity, and universality, which require that 
vastly more be conceded. 

Already it is clear that the question between Mr. 
Mill and the school he opposes cannot be said to be one 
as to the existence of intuition. I am not sure that 
any judicious defender of fundamental truth would de- 
mand or postulate a greater number of first principles 
than those allowed by the most influential opponent of 
necessary truth in our day. The question is not one as 
to the reality, but as to the nature and significance of 
ultimate truth. 

Of this I am sure, that the pressing philosophical 
want of our day is an exposition, with an enumeration 
and classification of the intuitions of the mind which, 
we have seen, must be admitted even by those who are 
supposed to deny them. It is time that those who 
allow them incidentally should be required to avow 



MR MILL'S ADMISSIONS. 69 

them openly and formally, and give a separate place 
to them. A flood of light will be thrown on metaphy- 
sics, and a world of logomachy between riyal schools 
scattered, when we have an earnest attempt, by one 
competent for the work, to unfold the laws of our 
intuitions and their mocle of operation. 



CHAPTEE IV. 

SENSATIONS. 

In the school to which Mr. Mill has attached him - 
self, there is a perpetual reference to Sensation. Those 
who look into their works with the view of discover - 
ing the deeper properties or higher affections of the 
mind, are wearied by the everlasting recurrence of 
the word, and by the perpetual obtrusion of the thing 
denoted by it. 1 Some members of the school seem to 
be incapable of comprehending anything but matter, 
and the sensations excited by matter. I bring no such 
charge against Mr. Mill. He is clearly capable of 
mounting into a higher and more spiritual region. 
But even he is often dragged down to the dust of the 
earth by the weight of the theory which he has under- 

1 The mental sciences elevate those who study them in proportion as 
they exhibit the higher faculties and ideas of the mind. This leads me to 
remark, that in the Competitive Examinations which now exercise so great 
an influence on the studies of our young men, care should be taken that 
the Examiners in Morals should not be taken mainly from the Sensational 
School, and that they be kept from so setting their questions, as to en- 
courage the reading only of the works of writers belonging to that school. 
In those departments in which the mental sciences have a place, they are 
surely meant to stimulate and to test a different order of tastes and talents 
l'rom those called forth by the physical and physiological sciences. 



SENSATIONS. 71 

taken to support. As we are threatened with a revival, 
under a new and disguised, and somewhat more elevated 
form, of the Sensational system which wrought such mis- 
chief in France at the end of last century, it is essential 
that we inquire what sensation is, and settle what it 
can do, and what it cannot do. In other words, let us, 
with the internal sense as our informant, look carefully 
at the original matter out of which Mr. Mill draws our 
higher ideas, with the view of determining whether the 
seed is fitted to yield such fruit. 

What then is Sensation ? It is allowed on all hands 
that it cannot be positively defined. This arises from 
its being a simple quality, and there is nothing simpler 
into which to resolve it. All we can do in the way of 
unfolding its nature, is to bid every man consult his 
consciousness when any bodily object is affecting his 
senses or sensibility. But while we cannot furnish an 
affirmative definition, we can offer some explanations to 
remove misapprehensions, and some decided denials to 
oppose accepted errors. 

It should be understood that the word is employed 
to denote an affection of the conscious mind (whatever 
that may be), and not of the mere bodily frame. It 
should further be borne in mind that it does not include 
that knowledge of bodily objects, of their externality 
and extension, which is now denoted by the phrase 
' sense -perception.' It is of special importance to press 
attention to the circumstance that sensation is not a 
separately existing object like this stone, this tree, or 
this bird, but is an attribute of an object. At this 



72 SEXSATIONS. 

point we are coming in collision with Mr. Mill. Else- 
where (Logic, B. I. c. iii.) lie has an ingenious distribu- 
tion of nameable things or realities into substances, 
attributes, and feelings, the last of course including sen- 
sations. " Substances are not all that exist : attributes, 
" if such things are to be spoken of, must be said to exist, 
" — feelings certainly exist." " Feelings, or states of con- 
" sciousness, are assuredly to be counted among realities, 
" but they cannot be reckoned among substances or 
" attributes." This distribution of realities, especially 
this separation of feelings from substances or attributes, 
seems to me to be curious : I have not met with it else- 
where. It is favourable to Mr. Mill's purpose, which we 
did not so well know when we had only his work on 
Logic, but with which we are now made fully acquainted 
by the fuller exposition of his views in the Examination 
of Hamilton : that purpose being to banish, to as great a 
distance as possible, substance and attribute, and leave 
only feelings. We are not yet sufficiently advanced, in 
these discussions, to deal with the confused metaphysics 
of substance and attribute. The present topic is sensa- 
tion, and sensation I maintain is an affection, that is an 
attribute, of the conscious mind. 

But Mr. Mill tells us that " the sensations are all of 
which I am directly conscious " (Logic, B. I. c. iii. § 7). 
This mode of representing our conscious states was in- 
troduced by Hume, who derived his sceptical conclusions 
from it. He maintained that we are conscious only of 
impressions and ideas, the ideas being merely fainter 
impressions. Hume took care never to enter into any 



SENSATIONS. 73 

explanation as to what lie meant "by "impression;" 
whether it implies, as it should do if it has any mean- 
ing, a thing impressing and a thing impressed. The 
doctrine of the school of Mill is that we are conscious 
merely of feelings, and among these, the first and all 
along the main place is given to sensation. Now, in 
opposition to these defective statements, I maintain that 
we are conscious, not of a mere impression, but of a 
thing impressed, not of sensation apart, but of self as 
sentient. On hearing this statement, metaphysicians 
will be disposed to ask with amazement, perhaps with 
scorn, "What! are we really then conscious of self?" 
And they will tell us that the child has never said to 
itself, " This is I." If they think it worth while going any 
further, they may then in condescension, or compassion 
towards our ignorance, explain to us that the Ego is a 
metaphysical notion, the product of advanced reflection. 
But I disarm all this at once, by allowing that we are 
never conscious of a self, apart from self as sentient, or 
as engaged in thinking, willing, or some other operation. 
And I balance this statement by another, that we are 
just as little conscious of the sensation, or the impres- 
sion, or the thought, or volition apart from self. The 
child has never said to itself, " This is I ;" but just as 
little has it said, "This is an impression;" "This is a 
sensation." We are in fact conscious of both in one 
concrete act ; ever conscious of self in its present affec- 
tion, conscious of self as affected. Mr. Mill uses lan- 
guage which implies this when he says (§ 4) that 
" sensations are states of the sentient mind ;" and every 



74 SENSATIONS. 

body employs like expressions if lie does not happen to 
be upholding a special theory. He who leaves out 
either of these elements, is not giving a correct inter- 
pretation of consciousness. "We may, by abstraction, 
separately contemplate the two, and important intellec- 
tual purposes are served by such a process. Each of 
the things we thus distinguish in thought has a real ex- 
istence ; the one as much as the other : the sensation or 
feeling has an existence, but so has also the self, ^ot 
that either has a separate existence, or an independent 
existence, or an existence out of the other. As the one 
is an abstract, so is also the other. If you call the one, 
say the self, a metaphysical entity, you should in con- 
sistency describe the other, the sensation, as in the same 
sense a metaphysical entity. The correct statement is 
that we are conscious of the sensation as a sensation of 
self, and of the self as under sensation. And as Ave can 
never be conscious of the self, except as sentient or 
otherwise affected, so we can never be conscious of a 
sensation except as a sensation of a sentient self. It is 
high time, when physiologists and metaphysicians are 
drawing such perverted conclusions, to put this seem- 
ingly insignificant and yet really important limitation 
upon the common statement. 

I am quite willing that Mr. Mill should apply the 
sharp razor of his Psychological Method to sensation. 
I have called in consciousness to declare what is in 
sensation, but I do not allow consciousness to decide at 
once, and without further inquiry, that sensations are 
and must be primary and elementary. I freely allow 



SENSATIONS. 75 

the mental analyst to put them in his crucible, and to 
try if he can decompose them. No such attempt has 
been made ; I believe no such attempt will ever be 
made. Mr. Mill and his school acknowledge that they 
are unresolvable and ultimate. I am glad to have one 
element allowed, — it may prepare the way for the ad- 
mission of others on the same title. In particular, the 
self (I will show in next chapter) may turn out to be 
quite as unresolvable as the sensations of self. 

As so much is made of sensations by this whole 
school of philosophy, we must be careful to inquire 
what is really embraced in them, and not allow any- 
thing to be drawn from them which is not truly in 
them. It is necessary in these times to utter even such 
a truism as this, that a sensation is a sensation, and is 
nothing more. A sensation is not a thing extended, is 
not extension, is not space. A sensation being only 
momentarily under consciousness, is not the same as 
time, which has a past and a future. A sensation is 
not matter or body, which is extended and occupies 
space. A sensation may be preceded by resistance, but 
is not itself resistance, which implies one body opposing 
the movement of another. It is important even to 
make the further statement, that we are conscious of 
many other mental acts and affections which are not 
identical with sensations. A sensation is not memory, 
say the remembrance of my reading Mr. Mill's book at 
a particular time. A sensation is not expectation, the 
expectation which I cherish that truth will in the end 
prevail over error. A sensation is not an imagination, 



76 SENSATIONS. 

as wlien I paint a glorious ideal of beauty or of virtue. 
A sensation is not judgment, even when that judgment 
is about sensation, as when I decide that the sensa- 
tions produced by a noise are not so pleasant as those 
excited by music. Certainly, sensation is not reasoning, 
as when I argue that mere sentient affections cannot 
yield our higher ideas and deeper convictions. Sensa- 
tion is not even the same as emotion, as when I fear 
that the sensational philosophy is to prevail for a time 
in this country. A sensation is something far lower 
than sentiment or affection, as when I would love God 
and my neighbours, — even those from whom I differ in 
most important points. A sensation is not a volition, 
as when I resolve to do my best to oppose prevailing 
error, — even when countenanced by influential names. 

But may not sensation be the cause of something 
else? I can answer this question only after giving 
an explanation. In ordinary mundane action, an effect 
is always the result of the operation of more than one 
agent or antecedent. " A man," says Mr. Mill, " takes 
" mercury, goes out of doors, and catches cold. We say, 
" perhaps, that the cause of his taking cold was ex- 
" posure to the air. . . . But to be accurate, we ought to 
" say that the cause was exposure to the air while under 
" the effect of mercury" (Loyic, B. in. c. v. § 3). I 
agree with this doctrine of Mr. Mill (it will be ex- 
pounded more fully in chapter xiii. of this treatise), 
and I would apply it to the supposed causative influence 
of sensations. Sensation may be one of the antecedents 
which go to make up the cause, but it cannot, pro- 



SENSATIONS. 77 

perly speaking, be a cause in itself ; it is a condition or 
occasion, and can produce an effect only when con- 
joined with some other agent. A sensation may be the 
occasion of something else, — say of a violent derangement 
of a bodily organ; but that derangement is not the 
sensation, and in accounting for it we must look not 
merely to the sensation, but the properties of the organ 
affected. A sensation may, in like manner, be the occa- 
sion of a new thought arising, but the thought should 
not be confounded with the sensation ; the sensation 
is not even the cause of the thought. Such a sensa- 
tion in a plant (supposing it to be capable of feeling), 
such a sensation in one of the lower animals, would 
give rise to no such thought. The sensation, can ori- 
ginate the thought only by stirring up a mental capa- 
city in the soul, which mental potency is to be regarded 
as the main element in the complex cause. And yet 
this essential element is inexcusably, culpably over- 
looked by the Sensational School, when they derive all 
our thoughts from sensations. They make the mere 
auxiliary or stimulating condition the producing power, 
as if, to use a homely illustration, we should make the 
setting of the pointer, which roused the attention of the 
sportsman, the cause of the killing of the bird shot by 
him. The mind of man, consciousness being the wit- 
ness, does entertain a vast variety of ideas, some of them 
of a very elevating character, such as those we entertain 
of God, and good, and eternity. I doubt whether these 
are the product of sensations in any sense. Of this I 
am sure, that they do not proceed from sensations ex- 



78 SENSATIONS. 

cept when sensations are employed and moulded by 
lofty mental faculties, which faculties, and not the sen- 
sations, are the main agents in the production of the 
effect ; and they should have their nature, laws, and 
modes of action unfolded by any one who would give us 
a correct theory of our mental operations. 

By insisting on such points as these, we lay an effec- 
tual arrest on those rash speculations of our day which 
derive man's loftiest ideas from so low and subordinate 
an agent as sensation. 



CHAPTER V. 

MIND, PERSONALITY, PEESOXAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 

Me. Mill admits fully the veracity of consciousness 
and the reality of the facts attested by it (see 8, e, rj). 
But his view of the objects of which it is cognisant is 
very defective. It seems to be derived, through Mr. 
James Mill and Dr. Thomas Brown, from Hume and 
the Sensational School of France. Condillac, and those 
who followed him, designated all the states of the mind 
by the words sentir and sensibilite, which conveniently 
embraced two such different things as sensations excited 
by outward objects, and mental emotions, such as 
hope and fear. We have no such pliable word in our 
tongue, and Brown, who caught so much of the French 
spirit, had to adopt a narrower phrase when he habi- 
tually represents all states of mind as Feelings : thus he 
speaks of " feelings of relation " and " feelings of appro- 
bation," both of which imply judgment. Mr. James 
Mill says, " In the very word feeling, all that is implied 
" in the word consciousness is involved." And now we 
rind Mr. J. S. Mill declaring " a feeling and a state of 



80 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

" consciousness are, in the language of philosophy" [that 
is, in the philosophy of Thomas Brown and James Mill], 
" equivalent expressions : everything is a feeling of which 
" the mind is conscious ; everything which it feels, or, in 
" other words, which forms a part of its own sentient 
" existence." Again, " Feeling, in the proper sense of the 
" term, is a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and 
" Thought are the subordinate species" {Logic, B. I. c. iii. 
§ 3). Of course Mr. Mill is at liberty to choose his 
own nomenclature, and use it in the signification he 
thinks fit to attach to it. But others have an equal 
liberty to reject it and give their reasons. It seems to 
me an unwarrantable use of the phrase to make Feel- 
ings embrace Thought, and I may add Volition ; and 
those who so use it will be found, in spite of themselves, 
and of all explanations, understanding the w T ord in its 
habitual and proper signification ; and when all other 
ideas and resolutions are spoken of as " feelings," the 
impression will be left that they are part of our sentient 
and (at best) emotional nature. 

Mr. Mill claims the liberty of examining all the facts 
of consciousness, and of resolving them if he can into 
simpler elements. I freely grant him this power. Our 
sensations, he grants, are simple and original. But I 
have argued that when we are conscious of a sensation, 
we are always conscious of self as sentient. Now I am 
quite ready to allow Mr. Mill or any other to reduce the 
self to something more elementary. But I am sure no 
components, which did not contain self, could give us 
self. Surely our perception of self could not be given 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 81 

by mere sensations, that is, by sensations in which self 
is not mixed up. We are as conscious of the self as of 
the sensation ; and the sensation could as little give us 
the self as the self could give the sensation. It should 
not be forgotten that this self appears in all our other 
mental exercises — thus showing that it is more essential 
than our very sensations ; it is found in our memories, 
beliefs, imaginations, judgments, emotions, and volitions. 
We are conscious of these not separately or as abstracts ; 
but of self as remembering, self as believing, self as 
imagining, self as judging, self as under feeling, self as 
willing. 

This self is what I call a Person. Thus understood, 
it is altogether correct to say that we are conscious of 
ourselves as persons. Xot that we are conscious of 
personality as a separate thing ; we are conscious in one 
concrete act of this person as sentient, or as thinking, 
or resolving:. I believe that the infant, that the child, 
does not separate the two. Even the mature man sel- 
dom draws the distinction unless, indeed, he be addicted 
to reflection, or has to speak of the ego and the non ego. 
It is onlv on our remembering; the self, and finding it 
necessary to distinguish between the various states of 
self, and on our discovering that there are other conscious 
beings besides ourselves, that we ever think of forming 
to ourselves the abstraction personality, or taking the 
trouble to affirm that we are the same persons to-day 
as we were yesterday,, or that we are different from all 
other persons. 

So much for our consciousness of our present self, or 
r 



82 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

of ourselves as persons. The truth now evolved enables 
us to develop the exact psychological nature of our 
conviction of personal identity. In all our waking 
moments we have a consciousness of a present self. 
But in every exercise of memory we have a remembrance 
of a past self. We remember the event as in past time. 
We remember it as an experience of self. Thus, in re- 
membering that we visited the London Exhibition, we 
recollect not merely the Exhibition, but ourselves as see- 
ing it. True, this recollection of ourselves may be very 
faint in comparison with that of the brilliant objects 
witnessed ; and, from laws of memory to be afterwards 
referred to, it may very much disappear ; still it is there 
wrapt up in one concrete act with the image of the exter- 
nal things. In this remembrance of ourselves we have 
more than a recollection of a past thought or a past 
feeling, say of the feeling we had when visiting the 
Exhibition, we remember the feeling as a feeling of self. 
Here, as in so many other cases which will come under 
our notice, Mr. Mill has failed to apprehend and unfold 
all that is in the fact of consciousness. " The feeling I 
had yesterday," is his account {Logic, B. 1. c. iii. § 2), 
" is gone never to return ; what I have to-day is another 
feeling exactly like the former, but still distinct from 
it." This is not the correct statement. What I had 
yesterday was a conscious self under one affection, say 
grief; what I have to-day is also a conscious self under, 
it may be, a like affection of grief, or it may be under a 
different affection, say joy. Having thus a past self 
brought up by memory, and a present self under con- 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 83 

scion sn ess, we compare them and affirm that they are 
the same. This is simply the expression of the fact 
falling under the eye of consciousness. Let Mr. Mill, 
if he choose, try his sharp analysis upon it. If he does 
so, he will find the edge of his instrument bent back 
as he would cut it. It is a rock, itself needing no sup- 
port, but fitted to act as a foundation. It is a self- 
evident truth, attained by the bare contemplation of 
the objects ; and no one can be made to come to any 
other decision, or to allow that he is a different person 
now from what he was when he recollects himself at 
some given instant in the past. 

We see what is meant by personality and personal 
identity. We can express both these, without wrapping 
them in that awful mystery in which they have so 
often been made to appear. Personality is the self of 
which we are conscious in every mental act. Personal 
identity is the sameness of the conscious self as per- 
ceived at different times. The phrases do not point to 
some unknown essence, apart from or behind the known 
thing. They simply designate an essential, an abiding 
element of the thing known. As the personality and 
personal identity appear, we are entitled to insist that 
they be brought out to view and expressed in every 
proper science of psychology. One of Aristotle's defi- 
nitions of the soul is " that (tovto) by which we live, 
and feel, and understand." 1 Some have charged him 
with introducing an unmeaning phrase when he men- 

1 'H ijjvxy Se tovto <L ^toju.ev, /cat aio~#ai/6;U.e#a., ko.1 Sic.i'oi'O/oi.efla. Trpartas' ioare Aoyos tis 
av elr) koX elSos, <iAA' oi>x v\r) kcX to tiiro)cet/i.6vov. — De Antrim, II. 'J. 



84 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

tions not only certain qualities of the soul, but a that 
by which we exercise the qualities. But Aristotle was 
far too comprehensive and accurate a thinker to omit 
the tovto, by which, no doubt, he meant to designate a 
thing, an existence, or rather a thing having existence, 
and capable of living, feeling, understanding. As we 
advance, we shall see that Mr. Mill is obliged to use 
similar phrases to denote the permanent thing that 
abides, amid the changes of attribute or exercise. In 
ordinary circumstances, no doubt, our attention is 
directed most forcibly to the changing element, to 
the action and new manifestation, and may allow the 
other, which is ever the same, to fall very much into 
what Mr. Mill calls " obliviscence." But it is the 
office of the careful psychologist to observe it ; to 
bring it out from the shade in which it lies ; and to 
give this conscious self, this remembered self, this iden- 
tical self, the same place in his system as it has in the 
mind of man. 

We are now in circumstances to judge of Mr. Mill's 
account of mind, and his psychological theory of the 
nature and genesis of the idea we form of it. In fram- 
ing these he has neglected to look carefully and 
patiently at the actual facts of consciousness, both in 
regard to the idea and conviction, and the elements out 
of which he would fashion it. He acknowledges that 
mind involves some sort of notion of what Kant calls 
Perdurability. He begins, indeed, by telling us that " we 
" neither can know nor imagine it, except as represented 
" by the succession of manifold feelings which metaphy- 



PEESOXAL IDEXTITY, SUBSTANCE. 85 

" sicians call by the name of states or modifications of 
" mind" (p. 205). I have put in italics the words which 
Mr. Mill uses, must use, to express the facts ; the words 
which correspond to the tovto of Aristotle. He goes 
on to say, " It is nevertheless true that our notion of 
" Mind, as well as of Matter, is the notion of a perma- 
" nent something contrasted with the perpetual flux of 
'•' the sensations and other feelings or mental states 
" which we refer to it ; a something which we figure as 
" remaining the same, while the particular feelings 
" through which it reveals its existence change." This 
is an inadequate account of the idea and conviction 
entertained by us in mature life. We do not refer the 
mental states to it, we know it in a particular state. 
We do not figure self as remaining the same, we judge 
or decide the conscious self of to-day to be the same as 
the conscious self of yesterday remembered by us. It 
does not reveal itself tliroiigli feelings, we know it as 
feeling, the one being as immediate as the other. 

Xevertheless his account, though confused and never 
exactly hitting the facts, is a very remarkable one. We 
must look at it carefully : — " Besides present feelings, 
" and possibilities of present feeling, there is another 
" class of phenomena to be included in an enumeration 
" of the elements making up our conception of mind. 
" The thread of consciousness, which composes the 
" mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present 
" sensations, but likewise in part of memories and ex- 
" yjectations. Xow, what are these ? In themselves, 
" they are present feelings, states of present conscious- 



86 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

" ness, and in that respect not distinguished from sen- 
" sations. They all, moreover, resemble some given 
" sensations or feelings, of which we have previously 
" had experience. But they are attended with the 
" peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in more 
" than its own existence. A sensation involves only 
" this : but a remembrance of sensation, even if not 
" referred to any particular date, involves the sug- 
" gestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a 
" copy or representation, actually existed in the past : 
" and an expectation involves the belief, more or less 
" positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it 
" directly refers, will exist in the future. Nor can the 
" phenomena involved in these two states of conscious- 
" ness be adequately expressed, without saying, that the 
" belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or 
" that I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the 
" sensations remembered or expected. The fact be- 
" lieved is, that the sensations did actually form, or will 
" hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or 
" threads of consciousness, of which the remembrance 
" or expectation of those sensations is the part now 
" present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a 
" series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the state- 
" ment by calling it a series of feelings which is aware 
" of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to 
" the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is 
" something different from any series of feelings or pos- 
" sibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that 
" something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feel- 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 87 

" ings, can be aware of itself as series" (pp. 212, 213). 
This surely is an excessively roundabout and far-fetched 
account of a very clear fact, in order to suit it to an 
empirical theory. Making the mind " a thread of con- 
sciousness," " a series of feelings," he is obliged to give 
to this thread or series a set of attributes, such as that 
it is aware of itself, in order to make it even in appear- 
ance embrace the obvious phenomena. He prefaces the 
above by an acknowledgment that " the theory has in- 
" trinsic difficulties [they are those stated] which it seems 
" to me beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to 
" remove." The intrinsic difficulties are very much the 
creation of the theorist. We decline certainly being 
shut up to the position, that the mind is " a series of 
feelings aware of itself," for if thus aware of itself, it is 
more than a series ; the genuine fact is that the mind 
is aware of itself as abiding. But as little do we con- 
sent to take the other alternative, that the mind is 
something different from the series of feelings ; it is 
an abiding existence with a series of feelings. 

He adds, " the truth is, we are here face to face with 
" that final inexplicability at which, as Sir William 
" Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we 
" reach ultimate facts." As finding himself shut up to 
such an issue, he should have exercised more patience 
in dealing with those who, like Eeid, Kant, and Hamil- 
ton, have been painfully striving to give an adequate 
account of these ultimate facts. If he says they are 
beyond investigation or expression, I meet him with a 
direct denial. The operations are within consciousness, 



88 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

and we can observe and co-ordinate them. The fact is, 
Mr. Mill himself has been trying to nnfold them, but has 
given a very insufficient and perplexed rendering. " The 
" true incomprehensibility perhaps is, that something 
" which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be in 
" a manner present : that a series of feelings, the infinitely 
" greater part of which is past or future, can be gathered 
" up, as it were, into a single present conception, accom- 
" panied by a belief of reality. I think, by far the wisest 
" thing we can do, is to accept the inexplicable fact, with- 
" out any theory as to how it takes place." This is a most 
circuitous and inadequate, I believe, indeed, an inac- 
curate statement of the fact. That which has ceased to 
exist is not present, it is the remembrance, which is a 
very different thing, that is present. The future is not 
gathered into the present, we at the present anticipate 
the future. We cannot, of course, give a theory of the 
production of an ultimate fact, but we can state it 
correctly, and even, I believe, seize and express its law. 
Let us inquire what he makes of the fact according 
to his Psychological Method. We shall find him accu- 
mulating statements which bring in new ideas, without 
his being able to reduce them even to an apparently con- 
sistent system, or to resolve them into simpler elements. 
" The belief I entertain that my mind exists, when it 
" is not feeling, nor thinking, nor conscious of its own 
" existence, resolves itself into a belief of a Permanent 
" Possibility of these states. If I think of myself as in 
" dreamless sleep, or in the sleep of death, and believe 
" that I, or in other words my mind, is or will be existing 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 89 

" through these states, though not iu conscious feeling, 
" the most scrupulous examination of my belief will not 
" detect in it any fact actually believed, except that my 
" capability of feeling is not in that interval perma- 
" nently destroyed, and is suspended only because it does 
" not meet with the combination of outward circum- 
" stances which would call it into action : the moment 
" it did meet with that combination it would revive, and 
" remains, therefore, a Permanent Possibility" (p. 205). 
It could be shown that at this place we are brought 
very nearly to the doctrine of Hume, who represents 
the mind as " a bundle or collection of different percep- 
tions," to which we are led, by certain tendencies, to give 
a fictitious identity (see Works, vol. i. pp. 318-334). But 
we have here to do not with Hume but with Mr. Mill, 
who represents mind as a series of feelings, with a belief 
of the permanent possibility of its states. It is admitted, 
then, that there is more than feelings, more than even 
a series of feelings, there is belief. Surely Mr. Mill 
might have inquired more particularly into the nature of 
this belief, and he might then have seen that it is quite 
as noteworthy a phenomenon and quite as essential to 
the mind as the very feelings themselves ; he might have 
found that it is quite as " ultimate " as the belief in 
the veracity in memory is acknowledged to be (see p) ; 
or rather he might have found it involved in that ulti- 
mate belief. 

Observe how mental attributes are growing in number, 
without an attempt to reduce them to simpler elements. 
He seems to allow that they cannot be resolved into 



90 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

sensation. " They are attended with the peculiarity that 
" each of them involves a belief in more than its own pre- 
" sent existence. A sensation involves only this." There 
is a ' belief/ a ' permanent ' something. Mark that 
we have now Time. He has stolen in imperceptibly 
(time always does so), but we should notice him now 
that he is in ; and we are entitled to ask him what he 
is and whence he has come ; and he is far too important 
a personage to allow himself to be dismissed at our wish. 
It is a permanent possibility, we decide that there may 
be things in this enduring time. Observe what we have 
now gathered together. We have sensations ; we have 
a series of sensations ; we have a belief ; we have a 
belief in time ; a belief in time as permanent, and of 
possibilities in time. These are evidently different from 
each other, consciousness being witness. The belief is 
not the same as the sensations, or the series of sensations. 
The permanence is not identical with the belief. The 
possibility is different from the permanent. I know no 
philosopher who has called in so many unresolved 
instincts to account for our convictions of memory and 
personal identity as Mr. Mill has done. His psycho- 
logical method is multiplying, instead of diminishing, 
ultimate elements. His system, so far from being simple, 
is in reality very complex ; and its apparent simplicity 
arises merely from his never summing up, or distinctly 
enunciating, the original principles lie is obliged to 
postulate and assume. 

But I would not have objected to his system merely 
because of its complexity, provided it had embraced all 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 91 

the phenomena. But I deny that he has noticed, or 
stated correctly, the facts of consciousness. ~No doubt 
there is a belief; but it is a belief in my past existence, 
conjoined with a knowledge of my present existence. 
There is time, an idea of time, and a conviction of the 
reality of time ; but it is in the form of a belief that I 
existed in time past. There is more than a belief, 
there is an immediate decision, that the present self 
known is the same with the past self remembered. 
There is more than an idea of mere possibility, there is 
the assurance that I did exist at a particular time, and 
that I who then existed do now exist. I acknow- 
ledge, that I have no intuitive certainty that I existed 
every moment of a dreamless sleep. I have intuitive 
assurance that I existed when I fell asleep, and that I 
exist now when I have awoke, and I am led by the 
ordinary rules of evidence to believe that I existed in 
the interval. Here it is that Mr. Mill's permanent 
possibility of feeling comes in : I believe that had I 
been awakened sooner I should have been consciously 
active as I now am. But these very possibilities all 
proceed on an intuitive remembrance of self, and an in- 
tuitive decision as to the identity of self. 

Mr. Mill labours to prove that his psychological 
theory leaves the doctrines that our fellow-men exist, 
and that God exists, and that the soul is immortal, 
where it found them. For we look on other people's 
minds as but a series of feelings like our own ; and we 
may regard the Divine Being as " a series of the Divine 
thoughts and feelings prolonged throughout eternity ; " 



92 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

and our immortal existence to be " a succession of feel- 
ings prolonged to eternity" (p. 207-211). Now we are 
not yet in a position to inquire (which is the all-im- 
portant question) whether Mr. Mill's theory admits of 
the usual arguments for the existence of our fellow-men, 
and of God, and of an immortal life ; or whether, if it 
cannot adopt the old arguments, it furnishes new ones. 
But before leaving our present subject I may remark, 
that the common doctrine, which I believe to be the true 
one, and which I have endeavoured to enunciate philo- 
sophically, is much more in accordance with our 
cherished convictions and sentiments than the subtle 
one defended by Mr. Mill. As believing that I myself 
am more than a series of feelings, that I have a perma- 
nent existence amid all mutations, I can, on evidence 
being adduced of their existence, take the same view of 
my fellow-men, of my friends, and my family ; that is, I 
can look upon them as having not only a permanent 
possibility of feelings but a permanent personality, round 
which my affections may cluster, and which leads me to 
treat them as responsible beings like myself. He says 
elsewhere (Logic, B. in. c. xxiv. § 1) : "My belief that 
" the Emperor of China exists is simply my belief that 
" if I were transported to the imperial palace or some 
" other locality in Pekin, I should see him. My belief 
" that Julius Caesar existed, is my belief that I should 
" have seen him if I had been present in the field of Phar- 
" salia, or the senate-house at Eome." This is to reverse 
the proper order of things, and to confuse all our con- 
ceptions. Looking on ourselves as persons with a per- 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 93 

manent being, on evidence produced of their existence, 
we take the same view of the Emperor of China and 
Julius Cresar, and thus believe that if we were in Pekin 
we should see the one, and that if we had been in the 
battle of Pharsalia we should have seen the other. The 
picture presented of the Divine Being, in this new phi- 
losophy, will appear to the great body of mankind to be 
unattractively bare and unmeaning, or rather in the 
highest degree shadowy, uncertain, and evanishing ; and 
they will rejoice when they are invited to contemplate 
Him instead as Jehovah, I am that I am, the indepen- 
dent and self-existent One. I am not inclined to urge our 
conviction of personality and personal identity as in 
itself a proof of our immortality ; but in constructing 
the cumulative argument, and cherishing the hope of a 
life beyond the grave, I feel it satisfactory to regard 
myself, I believe on sufficient evidence, not as a perma- 
nent possibility of feeling, but a permanent being, the 
same in the world to come as in this. 

We may now combine the results which we have 
reached. In every conscious act we know an existing 
thing, which when we begin to reflect we learn to call 
self, manifesting itself in some particular way which we 
are taught to regard as an attribute. Again, in all 
remembrance, we recollect self as exercising some par- 
ticular attribute in time past, and we know self as now 
remembering ; and on comparing the tAvo we decide that 
they are the same. This is a bare statement of the facts, 
as they daily present themselves. I defy Mr. Mill, or 
any other mental analyst, to reduce these facts of con - 



94 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

sciousness to fewer or simpler elements. In all con- 
sciousness, I have a knowledge of self as a person ; in 
all remembrance, a recollection of self as a person ; 
and in the comparison of the two a perception of their 
identity. 

And let it be observed, that both in the conscious 
self and the recollected, we have the self perceived by 
us as operating in a great number of ways, with thoughts 
and emotions in infinite variety. We come too to dis- 
cover (in a way which will come under our notice below) 
that there are other beings besides ourselves, w T ho have 
the same personality and identity, and the like incal- 
culable number and diversity of ideas, wishes, and 
feelings. As we begin to reflect on all this, and as we 
would speak about it, and make ourselves intelligible, we 
find it convenient to have a word to denote that which 
abideth in us, and is the same in us and in others. 
We have such a word in Substance, and we say that 
' mind is a substance.' In saying so, we mean nothing 
more than this, that in us and in others there is (1.) 
an existing thing; (2.) operating; (3.) with a permanence. 
But in saying this, we say much, that is, w T e make a 
statement full of meaning. By multiplying words of 
description or explanation we should only confuse and 
perplex the subject, which may be clearly discerned if 
only we look steadily at it, and weigh the several parts 
which make up the indissoluble whole. 

And here I feel myself called on to state that no 
doctrine of modern philosophy, not even the ideal theory, 
or theory of representative ideas, so condemned by Keid 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 95 

and exposed by Hamilton, has wrought such mischief 
in speculation as that of Locke in regard to substance- 
His statements on this subject are unsatisfactory through- 
out, and when they were attacked by Stillingfleet he de- 
fended them by a sparring and fencing unworthy of such 
a lover of truth ; he employed himself in repelling the 
objections of his opponent, instead of seeking to make 
his own views clearer. " So that if any one will examine 
" himself concerning the notion of pure substance in 
" general, he will find he has no other idea of it at 
" all, but only a supposition of he knows not what 
" support of such qualities, as are capable of producing 
" simple ideas in us" (Essay, B. n. c. xxiii. § 2). In 
the controversy he affirms and re-affirms that he does 
not deny the existence of substance, or that we have an 
idea of it, and is very indignant with Stillingfleet for 
saying that he does. But he makes it to be " the sup- 
port," but " unknown " support of qualities. As the 
support was something unknown, Berkeley in the next 
age did a good service to philosophy by discarding it 
altogether, so far as matter is concerned. But in the suc- 
ceeding age the avenger came, and Hume took away the 
unknown substratum from mind, as Berkeley had done 
from body. Eeicl rushed in to save fundamental truth ; 
but he did not show his usual shrewdness and wisdom 
when he retained Locke's " substratum," and argued so 
tenaciously that the known quality intuitively suggests 
an unknown substance. We should have been saved a 
world of confused and confusing controversy if Eeid, 
when abandoning Locke's " idea," had also rejected his 



96 MIND, PERSONALITY, 

" unknown support of qualities." Kant met the Scottish 
sceptic in a still more unsatisfactory manner, when he 
allowed that by the outward senses and by the internal 
consciousness we perceive only the phenomenon, and then 
referred us to some noumenon beyond. In the schools 
which have ramified from Kant, the question has ever 
since been, Is there merely a phenomenon, or is there a 
noumenon also ? Sir William Hamilton in this, as in 
so many other topics, has endeavoured to combine Eeid 
and Kant. He identifies the phenomenon of the German, 
with the quality of the British, philosophy ; he argues 
that the quality implies the substance, and the pheno- 
menon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or 
noumenon unknowable. Mr. Mill takes much directly 
or indirectly from Hume ; he favours in Kant all that 
is destructive ; he allows to Hamilton all his negative 
positions : and so we find him building on the miserably 
defective views which they have given of substance. 
" As our conception of body is that of an unknown 
" exciting cause of sensations, so our conception of mind 
" is that of an unknown recipient or percipient of 
" them, and not of them alone, but of all our other 
" feelings. As body is the mysterious something which 
" excites the mind to feel, so mind is the mysterious 
" something which feels and thinks " {Logic, B. I. c. iii. 
S 8). He finds no great difficulty, as Hume had done 
before him, in putting aside this unknown and myste- 
rious something. And it is high time, I think, that 
those metaphysicians who defend radical truth should 
abandon this unknown and unknowable substratum or 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 97 

nouinenon, which has ever been found a foundation of 
ice, to those who would build upon it. Sir William 
Hamilton having handed over this unknown thing to 
faith, Mr. Herbert Spencer has come after him, and 
consigned religion to it as to its grave, — and there, it 
ruay safely be said, it will disturb no one, not even by 
sending out a ghost from its gloomy chambers. 

We never know quality without knowing substance, 
just as we cannot know substance without knowing 
quality. Both are known in one concrete act. We 
may, however, separate them in thought. In contem- 
plating any given object, such as the thinking self, Ave 
may distinguish between the ' thinking ' which changes, 
and the ' existence ' which abideth. As both are known 
in the concrete, so both may be said to have an existence, 
not an independent existence, but an existence in, or 
in connexion with, each other. The one always implies 
the other, that is, the thinking always implies a thinking- 
existence, and the thinking existence is always exercised 
in some thought.. Mr. Mill gets a momentary glimpse 
of this doctrine, but does not follow it out. " We 
" can no more imagine a substance without attributes, 
" than we can imagine attributes without a substance " 
(logic, B. i. c. iii. § 6). Taking this view, we cannot 
without protest allow persons to speak of substance as 
being something unknown, mysterious, lying far down in 
a depth below all human inspection. The substance is 
known, quite as much as the quality. True, the sub- 
stance is never known alone, or apart from the quality, 
but as little is the quality known alone, or apart from a 

G 



98 MIFD, PERSONALITY, 

substance. Each should have its place, its proper place, 
neither less nor more, in every system of the human 
mind. 

Much the same maybe said of 'phenomenon' and 
1 noumenon,' which, however, have a still more mysteri- 
ous meaning than ' quality' and ' substance.' Pheno- 
menon means an appearance, but appearance is an 
abstract from a concrete ; we never see an appearance 
apart from a thing appearing. It is the object appearing 
to the subject seeing it. If the phrase is to be retained 
in philosophy, let us understand what is meant by it. 
Let us not as we employ it deceive ourselves by imagin- 
ing that we have, or can have, an appearance apart from a 
thing appearing. A phenomenon is a thing manifesting 
itself to us, as a quality is a thing in action or exercise. 
As to the ' noumenon,' it is not so easy to determine what 
can be meant by it. If it signifies the thing perceived 
by the mind, this is neither less nor more than the phe- 
nomenon. If it means a thing perceived by no mind, 
I allow that there are certainly things existing not per- 
ceived by the human mind, but then these things may 
be perceived by other minds, — I suppose must certainly 
be perceived by the Divine Mind. But if the nou- 
menon means something acting as the ground of the 
thing manifesting itself, or behind it as a support, I 
declare that we have no evidence of there being such a 
thing, and I can see no purpose, philosophical or prac- 
tical, to be served by it in the way of hypothesis or 
otherwise. Here Mr. Mill seems to me altogether right : 
<: This unknown something is a supposition without evi- 



PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 99 

dence." But I abandon it, because we have a known 
something ; in the case of mind a thing existing, acting, 
and permanent. 

But then it is said we do not know the thing in itself 
(Ding an sich). It is high time to insist on knowing 
what is meant by this phrase, taken from Kant, and 
with which of late years so many metaphysicians have 
been conjuring. It cannot be allowed to play a part 
any longer till it explains itself. It seems full of mean- 
ing, and yet I believe that if we prick it, it will be 
found to be emptiness. I understand what is meant 
by the thing; it is the object existing. But what is 
meant hy in itself? I acknowledge no itself beside, or 
besides, or beyond the thing. I confess to be so stupid, 
as not to be able to form any distinct idea of what is 
meant by the thing in itself. If it mean that the thing, 
the whole thing, is within the thing, I have about as 
clear a notion of what is signified as I have of the whale 
that swallowed itself. If it mean that there is a thing, 
in addition to the thing as it manifests itself, and as it 
exercises property, I allow that, for aught I know, there 
may be many such things. My knowledge of the thing, 
of all things, nay, of any one thing, is confessedly 
limited. As to what may be beyond the phenomenon, 
the thing as it appears to me, and to others who may 
report to me, I venture to say nothing, as I can know 
nothing about it. But believing that no other man 
knows anything about it any more than I do, I pro- 
test against its being represented as being a support 
of the thing known, or in any way essential to it. 



100 MIXD, PERSONALITY, ETC. 

Though I were to get new faculties and know that 
great unknown, I am not sure that it would make the 
thing known the least clearer, in any way more mys- 
terious or less mysterious than it now is. As it is con- 
fessedly unknown, I can trace no relation of dependence, 
or of anything else between it and the known. Lying 
as it does in the region of darkness which compasses 
the land of light, I think it best to leave it there. 

We are thus brought to the doctrine which commends 
itself to our first thoughts, that we know self imme- 
diately as existing, as in active operation, and with 
a permanence. This primitive knowledge furnishes a 
nucleus round which we may gather other information 
by experience and by reasoning, till we come at last to 
clothe mind with qualities so many and varied that it 
is difficult to classify them. I confess I grudge the 
school of Comte the epithet ' Positive.' It is a title 
which they have no right to appropriate to their crude 
system, which observes only the more superficial facts 
in these two wondrous worlds of mind and matter. I 
have in these two last chapters stated what I believe 
to be the true positive doctrine in regard to mind, that 
is, the expression of the facts without addition or omis- 
sion or hypothesis. 



CHAPTEE VI. 

BODY. 

We have now to face a more perplexing subject, the 
idea and conviction which we have in regard, to an ex- 
ternal world, the way in which we reach these, and the 
objective reality involved in them. In this border 
country there has been a war for ages in the past, and 
there is likely to be a war for ages in the future. There 
are real difficulties in the inquiry arising from the cir- 
cumstance that conscious mind and unconscious matter 
are so different — while yet they have an evident mutual 
relation, and also from the apparent deception of the 
senses ; and speculators have gathered an accumulation 
of imaginary ones by their refined and elaborate specu- 
lations, so that now there are not only the original 
obstacles in the way, but a host of traditional feuds. I 
cling to the conviction that there is a doctrine of natural 
realism, which, if only we could seize and express it, 
will be found encompassed with fewer difficulties than 
any far-fetched or artificial system. 

Sir "William Hamilton has given us a very elaborate 
classification of the theories of sense- perception. It is 



102 BODY. 

not needful to follow him in this treatise. But in order 
to correct errors and prepare the way for a fair discus- 
sion, it may serve some good purposes to look at the 
account given, of the steps involved, by the three British 
metaphysicians who have given the greatest attention 
to the subject. To begin with Dr. Thomas Eeid. Ac- 
cording to him, there is, first, an action or affection of the 
organism ; there is, next, a sensation in the mind ; thirdly, 
this sensation as a sign, suggests intuitively an external 
object. The two points on which he dwells chiefly are, 
first, that there is no idea between the external object 
and the mind perceiving ; and secondly, that we reach 
a belief in the external world intuitively, and not by 
any process of reasoning. " This conviction is not only 
" irresistible, but it is immediate ; that is, it is not by 
" a train of reasoning and argumentation that we come 
" to be convinced of the existence of what we perceive" 
{Works, p. 259). I believe that he has established his 
two points successfully, and in doing so he has rendered 
immense service to philosophy. Dr. Thomas Brown 
gives a different account of the operation. There is 
first, as in the other theory — indeed in all theories, an 
affection of the bodily frame ; secondly, a sensation in 
the mind ; and thirdly, a reference of that to an external 
object as the cause. He calls in two general mental 
laws to give us the reference. The first is an intui- 
tive law of cause and effect, which impels us when Ave 
discover an effect to look for a cause. We have a sen- 
sation of resistance, of which we discover no cause with- 
in the mind, and therefore we look for it beyond the 



BODY. 103 

mind. The second law, of which he makes large nse, 
is that of suggestion, which connects sensations, so that 
one becomes representative of others. 

Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mill are for ever criticis- 
ing these two doctrines, but it may be doubted whether 
either has given a clear and correct exposition of them. 
Hamilton, when he commenced his edition of Eeicl, 
thought that philosopher's views were the same as his 
own (we shall see wherein they differ immediately) ; as 
lie advances, he sees that this is not the case ; and he 
nowhere gives us a precise account of Eeid's theory, 
which, whether well founded or not, is consistent and 
easily understood. As to Brown, Hamilton is for ever 
carping at him, as if he had a cherished determination 
to remove his system out of the way, as one that opposed 
the reception of his own. The circumstance that neither 
Eeid's theory nor Brown's theory would quite fit into 
his compartments, is a proof that Hamilton's classifica- 
tion of theories, though distinguished by great logical 
power, is not equal to the diversities of human concep- 
tion and speculation. He clearly does injustice to 
Brown, by insisting on making him an idealist — he 
makes him a cosmothetic idealist. Now there is no 
idea in Brown's system, as there was in the older 
theories. He made great use of sensation, and was in 
great difficulties when he attempted to show how, from 
this sensation, we could infer an external world ; but 
the sensation is an existing, and not an imaginary thing- 
like the idea ; and the sensation was held by him to be 
an effect, but not at all a representative, of an external 



104 BODY. 

and extended object. Mr. Mill, in criticising Hamilton's 
criticism, would make Eeid an idealist (p. 177). This 
is obviously a mistake. Eeid did call in a sensation 
as a sign, but it was not supposed to be representative, 
that is, to bear any resemblance or analogy like the old 
idea to the external object. All that is asserted of it 
is that we are conscious of it, which we are not of the 
idea, and that it suggests a belief in an external object 
intuitively, and by the appointment of Him who gave 
us our constitution. Mill represents Eeid and Brown 
as holding substantially the same doctrine : " The dif- 
" ference between them is extremely small, and, I will 
" add, unimportant" (p. 175). Eeid held that we never 
could reason from the sensation within to the extended 
object without. Brown labours to show that the whole 
process is one of ordinary inference, proceeding always on 
the intuitive law of cause and effect, aided by the asso- 
ciation of ideas. But Mr. Mill tells us that " Brown also 
" thinks that we have, on the occasion of certain sensa- 
" tions, an instantaneous conviction of an outward object" 
(p\ 164). I am surprised at such a statement from one 
who has imbibed so much from Brown, who so clearly 
represents the process as involving inference. "We find 
everywhere such passages as the following : " Percep- 
" tion, then, even in that class of feelings by which 
u we learn to consider ourselves as surrounded by sub- 
" stance, extended and resisting, is only another name, as 
" I have said, for the result of certain associations and 
" inferences that flow from other more general principles 
" of the mind" (Lectures, xxvi.) I call the theory of Brown 



BODY. 105 

(which is taken from the Sensational School of France) 
the Inferential, as distinguished from the Ideal theory on 
the one hand, and the Intuitive theory on the other, 

Hamilton's doctrine differs both from that of Eeid 
and Brown. It is, that there is first an action of the 
organism, and secondly, a simultaneous sensation and 
perception. He labours particularly to show that sense- 
perception being evoked, there is nothing between it 
and the object, no sensation, no idea ; but that we gaze 
at once on the object, in fact are conscious of it, con- 
scious at one and the same time of the ego and the non 
ego. Between this and Brown's doctrine there is an 
irreconcilable difference. Brown makes the process 
one of inference, implying, no doubt, an intuition, but 
an intuition of a general character bearing on all other 
mental operations. Hamilton makes the perception 
primitive, and original, and immediate. Hamilton also 
differs from Eeid, but the point is not so important. 
Eeid makes the sensation precede the perception; 
whereas Hamilton, in accordance, I think, with the 
revelations of consciousness, makes them contempor- 
aneous. Both make the operation intuitive and not 
inferential. This doctrine of Hamilton is not without 
its difficulties. It leaves many points unexplained — 
perhaps they are ultimate and cannot be explained 
— possibly they are so simple that they do not need 
explanation. It does not profess to show hoiv the preced- 
ing organic affection is connected with the mental per- 
ception. Perhaps the human faculties cannot clear up 
the subject. Possibly the question itself may be un- 



106 BODY. 

meaning, for there may be no hoiv to ask about, no 
connexion except this, that the cognitive mind is so 
constituted as to know the bodily frame with which 
it is so intimately connected. This doctrine, as it is 
the most simple, seems to me to be upon the whole the 
most truth-like, that has yet been propounded. It does 
not profess to clear up all mysteries, but it embraces 
the acknowledged facts, and it starts no hypotheses. I 
regret the dogmatism which the author displays in 
asserting it. I do not agree with him in thinking that 
it can be established at once by an appeal to conscious- 
ness. But embracing as it does only facts, I am in- 
clined to adhere to it, till some facts not contained in 
it be ascertained by physiology or pyschology, or the 
two combined. I am certainly not disposed to abandon 
it for so hypothetical a doctrine as that adopted by Mr. 
Mill and elaborated by Professor Bain. 

In the mature man we find certain ideas, beliefs, 
and, I would add, judgments. I readily allow all of 
these to be subjected to an analysis. Mr. Mill is quite 
justified in declaring that " we are not at liberty to 
" assume that every mental process which is now as un- 
" hesitating and rapid as intuition was intuition at its 
" outset" (p. 144). At present we have to look at the 
ideas and convictions which we entertain in regard to 
the external world. I allow at once that " we have no 
" means of now ascertaining by direct evidence, whether 
" we were conscious of outward and extended objects 
" when we first opened our eyes to the light" (p. 147). 
I am willing, therefore, to consider Mr. Mill's theory of 



BODY. 107 

the genesis of our apprehension and belief. His theory 
seems to be, that we can get them by means of sensa- 
tions and associations of sensation. " All we know of 
" objects is the sensations they give us, and the order of 
" the occurrence of these sensations." " Of the outward 
" world we know and can know absolutely nothing, ex- 
" cept the sensations we experience from it" (Logic, B. I. 
c. iii. § 7). The result reached by him is, that " matter 
may be defined a permanent possibility of sensation" 
(p. 198). He does not commit himself, but he is not 
averse to the idea that " the non ego altogether may be 
but a mode in which the mind represents to itself the 
possible modifications of the ego" (p. 189). 

In the discussion which is forced upon us by this 
doctrine, which at first sight seems so strange, there are 
two points to be specially attended to : First, is Mr. 
Mill's account of the ideas and convictions which we 
have concerning body correct ? Under this head our 
appeal must be to consciousness. I believe that it de- 
clares that Mr. Mill, in his analysis, commonly leaves 
out the main element. A second question has to be 
answered, Does Mr. Mill's hypothesis explain all that 
is in our apprehension and belief? In answering 
this question we must be careful not to allow him to 
do, what Mr. Crosse and M. Pouchet are suspected of 
having done in professing to establish the doctrine of 
spontaneous generation by experiment. Mr. Crosse is 
alleged to have had the germs of the acari produced by 
him in his carelessly cleaned vessels ; and M. Pouchet 
to have had the germs from which he derived animals 



108 BODY. 

in the putrescent matter. Certain it is, that when other 
persons performed the same experiments as Mr. Crosse, 
taking care to exclude all organized bodies, no animals 
were produced ; and M. Pasteur maintains that, if you 
allow him to destroy the germs in the putrescent fluid, 
no life will appear. Now, we must keep a strict watcli 
on Mr. Mill, lest he be guilty of a like oversight in de- 
riving all our ideas and convictions from so few germs. 
As we do so, we shall find that in order to prop up the 
theory, which he professes to rear on so narrow a basis, 
he is obliged to add buttress after buttress in the shape 
of new ideas and implied faculties. In particular, we 
shall find him guilty of a very grave logical mistake : 
he is ever assuming, without perceiving it, the idea 
which he professes to explain. In admitting the vera- 
city of memory, he himself lays down a most important 
principle, that we should assume the belief " for which 
" no reason can be given which does not presuppose the 
" belief, and assume it to be well-grounded." We shall 
find that in unfolding his theory of the genesis of our 
ideas of body he neglects this rule, and without being 
aware of it, assumes the ideas of Externality, and 
Eesisting Force, and Extension, which he is seeking to 
generate and explain by a circuitous process. Let us 
look at these ideas in the order now mentioned. 

(1.) WJiat is implied in Externality 1 Mr. Mill says 
we are aware of ourselves as a series. If I were in- 
clined to adopt this representation, I would say that by 
externality we mean a something without and beyond 
the series. But I have objected to this account as 



BODY. 109 

inadequate. I have endeavoured to show that in all 
mental action, even in sensation, there is a perception 
of self as existing, that in memory there is a remem- 
brance of self, and that we proclaim the present self 
and the remembered self identical. ISTow, by an exter- 
nal object I mean a thing existing but not this self, a 
thing different from this permanent and identical self. 
I believe that our first perceptions of externality are 
derived from things apprehended as extended, as having 
a direction and stretching away in space. But as this 
involves extension, the consideration of it falls under 
next head. For the present we must look at externality 
simply as denoting an existing thing, different from, 
and not part of, the ego known by self-consciousness. 
Mr. Mill admits that every man comes to entertain 
some such apprehension. " I consider them (the sen- 
" sations) to be produced by something not only existing 
" independently of my will, but external to my bodily 
" organs and my mind" (Logic, B. I. c. iii. § 7). I am 
here to examine his account of the generation and the 
nature of this idea and conviction. I have found great 
difficulty in handling the subject, owing to the gossamer 
character of the theory, which is far too subtle and in- 
genious to be solid or true. 

In conducting this whole discussion, we must be on 
our guard against being misled by an ambiguity in the 
use of the phrase ' outward world.' It may mean the 
world out of the conscious mind — this I venture to call 
the extra-mental world ; or it may mean the world be- 
yond the body— this, for distinction's sake, I call the 



110 BODY. 

extra- organic world. I am not sure that Mr. Mill, or 
Mr. Bain who helps him to develop his system, have 
escaped the perplexities thus arising. I insist that they 
are not at liberty to assume the existence of the bodily 
frame, and then and thus account for the idea of a 
world beyond. Assuming only a series of sensations 
aware of itself, they must thence generate something 
exterior. 

Mr. Mill thus gets the idea of externality : — " I see a 
" piece of white paper on a table. I go into another 
" room, and though I have ceased to see it, I am persuaded 
" the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations 
" which it gave me ; but I believe that when I again 
" place myself in the circumstances in which I had 
" those sensations, that is, when I go into the room, I 
" shall again have them ; and further, that there has 
" been no intervenino; moment at which this would not 
" have been the case. Owing to this law of my mind, 
" my conception of the world at any given instant con- 
"" sists, in only a small proportion, of present sensations. 
" The conception I form of the world existing at any 
" moment comprises, along with the sensations I am 
" feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation" 
(p. 192). I wish Mr. Mill would employ language con- 
sistent with his theory, and we should then be in a posi- 
tion to judge whether he is building it up fairly. As yet 
we know nothing of " white paper," " a room," " another 
room ; " least of all can we be aware of beiug placed in 
" circumstances :" all which certainly imply the very ex- 
ternality he is seeking to gender. We may believe that 



BODY. Ill 

Mr. Mill does not forget, but it is necessary to warn his 
readers against forgetting, that we have yet only one 
sensation succeeding another. He refers to " a law of 
mind." The law he postulates is, " that the human 
" mind is capable of Expectation. In other words, that 
" after having had actual sensations, we are capable of 
" forming the conception of possible sensations" (p. 190). 
It is one of the many postulates he is ever making. 
His assumptions are far from being the fewest and the 
simplest fitted to explain the phenomena. If he had 
postulated that in every act of sense-perception we ap- 
prehend a something external, the facts would have 
been explained much more satisfactorily. But let us 
go on with his explication. He calls attention to the 
circumstance, that " the sensations are joined in groups," 
so that " we should have, not some one sensation, but a 
" great and even an indefinite number and variety of 
" sensations, generally belonging to different senses, 
" but so linked together that the presence of one 
" announces the possible presence, at the same instant, 
" of any or all the rest" (p. 194). But let it be observed 
that w T e do not yet know that the sensations belong to 
different senses, or come from different parts of the 
body, and the groups of sensations can no more give us 
externality than the individual sensations. But then 
" we also recognise a fixed order in our sensations." 
We have not yet cause and effect, but we have " an 
" order of succession which, when ascertained by obser- 
" vation, gives rise to the ideas of cause and effect." 
" Whether we are asleep or awake the fire goes out, and 



112 BODY. 

" puts an end to one particular possibility of warmth 
" and light. Whether we are present or absent, the 
" corn ripens and brings a new possibility of food." I 
have again to remind Mr. Mill's readers that we do not 
yet know that we have bodies to sleep or wake ; the 
sleeping and waking, the fire and the corn, are all in us 
as sensations. The "present" and the "absent" slip 
in very dexterously ; but as yet we know no place at 
which we are present, or from which we may be absent. 
The incipient cause and effect are as yet mere ante- 
cedence and consequence within the mind. 

" When this point has been reached, the Permanent 
" Possibilities in question have assumed such unlikeness 
" of aspect, and such difference of position relatively to 
" us, from any sensations, that it would be contrary to 
" all we know of the constitution of human nature 
" that they should not be conceived as, and believed to 
" be, at least as different from sensations as sensations 
" are from one another" (p. 196). Still, all is within the 
thread of consciousness. But then it is said there is 
something in our " constitution" that makes us believe 
the possibilities to be different from sensations. I am 
glad of an appeal to our constitution, in which there is 
more, I believe, than Mr. Mill has unfolded. Yet I fear 
that the actual appeal is in no way complimentary. 
Our constitution makes us believe this "possibility" 
of sensations to be different from the sensations. But 
Mr. Mill does not say, and would not say, that our 
constitution is right in all this, or that there is any 
reality corresponding to the belief. I am not quite 



BODY. 113 

sure to what law of our constitution he refers. If it be 
his favourite principle of association of sensations, it is 
clear that it cannot help him, for the associated sensa- 
tions are all in the mind ; and if a train of sensations 
could give us (which, I believe, it cannot) what is not 
in the ideas, it must be in virtue of some power in 
the train which is not unfolded. If he mean the ten- 
dency, on which he dwells so much elsewhere, to give 
an external reality to things within, I admit that there 
is such a tendency in loose thinking ; but then it is in 
minds that have already reached a knowledge of some- 
thing outward, and it is for Mr. Mill to show, which 
would be difficult, that it could exist in a mind that as 
yet had no idea of externality. I cannot see that by 
either process Mr. Mill has got the conception of an 
outward world, and I am sure that neither process would 
justify our belief in the reality of such a world. A be- 
lief generated by an accidental or fatalistic association 
might be error quite as readily as truth, and the dis- 
position to give an external embodiment to internal 
feelings is avowedly illusory. Already we see those 
flaws in the foundation which render the whole struc- 
ture insecure, and make it impossible for man to be 
certain that he can reach any truth beyond the con- 
sciousness of the present sensation. 

Our author now crosses at one leap the widest gulf 
of all. " We find that they (possibilities of sensation) 
" belong as much to other human or sentient beings as 
" ourselves." " The world of possible sensations, succeed- 
" ing one another according to laws, is as much in other 



114 BODY. 

" beings as in me, it has therefore an existence outside 
" me ; it is an external world." But where in the pro- 
cession of internal feelings which has passed before us 
can other human beings come in ? "I conclude that 
" other human beings have feelings like me ; because, 
" first, they have bodies like me, which I know in my 
" own case to be the antecedent condition of feelings ; 
" and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts and other 
" outward signs which in my own case I know by ex- 
" perience to be caused by feelings." Doubtless, if we 
had got our bodily frames as out of ourselves, the argu- 
ment might have been conclusive. He tells us that we 
observe bodies which do not call up sensations in our 
consciousness ; and since they do not do so in my con- 
sciousness, I infer that they do it out of my conscious- 
ness. The inference might be legitimate, provided we 
had otherwise got an apprehension of things out of and 
beyond the consciousness. All reasoning is usually said 
to be from what we know ; but in this inference we 
have in the conclusion what is not in the premisses. 
Or, if we take Mr. Mill's theory of reasoning, that it is 
from particulars to particulars, by some sort of registered 
observation, the argument is seen to be equally falla- 
cious ; for we have no register of objects out of ourselves 
to authorize us to infer that these possibilities constitute 
an external world. I am not at all sure that Mr. Mill 
(p. 207) has cause to condemn Eeid, when he main- 
tains that a like position taken by Hume lands us in a 
system of solitary egoism, or, as Mr. Mill expresses it, 
that " the non ego altogether may be but a mode in 



BODY. 115 

i{ which the mind represents to itself the possible rnocli- 
" fications of the ego." I am convinced that it is not by 
such a process, that babies come to believe in the exist - 
ence of those who nurse them and are round about 
them. So far as I can see, ^Ir. Mill has never logically 
got out of the shell of the ego ; nor can I see how any 
one can get out of it, except by means of an original 
impulse. I suspect that in Mr. Mill's belief of the exist- 
ence of his fellow-men, for whose benefit he has written 
so many able volumes, there is involved a spontaneous 
step more convincing than his reflex logic. 

The conclusion reached is : " Matter may be defined, 
a permanent possibility of sensation" (p. 198). We 
shall not be in circumstances thoroughly to examine 
this definition till we have fully unfolded, in the next 
two heads,, the nature of our perceptions of Resistance 
and Extension,, which enter essentially into our appre- 
hension of Matter. Considered as an account even of 
Externality it is defective. I believe, indeed, that it is 
the only result which Mr. Mill can reach from his in- 
duction or his premisses. It should be observed that 
he does not, as some would expect him, define matter 
the Cause of sensations. Mr. Mill says what he means, 
and means what he says, when he describes Matter as 
the Possibility, not the cause of sensations. Dr. Brown, 
by help of ingenuity and tAvisting, could reach a cause, 
for he called in an intuitive conviction, which impels 
us when we discover a phenomenon to look for a cause ; 
and when, as in the case of certain sensations, we can- 
not get a cause within, we are driven to seek it without. 



116 BODY. 

His theory, however, was after all defective, for it 
makes matter, as a cause, unknown, whereas we 
know matter, as we shall see forthwith, as resisting 
our effort, and as extended. But Mr. Mill cannot be 
sure, and does not profess to be sure, that he has 
reached matter even as an unknown cause. For our 
sensations have no discoverable causes within the mind ; 
and as we have no sensitive experience of sensations 
having causes, and no original conviction constraining 
us to seek for a cause, it is quite conceivable that they 
have no causes. But do these ' possibilities' amount 
to the idea, which we have, of an outward world ? So 
far as we have gone, we do not seem to be beyond the 
' series of feelings,' for the idea we have got is simply 
of possibilities of sensation. Mr. Mill thinks that 
" both philosophers and the world at large, when they 
" think of matter, conceive it really as a Permanent Pos- 
" sibility of Sensation" (p. 200). 1 The ' permanence' is 
really an important element, presupposing the idea of 
time, and of the past and the future; all of which 
carry us into a region high above sensation, and imply 
mental faculties with an extensive capacity and wide 

1 Mr. Mill (p. 200) admits that the majority of philosophers fancy that 
matter is something more, and that the world at large, if asked the ques- 
tion, would undoubtedly agree with the philosophers. But then he 
accounts for this " imaginary conception," as he calls it, by two tenden- 
cies of the mind,— one derived from our observation of differences, the 
other from our observation that every experience has a cause ; it is thus 
that we are led to suppose that things have a substantive reality. As I do 
not stand up for a substance different from the thing known, I do not re- 
quire to examine this theory. In future chapters his defective view of the 
comparative power of the mind and of causation will be subjected to 
criticism. 



BODY. 117 

range. But not even with this addition does the de- 
scription come up to the reality, I mean mental reality. 
Mr. Mill says that these "Permanent Possibilities" are 
now " conceived as, and believed to be, as different from 
" sensations as sensations are from one another" (p. 
196). It should be observed that the sensations thus 
discovered to be different, are all sensations hi the 
" series of feelings" or " thread of consciousness." But 
our apprehension of an outward world is of something, 
not only differing from the sensations as one sensa- 
tion differs from another, but different from the self, 
which, as we have found in last chapter, we know as 
sentient. We apprehend the material object as an 
existing thing — quite as much as the self, but distinct 
from the self. 1 It never has been shown how the ego, 

i Professor Bain reaches the conclusion : " It is quite true that the 
" object of consciousness, which we call Externality, is still a mode of 
" self in the most comprehensive sense, but not in the usual restricted 
" sense of 'self and 'mind,' which are names for the subject to the ex- 
clusion of the object" {Senses and Intellect, p. 381). We are accus- 
tomed to say that " light exists as independent fact, with or without any 
" eyes to see it. But if we consider the case fairly, we shall see that 
" this assertion errs not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can 
" have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming that to 
" have an existence out of our miuds which we cannot know but as in 
" our minds. In words, we assert independent existence, while in the 
"very act of doing so we contradict ourselves" (p. 385). Again, "we 
" are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material 
" world ; the very act is a contradiction" (p. 379). At this point extreme 
sensationalism and extreme idealism, Mr. Bain and Mr. Ferrier, meet and 
are one ; it would be a contradiction to speak of the one as independent 
of the other ; they are joined in this philosophy of identity, which tran- 
scends that of Hegel himself ! But joking aside, it is easy to represent the 
doctrine which affirms the existence of independent objects out of the mind 
so as to make it contradictory ; but there is no contradiction in the doc- 
trine when correctly stated. Of course, knowledge is in a mind, but it 
may be of an existence " out of our minds." 



118 BODY. 

by reasoning or any other logical process, can give the 
non ego. I must therefore look on the ego as having a 
capacity of discovering the non ego, directly or indirectly. 
Mr. Mill has utterly failed to rear up the actual mental 
idea and conviction from the postulated materials. Till 
such time as a mean can be pointed out by which we 
can reach the outward world as an existence, I cling to 
the belief that the self is endowed with a capacity of 
immediately knowing not only the self, but the not-self. 

But it will be necessary to review Mr. Mill's theory 
of the genesis of our idea of Matter more carefully. 
We shall find it throughout a series of assumptions, no 
one of which admits of proof, and some of which can be 
disproven. Often do I wish, as I examine it, that Sir 
William Hamilton had been still alive to brush away by 
his sweeping logic the ingenuities which are employed 
to support it. " Our conception of Matter," says Mr. 
Mill, " comes ultimately to consist of Eesistance, Exten- 
" sion, and Figure, together with miscellaneous powers 
" of exciting other sensations" (p. 219). There is a pal- 
pable omission here, for it omits those powers (specially 
mentioned by Locke, Essay, B. n. c. ii. § 23) by which 
one body operates upon another ; " thus the sun has a 
power to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid." 
It is enough for us here to examine Mr. Mill's theory 
of the production of the idea of Eesistance and of 
Extension. 

(2.) We have certainly an idea of Resistance and a 
belief in it. In the mature man it becomes a perception, 
and a conviction of an object out of the body, or in the 



BODY. 119 

"body, resisting an effort to move a member of the body. 
In next chapter I will give some account of the sense 
which reveals the resisting object; for the present we 
are examining Mr. Mill's theory (see pp. 219-21). " Ee- 
" sistance is only another name for a sensation of our 
muscular frame, combined with one of touch." It should 
be remarked that this language is not meant to imply 
that w r e have a muscle, or that we have skin ; the re- 
sistance and the touch must yet be considered as sen- 
sations in the mind. " When we contract the muscles 
" of our arm, either by an exertion of will or by an 
" involuntary discharge of our spontaneous nervous ac- 
" tivity, the contraction is accompanied by a state of sen- 
" sation, which is different according as the locomotion, 
" consequent on the muscular contraction, continues 
" freely or meets with an impediment. In the former case 
" the sensation is that of motion through empty space." 
We shall see that we seem to have no sensation of 
motion in empty space. When our muscular effort is 
not opposed by anything without the body, what we 
have is a feeling of tension, or of one muscle resisting 
another. But let this pass, as having no special con- 
nexion with our present discussion. He goes on to 
say, that if we will to exert our muscular force, and the 
exertion is accompanied by the usual muscular sensa- 
tion, but the expected sensation of locomotion does not 
follow^, we have what is called the feeling of resistance, 
or, in other words, of muscular motion, and that feeling 
is the fundamental element in the notion of matter. 
He shows how " skin sensations of simple contact in- 



120 BODY. 

11 variably accompany the muscular sensations of resist- 
" ance ;" how our sensations of touch " become represen- 
" tative of the sensations of resistance with which they 
" habitually coexist ;" and " our idea of matter as a re- 
" sistiug cause of miscellaneous sensations is now consti- 
" tuted." Every one knows that the muscular sense and 
touch combine, to give us the knowledge of matter as 
a resisting object. But does Mr. Mill's account come 
fully up to the facts falling under the eye of conscious- 
ness ? Does his theory explain the facts ? Both 
questions must be answered in the negative. In touch, 
as we shall see in next chapter, we localize, I believe 
intuitively, our sensations in a given direction, and at 
a given point in the surface of the body. Again, in 
the exercise of the locomotive energy, accompanied by 
muscular sensation, we have a sense of a member of our 
body which we will to move, of which member we 
must have some idea, otherwise we could not form a 
volition regarding it ; and we have a perception of this 
member in motion, resisted by a body out of our frame. 
Mr. Mill's theory does not yield all of these, — I rather 
think not even any one of these thoroughly. It takes 
no notice of the volition which moves the member, for 
this would introduce an element above sensations. It 
is not consistent with that idea of a member of the 
body, which is necessary to the volition ; for the theory 
to be consistent must presuppose that we have yet no 
knowledge of our bodily frame. There can yet be no 
apprehension of motion in space, for as yet we have no 
idea of space. The idea is not even of resistance, pro- 



BODY. 121 

perly speaking, for we have no idea of a resisting 
object. So far as we have gone we have only sensa- 
tions differing from each other in feeling or in intensity, 
and sensations coexisting, and sensations succeeding 
each other, and sensations the signs of other sensations. 

(3.) The mature man has also an idea of Extension 
and a belief in Extended objects. We have an apprehen- 
sion and a conviction of our bodies as extended, and of 
other bodies as extended, that is, as occupying space, as 
being contained in space, as being of a certain spatial 
form, and as being movable in space. Can the sensa- 
tion and association theory account for the generation of 
this mental phenomenon? I believe it breaks clown 
both psychologically and physiologically.- 

At this point Mr. Mill hands us over to his friend 
Professor Bain, who, in The Senses and the Intellect, has 
elaborated into a minute system the general statements 
scattered throughout Mr. Mill's Logic. Beginning with 
Feelings he goes on to Thought, making; its fundamental 
attributes to be Consciousness of Difference, Conscious- 
ness of Agreement, and Pietentiveness ; and he builds 
up his system mainly out of Feelings by means of the 
laws of Association by Contiguity and Eesemblance. I 
cannot in a work like this, devoted to a different indi- 
vidual, review Mr. Bain's theories. But I beg to ask 
whether we ever have Feeling without some perception 
of an object, say self, as feeling ? Feelings, even such 
as joy or pain, are mere abstracts separated from our con- 
sciousness of self, as rejoicing or in distress. A proper 
psychological system should begin with the concrete 



122 BODY. 

perception, and not with a quality separated from it. 
So much for his foundation. And as to his mode of 
building, it will he shown to he altogether unsatisfac- 
tory, in the strictures we have to offer on such subjects 
as Association of Ideas, Comparison, and Eelativity of 
Knowledge, as treated by Mr. Mill. Mr. Bain has 
received great praise for combining physiology with 
psychology. It is true that in his introduction, and in 
various parts of his work, he has given an account of 
the anatomy and physiology of the brain and nerves 
and organs of movement. But there is a mighty gap, 
which he can scarcely be said to have tried to fill 
up, between these unconscious parts and the conscious 
thoughts and feelings of mind proper. The most valu- 
able part of his work is that in which he describes, more 
minutely than had ever been done before, the feelings 
excited by muscular and nervous action, accounting, I 
think, so far successfully, for many of our spontaneous 
and supposed instinctive movements. But he is out of 
his proper region when he comes to deal with the pecu- 
liar operations and the higher ideas of the mind. With 
a fine capacity for observing bodily affections, and an 
undoubted vigour and tenacity of intellect in dealing 
with material facts, he seems to be unfitted for realiz- 
ing fully pure mental or spiritual phenomena, as falling 
simply under the eye of consciousness. He makes as 
much use of nerve-forces as Hartley did of vibrations, 
and seems to identify conscious feelings with them, 
making the current and the consciousness two sides 
of one thing. Even when he is professedly treating of 



BODY. 123 

Emotions, Thoughts, and Volitions, he has great dif- 
ficulty in rising above nerve affections ; and when he 
does make the attempt, it is immediately to fall back 
to his old level of sensations. He is to be constantly 
watched when he would draw our higher ideas of neces- 
sary truth, of beauty and of moral good from sensitive 
affections variously associated. It could be shown, that 
in treating of our intellectual and moral and voluntary 
operations, while apparently proceeding in so matter of 
fact a manner, he is continually passing, without seeing 
it, from unconscious to conscious action, from bodily 
sensations to mental ideas, and advancing hypotheses as 
to the influence of nervous and muscular action, which 
could be shown to be true only by their explaining all 
the mental facts revealed by consciousness ; and this he 
cannot be said to have attempted, as consciousness is 
seldom consulted, even formally or professedly. There 
is proof of all this in his theory of what constitutes our 
idea of extension and its mode of growth. 

In the earlier editions of his Logic (B. I. c. iii. § 7), 
Mr. Mill had described Brown as showing clearly that 
the notions of extension and figure are derived " from 
" sensations of touch, combined with sensations of a class 
" previously too little adverted to by metaphysicians 
" — those which have their seat in the muscular frame." 
He adds, characteristically, " Whoever wishes to be 
" more particularly acquainted with this admirable 
" specimen of metaphysical analysis, may consult the 
" first volume of Brown's Lectures or Mill's Analysis of 
" the Mind." The thought has germinated, and in his 



124 BODY. 

later editions he is able to refer to Mr. Alexander Bain 
and Mr. Herbert Spencer as following out the investi- 
gation. Mr. Bain has certainly taken up the idea, and 
ridden it to exhaustion, I should say to death. 

" We may accede,''" says Professor Bain, as quoted by 
Mr. Mill (p. 226), "to the assertion sometimes made, 
" that the properties of space might be conceived or felt 
" in the absence of an external world, or any other 
" matter than that composing the body of the percipient 
" being ; for the body's own movements in empty space 
" would suffice to make the very same impressions on 
:> the mind as the movements excited by outward objects. 
" A perception of length, or height, or speed, is the 
" mental impression or state of consciousness accompany- 
" ing some mode of muscular movement, and this move- 
" ment may be generated from within as well as from 
" without.'*' In criticising this theory, so cloudy in its 
outline, we are placed in difficulties, in consequence of 
its not being clear whether Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain 
assume the existence of the bodily frame as a material 
object, in the common acceptation, as implying objective 
existence and extension, or, even in their own sense, as 
" the mere possibility of sensations." Are they accounting 
for the extra-mental world, including the bodily frame ? 
or simply for the extra-organic world ? In most places 
Mr. Bain seems to posit the body as a reality. In the 
passage quoted, he speaks of the matter composing "the 
body of the percipient being," as if he needed it to 
explain our idea of " the properties of space." He 
talks of a movement being " generated from within," 



BODY. 125 

which cannot mean within the mind, which is a mere 
series of feelings ; it must mean within the body, which 
is quietly assumed. The whole plausibility, I had 
almost said intelligibility, certainly the expressibility, 
of the theory lies in its being supposed that there is a 
body, and even an extended body. He derives all from 
nerve- currents which imply space, and motion in space 
and he constructs the idea of extension by a sweep of the 
hand, or a sweep of the eye, or a volume of feeling, which, 
if taken metaphorically, explain nothing, and if taken 
literally, that is, as actualities, imply space and motion 
in space. But if the body is assumed as known imme- 
diately, then there is admitted a vast body of intuition, 
of which he should have measured the amount, and ac- 
knowledged the significance. Or if it be said that the 
bodily frame is assumed as an hypothesis, the answer 
is obvious. If it explains, as he thinks (I do not), the 
whole facts, then the hypothesis is rendered probable, 
and he must adhere to it ; for the author of an hypo- 
thesis cannot be allowed to employ it to reach a con- 
clusion and then abandon it ; on the contrary, he must 
keep by it and all its logical consequences. On what- 
ever ground assumed, it is clear that when assumed 
there is little left to call for explanation. After we 
have got our own bodies, with " matter " composing 
them, capable of taking a " sweep," and of having " a 
movement generated within," it can be no difficult 
matter to conceive of other bodies being extended, 
and in motion, and resisting our movement. 

But in this discussion I must in all fairness suppose 



126 BODY. 

that he does not assume the existence of the bodily 
frame. 1 His business is to show, on his theory, how 
our conception in regard to body is generated. As he 
attempts to do so, I am entitled, after this statement, 
to take care that he does not assume surreptitiously 
what he professes to produce by a process. He has as 
yet got nothing but a series of feelings, with a possi- 
bility of sensations coming no one can tell from what 
quarter. I cannot allow him, in order that he may in- 
geniously get more, to employ a supposed body with 
a " sweep" and " contractions." 

" When a muscle," says Mr. Bain, as quoted by Mr. 
Mill (see pp. 222-24), " begins to contract, or a limb to 
" bend, we have a distinct sense how far the contraction 
" and the bending are carried ; there is something in 
" the special sensibility that makes one mode of feeling 

1 Since writing the above, I find Mr. Herbert Spencer saying of Mr. 
Mill : " If, knowing more than his own states of consciousness, he declines 
" to acknowledge anything beyond consciousness until it is proved, he 
" may go on reasoning for ever without getting any further ; since the 
" perpetual elaboration of states of consciousness out of states of con- 
" sciousness can never produce anything more than states of conscious- 
" ness. If, contrariwise, he postulates external existence, and considers 
" it as merely postulated, then the whole fabric of his argument, standing 
" upon this postulate, has no greater validity than the postulate gives it, 
" minus the possible invalidity of the argument itself. The case must not 
" be confounded with those cases in which an hypothesis or provisional 
" assumption is eventually proved true by its agreement with facts ; for 
" in these cases the facts with which it is found to agree are facts known 
" in some other way than through the hypothesis : a calculated eclipse of 
" the moon serves as a verification of the hypothesis of gravitation, because 
" its occurrence is observable without taking for granted the hypothesis 
" of gravitation. But when the external world is postulated, and it is 
" supposed that the validity of the postulate may be shown by the ex- 
" planation of mental phenomena which it furnishes, the vice is that the 
" process of verification is itself possible only by assuming the thing to be 
" proved."— Art., M^ll v. Hamilton, in The Fortnightly Review, No. V. 



BODY. 127 

" for half contraction, another for three-fourths, and an- 
". other for total contraction." " If the sense of degrees of 
" range be thus admitted as a genuine muscular deter - 
" urination, its functions in outward perception are very 
" important. The attributes of extension and space fall 
" under its scope. In the first place, it gives the feel- 
" ing of linear extension, inasmuch as this is measured 
" by the sweep of a limb or other organ moved by the 
" muscles. The difference between six inches and 
" eighteen inches is expressed to us by the different 
" degrees of contraction of some one group of muscles ; 
" those, for example, that flex the arm, or, in walking, 
" those that flex or extend the lower limb. The in- 
" ward impression corresponding to the outward fact of 
" six inches in length, is an impression arising from the 
" continued shortening of a muscle — a true muscular 
" sensibility. It is the impression of a muscular effort 
" having a certain continuance ; a greater length pro- 
" duces a greater continuance (or a more rapid move- 
" nient), and, in consequence, an increased feeling of 
" expended power. The discrimination of length in 
" any one direction includes extension in any direc- 
" tion." This reads very like assuming an extended 
bodily arm taking a sweep, and thus giving us the idea 
of extension. Of course we understand, on reflection, 
that the sweep is only a sensation in the " series of 
feelings," but when we understand this, we see how far 
we are from having the idea of extension produced. 

In explanation of the theory, Mr. Mill says, " Mr. 
" Bain recognises two principal kinds or modes of clis- 



128 BODY. 

" criminative sensibility in the muscular sense : the 
" one corresponding to the degree of intensity of the 
" muscular effort — the amount of energy put forth ; 
" the other corresponding to the duration — the longer 
" or shorter continuance of the same effort. The first 
" makes us acquainted with degrees of resistance, 
" which we estimate by the intensity of the muscular 
" energy required to overcome it. To the second we 
" owe, in Mr. Bain's opinion, our idea of extension." 
I have already commented on the defects in Mr. Mill's 
account of oar apprehension of resistance. We have 
here to consider the theory of the genesis of the idea of 
extension. It is referred to the continuance of a sen- 
sation. 

And here it is proper to state, that some deny the 
existence of such a sensation as arising when the arm 
sweeps through empty space. E. H: Weber had come, 
in 1852, to the conclusion : — " Of the voluntary motion 
" of our limbs we know originally nothing. We do not 
" perceive the motion of our muscles by their own 
" sensations, but attain a knowledge of them only 
" when perceived by another sense. The muscles most 
" under our control are those of the eye and the voice, 
" which perform motions microscopically small, yet 
" we have no consciousness of the motion. We move 
" the diaphragm voluntarily against the heavy pres- 
" sure of the liver, etc., yet with as little consciousness 
" of the motion. It follows that the motions of our 
" limbs must be observed by sight or touch in order 
" to learn that they move, and in what direction." 



BODY. 129 

Mr. Abbot quotes this passage in Ms Sight and Touch 
(p. 71), and lie adds, " The more recent researches of 
" Aubert and Kainmler not only confirm this result, but 
" tend further to prove that there is not in the muscles 
" any sense whatever of their contraction." " Accord- 
" ingly, they remark that the friction of our clothing is a 
" considerable aid in judging of our motions, especially 
" if it is close fitting. When wearing boots, etc., with 
" which we are not familiar, we are less certain of our 
" judgments, and .this is the more noticeable in riding, 
'•' as the eye does not then control our judgment." The 
question is for physiologists to settle. I am not satis- 
fied that the Germans referred to can have established 
their point. But until there is a more thorough deter- 
mination of the exact function of the nerves attached 
to the muscles, it is preposterous to found a huge meta- 
physical theory on our muscular sensations when the 
arm moves in empty space. 

My opinion on such a subject is of no value, but I 
am disposed to think that we have a sense of the con- 
traction of at least some of our muscles, and of its con- 
tinuance. 1 On the supposition that we have a sense of 
resistance, which seems established, the muscles of our 
arm, being always in a state of more or less tension, 
must feel the resistance offered bv one muscle to another. 



1 Mr. H. Lewes thinks he has demonstrated the existence of the Mus- 
cular Sense. He skinned a frog, and thus made it insensible to external 
impressions, and found it " to manifest all those phenomena usually attri- 
buted to the muscular sense" (Brit. Assoc, 1859). We require a more 
thorough investigation of the relations, ?nd differences, of the precise 
functions of the nerves of touch-proper and the muscular se:ise. 

1 



130 BODY. 

Dr. Kirkes says that the muscles " possess sensibility 
" by means of the sensitive nerve-fibres distributed in 
" them. The amount of common sensibility in muscles 
" is not great." " But they have a peculiar sensibility, 
" or at least a peculiar modification of common sensi- 
" bility, which is shown in that their nerves can com - 
" municate to the mind an accurate knowledge of their 
" states and position when in action" (Phys., p. 530, 
5th ed.) We may, therefore, know the contractions. 
Bat let us take along with us the full facts. The sense 
of touch-proper, as we shall see in next chapter, always 
refers the sensations to the points in the skin at which 
the nerves terminate ; and the muscular sense merely 
intimates that one organ is resisting another. In that 
" sweep of the arm," of which Mr. Bain makes so much, 
there is implied, first, a direction of the points of sen- 
sation in the skin, secondly, a muscular resistance, and, 
I rather think, thirdly, an experience to enable us to 
combine the two. There is, I suspect, a further element. 
In whatever way it may begin, the continuance of the 
experimental bending of the arm, which Mr. Bain em- 
ploys, must be done by the will. But a vague direc- 
tionless effort will not move a limb, still less continue 
to move it in a certain way. The volition to continue 
the sweep of the arm implies a contemplated end, or 
some idea of the arm, and a belief in its existence, and, 
1 should think, in its extension. It thus appears that 
it is to reverse the proper order of things, to make the 
continuance of " the sweep of the arm" constitute or 
give us the idea of extension. In the very movement 



BODY. 131 

we have an idea of an extended arm by touch-proper 
or feeling ; as we move the arm, we become acquainted 
with the resistance of one felt member by another ; and 
in order to the continuance of the voluntary sweep, 
there must be some apprehension, more or less vague, 
of the limb which we continue to move. 

There are many serious physiological difficulties in 
the way of accepting this muscular theory. The extent 
of a sweep of the arm does not depend merely on the 
amount of force put forth ; nor does it depend solely on 
the continuance of the effort : it depends also on the 
proportionate length of the two arms of the lever on 
which the muscle operates. For instance, the biceps 
muscle of the arm is inserted an inch below the elbow- 
joint, whilst the distance from the point of insertion to 
the end of the limb may be sixteen inches. When the 
muscle contracts to a certain extent, the rapidity of the 
movement at the extremity will be sixteen times as 
great as it would have been if the insertion had been 
at the extremity ; and, on the other hand, the force em- 
ployed by the muscle has been sixteen times as great 
as would have been required if the insertion had been 
at the extremity. A large amount of force is thus ex- 
pended in order to secure the great advantage of rapidity 
of movement. It is clear, therefore, that neither the 
intensity nor the extent of contraction can give us the 
amount of motion in the part on which the muscle 
operates ; and, that while the muscular sense may in- 
form us of the intensity, and extent of the intensity, and 
extent of the contraction of the fibres of a muscle, it can 



132 BODY. 

give us no information of the extent of the movement 
of our limbs, till after long experience applied to each 
limb. " It is doubtful/' says Dr. Kirkes (Phys., p. 646), 
" how far the extent of muscular movement is obtained 
" from sensations in the muscles themselves. The sen- 
" sation of movement attending the motions of the hand 
" is very slight ; and persons who do not know that the 
" action of particular muscles is necessary for the pro- 
" duction of given movements, do not suspect that the 
" movement of the fingers, for example, depends on 
" action in the forearm." Mr. Abbot has pressed some 
of the difficulties (Sight and Touch, p. 70) : " Let us 
" suppose a blind man trying to get the notion of dis 
•• tance from the motion of his hand. He finds a cer- 
" tain sweep of the hand brings it into contact with a 
" desk ; the distance of which, therefore, is represented 
" by that effort. But it requires a greater effort to 
" reach the eyes or the nose ; and distance being 
" z= locomotive effort, it is demonstrated that the nose 
" extends beyond the desk. The top of the head must 
" be conceived as more remote, and the back farthest 
" of all. In general, when we refer distances to the 
" eye, as we habitually do, objects four inches from the 
" eye must appear farther from us than those at twelve. 
" This is another novelty. But again, since the hand 
" moves in curves, and cannot without considerable 
" effort be made to move in a straight line, it is also 
" demonstrated that an epicycloid is shorter than a 
" right line between the same points." 

But, after all, the question is to be decided by psycho- 



BODY. 133 

logical rather than physiological considerations. The 
phenomenon to be explained is our idea of extension, 
and consciousness will require to be consulted. The 
theory was started by Brown, and Hamilton had thus 
examined it (Append., Eeid's Works, p. 869) : " The 
" notion of Time or succession being supposed, that 
" of longitudinal extension is given in the succession of 
" feelings which accompanies the gradual contraction 
" of a muscle ; the notion of this succession constitutes 
" ipso facto the notion of a certain length ; and the 
" notion of this length" (he quietly takes for granted) 
" is the notion of longitudinal extension sought. The 
" paralogism here is transparent. Length is an ambi- 
" guous term ; and it is length in space, extensive length, 
" and not length in time protensive, whose notion it 
" is the problem to solve." Mr. Mill (p. 227) quotes 
this language, and tries to avoid the argument by urging 
that the " assertion of Brown, and of all who hold 
" the Psychological theory, is that the notion of length 
" in space, not being in our consciousness originally, 
" is constructed by the mind's laws out of the notion of 
" length in time. The argument is not, as Sir William 
" Hamilton fancied, a fallacious confusion between two 
" different meanings of the word length, but an iden- 
" tification of them as one." This statement is cer- 
tainly sufficiently clear, but it crowns the absurdity. 
" When we say that there is a space between A and B, 
" we mean that some amount of these muscular sensa- 
" tions must intervene ; and when we say the space is 
" greater or less, we mean that the series of sensation 



134 BODY. 

" (amount of muscular effort being given) is longer or 
" shorter." " Now this, which is unquestionably the 
" mode in which we become aware of sensation, is con- 
" sidered by the psychologists in question to be exten- 
" sion." I need not repeat that what is here represented 
as unquestionable, has been questioned physiologically. 
But we are now discussing the psychological question. 

We have here three different phenomena — con- 
sciousness being the witness. We have — (1.) Series of 
Muscular Sensations ; (2.) Length of Time ; (3.) Length 
of Space. These three may have relations one to an- 
other, but they are surely diverse from one another. 
Mr. Mill explains that he does not draw the one from 
the other, which would be preposterous enough, but he 
declares them identical, which is absurd in the extreme. 
It matches the doctrine of Hegel, justly regarded as the 
reductio ad absurdum of his whole philosophy, that all 
things are one. Hegel lessened the absurdity of this 
statement by another, that all things are different ; but 
Mr. Mill has no such explanation to offer, for he de- 
clares muscular sensations, time, and space to be iden- 
tical, without a difference. Mr. Mill gives a scanty 
enough account of the faculties of the mind, but he 
acknowledges that we possess a power of discerning 
differences. If we can trust our capacities at all, they 
declare that the three things under consideration are as 
different as any one thing can be from any other. 

A series of muscular sensations and length of time are 
surely different. They are different in themselves, and 
we can conceive an animated being, say a lobster, to 



BODY. 135 

have a succession of sensations, and yet no idea of time. 
Again, series of muscular sensations and extension are 
not the same. The series of feelings excited as I pass 
my hand over a table is not the same as the yard square 
which is the size of the table. Curious consequences 
would seem to follow from this doctrine of identity. If, 
in the next attempt with the same series of sensations, 
my hand passed over a table two yards long, the theory 
would identify the time with two yards, as before it did 
with one ; and as Mr. Mill admits the law of identity 
(see ©.), or, that things which are identical with the 
same thing are identical with one another, it would make 
one yard, which is the same with a series of sensations, 
identical with two yards, which is identical with the 
same series of sensations. To represent this otherwise. 
The length of time taken by us to travel between 
London and Paris does not merely help us (as every 
one admits) to estimate the length of way when we 
have an idea of the rate at which we are travelling (as 
the thermometer measures heat for us), but is the very 
same with the length of the way ; and as we travel it in 
a longer or shorter time, or with more or fewer sensa- 
tions, so is the length of way actually longer or shorter 
at different times. If we draw back from such conse- 
quences by appealing to a different measure, would not 
this show that we had unfortunately taken the wrong 
rule ? But, after all, I will not positively affirm that 
such consequences follow, for the doctrine is one that 
baffles all reasoning, because it sets aside the first pre- 
misses of reasoning. Mr. Abbot says very properly. 



136 BODY. 

• : Indeed the obvious differences between the two ideas 
" are so great, that a philosopher who has neglected 
" them can scarcely be convinced by more abstruse 
" considerations. Thus, muscular effort- has degrees, its 
" parts are not equal ; extension does not admit of 
" degrees, its parts are equal. Extension has three 
" dimensions, muscular effort only one. The parts of 
" extension are co-existent, those of muscular effort are 
" successive." Finally, length of time and length of space 
are not the same. As well might we identify colours 
with smells, sounds with shapes, sweet with sour, light 
•with darkness, love with hatred, virtue with vice, Mr. 
Mill with Sir William Hamilton, as identify extension 
with duration. 

Mr. Mill's attempt to get support to his hypothesis 
from the sense of sight is, if possible, still more unsuc- 
cessful. He is obliged to suppose that in vision we 
have originally only a sensation of colour, and that the 
idea of an extended surface is given by, or rather is 
identical with, the time occupied by the muscular sen- 
sations as we move the eye. Sir William Hamilton, in 
reviewing Berkeley, had noticed the doctrine that the 
eye gives us only colour, and his criticism has commonly 
been regarded as amounting almost to a demonstration : 
" All parties are, of course, at one in regard to the fact 
" that we see colour. Those who hold that we see ex- 
" tension, admit that we see it only as coloured ; and 
" those who deny us any vision of extension make colour 
" the exclusive object of sight. In regard to this first 
" position all are therefore agreed. Nor are they less 



BODY. 137 

" harmonious in reference to the second ; that the power 
" of perceiving colour involves the power of perceiving 
" the differences of colours. By sight we, therefore, per- 
" ceive colour, and discriminate one colour, that is, one 
" coloured body, — one sensation of colour, from another. 
" This is admitted. A third position will also be denied 
" by none, that the colours discriminated in vision are, 
" or may be, placed side by side in immediate juxta- 
" position ; or one may limit another by being super - 
" induced partially over it. A fourth position is equally 
" indisputable ; that the contrasted colours, thus bound- 
" ing each other, will form by their meeting a visible 
" line, and that, if the superinduced colour be sur- 
" rounded by the other, this line will return upon itself, 
" and thus constitute the outline of a visible figure. 
" These four positions command a peremptory assent ; 
" they are all self-evident. But their admission at once 
" explodes the paradox under discussion" — (that exten- 
sion cannot be cognised by sight alone). " And thus : 
" A line is extension in one dimension — length ; a figure 
" is extension in two — length and breadth. Therefore 
" the vision of a line is a vision of extension in length ; 
" the vision of a figure, the vision of extension in length 
" and breadth" (Metaph. vol. ii. p. 167). 

Mr. Mill acknowledges " I cannot make the answer 
to this argument as thorough and conclusive as I could 
wish" (p. 239). His attempts to lessen its force are 
exceedingly weak and palpably insufficient. He calls 
attention to the circumstance that the eye " does not 
" cognise visible figure by means of colour alone, but 



138 * BODY. 

" by all those motions and modifications of the muscles 
" connected with the eye, which have so great a share 
" in giving us our acquired perceptions of sight." Be it 
so, the demonstration remains untouched, that we take 
in figure when we take in colour. He says, that an eye 
immovably fixed " gives a full and clear vision of but a 
small portion of space." The admission is sufficient for 
our purpose. He throws us once more on Mr. Bain, who 
tells us, " When we look at a circle, say one-tenth 
" of an inch in diameter, the eye can take in the whole 
" of it without movement," The tenth of an inch is as 
good as a whole inch, or a foot, or a yard. In the tenth 
of an inch is extension with a boundary, and may be a 
measure to aid us in ascertaining the extent we can 
take in by the sweep of the eyes. Mr. Mill admits " a 
" rudimentary conception must be allowed ; for it is evi- 
" dent that even without moving the eye we are capable 
" of having two sensations of colour at once, and that 
" the boundary which separates the colours must give 
" some specific affection of sight." He would lessen the 
significance of this admission in a very unworthy man- 
ner : " But to confer on these discriminative impres- 
" sions the name which denotes our matured and per- 
" fected cognition of extension, or even to assume that 
" they have anything in common with it, seems to be 
" going beyond evidence." No one maintains that our 
primary vision of a surface by the eye comes up to our 
perfected cognition of extension ; still it is a surface, 
and it has a boundary, and therefore it has something 
in common with it. Mr. Bain tells us, " We may still, 



BODY. 139 

" however, see very strong grounds for maintaining the 
" presence of a muscular element, even in this instance." 
Be it so, the demonstration of Hamilton holds good, 
that in the two colours in this space, whether with or 
without the aid of the muscles, we have lines and 
spaces. But he adds, " In the second place, the essential 
" import of visible form is something not attainable 
" without the experience of moving the eye. If we 
" looked at a little round spot, we should know an 
" optical difference between it and a triangular spot ; 
" and we should recognise it as identical with another 
" round spot." And then, subjecting the fact to his theory, 
instead of forming his theory from the facts, he tells us, 
" We mean by a round form something which would 
take a given sweep of the eye to comprehend it." I 
suppose this is what he means by the import of form, 
that it is the time spent in muscular action (!), which I 
rather think might be the same for a square, or a triangle, 
or an oval, of a certain size, as for a circle. I really 
cannot understand how we should optically know the 
difference of the figures, unless we perceived them as 
figures. In spite of all these perverted attempts at the 
resolution of them into something else, there still re- 
mains the surface and the boundary perceived by the eye. 
Failing utterly in the psychological analysis, Mr. 
Bain and Mr. Mill (p. 232) fall back on a statement of 
Platner, which Sir William Hamilton had copied into 
his Lectures without knowing what to make of it. " In 
" regard to the visionless representation of space or 
" extension, the attentive observation of a person born 



140 BODY. 

" blind, which I formerly instituted in the year 1785, 
" and again in relation to the point in question, have 
" continued for three whole weeks — this observation, I 
" say, has convinced me that the sense of touch by 
" itself is altogether incompetent to afford us the repre- 
" sentation of extension and space, and is not even 
" cognisant of local exteriority ; in a word, that a man 
" deprived of sight has absolutely no perception of an 
" outer world beyond the existence of something effec- 
" tive, different from his own feeling of passivity, and in 
" general only of the numerical diversity, — shall I say 
" of impressions or of things ? In fact, to those born 
" blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and dis- 
" tance means in their mouths nothing more than the 
" shorter or longer time, the smaller or greater number 
" of feelings which they find necessary to attain from 
" some one feeling to another. That a person blind 
" from birth employs the language of vision — that may 
" occasion considerable error ; and did, indeed, at the 
" commencement of my observations, lead me wrong ; 
" but, in point of fact, he knows nothing of things as 
" existing out of each other ; and (this in particular I 
" have very clearly remarked) if objects, and the parts 
" of his body touched by them, did not make different 
" kinds of impressions on his nerves of sensation, he 
" would take everything external for one and the same. 
" In his own body he absolutely did not discriminate 
" head and foot at all by their distance, but merely by 
" the difference of the feelings (and his perceptions of 
" such differences was incredibly fine) which he ex- 



BODY. 141 

" perienced from the one and from the other, and, 
" moreover, through time. In like manner, in external 
'- bodies, he distinguished their figure merely by the 
" varieties of impressed feelings ; inasmuch, for example, 
" as the cube by its angles affected his feelings differently 
" from the sphere." 

Let it be observed of this account, that it is largely 
theoretical, by one who believed with Kant, that there 
were a priori forms of space and time in the mind, 
and that these were brought forth empirically only by 
the sense of sight. Platner does not give us the facts 
to enable us to judge for ourselves ; he favours us only 
with his conclusions. His observations carry us as far 
back as 1785, when the distinction between touch- 
proper and the muscular sense was not established. 
Later physiological research has shown that, in the case 
of the blind, as in all others, touch-proper makes us 
localize the affections of our bodily frame, and that the 
muscular sense gives us " something effective, different 
from our feeling of passivity : " we may add, different 
from our felt bodily frame. It has been proven by 
later and fully detailed researches, that those born blind 
know their own body as extended by the common sen- 
sations of feeling, and know extra-organic objects by 
the resistance offered to their muscular efforts. Even 
Mr. Mill is obliged to modify and explain Platner 5 s 
statement (p. 233) : — " But Platner, though uninten- 
" tionally, puts a false colour on the matter when he 
" says that his patient had no perception of extension ; 
" he had conceptions of extension after his own man- 



142 BODY. 

" ner ;" in fact, " all that is meant by persons who see." 
Without this explanation the statement of Platner would 
be fatal to the theory of Mill, who makes us get our 
knowledge of extension from the muscular feelings, 
and not as Platner, whose avowed aim is to get it from 
sight. With this explanation it can help neither side, 
for it puts those who see in the same position as the 
blind, and those who see will be admitted by all to 
have " a perception of an outer world" by the sense of 
touch. I believe that Platner may be right when he 
says that " local exteriority," that is, objects out of the 
body, may not be given by touch-proper or feeling ; but 
this is certainly given by the muscular sense in the case 
of the blind, as in that of the seeing. When he speaks 
of time serving instead of space to those born blind, and 
that vicinity and distance means only shorter or longer 
time, or the smaller or greater number of feelings which 
they find necessary to attain from some one feeling to 
another, I believe he was led astray by not distin- 
guishing between our apprehension of space and the 
measure of space. The idea of members of the body 
localized is given most probably by all the senses. 
But the actual measurement of space is always a sub- 
sequent process, implying comparison and a standard. 
I believe that in all of us the succession of our feelings, 
of our muscular feelings, but also of our mental ideas 
and feelings as well, is one means of helping us to 
measure (not only time, but) space ; we measure it in a 
loose way, by the feelings we have experienced in pass- 
ing over it in travelling, or by a member of our body. 



BODY. ' 143 

Those born blind must be specially dependent on such 
a measure. Those who see have a natural measure 
provided in the surface which falls under the perception 
of the eye. Those born blind have such a measure in 
the surface of the body given by touch, and in the effort 
of the locomotive energy reported by the muscular 
sense. We shall see in next chapter that a very dif- 
ferent account from that of Platner is given by later 
German physiologists. 1 

As the result of these discussions, it appears that we 
have ideas and convictions of externality, of resistance 
to the energy of self, and of extension, that cannot be 
resolved into any elements which do not imply them. 
But do these subjective apprehensions and beliefs im- 
ply corresponding objective realities ? This is the old 

1 In order to be able to form an intelligent opinion on these subjects, I 
put myself in communication with the Rev. J. Kinghan, who for twenty- 
years has been connected with the institution for the Blind in Belfast, 
first as assistant, and now as Principal. He declares that he has never 
found anything, in all his teaching of the bliud, or intercourse with them, 
to confirm Platner's statement. Those born blind cannot have the visual 
idea of space, but they have, he says, a veiy clear notion of figure and 
distance got directly from the sense of touch. With his aid I have experi- 
mented with very young children born blind. I put two small pieces of 
wood, one triangular and the other square, under the palm of the hand, 
and without being allowed to move the hand over it, they at once told us 
the shape of each. When their head, and their legs, and their arms were 
pricked exactly alike, they at once showed us the seat of sensation, and 
knew the points to be out of each other. I moved their hand first over a 
book seven inches long, and then over a desk fourteen inches long, 
occupying the same time with each process, and they at once declared 
that the latter was much longer than the former. We allowed a boy to 
feel round a room with which he was unacquainted, and he at once de- 
clared its shape. One of these children was a girl of the age of eight, just 
entered the Institution, so ignorant that she did not know the meaning of 
angle or corner or point, calling the corners of the figures " little heads." 
She said the square had two little heads and two little heads, but was 
not sure that two and two make four. 



144 BODY. 

question of metaphysics. To treat it historically, logi- 
cally, and critically, would require a separate volume. 
Fortunately it is not necessary here to enter upon the 
wide question. Mr. Mill grants that there is an assur- 
ance which is " a test to which we may bring all our 
convictions" (see k), and that " we may be sure of what 
we see as well as what we feel" (see //,.) Following 
these admitted principles, I do not see that Mr. Mill 
can object to the reality of an extended world, provided 
always that it be shown that our ideas as to externality 
and extension cannot be resolved into simpler ele- 
ments. The conviction we entertain as to an external 
world is of the nature of a primitive perception, and 
not a derivative idea. We perceive objects out of our- 
selves resisting us and extended. This perception, 
like that of consciousness, is self-evident : we seem to 
look at once on the object. It is also necessary : no 
doubt we can imagine it to be otherwise, but we can- 
not be made to judge or believe that our hand is not 
an extended object. It is universal : all men entertain 
it and act upon it. Ingenious objections may be urged 
against all this, but they are such as are advanced not 
only against all truth, but against all inquiry, and pro- 
ceed upon a universal scepticism, which Mr. Mill, who 
professes to be a lover of truth, does not avow. 

These same considerations justify us in looking upon 
body as a substance. It will be remembered that I do 
not stand up for an unknown substratum beneath the 
known thing. Whatever is knowm as existing, as 
acting, and having permanence, I regard as a substance. 



BODY. 145 

Mind is a substance, as it can be so characterized. But 
we have seen that we know body as an existence, in 
operation, and with, as Mr. Mill allows, a permanence ; 
it is therefore a substance. It is vastly more than a 
"possibility;" it is an actuality. It is more than a 
possibility of "sensations;" it has an existence even 
as the sensations have ; and a body is known not only 
as giving sensations, but as capable of acting on other 
bodies in a variety of ways, which it is the office of 
physical science to classify and to reduce to laws. By 
adhering to these simple principles we are made to feel 
that we are out of the region of phantoms and in the 
land of realities. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

There is an impression among many that Mr. 
Mill's theory has the support of physiology, and this is 
strengthened by the anatomical and physiological de- 
tails which constitute so large a portion of Mr. Bain's 
work. But I cannot discover that either has found 
a basis, or even a starting-point, for their general theory 
of the mind, or for their particular theory of the man- 
ner in which we reach the idea of an extended world, 
in any ascertained phenomena of our bodily frame. 
Their speculations receive no aid from physiology, and 
must stand or fall by their psychological merits or 
demerits. The physiology of the senses is still in a 
very uncertain condition, and, whatever it may do in 
ages to come, can as yet throw little light on strictly 
mental action, except, indeed, in the way of correcting 
premature hypotheses. It may be profitable to look at 
some of the later researches into the senses conducted 
by eminent physiologists, especially in Germany. We 
shall find that they give no sanction to the hypothesis 
of Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain, and seem to favour a theory 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 147 

of a very different character. In the sketch that follows, 
I have made free "use of the great works on physiology 
which have been published in our country, and still 
more particularly of the admirable historical, critical, 
and expository summary by Wundt, in his Beitrage zur 
Theorie der Sinneswahmehmung. 

Touch. 

The scientific investigation of this sense may be said 
to have commenced with the researches of J. Muller 
and E. H. Weber. The general result reached by Muller 
is, that " every point in which a nerve-fibre ends is 
represented in the sensorium as a space-particle" 
(Wundt, Theor. Sinneswah?\) There are disputes as to 
how the general law should be stated, but we have a 
fact here which has not been and cannot be set aside. 
The nerves of touch proper, setting out from the base of 
the brain, tend towards the periphery of the body. They 
reach the skin each at a determined point : there is a 
special aggregation of these points in the mid-finger and 
the tip of the tongue. Now, wherever the nerve termi- 
nates, there the sensation is felt : thus, if we prick a 
nerve which reaches the mid-finger, the pain is localized 
at the point where the nerve terminates. If we stretch 
or pinch the ulnar nerve, by pushing it from side to side, 
or compressing it with the fingers, the shock is felt in 
the parts to which its ultimate branchlets are distributed, 
namely, in the palm and back of the hand, and in the 
fourth and fifth fingers. "According as the pressure 



148 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" is varied the pricking sensation is felt by turns in the 
" fourth finger, in the fifth, in the palm of the hand, or 
" in the back of the hand ; and both on the palm and 
" on the back of the hand the situation of the pricking 
" sensation is different, according as the pressure on the 
" nerve is varied ; that is to say, according as different 
" fibres or fasciculi of fibres are more pressed upon than 
" others. The same will be found to be the case in 
" irritating the nerve in the upper arm" (Miiller's Phy- 
siology, by Baly, p. 740). So strong is this tendency to 
localize the sensation at the extremities of the nerves, 
that when an arm or leg is amputated the person has 
still the feeling of the lost limb. Miiller has collected 
a number of such cases (76., pp. 746, 747). "A student, 
" named Schmidts, from Aix, had his arm amputated 
" above the elbow thirteen years ago ; he has never 
" ceased to have sensations as if in the fingers. I 
" applied pressure to the nerves in the stump ; and M. 
" Schmidts immediately felt the whole arm, even the 
" fingers, as if asleep." " A toll-keeper in the neigh- 
" bourhood of Halle, whose right arm had been shattered 
" by a cannon-ball in battle, above the elbow, twenty 
" years ago, and afterwards amputated, has still, in 
" 1833, at the time of changes of the weather, distinct 
" rheumatic pains, which seem to him to exist in the 
" whole arm ; and though removed long ago, the lost 
" part is at those times felt as if sensible to draughts of 
" air. This man also completely confirmed our state- 
" ment, that the sense of the integrity of the limb was 
" never lost." When there is a change made artifi- 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 149 

ciaJly in the peripheral extremities of nerves, the sen- 
sations are still felt as if in the original spots. " When, 
" in the restoration of a nose, a flap of skin is turned 
" down from the forehead and made to unite with the 
" stump of the nose, the new nose thus formed has, as 
" long as the isthmus of skin by which it maintains its 
" original connexions remains undivided, the same sen- 
" sations as if it were still on the forehead ; in other 
" words, when the nose is touched, the patient feels the 
" impression in the forehead. This is a fact well known 
" to surgeons, and was first observed by Lisfranc" 
(lb., p. 748). 

No doubt it is possible to ascribe all this to experi- 
ence and the association of ideas. We first, it is said, 
find by observation that a certain sensation originates 
in a particular part of the body, and the same sensation 
ever after suggests the part. But the facts, as a whole, 
Avill not submit to this explanation. It is difficult to 
see how the phenomena quoted can be thus accounted 
for. For surely an experience of thirteen or twenty 
years might have been sufficient to change the associa- 
tions acquired at an earlier date, and to place the per- 
sons under the influence of new ones, provided always 
that the original ones had not been instinctive or native. 
In the case of the transference of the flap of skin, Mtiller 
says, " When the communication of the nervous fibres 
" of the new nose with those of the forehead is cut off 
" by division of the isthmus of skin, the sensations are 
" of course no longer referred to the forehead ; the sen- 
" sibility of the nose is at first absent, but is gradually 



150 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" developed." This language implies that the old refer- 
ence to the forehead ceased in spite of the old asso- 
ciation when the isthmus was cut ; and that the new 
reference to the nose was occasioned by the sensibility 
of the nerve, according to the physiological law, which 
makes us ascribe the sensation to the extremity of the 
nerve. It is not easy to see how experience could give 
us the ready localization of the sensation, more parti- 
cularly when the feeling is within the body, and in a 
part which has never fallen under the senses of touch 
or sight. It is hard to believe that the instantaneous 
voluntary drawing back of a limb when wounded, and 
the shrinking of the frame when boiling liquid is poured 
down the throat, can proceed from an application of an 
observed law as to the seat of sensations. From a very 
early age, and long before they give any evidence of 
knowing distance beyond their bodies, or having any 
other acquired perceptions, children will indicate that 
they know at least vaguely the seat of the pain felt by 
them, — if a child is wounded in the arm, it will not 
hold out its foot. But the question seems to be set at 
rest by a physiological fact, thus stated by Dr. Baly : — 
" Professor Valentin (Repertor. fur Anat. und Physiol, 
" 1836, p. 330) has observed, that individuals who are 
" the subjects of congenital imperfection, or absence of 
" the extremities, have, nevertheless, the internal sensa- 
" tions of such limbs in their perfect state. A girl aged 
" nineteen years, in whom the metacarpal bones of the 
" left hand were very short, and all the bones of the 
" phalanges absent — a row of imperfectly organized 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 151 

" wart-like projections representing the ringers, assured 
" M. Valentin that she had constantly the internal sen- 
" sation of a palm of the hand, and five fingers on the 
" left side as perfect as on the right. When a ligature 
" was placed round the stump, she had the sensation of 
" ' formication' in the hand and fingers ; and pressure 
" on the ulnar nerve gave rise to the ordinary feeling 
" of the third, fourth, and fifth fingers being asleep, 
" although these fingers did not exist. The examina- 
" tion of three other individuals gave the same results" 
(Jb., p. 747). 1 

Miiller maintains, that in this way we get a know- 
ledge of the greater nuniber of the parts of our body, 
and in all the dimensions of space ; and that when our 
body comes into collision with another body, if the shock 
be sufficiently strong, the sensation of our body to a 
certain depth is awakened, and there arises a sensation 
of the contusion in the whole dimensions of the cube. 
He thus makes the knowledge not only of the third 
dimension of space, but of our own body, to depend on 
an original disposition (Anlage). He carries this doc- 
trine so far as to hold that as the nerves of all the senses 
are extended over the frame, so there is a representation 
of space given not only by touch and sight, but also by 
taste and smell — the sense of hearing alone not giving 
us a perception of space, because it does not perceive 

1 Mr. Mill refers (p. 246) to a case given him by Hamilton from Maine 
de Biran, of a person who had lost the power of the motor nerves, hut who, 
though still alive to the sense of pain, was nnable to localize the feeling. 
The case is valueless, as evidently the functions of the nervous apparatus 
were deranged. 



152 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 

its special extension. " The first idea of a body having 
" extension, and occupying space, arises in our mind 
" from the sensation of our own corporeal extension. 
" This consciousness of our own corporeal existence is 
" the standard by which we estimate in our sense of 
" touch the extension of all resisting bodies" (Physiology, 
p. 1081). Wundt says (p. 2), " These views, if they are 
" not always carried out with such consistency, are in 
" their essential fundamental positions still acknow 
" ledged at this day by most physiologists." 

It is interesting to notice that a like doctrine was 
held on independent grounds by two of the greatest 
psychologists of this century, — by M. Saisset in France, 
and Sir William Hamilton in this country. The former 
dwells on the localization of our sensations in their 
various organic seats (see Art. " Sens " in Diet, des Sciences 
Philos.) The latter says that " an extension is appre 
" hended in the apprehension of the reciprocal exter- 
" nality of all sensations," and that " in the conscious- 
" ness of sensations relatively localized and reciprocally 
" external, we have a veritable apprehension, and con- 
" sequently an immediate perception of the affected 
" organism, as extended, divided, figured," etc. (App., 
Eeid's Works, pp. 884, 885. )* I confess that I have a 
great partiality for this doctrine. Even the sense of 
hearing, if it does not yield the extension of our frame, 
may give a direction to the sound heard in the ear. The 
conclusion is the result of accurate physiological research, 

i It is interesting to find D. Stewart saying, " It is characteristical of 
" all sensations of tovxh, that they are accompanied with a perception of 
" the local situation of their exciting causes " {Elem., vol. iii. p. 310). 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 153 

and it seems to me to clear up most of the psychological 
difficulties connected with the senses, and to favour a 
metaphysical realism which enables us to stand up for 
the veracity of our original sense-perceptions, which are 
mainly of the body as affected. It supposes that when 
the soul is roused into consciousness by an affection of 
the nerves, it gives a direction and a localization to its 
sensations, and as it feels simultaneously a number of 
sensations from different members of the body, it feels 
them to be out of each other, and related in respect of 
direction ; and as sensations accumulate and succeed 
each other, it gives a sensation, or rather perception, of 
our capacity of being affected at very different points of 
the periphery, and consequently of a volume. When 
in a tepid bath we have not only a pleasant sensation 
(which is all that Mr. Bain allows), we have a feeling 
of the frame as affected over the whole surface. But 
let not this statement be misunderstood. No one 
means to affirm that we have as yet a representation or 
image in the mind of the external configuration of the 
body, and of its several parts, such as we reach when 
we come to feel them with the hand or see them in a 
mirror. This is a subsequent attainment made by a 
gathered experience through the combination of various 
senses ; and we are often in perplexity from the diffi- 
culty of uniting the intuitive with the acquired know- 
ledge, as when we know that the pain in toothache is 
in a certain direction, and yet are in doubts as to what 
tooth corresponds externally to the internal localization. 
But as the ground of the whole, we have a localized 



154 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

perception of points, and of different points and direc- 
tions, in our bodily frame, which, I may add, is felt to 
be ours by the command which our efforts have over it, 
and the sensations of which it is felt to be the seat. 
Some parts of this general view seem to me to be 
established by physiological arguments, and the theory 
as a whole is vastly better fitted to meet and account 
for our idea of extension than the baseless hypothesis 
sanctioned by Mr. Mill. 

The curious experimental researches of Weber seem 
to confirm the general doctrine that Touch Proper or 
Feeling is very specially, as the Germans represent it, 
a space-giving organ. His experiments were conducted 
by means of a pair of compasses sheathed with cork, 
with which he touched the skin while the eyes were 
closed, in order to determine how close the points of the 
compasses might be brought to each and still be felt as 
two bodies. The distance between the points necessary 
to indicate different sensations was found to vary in 
different parts of the body, from one-half Parisian line 
on the tip of the tongue to thirty Parisian lines on the 
back of the body, thus showing the sensitiveness of the 
one part to be sixty times finer than that of the other 
part. The capability of discerning the difference of 
sensation is somewhat different in different individuals, 
but it is said that their relative proportion in different 
parts of the body remains tolerably constant in the 
same individual. The researches seem to imply that 
the sense of touch indicates to us, in a way which can- 
not be the result of a gathered experience, both points 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 155 

of space and intervals of space, always within and not 
beyond the bodily frame. The points must be per- 
ceived immediately, and an interval or line between is 
either perceived immediately, or is necessitated in 
mathematical thought by the comparison of the differ - 
ent points. 

Weber regards the skin as a sort of mosaic of circles 
or compartments, which in different positions have 
different magnitudes and shapes, and that each has its 
own capacity of sensation. The theory suggested by 
Fick is thus stated by Dr. Carpenter : " Each nerve- 
" fibril breaks up into a pencil of fine filaments at the 
' : periphery, which are distributed over a certain space, 
"perhaps on the average about 1'25 of an inch in 
" diameter. An impression made upon any one of these 
" filaments conveys the same sensation to the sensorium, 
" providing no other nerve be distributed to the same 
" space ; but this hardly ever occurs, and hence com- 
" pound sensations arise by which our perception of the 
" precise spot of the skin touched by a point is accurately 
" determined. It is obvious that the closer these 
" ' sensory circles' are, and the more intimately the 
" branches of different nerves are intercalated with one 
'•' another, the greater will be the sense of locality of 
" that part ; or, in other words, the greater will be 
" the facility with which minute differences in the pre- 
" cise spot touched will be appreciated" (Hum. Phys., 
p. 611). The subject has been keenly discussed in Ger- 
many. According to George, movement is the source 
of all objective consciousness. If by objective con- 



156 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

sciousness is meant not that of our bodily frame, but 
of something beyond, I believe the doctrine is correct. 
We discover extra-organic objects by the resistance 
offered to our movement, Fortlage ascribes our intui- 
tion of body to the restraint laid on our impulse 
(Triebhcmmung). It is thus, no doubt, we know the 
existence of objects beyond our bodies, but already in 
touch we have an apprehension of our frames as ex- 
tended. Lotze has observed much, and speculated more 
on this whole subject He says that when two object - 
points come into perception through two excitations 
of the nerves, the consciousness of their spatial near- 
ness to one another is not given ; and he starts the 
hypothesis that this is furnished by a third nerve- 
process, which he calls " place indicators." Meissner has 
sought to bring Lotze's hypothesis into unison with 
physiological and anatomical researches. He thinks he 
has discovered "touch- corpuscles," which he represents 
as the actual touch-organs. These are found specially 
in the hand and the foot, and they at once give us 
bodies without us as objects, apart from the sensation 
of pressure. These researches and discussions all pro- 
ceed on the idea that our knowledge of an extended 
world is obtained not exclusively by a sweep of the 
hand, but by some special provision in the sense of 
touch proper or feeling. 

The admitted conclusions are thus stated by AVundt 
(pp. 64, 65) : " With every single sensation (Empfind- 
" ung) is connected involuntarily the representation 
" of the place at which it occurs. As soon as there 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 157 

" are two contemporaneous sensations in the percep- 
" tion (Wahrnehmung), there is thence given a dim re- 
" presentation of the extent of the skin which the 
" impressions embrace, whereby the impressions are 
" immediately conceived as spatially separated. But 
" about the magnitude of their separation in space 
" nothing determinate can yet be declared, as that re- 
" presentation is for this purpose altogether indistinct. 
" It is usually only when one is first led through an 
" internal or external impulse to resolve upon an esti- 
" mation by measure, that there is raised a clear image 
" of the entire parts of the body and of the points 
" touched, and thereby is first given the determinate 
" representation of the interspace which lies between 
" the impressions." He then explains, that, in regard to 
the distance which is to be found between two impres- 
sions, the soul, in that it perceives two different sensa- 
tions of place (Ortsempfindungen), is compelled to put 
an interspace between them, and to represent this out 
of the like experience through sight or the muscular 
sense. 

Musculak Sense. 

Sir Charles Bell established the great truth, that the 
nerves of sensation differ from those of motion. From 
his physiological researches, and the ingenious psycho- 
logical speculations of his contemporary, Dr. Thomas 
Brown, has proceeded the very general acknowledgment 
in this country of the existence of a Muscular Sense to 
be distinguished from Touch Proper. Physiologically 



158 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

the Muscular Sense consists of a Motor nerve, under the 
control of the will, going out from the brain and moving 
the muscle attached to it, and of a Sensor nerve going 
back to the brain and giving intimation of the motion. 
Psychologically this sense serves as important purposes 
as either touch proper or sight. It may be doubted 
whether, apart from this endowment, we should have 
a sense or knowledge of any object beyond our bodily 
frame. Feeling, or the skin-sense as it has been 
called, seems to give us merely the periphery of our 
bodies ; and when we become cognizant of an extra- 
organic object, as when on pressing the palm of the 
hand on a table we feel a surface, I believe there is a 
combination of the two senses of touch proper giving us 
a sense of the surface of the hand, and of the muscular 
sense giving a knowledge of an outward object resisting 
this surface. " If we lay our hand upon a table, we be- 
" come conscious, on a little reflection, that we do not 
" feel the table, but merely that part of our skin which 
" the table touches" (Muller, p. 1081). Even as to the 
coloured surface falling under the eye, it is doubtful 
whether we should place it certainly out and beyond 
our organism without the concurrence of the muscular 
sense and a gathered experience. The boy born blind, 
whose eye was couched by Cheselden, said that objects 
at first seemed " to touch his eyes as what he felt did 
his skin." In a like case operated upon, and recorded 
by Home, objects seemed at first to touch the eye. The 
expressions are somewhat vague, but it is clear that the 
objects were felt as having a close relationship to the 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 159 

eye, and were not known as being at a distance. It is 
certain that it is mainly and most effectually (if not 
exclusively) by the muscular sense that we obtain an 
apprehension, or rather knowledge, of an object beyond 
our bodily frame, and independent of it. Dr. Carpenter, 
with his usual sound judgment, declares that it is 
probably on the sensations communicated through this 
sense that " the idea of the material world, as some- 
" thing external to ourselves, chiefly rests ; but that this 
" idea is by no means a logical deduction from our ex- 
" perience of these sensations, being rather an instinc- 
" tive or intuitive perception directly excited by them " 
{Hum. Phys., p. 612). 

I cannot do better than quote once more from Wundt, 
who gives us the result of German research (p. 427). 
' ; The first acts of sense-perception are grounded on the 
" operation of the Muscular Sense [that is, so far as 
" objects beyond the body are concerned]. When we 
" move our members we come upon external resist - 
" ances*. We observe that these resistances some- 
" times give way before our pressure ; but we find 
" at the same time that this takes place with very 
" different degrees of facility, and that in order to put 
'■ different bodies in motion we must apply very different 
'■ degrees of muscular force ; but to every single degree 
u of the contraction-force there corresponds a determi- 
" nate degree in intensity of the muscular sensations. 
:: With these muscular sensations, the sensations of the 
' : skin which cover our members of touch so continually 
" mingle, that the intensity of these touch-sensations 



160 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" goes parallel to the intensity of the accompanying 
" muscular sensations. "We succeed in this way in con- 
" necting the degree of intensity of the muscular sen- 
" sations in a necessary manner with the nature of the 
" resistances which set themselves against our move- 
" ment." 

Vision. 

The eye is a more complicated structure than any of 
the other organs of sense, and there are more disputes 
as to the functions and operations of its parts than in 
regard to those of any of the other senses. On some 
points, however, there is a pretty general agreement 
among the scientific physiologists in Germany, who have 
devoted so much attention to the subject ; and these are 
sufficient for our purpose, being opposed to the hypo- 
thesis supported by Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain. 

It seems to be admitted on all hands, that by the eye 
we have immediately a perception of space in two 
dimensions, or of a surface. In stating the views of 
Miiller, Wundt says (p. 95), "We can perceive spatial 
" extension and the relation in position of outward objects 
" only so far as we have a spatial sensation of our own 
" retina and the relative position of its single points. 
" As the retina spreads itself in a surface, the images of 
" objects obtain upon it only two dimensions. But this 
" disadvantage, under which sight labours as compared 
" with feeling, is compensated by the body's own move- 
" ments, by means of which we can view successively the 
" one object from different stand-points. As regards 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES, 161 

" the sense of sight, the perception (Anschauung) of the 
" third dimension is through a judgment, and so Miiller 
" calls it a representation (Vorstellung), while he desig- 
" nates the intuition of surface as a sensation." " The 
" grand principle of the theory of Miiller, that the 
" perception of a surface is a sensation, and that the 
" perception of depth on the other hand is a represen- 
" tation formed through judgment, is to this day the 
" universally received one, and the researches remain 
" settled, although this department since that time has 
" been enriched by a great many new facts, and although 
" this principle, so far as certain matters of fact are 
" concerned, does not seem to be sufficient." The in- 
sufficiency does not relate to the original discernment 
of a surface by the eye, which seems to be acknow- 
ledged on all hands, but to the provision in the eye 
itself for discovering the three dimensions of space. 
" The perception of superficial space, which goes before 
" all representations of space, and makes the same 
" possible, is bound up in the sense of sight so inti- 
" mately with the pure sensation, that there is nowhere 
" in the consciousness any act lying in the middle be- 
" tween the sensation and its perception in the form 
"' of space" (p. 145). It should be added that Waitz 
and Lotze are opposed as to whether the chief impor- 
tance should be attached to the sensible or motor 
factors : Waitz ascribing the greater value to the sensa- 
tion ; and Lotze, to the motor element. Wundt (p. 104) 
says that all observation shows that both exercise an 
influence at the same time. 

L 



1G2 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 

So much for our perception of a superficies by the 
eye. But there is a provision in the organ of sight for 
giving us space in three dimensions, and for discover- 
ing the distance of objects. This can be done even by 
the single eye, not immediately with every perception, 
as may be done by the two eyes, but by a succession of 
perceptions. This is accomplished in the case of a 
single eye by its power of accommodating itself to dif- 
ferent distances. Much attention has been given of 
late years to the nature of the accommodation-mechan- 
ism by Helmholtz and others. The accommodation 
seems originally to be involuntary and unconscious, but 
is brought under our notice by the attached muscular 
feeling. So far as this means is concerned, the deter- 
mination of distance by one eye is confined within very 
narrow limits ; but there is a great help to it in the 
movement of the ball of the eye, of which intimation is 
given by the attached muscles. But by far the most 
important provision in the visual organ for discovering 
the third dimension of space is to be found in binocular 
vision, that is, in the convergence of the axis, according 
as the objects are near, and in the different aspect of the 
object falling under each eye. Wundt again supplies us 
with an excellent summary : " The measurements which 
" we are able to bring out by means of our senses which 
" give us the intuition of space show this remarkable 
" difference between the two, that the eye as the sense 
" operating in the distance measures space according to 
" all the four dimensions; whereas sensations by the skin, 
" which are effected only by the immediate contact of 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SEXSES. 163 

" the outward object with the surface of the skiu, are all 
" disposed only over one surface. The perception of the 
" third dimension of space through the sense of sight is, 
' : however, so far as can be proven by experience, a 
" mediate one derived from the movements of the 
" muscles of the eye (partly of the external, which move 
" the apple of the eye : partly of the internal, which 
"regulate the accommodation - mechanism). These 
" measurements of distance depend on nothing but 
" the estimation of the muscular sensations acconi- 
u panying the movements, and therefore the percep- 
" tion is accomplished only by means of a lengthened 
" experience and practice, and hence arise the great 
" uncertainty and incompleteness of all measurements 
" of that kind. Originally all spatial sense-intuitions 
" are of surfaces; depth for the eye conies forth gradually 
" out of the surface ; the sense ever penetrates deeper 
" and deeper into boundless space, its circle of vision 
'•' widening as the visual circle of its experience ex- 
" tends" (p. 29). 

That the eye is immediately cognizant of direction 
and superficial figure, is proven by the reported cases of 
persons born blind, but who acquired eye-sight by 
means of a surgical operation. The best reported case 
is that of Dr. i ranz of Leipzig (Phil. Trans, of Roy. Soc. 
1841), and I shall quote from it at considerable length. 
The youth had been born blind, and was seventeen years 
of age when the experiment was wrought which gave him 
the use of one eye. When the eye was sufficiently 
restored to bear the light, " a sheet of paper on which 



164 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" two strong black lines had been drawn, the one hori- 
" zontal, the other vertical, was placed before hirn at 
" the distance of about three feet. He was now allowed 
" to open the eye, and after attentive examination he 
" called the lines by their right denominations." " The 
" outline in black of a square, six inches in diameter, 
" within which a circle had been drawn, and within the 
" latter a triangle, was, after careful examination, recog- 
" nised and correctly described by him." " At the dis- 
" tance of three feet, and on a level with the eye, a solid 
" cube and a sphere, each of four inches diameter, were 
" placed before him." " After attentively examining 
'" these bodies, he said he saw a quadrangular and a 
" circular figure, and after some consideration he pro- 
" nounced the one a square and the other a disc. His 
" eye being then closed, the cube was taken away and 
" a disc of equal size substituted and placed next to the 
" sphere. On again opening his eye he observed no 
" difference in these objects, but regarded them both as 
" discs. The solid cube was now placed in a somewhat 
" oblique position before the eye, and close beside it a 
" figure cut out of pasteboard, representing a plane out- 
" line prospect of the cube when in this position. Both 
" objects he took to be something like flat quadrates. A 
" pyramid placed before him with one of its sides to- 
" wards his eye he saw as a plain triangle. This object 
" was now turned a little so as to present two of its 
" sides to view, but rather more of one side than of the 
" other : after considering and examining it for a long 
" time, he said that this was a very extraordinary figure ; 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 165 

" it was neither a triangle, nor a quadrangle, nor a 
" circle ; lie had no idea of it, and could not describe it; 
" ' in fact,' said he, ' I must give it up.' On the con- 
" elusion of these experiments, I asked him to describe 
" the sensations the objects had produced, whereupon 
" he said, that immediately on opening his eye he had 
" discovered a difference in the two objects, the cube 
" and the sphere, placed before him, and perceived that 
" they were not drawings ; but that he had not been 
" able to form from them the idea of a square and a 
" disc until he perceived a sensation of what he saw in 
" the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the 
" objects. When I gave the three bodies (the sphere, 
" cube, and pyramid) into his hand, he was much sur- 
" prised he had not recognised them as such by sight, 
" as he was well acquainted with mathematical figures 
" by his touch." These observations show that the eye 
takes in surface and superficial figure at once, but can- 
not immediately discern solidity. If the persons have 
the use of both eyes, they would observe the difference 
between a disc and a solid, but they would not be able to 
say, till they feel it, that the latter is a solid. It re- 
quires to be added, that persons who have their sight 
thus given them require observation and thought to recon- 
cile the information they had got from touch with that 
which they are now receiving from sight — just as persons 
who have learned two languages, say German and French, 
require practice to enable them readily to translate the 
one into the other. In the case reported by Cheselden, 
the boy, " upon being told what things were whose form 



166 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" he before knew from feeling, said he would carefully ob- 
" serve that he might know them again." Dr. Carpenter 
tells us of a boy of four years old, upon whom the opera- 
tion for congenital cataract had been very successfully 
performed, that " he continued to find his way about 
" his fathers house rather by feeling with his hands, as 
" he had been formerly accustomed to do, than by his 
" newly acquired sense of sight, being evidently per- 
" plexed rather than assisted by the sensations which 
" he had derived through it. But when learning a new 
" locality, he employed his sight, and evidently perceived 
" the increase of facility which he derived from it " 
(Man. o/Phys., p. 593). 

All the recorded cases show that there is also a pro- 
cess of reasoning and experience in the discovery of dis- 
tance. Mr. Abbot (p. 150) gives the following account of 
the observations of Trinchinetti : — " He operated at the 
" same time on two patients (brother and sister), eleven 
" and ten years old respectively. The same day, having 
" caused the boy to examine an orange, he placed it 
" about one metre from him, and bade him try to take it. 
" The boy brought his hand close to his eye (quasi a 
" contatto del suo occJiio), and closing his fist, found it 
" empty, to his great surprise. He then tried again a 
" few inches from his eye, and at last, in this tentative 
" way, succeeded in taking the orange. When the same 
" experiment was tried with the girl, she also at first 
" attempted to grasp the orange with her hand very 
" near the eye (colla mano assai vicina all' occhio), 
" then, perceiving her error, stretched out her forefinger 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 167 

" and pushed it in a straight line slowly until she 
" reached the object." Other patients have been observed 
(by Janin and Duval) to move their hands in search of 
objects in straight lines from the eye. Trinchinetti 
" regards these observations as indicating a belief that 
" visible objects were in actual contact with the eye." 
It is clear that the eye gives direction to the object, but 
does not apprehend distance immediately. Franz says 
of his patient, that " if he wished to form an estimate of 
" the distance of objects from his own person, or of two 
" objects from each other, without moving from his 
" place, he examined the objects from different points of 
" view by turning his head to the right and to the left." 
The German physiologists have paid great attention 
to the case of persons born blind, and the conclusions 
reached do not correspond with those of Platner. " As 
" respects persons born blind," says Wundt (p. 60), 
" who are not supported by the accompanying and pre- 
" ceding experience of the sense of sight, the perception 
" of the sensation of place takes place after a much 
" more tedious and laborious manner. The blind man 
" receives the representation of his body wholly through 
" his own touch. While he touches with the finger or 
" hand different parts of his body, there arise in the 
" muscles of the arm just as many different muscular 
" feelings. These become to him a measure of different 
" distances. Thus he receives from the mutual spatial 
" position of single points a representation of his skin- 
" surface, and while at the same time, at every point, 
" the Quale of the sensation corresponding to the same 



168 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

" imprints itself, he is placed in a position also to de- 
" clare the place where are to be found the impressions 
" which work from without." 

This is more fully explained (p. 31) : "The represen- 
" tation of the third dimension can also be awakened 
" in the person born blind, but this only through a long 
" series of conclusions, in which the changing impres- 
" sions of the sense of feeling, and the muscular sensa- 
" tions of the entire self-moving body, work together. 
" As the person seeing remains in his place, and lets 
" the objects in a manner come towards him, while 
" he, at his will, opens his eyes to the far or the near ; 
" so must the blind person, when he would discover 
" the outer world, go and seek out the objects which 
" remain to him in unchangeable rest," " The person 
" seeing accommodates only his eye, the blind man his 
" whole body, to the objects." 

It does not concern us in this discussion to inquire 
what truth there is in the Berkeleyan theory of vision. 
If the above conclusions be trustworthy, as I believe 
they are, they show it can be accepted only with im- 
portant modifications. Berkeley was positively mistaken 
in arguing that the eye is percipient only of colour, 
and not of extension. He was further guilty of an 
oversight in nob attending to the very special provision 
in the organs of vision for enabling us, always by ex- 
perience, to discover the third dimension of space, and 
distance. It is firmly established that a surface is ever 
presented to the eye, and is perceived immediately ; and 
this surface supplies a measure to us in all our other 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 169 

visual perceptions. It is now proven that there is a 
beautiful teleological apparatus in each eye, and still 
more in the relative position of the two eyes, whereby 
we can discover the solidity and estimate the distances 
of bodies. 1 

As the result of this criticism, conducted on the 
Psychological Method, we find ourselves entitled to 
adhere to a certain body of intuitive truth respecting 
both mind and matter. Instead of looking on mind as a 
mere " series of feelings," w 7 e apprehend it as an abiding- 
existence, with various properties which evolve them- 
selves from day to day in our experience. Instead of 
regarding matter as a " possibility," we contemplate it 
as having a permanent being, with diverse forms of 
activity, which are ever manifesting themselves to our 
senses. On this intuitive truth we build others by a 
gathered observation, and as we clo so we feel that they 
are laid on a foundation which cannot be shaken. 

Some object to this realistic doctrine, whether as held 
by the world at large or by professed metaphysicians, 
that it is contradicted by the established truths of 
modern physical science, which shows that light and 
heat are not substances, but vibrations in an ether, and 
that all the other physical forces are correlated with 
them. But these discoveries of recent science are all 
consistent with a doctrine of natural realism, when the 
same is properly expounded. Our senses afford us 
primarily a knowledge of the affections of our bodily 
frame, these affections being always localized. Such 

1 Thus far there is truth in Abbot's Sight and Touch. 



170 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

information is given us by touch, by sight, and pro- 
bably also by smell, taste, and hearing. Then, by the 
muscular sense, we come to know objects resisting the 
movement of our localized organs, and external to these 
organs. In these operations, and especially in muscular 
resistance, we know motion and force, that is, we are 
sensible of a limb moving in consequence of an effort, 
and being stayed by an extended object with a resisting 
force. This is all we know primarily of matter by the 
senses, and it has not been set aside by any doctrine of 
modern physical science. 

I have no partiality for the distinction between the 
Primary and Secondary Qualities of bodies. In fact, as 
has often been acknowledged, the secondary qualities, 
such as heat and smell, are not so much properties of 
matter as felt affections of our organism, which may in- 
deed imply an external cause, but with which they are 
not to be identified. We can, however, specify the 
qualities of body which are primarily or intuitively 
known. These seem to be Externality, Resisting Force, 
and Extension, together, I think, with Motion in Space. 
All besides, such as temperature, odours, tastes, and 
sounds, are mere affections of our organism, giving notice 
of changes in our bodily frame. Lotze says that our 
sense of pressure and of temperature is not an object, 
but a condition which the incitement in the parts of the 
skin brings forth. Meissner, following out the same 
doctrines, says that they are not sensations (Em/pfind- 
ungen), but feelings, in so far as they do not stand in 
relation directly and immediately to an object, but are 



THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 171 

a condition of the subject, our own selves. Even colour 
itself, though more objective, is felt merely, as in the 
seen surface, standing in relation to our eye, and we can 
say nothing more of it than that it affects us in a par- 
ticular manner. 

Taking this view of matter, we see that we have first 
an original or intuitive knowledge. To this we are ever 
adding by observation, by generalization, and by deduc- 
tion. But then, in the rapidity of thought and the 
hurry of life, our observations are often loose, our 
generalizations too wide, and our reasonings hasty. 
Hence the errors into which we are led, which, how- 
ever, are not to be charged on our senses, but upon the 
judgments we have superinduced upon the information 
which they furnish. It cannot be shown that our in- 
tuitive perceptions, being those that have the sanction 
of Him who made us, ever do deceive us, or that they 
are contradicted by any established truth of science. 1 

Adopting these views of our original perceptions, w T e 
see how we have a confirmation of their trustworthiness 
in the circumstance that the different senses yield the 
same testimony. I am persuaded, indeed, that our 
conviction rests primarily, and all along most firmly, on 
the assurance we have as to the veracity of each sense 
(see //,.) Still it is possible to get verifications even of 
our intuitions and demonstrations, — thus land nieasur- 

i I "have endeavoured to show that the difficulties connected with the 
apparent deception of the senses can be removed by attending to three 
distinctions : — (1.) That between our Original and Acquired Perceptions ; 
(2. ) That between Sensation and Perception ; (3.) That between the Objects 
Intuitively Perceived ; all of them being extra-mental, but some of them 
also extra-organic— {Intuitions, Pt. n. B. n. c. i. § 3.) 



172 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 

ing and astronomy corroborate our geometrical deduc- 
tions. It is certainly satisfactory to find that, in their 
original depositions, the senses, which are so far inde- 
pendent witnesses, thoroughly concur. Thus both 
touch and sight give us surfaces, which a little experi- 
ence enables us to discover to be identical. It is pro- 
bable that all the senses give us direction outward. It 
is certain that they all give us information directly or 
indirectly of external objects ; and thus each in its own 
way prepares us for looking out upon and estimating a 
world which, beginning at self as a centre, extends as 
far into space as the eye, aided by the telescope, can 
penetrate. 



CHAPTEE VIII. 

MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, BELIEF, AND UNCONSCIOUS 
MENTAL OPERATIONS. 

The faculty of Memory has not received any very 
special consideration in the writings of Mr. Mill. When 
we turn to the account given by his predecessors in the 
school, we find it defective, in fact, as is usual with 
them, overlooking the main element. Our recollections 
are represented as ' revived sensations.' The statement 
might be allowed to pass in common conversation, or 
in loose literature, but cannot be accepted from a meta- 
physician. There may be a revival not merely of our 
sensations, but t of our mental operations generally, of 
our thoughts, our emotions, — of our very recollections. 
And in every exercise of memory there is more than a 
revival of our experience. As the new and the essential 
element, there is a belief that we have had the experience, 
and that the event has been before us, in time past. All 
this being matter of constant consciousness, we seldom 
notice it, just as we pay no attention to the bodies 
which we ever see falling to the ground. But as it was 
the falling apple, which ordinary men thought beneath 
their regard, which seemed to Newton (if the common 



174 MEMORY, ASSOCIATIOX OF 

story is to be credited) the phenomenon to be weighed, 
and which actually furnished the key to the explanation 
of the path of the moon and planets in their orbits ; so 
it is in the familiar facts of onr consciousness that the 
psychologist finds the means of clearing up the more 
complex laws of our mental nature. In particular, 
every one who would dive into the deeper mysteries 
of raiiid must specially estimate what is involved in 
memory, which is quite as important a faculty as even 
sensation in our mental constitution. 

In memory, let it be observed, we are beyond the 
territory of immediate knowledge, with the object before 
us : we are now in the region of Faith. We believe in 
the existence of an object not now present ; in that, say, 
of a departed friend never again to be met with in this 
world. We believe that this friend lived, and that we 
had frequent intercourse with him, in time past, I 
call this the Eecognitive Power of Memory, to distin- 
guish it from the mere reproductive, the recalling and 
imaging power. What we thus experience, what we are 
conscious of, cannot be called ' a revived sensation ' 
without giving the revival much that was not in the 
sensation. We have now not only Faith in its rudi- 
ments, we have Time in all its significance. Xo doubt 
it appears first in the concrete mixed up with other 
things ; but so do all our ideas, so do our very sensa- 
tions. It comes in the form of an event believed to 
have happened in time past. But it is there in the 
mind, consciousness being witness ; and we have only 
to abstract the time from the event to have the abstract 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 175 

idea of time, — just as we have the idea of sensation by 
separating in thought the sentient from the self-sentient. 
Time thus reached has quite as real an existence as the 
very sensation which may have been conjoined with 
our original perception of the event. 

Mr. Mill, in language already quoted (supra, pp. 
59, 85), admits the existence of the belief involved in 
rneniory, and asserts its veracity and ultimate veracity. 
Our memories and expectations are present feelings, .but 
" each of them involves a belief in more than its own 
existence." A remembrance involves " the belief that 
" a sensation, of which it is a copy or representation, 
" actually existed in the past ; " and an expectation in- 
volves the belief, " that a sensation or other feeling to 
which it directly refers will exist in the future ;" and 
the belief the two include is, " that I myself formerly 
" had, or that I myself and no other shall hereafter 
" have, the sensations remembered or expected." He is 
fond, as we shall immediately see, of ascribing most of 
our convictions, beliefs, and judgments to association of 
ideas. Mr. James Mill had declared broadly, " that 
" wherever the name Belief is applied, there is a case of 
" the indissoluble association of ideas ;" and that " no 
" instance can be adduced in which any thing besides 
" an indissoluble association can be shown in belief" 
(Analysis, p. 281). But his son has been obliged to 
modify this doctrine, and to allow that there is an 
" ultimate " belief prior to association, and independent 
of it. I am sure that he is right in calling in such a 
belief. But I am also sure that he should have called 



176 MEMORY, ASSOCIATIOX OF 

in other beliefs equally independent of association ; and 
we shall have to supply his deficiencies as we advance 
by showing how wide is the domain of faith. Mean- 
while let us observe how much is involved in the faith 
of memory and expectation. We have seen in last 
chapter that the senses directly or indirectly open to 
us the distant and the remote, till our minds are lost 
in the immensity of space. Now we see time stretching 
away into the past and the future, till it goes out into 
eternity. And it is interesting to notice, that while these 
ultimate beliefs, like the senses, carry with them their 
own evidence, they are ever meeting with corroborations. 
We remember a field, a dell, a cottage which we once 
visited ; we have not seen it for many years, but as we 
now go back to it, we find it as we have been picturing 
it in our minds. These confirmations of our lower 
faiths help us to put a more implicit trust in our 
higher natural beliefs, which may not admit of any 
confirmation by sense. Already, in this belief of 
memory and expectation, we have the beginnings and 
the rudiments of that faith in the unseen, which in its 
higher flights carries us so far beyond ourselves, and 
lifts us as on wings high above this world. 

The subject of Association of Ideas, which is inti- 
mately connected with Memory, has long engaged the 
attention of British metaphysicians. It is referred to 
by Hobbes, who was evidently aware of what Aristotle 
had written. It was employed by Locke to explain 
certain anomalies and eccentricities of mind and char- 
acter. Its importance in accounting for ordinary mental 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 177 

action was first brought out fully by Francis Hutcheson, 
who showed in particular how it helped to create secon- 
dary affections. Some of its properties had a prominence 
given them by Hume, who used it to help his sceptical 
purposes by explaining by it many of the beliefs usually 
ascribed to reason. A fuller and a juster account of it 
than any previously published was given by Turnbull 
(the preceptor of Eeid) in his Moral Philosophy. Hart- 
ley speculated upon it in an empirical and peculiarly 
Anglican manner, identifying association with vibrations 
in the nerves. All the Scottish metaphysicians, in- 
cluding Eeid, Beattie, and Stewart, discoursed upon it 
with greater or less fulness. But as universal attention 
was called to it, its power and significance came to be 
greatly exaggerated. This was certainly done by Alison 
when, passing far beyond the more sober views enter- 
tained on the same subject by Hutcheson and Beattie, 
he sought to account by this one principle for all the 
phenomena of beauty. Brown drew back from so ex- 
treme a position, and maintained that there was excited 
by beautiful objects a class of feelings which could not 
be resolved into association of ideas nor anything else. 
But in his mental physiology suggestion plays a very 
important, I would say the principal, part. He treats 
of our intellectual operations under the heads of Simple 
and Belative Sucwestion, and indulges in an excess of 
ingjenuitv in making these two faculties manufacture 
so many of our ideas. Mr. James Mill followed, and 
carrying out a hint thrown out by Brown, that all our 
associate feelings could be reduced to " a fine species of 

M 



178 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

proximity" (Lecture xxxv.), resolved all suggestion into 
the one law of contiguity ; and abandoning Brown, who 
stood up for intuitive beliefs, and adhering to Hume, 
accounted for our very beliefs and judgments by associa- 
tion. The time for a reaction had now come. Artists 
never favoured Alison's reduction of beauty to associa- 
tion. New and profound ideas were introduced into 
English metaphysics by Coleridge, and through the 
taste stimulated by him and others for German specu- 
lation. But the recoil was actually called forth by Sir 
James Mackintosh's Dissertation on Ethical Science, 
which at once created the opposition of our higher 
moralists to the attempt made by him to manufacture 
our idea of moral good by means of association. Sir 
W. Hamilton, who belongs to this period, devoted 
his penetrating intellect to the more thorough expres- 
sion of the laws of the reproduction of our ideas, and 
has thrown not a little light on the subject, at the same 
time keeping the principle in its own place. Some of us 
had hoped that this tendency to exaggerate the power 
and importance of association had enjoyed its day, and 
was now past for ever. But the wheel of speculative 
opinion seems to have come round to the position it 
had an age ago ; and we find association of ideas oc- 
cupying in the writings of the younger Mill and Mr. 
Bain as high a place as it ever had in the works of 
Alison and Brown, of Mackintosh and the older Mill, — 
or, we may add, as it had two ages earlier still in the 
philosophy of Hume and of Hartley. There is evidently 
clear room for a new discussion of the whole subject. 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 179 

Of late it has been taken up by the German metaphy- 
sicians generally ; and the School of Herbart, in particu- 
lar, has been seeking to give a mathematical expression 
to the laws of the succession of our ideas. I should like 
to see the results of the investigations of the British 
School — especially of Hamilton, and of the later German 
metaphysicians, wrought out into a consistent system. 

Mr. Mill can scarcely be said to have added much 
to our knowledge of the laws of association. He spe- 
cially dwells on two points, and he exaggerates and 
distorts both. The first is what he calls the Law of 
Inseparable Association. " Associations produced by 
" contiguity become more certain and rapid by repeti- 
" tion. When two phenomena have been very often 
" experienced in conjunction, and have not in any 
" single instance occurred separately, either in experi- 
" ence or in thought, there is produced between them 
" what has been called Inseparable Association ; by 
" which is not meant that the association must inevi- 
" tably last to the end of life, that no subsequent ex- 
" perience or process of thought can possibly avail to 
" dissolve it, but only that, as long as no such experience 
" or process of thought has taken place, the association 
" is irresistible, it is impossible for us to think the one 
"thing disjoined from the other" (p. 191). We have 
here an important truth, which was much dwelt upon by 
our author's father. It can scarcely be raised to the dig- 
nity of a law : it results from higher laws. According to 
the frequency with which two ideas have been together, 
so will be the tendency of the one to recall the other. 



180 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

When they have often "been associated, the one will 
bring up the other, not only without an act of will on 
our part, but it may be in opposition to our utmost 
efforts. Thus there are painful recollections which we 
would fain be rid of, but they cleave to us with horrid 
pertinacity, because conjoined with objects which are 
for ever pressing themselves on our notice. The only 
way of dissolving such a combination is by forming a 
new one, — as in chemistry we dissolve a compound by 
bringing to bear upon it another substance, which having 
a strong affinity to one of the elements, draws it away 
from that with which it is now united. It is thus we 
break up an old set of associations by forming new 
ones, say by a change of scene or society. 

So far we have a well-known operation, according to 
a well-known law. But let us understand precisely 
what is involved. We shall find that Mr. Mill has so 
stretched the law as to make it embrace an entirely 
different phenomenon. It is implied that two ideas 
having been together, the one will never cast up with- 
out the other tending to follow. But this does not re- 
quire that we judge or decide that there is, and still less 
that there must be, some relation between them in the 
nature of things, or discerned by the mind. On the 
contrary, we may see them to be utterly discrepant, 
and wish that we could only break the links that join 
them in the chain of association. Thus there is a 
lovely spot where we once saw a foul act committed, 
and ever since, as we pass it, the whole scene rushes into 
our mind ; but we never think or conclude that there is 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 181 

any necessary or even natural connexion between the 
place and the deed. Mr. Mill has slipped in a word 
very dexterously, when he says, " It is impossible for 
us ever to think the one disjoined from the other." 
This is true only when by ' think ' we understand 
' having the idea of.' It is a fact that the one idea re- 
calls the other, but we do not therefore think the one 
to be joined to the other, either in the nature of things, 
or according to the laws of thought. 

We have here come to one of the gravest errors into 
which Mr. Mill has fallen in his theory of the operations 
of the mind. It is that of making the association of 
ideas usurp the province of judgment, which declares 
that two ideas or objects have a relation. I admit that 
the two, suggestion and judgment or comparison, often 
coincide and co-operate, and accomplish most important 
ends as they do so. Things that have a natural con- 
nexion are often presented to us together, they are thus 
brought under the law of association, and they are 
henceforth often recalled at the same time. In this 
way the association of ideas may lead to a hasty belief, 
not founded on a careful comparison of facts. I believe 
that much of what is usually reckoned understanding 
or judgment, contains little else than an association of 
ideas. The so-called ' thought ' of the lower animals, 
of children, and even of men of mature years, consists 
mainly in ideas succeeding each other in a train deter- 
mined by outward circumstances or by habit. It has 
to be added, that association of ideas often essentially 
aids us in forming a mature judgment, by bringing 



182 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

things that have a positive relation into juxtaposition, 
whereby we are enabled to discover the connexion. 
As the association helps the judgment, so the judgment, 
when it once connects the two things, creates an asso- 
ciation of ideas, whereby the one tends to bring up the 
other, and thereby we may be led to discover further 
relations, real or imaginary. But the actual comparison 
of two ideas or objects, and the predication of their 
agreement or disagreement, is always an operation dif- 
ferent from, and should be regarded as higher than, the 
mere alliance of them by an accidental association in 
our minds. The psychologist, instead of confounding, 
should be careful to distinguish them. Philosophy 
should aim at delivering us as much as possible from 
the power of accidental conjunctions, and bringing us 
under the habitual influence of a judicial temper of 
mind, which looks to the nature of things. Mr. Mill 
has done as much as within him lies to degrade human 
intelligence, by grounding beliefs on association, when 
he should have led us to seek for a deeper foundation 
in the mind's capacity of discerning realities and their 
relations. This is a subject which will come more fully 
before us when we consider Comparison. 

Mr. Mill makes great use of another peculiarity of 
association, which had been much dwelt on by Brown. 
" When impressions have been so often experienced in 
" conjunction, that each of them calls up readily and in- 
" stantaneously the ideas of the whole group, these ideas 
" sometimes melt and coalesce into one another, and 
" appear not several ideas but one" {Logic, B. vi. c. iv. § 3). 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 183 

Thus far we have a correct statement. When ideas have 
often been in company, they flow together so spontane- 
ously, and in the end so rapidly, that we cannot stay or 
even watch them in their course. As thus having no 
attention bestowed on them, some, or perhaps the whole, 
pass away into oblivion, according to a law to be imme- 
diately unfolded. Possibly we do not declare them to 
be one — I rather think we make no declaration about 
them at all ; but we do not, we cannot, distinguish them 
one from another. And when high feeling mingles with 
them, there may be produced upon our nervous orga- 
nism a combined result of a peculiar, perhaps of an 
intense, kind, which may abide when the mental ideas 
and emotions are gone. 

But Mr. Mill goes much further than this. " When 
" many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind 
" together, there sometimes takes place a process of a 
" similar kind to chemical combination" {Logic, B. vi. 
c. iv. § 3). This he explains, " The effect of concurring 
" causes is not always precisely the sum of the effects 
" of those causes when separate, nor even always an 
" effect of the same kind with them;" thus water, the 
product, differs in its qualities from its two elements, 
oxygen and hydrogen. We must be very careful here 
to ascertain the precise facts, to guard against exagger- 
ating them, or allowing them to be turned to illegiti- 
mate purposes. Let it be observed, that in chemical 
action we have always two substances, each with many 
properties known and unknown : we bring them into 
a certain relation to each other ; an action takes place 



184 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

very much of an unknown character, but implying the 
operation of electricity, or of one of the correlated forces 
of the universe ; the result is the formation of water, 
which possesses properties different from the oxygen, 
and the hydrogen, and the energy exerted in producing 
the changes, but which is always capable of being re- 
solved into the same old elements with the same mea- 
sure of energy. Now the question is, is there an 
analogous operation produced by the association of 
ideas ? I have admitted that, as the result of long and 
repeated conjunction, ideas, each, it may be, with its 
own peculiar feeling, succeed each other w T ith incalcul- 
able rapidity, so that we cannot distinguish between 
them ; and that they may coalesce in a result. Show 
the mother a plaything which belonged to a deceased 
child, and what a rush of remembrances and attached 
emotions will spring up, which she is not only not in- 
clined, but not able, to analyse. But is there anything 
in all this like chemical action ? There is a mighty tor- 
rent, but it appears to me that in the confluence there 
is nothing after all but the individual ideas with their 
corresponding feelings. There may be new associations, 
but there does not seem to be a new idea. Some of the 
ideas may pass away on the instant never to be recalled, 
whereas others may bulk largely before the mind, and 
leave their observed or abiding consequences. But in 
the agglomeration there seems to be nothing but the 
ideas, the feelings, and their appropriate impressions, 
coalescing; there is no new generation, no generation 
of an idea not in the separate parts of the collection. 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 185 

In particular, it is altogether ■unwarrantable out of 
mere associated sensations to draw those lofty ideas 
which the mind can form as to substance and quality, 
cause and effect, moral good and moral obligation. Let 
us observe with care what is implied in the production 
of a new body by chemical composition. There is one 
element with its properties, and another element with 
its properties, a mutual action in which there is poten- 
tial energy expended, and a new product with its pro- 
perties. And this mutual action we reckon a wonderful 
action of bodies ; we distinguish it from mechanical 
action ; we call it by the name of chemical affinity, and 
we seek to determine its laws. But let us suppose that 
instead of two elementary bodies we have two sensa- 
tions, say of two colours, or two smells, or two sounds, 
and that these have been often together, so that the one 
always comes up immediately after the other ; I ask, 
whether we have any ground to believe that these would 
of themselves generate a third thing different from the 
two ? If they do, it must be by some causal power in 
the sensations, or out of the sensations, in the mind or 
out of the mind ; and it is the business of the psycho- 
logist not to overlook this power, not to confound it 
with the mere association of old ideas, but to separate 
it from them carefully, diligently to observe it, and 
endeavour to discover its laws — as the chemist seeks to 
find the law of elementary affinity. I can discover no 
evidence that two sensations succeeding each other will 
ever be anything else than two sensations, or that two 
t remembered sensations will ever be anything else than 



186 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

two remembered sensations. When a further product 
appears, such as the idea of power, or the idea of the 
good, it cannot be the effect of a mere sensation, except 
in the sense above explained (p. 76), of an occasion, im- 
plying a co-operative capacity in the mind, such as a 
judgment or a power of discerning moral good, — which 
capacity should be noted as carefully as the sensations. 
In short, the laws of association are the mere laws of 
the succession of our ideas and attached feelings, and 
can generate no new idea, without a special inlet from 
without or capacity within. Association cannot give a 
man born blind the least idea of colour, and as little 
can it produce any other idea. By mixing the colours 
of yellow and blue the hand could produce green ; but 
give a person the idea of yellow and the idea of blue, 
and from the two he could not manufacture the idea of 
green ; still less could he from these sensations, or any 
others, form such ideas as those of time or potency. 

There are two points in regard to the association of 
ideas which require to be cleared up. The first is the 
precise and ultimate expression of the law, that things 
which are related, in particular, that things which are like 
suggest each other. This law, under one form or other, 
has appeared in nearly every classification of the laws 
of the succession of our mental states from the time of 
Aristotle downwards. Mr. Mill puts the law in the 
form, " Similar phenomena tend to be thought of to- 
gether" (p. 190). I believe that other related things 
do also suggest each other ; but let this pass. The 
unsettled question is, must the relation be seen by the 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 187 

mind before the law operates ? I see a portrait, and it 
at once suggests the original I have never seen the 
two together ; I see the portrait for the first time, the 
original is not present, and yet it is immediately called 
up. It can scarcely be alleged in such a case that I 
first discover the resemblance, and then have the idea 
of the original, for until the idea of the original springs 
up I cannot discover the resemblance. Is the law then to 
take this form, that like suggests like before the likeness 
is observed ? This is a topic on which Hamilton often 
pondered, and he has advanced some subtle considera- 
tions which are perhaps not sufficiently reduced to a 
consistent system. Mr. Mill severely criticises Hamil- 
ton, but has not himself sounded the depths of the sub- 
ject, which requires to be further cleared up before we 
have an ultimate expression of the laws of association. 
In endeavouring to explicate it, we must ever keep a 
firm hold of the distinction between the observation of 
relations, which is an act of comparison, and the mere 
suggestion of one thing by another. We shall see that 
the school of Mr. Mill has perseveringly confounded 
them. 

The other point requiring further elucidation relates 
to the Secondary Laws of Suggestion, as they have been 
called by Brown, or the Law of Preference, as it has 
been called by Hamilton. To explain what this means : 
suppose that the idea now before the mind has been 
associated with a great number of others, according to 
the laws of contiguity and correlation ; the question 
arises, why among these ideas does it go after one rather 



188 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

than another ? I met with a dozen people at a dinner : 
what makes me think of some one of them rather than 
the others ? Many references had been previously 
made to the facts bearing on this subject, but the first 
enumeration of Secondary Laws, as different from the 
Primary, was made by Brown, whose arrangement though 
clear was defective in logical reduction. I am sure 
there are two Laws of Preference which have a powerful 
influence. One of these is the law of native taste and 
talent. We go after the ideas which have the deepest 
interest to our natural faculties. Some, for instance, 
have a great tendency to observe resemblances, and 
among possible associations they will find likenesses, 
analogies, and affinities coming up most strongly and 
frequently. Some have constitutionally certain strong- 
appetencies or passions, and their thoughts will tend 
towards the corresponding objects. The mother with a 
strong love of offspring will find every topic started and 
event occurring, suggesting possible perils or enjoyments 
to her children. I need not dwell on this, as it has no 
special reference to our present discussion, which cer- 
tainly the other has. 

I call it the Law of Mental Energy. Those ideas 
are brought up most readily and frequently on which 
we have bestowed the greatest amount of mental force. 
Every mind seems to be endowed with a certain amount 
of power, and, according to the power expended on an 
idea, so is it remembered for a greater length of time, 
and so is it suggested more easily and frequently. It 
may be an energy of sensation, as when the idea has 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 189 

been very pleasurable or very painful. It may be an 
energy of intelligence, as when we have devoted one or 
several of our faculties, eagerly or for a length of time, 
to a given object. It may be an energy of emotion, as 
when a lively hope or an anxious fear has collected 
round a particular event. Or it may be an energy of 
will, as when we have given earnest attention to a sub- 
ject. Of course, the ideas, when they appear, always 
come up according to such Primary Laws as those 
of contiguity and correlation ; but the Law of Energy 
shows why, among a variety of objects which it might 
follow, the mind takes one rather than another. It is 
thus we explain that Law of Inseparable Association 
on which Mr. Mill dwells so much : the ideas have 
been together, and much energy having been expended 
on them in their frequent combination, they come up 
together, and they come up often. Much the same 
effects as are produced by frequent occurrence follow 
from a very strong energy being exerted only for a brief 
period, only, may be, for a few minutes or moments. 
A strong sensation, as that of an avalanche, heard, it 
may be, only once in our lives, may leave a life-long 
impression of itself. We can never forget the moment 
when, after long search and toil in some branch of re- 
search, a glorious thought burst on our view like the 
sun, and threw a flood of light on all surrounding 
objects. A terrible convulsion of fear will imprint it- 
self on our souls for life, and be renewed by every cor- 
related circumstance. An acute sorrow will burn itself 
into the soul, and leave a wound which a thousand cir- 



190 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

cumstances will tend to open, — thus the widow can 
never pass the spot where her husband was thrown out 
of a carriage and killed in her presence, without having 
the whole scene with its nervous agitations revived. 

This train of thought and observation opens to us what 
I regard as a very deep and fundamental law of memory 
in its recalling power. I believe we are momentarily con- 
scious of every sensation, idea, thought, or emotion of the 
mind. But it is mercifully provided that many of our 
mental states are never reproduced : they are happily 
allowed to pass away into forgetfulness, at least they 
cannot be brought up in ordinary circumstances, — though 
there are curious recorded instances of their reappearing 
in extraordinary positions. We should certainly be in a 
pitiable condition if every tick of the clock in the room 
in which we sit, if every act of will put forth in moving 
our limbs, if every passing thought in our day dreams or 
our night dreams, came up as readily as our more import- 
ant cogitations, which have engaged and engrossed much 
thought and attention. While we are conscious (so it 
appears to me) of every mental operation, it seems to be 
necessary that a certain amount of mental force should 
be expended in order to our having the capacity to re- 
call it. Very possibly this mental law may be con- 
nected with a physiological one, with what has been 
called by Dr. Carpenter " unconscious cerebration." I 
am inclined to think that our conscious mental affec- 
tions tend to produce an unconscious brain affection, 
and that the concurrence of the brain thus affected is 
necessary in order to memory, or the reproduction of an 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 191 

idea. Now, a certain amount of mental force may be 
necessary to produce the cerebration, without which 
there can be no recollection. Whether from purely 
mental or cerebral causes, or as I think from the two 
combined, it looks as if the recalling of ideas requires 
that they should first have been in the consciousness 
with a certain amount of force or vividness. Many 
ideas which have been in the mind never reappear, and 
those which do, come forth, according to the power or 
prerogative we have imparted to them— like the stars, 
which do not all show themselves, — for otherwise the 
sky would be one blazing concave, but which, when 
they do appear, come out according to their nearness to 
ns and their magnitude. 

It is by this broader and deeper principle that I 
account for what Mr. Mill chooses to call the Law of 
Obliviscence. I agree with Sir William Hamilton in 
thinking that there may be more than one object before 
the mind at one time. Suppose that there are five 
objects before the eye, I believe that we could notice all 
of them. But our apprehension of all and each is so 
spread and dissipated, is so faint and vague, that the 
chance is, that no one of them ever presents itself to the 
mind at any future time. But let one of them be of a 
very brilliant colour, or let it have a large amount of 
attention centred upon it for a special end, or suppose 
that it had created an interest in itself in time past 
so that it now awakens lively feeling, that object will 
be found to have so imprinted itself on the mind, 
that it will remain when others pass into obliviscence. 



192 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

" After reading," says Mr. Mill (p. 260), "a chapter of 
" a book, when we lay down the volume do we remem- 
" ber to have been individually conscious of the printed 
" letters and syllables which, have passed before us ? 
" Could we recall, by any effort of mind, the visible 
" aspect presented by them, unless some unusual cir - 
" cumstance has fixed our attention upon it during the 
" perusal ? Yet each of these letters and syllables must 
" have been present to us as a sensation for at least a 
" passing moment, or the sense could not have been 
" conveyed to us. But the sense being the only thing 
" in which we were interested- -or, in exceptional cases, 
" the sense and a few of the words or sentences — 
" we retain no impression of the separate letters and 
" syllables." By the same principle, we account for the 
facts which of late years have been commonly ascribed 
to Unconscious Mental Action. 

Mr. Mill has done essential service to philosophy by 
opposing the tide which, both in Germany and in Britain, 
has been flowing too strongly in favour of this theory. 
And yet I am not sure that he has apprehended all that 
is in the facts supposed to favour the doctrine. 

(1.) I hold that the soul, from the very first, is en- 
dowed with certain powers or tendencies. Even matter 
has capacities which lead to action, and to changes of 
state when the needful conditions are fulfilled ; and 
much more must the soul have original properties, 
which come forth in operation according to the law im- 
posed on them. But in these primary endowments 
there is no action, conscious or unconscious ; there is 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 193 

simply a capacity of action. Some of the German 
philosophers who support the theory confound these 
a priori powers or regulative principles of the mind, of 
which we are certainly not conscious, with the actions 
that proceed from them, and of which we are con- 
scious. 

(2.) The mind by action is ever acquiring and laying 
up power, capacity, tendency. AYe have something 
analogous in physical nature. In the geological ages, 
the plants by drinking in the sunbeams acquired a stock 
of power, which went down with them into the earth as 
they sank into it, which abides in the coal which they 
helped to form, and is now ready to burst out in heat 
and flame in our fires, and supply mechanical power to 
our steam-engines. There seems to be a like laying up 
of power in the mind ; of intellectual, and, I may add, 
of moral or immoral power — the result of continued 
mental action. "When we have done an act, we have a 
greater capacity, along with a tendency to do it again. 
Thus it is that we are, all our lives long, and on every 
day of them, acquiring powers, tendencies, dispositions, 
habits, inclinations, which are to abide with us for years 
— perhaps for ever. This is one of the regulating princi- 
ples in the reproduction of our mental states generally, 
and particularly in the association of ideas. What is 
done, and especially what is done repeatedly, leaves its 
trace on the soul, and may appear in deeds long long 
alter. Ideas which have been together simultaneously 
or in immediate succession, have the property and the 
tendency to come up together, and this in proportion to 



194 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

the mental energy which has been expended in pro- 
ducing them, and under this to the frequency with which 
they have been together. This is one of the elements 
which gives its beneficent and its awful power to habit. 
But let it be carefully observed, that in all this we have 
not come in sight of unconscious mental action. We 
were conscious of every step of the actual operations of 
the mind, and we were responsible for them throughout. 
Those who support the theory mistake the unconscious 
acquired power for unconscious acts. 

(3.) The mind by action may affect the structure of 
the brain, or the forces — mechanical, chemical, vital — 
operating in it, and in the nervous system. Material- 
istic physiologists represent high mental capacity as 
resulting from a large or finely constructed brain. The 
more probable theory is, that a nicely adapted and a 
finely strung cerebral structure results from high mental 
capacity and activhy. It is not the casket which forms 
the jewel, but it is the jewel that determines the size 
and shape of the casket ; or, to use a better illustration 
in such a connexion, it is the kernel that determines 
the form of the husk. The finely organized brain thus 
produced may, in man and the lower animals, tend to 
go down by the ordinary laws of transmission from 
parent to offspring. It is thus, that in certain of the 
West India Islands, by examining the heads of the 
nep'roes on a plantation, a hatter can tell at what age 
their forefathers were transplanted from Africa, — the 
brain being larger hi those families w T hose ancestors 
have been longest in contact with civilized men. It is 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 195 

thus, that in our own country, the average size of the 
heads of the educated classes is larger than that of the 
uneducated. But in this, the actual action of the mind 
is conscious throughout. It is only the organic product 
of which we are unconscious. 

This is not the place to work out these principles to 
their results. They imply important and far-ranging 
consequences — mental and organic. But these are not 
the doctrines defended by those whose opinions I am 
here reviewing. Xot satisfied with native endowments, 
aud acquired powers, and bodily effects, which are un- 
conscious, they insist on the existence of actual opera- 
tions which are unaccompanied with consciousness. 
They are not agreed among themselves as to what is the 
nature of this action. The theory was introduced into 
modern speculation by Leibnitz, who connected it with 
the essential activity of his monads. It was eagerly 
seized by certain of the pantheistic speculators of Ger- 
many, who maintained that the Divine Idea awakes to 
consciousness according to certain laws. As held in the 
present day, it takes two different, I should say incon - 
sistent, forms. According to a numerous school in 
Germany, which may be held as represented by the 
younger Fichte, the unconscious mental action is 
thought, and thought of the highest kind : the thought 
which in the bee constructs the cells on mathematical 
principles ; which bursts out in the highest products of 
genius, artistic, literary, and philosophic, and gives birth 
even to inspiration. The theory under this form seems 
to me to be fanciful in the highest degree. As to ani- 



1 9 G MEMOR Y, A SSOCIA TION OF 

mal instincts, they are clearly to be traced to original 
or inherited properties, obeying laws not yet determined. 
And as to genius, it is to be explained by far different 
principles. We account for it by high mental endow 
ment, often stimulated into intense action by a peculiar 
nervous temperament. We have no evidence that, prior 
to Bacon composing the Novum Organum, or Shak- 
speare writing Hamlet, there was any mental operation 
below consciousness. There were lofty gifts in both, 
and also a training and experience which leit their per- 
manent effects ; but when these came forth into action, 
I apprehend that the illustrious authors were quite 
conscious of them, though they might not have been 
able or disposed to furnish a metaphysical analysis of 
them. 

The theory of Hamilton is of a more sober character, 
but seems to be equally devoid of evidence to support 
it. The class of facts on which he rests his opinion are 
misapprehended. " When we hear the distant murmur 
" of the sea, what are the constituents of the total per- 
" ception of which we are conscious?" (Metaph., vol. i. 
p. 351.) He answers that the murmur is a sum made 
up of parts, and that if the noise of each wave made 
no impression in our sense, the noise of the sea, as 
the result of these impressions, could not be realized. 
" But the noise of each several wave at the distance, 
" we suppose, is inaudible ; we must, however, admit 
" that they produce a certain modification beyond con- 
" sciousness on the percipient object." He speaks of 
our perception of a forest as made up of impressions 



IDF AS, BELIEF, ETC. 197 

left by each leaf, which impressions are below con- 
sciousness. There is an entire misapprehension of the 
facts in these statements, and this, according to Hamil- 
ton's own theory of the object intuitively perceived. 
The mind is not immediately cognizant of the sound 
of the sea, or of its several waves, — nor of the trees of 
the forest and their several leaves. All that it knows 
intuitively is an affection of the organism. The im - 
pression made by the distant object is on the organism ; 
and when the action is sufficiently strong, the mind is 
called into exercise, and, from the perceived affections, 
argues or infers the peculiar nature of the distant cause. 
In this class of phenomena there is no proof of a mental 
operation of which we are unconscious. 

Hamilton explains, by supposed unconscious acts, a 
class of mental phenomena with which we are all fami- 
liar. We walk in a " brown study" from a friend's house 
to our home : there must have been many mental acts 
performed on the way, but they cannot be recalled. 
The question is, were they ever before the conscious- 
ness ? Dugald Stewart maintains that they were for 
the time, but that we cannot recollect them. Notwith- 
standing the acute remarks of Hamilton, I adhere to 
the explanation of Stewart. I do so on the general 
principle, that in propounding an hypothesis to explain 
a phenomenon, we should never caH'in a class of facts, 
of whose existence we have no other proof, when we 
can account for the whole by facts known on indepen- 
dent evidence. Hamilton tells us, " When suddenly 



198 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF 

" awakened during sleep (and to ascertain the fact, I 
" have caused myself to be roused at different seasons 
" of the night) I have always been able to observe that 
" I was in the middle of a dream;" but, he adds, that 
he was often scarcely certain of more than the fact that 
he was not awakened from an unconscious state, and 
that we are often not able to recollect our dreams. He 
represents it as a peculiarity of somnambulism, that 
we have no recollection when we awake of what has 
occurred during its continuance (vol. i. pp. 320-322). 
Every one will admit that we are often conscious of 
states at the time, which we either do not remember at 
all, or more probably cannot remember, except for a very 
brief period after we have experienced them. We have 
thus an established order of facts sufficient to explain 
the whole phenomena, and do not require to resort to 
alleged facts of which we have and can have no direct 
evidence. We walk home of an evening from a place 
at a distance conversing as we go along with a friend. 
In order to our reaching our dwelling, there must have 
been a number of mental acts to enable us to thread our 
way, along possibly a very perplexed road. Next morn- 
ing we remember the topics gone over in the conversa- 
tion, but have entirely and for ever forgot the acts of 
will implied in guiding our steps. But I venture to 
affirm that at the time we were conscious of both, that 
we were conscious even of the volitions that brought 
us safely to our home, and that we should have seen 
this and acknowledged it, and remembered it, had 



IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 199 

there been anything to call our attention to it at the 
time. The reason why the one is remembered while the 
other is forgotten, is to be found in the circumstance, 
that the conversation excited our interest, whereas the 
walk, as being the result of long acquired habit, called 
forth no feeling, and so passed into oblivion. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

JUDGMENT. OR COMPARISON. 

In this chapter I have to point out. first, a grave de- 
fect, and then a still graver error. 

There is no part of the psychology of the school to 
which Mr. Mill belongs in which their defects are so 
evident as in their account of the Judging, Comparative, 
or Correlative capacity. They may have been misled 
in part by Brown, who joined in one suggestion and 
relation, under a faculty which he called Eelative Sug- 
gestion, whose function it is at once to discover relations 
and suggest objects according to relations. Brown was 
wrong, I think, in allowing two such diverse functions 
to one power ; but it is justice to him to say that he has 
given a comprehensive view of the relations which the 
mind of man can discover. He has a generic and a 
specific division. He has first a grand twofold division 
into Co-existence and Succession. Under the first he 
embraces Position, Besemblance or Difference, Propor- 
tion, Degree, Comprehension ; and under the second, 
Causal and Casual Priority. The later members of the 
school, such as Mr. James Mill, Mr. J. S. Mill, and 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 201 

Mr. Bain, have been lessening the number, and lower- 
ing the importance of the relations which can be dis- 
covered by our faculties, and thus narrowing our mental 
powers, so as to enable them the more readily to account 
for the phenomena of the mind by sensations and asso- 
ciation. Mr. James Mill does speak of Eelative Terms, 
but contrives to get them without calling in a special 
faculty of Comparison. Mr. J. S. Mill, after specifying 
1st, Feelings, 2d, Minds, and 3d, Bodies, as included 
among nameable things, mentions, " 4th and last, the 
" Successions and Co- existences, the Likenesses and 
" Unlikenesses between feelings or states of conscious- 
" ness." In explanation, he tells us, " Those relations, 
" when considered as subsisting between other things, 
" exist in reality only between the states of conscious 
" ness which those things, if bodies, excite, if minds, 
" either excite or experience" {Logic, B. i. c. iii. § 15). 
This statement is quite in accordance with his general 
theory as he has now developed it. As we know ori- 
ginally only feelings or states of consciousness, so the 
relations we discover can only be between feelings and 
possibilities of feeling. No doubt most people imagine 
that in comparing Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, and 
Napoleon Buonaparte ; and in comparing or contrasting 
Louis Napoleon with Augustus, Comte with Hobbes, 
and Mill with Hume, we are comparing things out of 
our states of consciousness : but the new philosophy 
corrects this vulgar error, and in doing so is consistent 
with itself — whether it be consistent with our intuitive 
assurances or no. To complete the simplicity of the 



202 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

reduction, Mr. Bain tells us, in reviewing Grote's Plato 
(Macmillan's Magazine, July 1865), "These two facts, 
" Cognisance of Difference and Cognisance of Agree- 
" ment, can be shown to exhaust the essence of know- 
" ledge, and both 'are requisites. All that we can 
" know of a gold ring is summed up in its agreement 
" with certain things, round things, small things, gold 
" things, etc, and its differences from others, squares, 
" oblong, silver, iron," etc. 

I maintain that this account of man's power of cor- 
relation is far too narrow, — consciousness being the 
witness and arbiter. Profound thinkers have given a 
much wider sweep to the intellect. I have quoted the 
enumeration by Brown, and I have presented below the 
classifications of such thinkers as Locke, Hume, and 
Kant. 1 I ask the reader to look at them, and to decide 
for himself whether they can all be reduced to agree- 
ment and disagreement. Mr. Mill gives a place to co 
existences and successions. In this he is surely right : 
for when I say that Shakspeare and Cervantes died the 
same year, and that the ancient epic poets, Homer and 
Virgil, lived before the modern ones, Dante and Milton, 
I indicate more than an agreement in the former case 
and a disagreement in the latter, — I intimate the point of 

1 Locke specifies Cause and Effect, Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, 
Proportion and Moral Kelations {Essay, B. II. c. xxxvii.) Hume mentions 
Resemblance, Identity, Space and Time, Quantity, Degree, Contrariety, 
Cause and Effect. Kant's categories are, — I. Quantity, containing Unity, 
Plurality, Totality. II. Quality, containing Reality, Negation, Limita- 
tion. III. Relation, containing Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and 
Dependence, Community of Agent and Patient. IV. Modality, containing 
Possibility and Impossibility, Existence and Non-Existence, Necessity 
and Contingence. 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 203 

relation, which is that of Time, — a relation, I may 
add, the significance of which has not been estimated by 
Mr. Mill. When I say that one figure before my eyes 
is a disc, and another a solid, I declare more than a dif- 
ference or co- existence, I declare that the two differ in 
respect of their occupation of space. Again, when I 
affirm that oxygen is one of the elements of water, I 
predicate a relation of part and whole, and imply one 
of composition, which is surely more than agreement, 
or co -existence, or succession. The same may be said 
of other relations, such as that of quantity, when I 
maintain that Chimborazo is higher than Mont Blanc ; 
and of active property, when I declare that the sun 
attracts the earth, and that oxygen combines with 
hydrogen to form water. 1 

We are now in a position to discover and expose 
what is perhaps the most fatal error in the whole 
theory : it consists in ascribing to association the func- 
tions of judgment. Mr. James Mill thus sums up a 
statement : " We have now then explored those states 
" of Consciousness which we call Belief in existences : 
" Belief in present existences ; Belief in past existences ; 
" and Belief in future existences. We have seen that, in 
" the most simple cases, Belief consists in sensation alone, 
" or ideas alone ; in the more complicated cases, in sen - 
" sation, ideas, and association, combined ; and in no 
" case of belief has any other ingredient been found." 



1 I have arranged the Kelations as those of Identity and Difference, 
Whole and Parts, Space, Time, Quantity, Besemblance, Active Property, 
and Cause and Effect.— Intuitions, P. II. B. in. c. i. 



204 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

As to Propositions, he says they are either of general 
names or particular names. Of the former he says, 
" They are all merely verbal ; and the Belief is nothing 
" more than recognition of the coincidence, entire or 
" partial, of two general names." As to the latter, lie 
says, " Propositions relating to individuals may be ex- 
" pressions either of past or future events. Belief in 
" past events, upon our own experience, is memory ; 
" upon other men's experience, is Belief in testimony ; 
" both of them resolved into association. Belief in 
" future events is the inseparable association of like 
" consequents with like antecedents" {Analysis, pp. 290, 
307, 308). I am not sure whether the son w T ould adopt 
the whole of this statement : he has been obliged to 
admit that memory yields an ultimate belief, wdiich is 
not the result of association. But his theory in the 
main coincides with that of the father. It is admitted 
that there is an original consciousness of sensations, 
and that there is a memory of sensations, which cannot 
be resolved into anything simpler. It is further postu- 
lated that there is an association of sensations according 
to contiguity and agreement, and that there is an ex- 
pectation of sensations. Out of these, as I understand, 
spring our judgments (if indeed we have the pow r er of 
judging) and our beliefs, which imply, and can imply 
nothing more than contiguity or agreement in the sen- 
sations. I charge this doctrine with stripping man of 
the capacity of judging of the actual relations of things ; 
and making all our beliefs, except those involved in sen- 
sations, and the memory of them, to be the creation of 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 205 

circumstances, and capable of being changed only by 
circumstances with their conjunctions and correspon- 
dencies, which, for anything we can ever know, may 
be altogether fortuitous or fatalistic. 

The defects of the theory commence in the account 
given of the matter with which the mind starts : this 
is supposed to be merely sensations. But the fatal con- 
sequences do not become evident till we see what must 
be the explanation rendered of the mind's capacity of 
Judgment. I have endeavoured in this treatise to meet 
and stop the error at its inlet, that so we may be pre- 
served from the issues. I have shown that the mind 
starts with an original stock of knowledge and belief. 
In sense-perception it knows objects, with an existence, 
external to self, extended, and capable of resistance and 
of motion. In self- consciousness it knows self as an 
existing thing, sentient, or knowing, or remembering, or 
believing, or judging, or resolving, or entertaining moral 
or other sentiments. In memory we remember our- 
selves and the event in the past, and thus have a con- 
tinuous and identical self, with the important element 
of time. And now we can compare all these, and dis- 
cover relations among them. By this further faculty 
the domain of our knowledge is indefinitely extended : 
in fact our acquaintance with an object is very vague 
and very limited till we have detected its connexions 
with other things. But what I wish specially noticed 
is, that the comparison is not between mere " feelings 
or states of consciousness," but between things, with- 
out us as well as within us. I compare self in one state, 



206 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

say under sensation, with self in another state, say re- 
collecting or resolving. I compare one extended object 
with another, and declare the one to be larger than the 
other. I compare events remembered, and declare that 
they happened at different times. I compare my very 
comparisons, and discover further, it may be more recon- 
dite, proportions and harmonies, till we link all nature 
within and without us in a series of uniformities. And 
let it be observed, that our judgments throughout are 
judgments as to realities. As being cognizant of ex- 
tended objects in perception by the senses, on noticing 
two extended objects, say St. Paul's and its door, we 
declare the one to be greater than the other ; and our 
judgment is about things, and not about sensations, or 
the mere possibilities of sensation. On seeing two per- 
sons on our right hand and two persons on our left hand, 
we declare them to be four, as soon as we understand 
what ' two' and what ' four' mean. We remember our 
school days and our college clays, and we declare the 
one to be prior to the other. Our comparisons in such 
cases are of things, and our judgments upon things, and 
not on mere feelings, or mere possibilities of feeling. 
Circumstances have not produced the judgments, nor 
can circumstances change or modify them. In all cir- 
cumstances I decide that the house is larger than its 
door ; that two and two make four ; and that an event 
which occurred when we were ten years old must be 
prior to one which happened when we were twenty. 

I admit that association tends to produce action, in- 
dependent of judgment upon a comparison of the things. 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 207 

When tilings have often been together in the mind, we 
go spontaneously from the one to the other ; and if action 
be needed to secure the second, we will be disposed to 
exert it. As Mr. Bain, in unfolding the nature of our 
Beliefs, expresses it (Emot. and Will, p. 579), 1 " An 
" animal sees the water that it drinks, and thereby 
" couples in its mind the property of quenching thirst 
" with the visible aspect. After this association has 
" acquired a certain degree of tenacity, the sight of 
" water at a distance suggests the other fact, so that, 
" from the prospect, the animal realizes to some degree 
" the satisfying of that craving. The sight of water to 
" the thirsty animal, then, inspires the movements 
" preparatory to actual drinking ; the voluntary organs 
" of locomotion are urged by the same energetic spur 
" on the mere distant sight, as the organs of lapping 
" and swallowing under the feeling of relief already 
" commenced. This is the state of mature conviction 
" as to the union of the two natural properties of water." 
I reckon this as a case mainly of association, and not of 
judgment. I do allow that association tends to make 
us form judgments. When two objects have been often 
brought together, we are led to discover a resemblance, 
real or imaginary, between them. But admitting all 
this freely, I maintain that the mind has a power of 
judgment, upon the bare contemplation of objects, and 
apart altogether from the association of instances. On 
the simple consideration of two straight lines, I am sure 

1 Mr. Bain admits Intuitive Beliefs, but then they deceive us. " The 
inborn energy of the brain gives faith, and experience scepticism," p. 582. 



208 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

they cannot enclose a space. I have only to hear of a 
case of ingratitude for favours to declare it to be bad 
and blameworthy. 

While the two, association and comparison, often 
help each other, yet they are never the same. The one 
may exist without the other; and the one does not 
increase nor decrease with the other. In many cases 
there is a strong and inseparable association without 
the judgment perceiving any relation, nay, where it 
would declare that there is no connexion in the nature 
of things. Thus the letter A naturally suggests the 
letter B, because they have come so often together in 
our repetition of the alphabet ; yet no one thinks that 
the two have in themselves any bonds of union. It so 
happens that, when the name St. Patrick is brought up, 
I always associate with it the legend I heard in my 
youth about the saint swimming from Donaghadee to 
Portpatrick, with his head in his teeth ; yet the fre- 
quency of the conjunction has not been able to coiwince 
me of the possibility of the act. Often have the num- 
bers 17 and 20 been together in my mind, from the 
accident of their having been printed together on a 
card on which I had frequent occasion to look ; but it 
has never occurred to me that the two must have a 
necessary connexion. It thus appears that frequency 
of association cannot of itself generate a judgment with 
its attached belief. On the other hand, a judgment 
declaring that there is a connexion does not imply that 
there has been a frequent association. Comparatively 
seldom have 17 + 20 been conjoined in my mind with 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 209 

3 7 — certainly not so frequently as 1 7 has been asso- 
ciated with 20, — and yet, on the bare contemplation 
of 17 -f- 20, I declare them to be equal to 37, and 
cannot be made to decide otherwise. If I hear that 
Peter Jones robbed his master John Smith who trusted 
him, I declare that Peter Jones deserves punish- 
ment, and' this though I never heard of Peter Jones 
before. 

Mr. Mill is prepared to carry out his principles to 
consequences, which seem to me a reductio ad aosurdum 
of the principles. He tells us (p. 69) that " the reverse 
" of the most familiar principles of geometry might have 
" been made conceivable, even to our present faculties, 
" if these faculties had co-existed with a totally different 
" constitution of external nature," and quotes at length, 
in proof of this, from Essays ~by a Barrister, in which it 
is said, — " There is a world in which, whenever two 
" pairs of things are either placed in proximity or are 
" contemplated together, a fifth thing is immediately 
" created and brought within the contemplation of the 
" mind engaged in putting two and two together. This 
" is surely neither inconceivable, for Ave can readily 
" conceive the result by thinking of common puzzle 
" tricks, nor can it be said to be beyond the power of 
" Omnipotence. Yet in such a world surely two and 
" two would make five." This certainly would be the 
result on Mr. Mill's theory. But such consequences 
can be admitted only by those who deny the mind all 
power of knowing the nature of things. Those of us 
who stand up for a power of independent judgment, 

o 



210 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

that is, a judgment founded on the perception of things, 
cannot allow such conclusions. Were we placed in a 
world in which two pairs of things were always fol- 
lowed by a fifth thing, we might be disposed to believe 
that the pairs caused the fifth thing, or that there 
was some prearranged disposition of things producing 
them together ; but we could not be made* to judge 
that 2 + 2 = 5, or that the fifth thing is not a different 
thing from the two and the two. On the other suppo- 
sition put, of the two pairs always suggesting a fifth, 
we should explain their recurrence by some law of 
association, but we would not confound the 5 with 
the 2 -f 2, or think that the two pairs could make 
five. 

The same ingenious gentleman supports the theory 
by another illustration, and receives the sanction of Mr. 
Mill. " It would also be possible to put a case of a 
" world in which two lines would be universally sup- 
" posed to include a space. Imagine a man who had 
" never had any experience of straight lines through the 
" medium of any sense whatever, suddenly' placed upon 
" a railway stretching out on a perfectly straight line 
" to an indefinite distance in each direction. He would 
" see the rails, which would be the first straight lines 
" he had ever seen, apparently meeting, or at least 
" tending to meet, at each horizon ; and he would thus 
" infer, in the absence of all other experience, that they 
" actually did enclose a space when produced far enough." 
Now I allow that this person, as he looked one way, 
would see a figure presented to the eye of two straight 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 211 

lines approaching nearer each other; and that as he 
looked the other way he would see a like figure. But 
I deny that in combining the two views he would ever 
decide that the four lines seen, the two seen first and 
the two seen second, make only two straight lines. In 
uniting the two perceptions in thought he would cer- 
tainly place a bend or a turn somewhere, possibly at the 
spot from which he took the two views. He would 
continue to do so till he realized that the lines seen on 
either side did not in fact approach nearer each other. 
Or to state the whole phenomenon witli more scientific 
accuracy : Intuitively, and to a person who had not 
acquired the knowledge of distance by experience, the 
two views would appear to be each of two lines ap- 
proaching nearer another ; but without his being at 
all cognisant of the relation of the two views, or of one 
part of the lines being farther removed from him than 
another (see supra, pp. 160-168). As experience told 
him that the lines receded from him on each side, he 
would contrive some means of combining his observa- 
tions probably in the way above indicated ; but he never 
could make two straight lines enclose a space. 

The same remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to a third 
case advanced by the Barrister. Thomas Beid, who was 
a man of humour and addicted to mathematics, amused 
himself and relieved a dry discussion by drawing out a 
"Geometry of Visibles" (Works, p. 147), in which he 
exhibits the conclusions which could be deduced from 
the supposed perceptions of sight. He proceeds upon 
the Berkeley an doctrine of vision, and supposes that by 



212 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

sight we could have " no conception of a third dimen- 
sion " of space ; and that a person with sight, but with- 
out touch, would see length and breadth, but could 
have no idea of thickness, or of the distinction of figures 
into planes and curves. Such a one, he thinks, might 
be driven by geometry to the conclusion that " every 
" right line being produced will at last return into 
" itself;" that "any two right lines being produced will 
" meet in two points ; " and that " two or more bodies 
" may exist in the same place."* But these inferences 
can be deduced only by denying to vision functions which 
belong to it, and ascribing to it others which are not 
intuitive or original. We have seen that the eye takes 
in intuitively a coloured surface, and if there be two 
colours on the surface, divided by a curve line, we at 
once have the perception of a curve. Again, by bin- 
ocular vision we have, if not intuitively, at least by an 
easy process of experience and inference, space in the 
third dimension. It is further to be borne in mind, that 
in our acquired perceptions we lay down rules which 
may help us in common cases, but which, not being 
absolutely correct, may lead into error when improperly 
applied to other cases ; as when we argue from the 
crooked image presented to the eye that there is a 
crooked stick corresponding to it in the water. Pro- 
ceeding on such assumptions as these, it is possible to 
show that we are landed in the consequences so graphi- 
cally pointed out by Eeid. But the consequences are 
not legitimate, because they are drawn from a mis- 
apprehension pf the precise nature of our intuitive 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 213 

perceptions in vision. There is and can be no evidence 
that a person with the sense of sight, but without the 
sense oi] touch, would draw them. I hold that the very 
vision of two straight lines would prevent us from 
being led to declare that they could meet at two 
points. Upon the bare contemplation of the lines, 
whether made known bv sight or touch, we at once 
reject all such conclusions, however ingeniously con- 
structed from premisses which have not the sanction of 
our constitution. 

When such consequences are allowed and defended, 
we see how ominous is this conjunction in the philo- 
sophic firmament of the School of Comte with that of 
Hume. The philosophy thus generated places truth, 
that is, a knowledge of the nature of things, beyond the 
reach of the human faculties ; which commence with 
they know not what, and close, after a laborious process, 
with results which may have as little reality as a suc- 
cession of dis'solving views. Stripping us of a power of 
independent judgment, it leaves us the servants, I should 
rather say the slaves, of circumstances, with their con- 
junctions and correspondences, which may all be the 
issue of blind chance or dead mechanism, — certainly 
without our being able to say that they are not. Along 
with independence, I fear there is also taken away all 
responsibility, of judgment and belief, — except, indeed, 
such accountability as we may require of a horse or a dog 
when we associate its vices with a lash, simply to pre- 
vent the animal from doing the deed again. I am per- 



214 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 

suaded that such a creed must exercise, whether the 
persons are or are not aware of it, whether they do or 
do not confess it, a deadening influence on those who 
actually believe it and come under its sway; and if 
ever it should be accepted in its results (I say results, 
for its processes are too subtle to be grasped by the 
rough hands of the common people), and its appropriate 
sentiments diffused, in a community, the consequences 
would be as fatal as those which flowed in the end of 
last century in France, from the prevalence of the Sen r 
sational Philosophy, when it gave a wrong direction to 
the great political upheaval, and helped to degrade the 
national character. 

We can avoid these issues only by maintaining that 
man is so constituted as to know originally something 
of the reality of things, and to be capable of rising to 
an acquaintance with their relations. Association may 
help us to form a reasonable judgment — and it is a 
happy circumstance when it does so ; but whether we 
are or are not so aided, we should be taught that it is 
our duty to found our beliefs on a previous judgment, 
in which we look to the nature of things as the same 
can be discovered by us. One end, no doubt, of a good 
training is to encompass us with profitable associations 
in the family, in the social circle, and in the community ; 
with associations originating in the highest sentiments, 
and sanctioned by the common conscience and the uni- 
versal reason of the men of former ages. But it is a 
still higher end of the highest education to raise us 
above all hereditary and casual association of times 



JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON. 215 

or circumstances, and to constrain ns to base our 
beliefs on an inspection of realities and actualities. 
Every youth should be taught that he is endowed with 
an inherent power of discernment, which he is not at 
liberty to lay aside in any circumstances, and for the 
proper use of which he is responsible. 



CHAPTEE X. 



RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 



When Professor Ferrier propounded the theory that 
one's self mixes as an integral and essential part with 
our knowledge of every object, and Sir William Hamilton 
unfolded his doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, I 
felt constrained to declare that there were views pre- 
valent in metaphysical speculation which were working 
as much mischief as the ideal theory had done in the 
days of Berkeley ; and I ventured to affirm that if Pro- 
fessor Terrier's speculations were not regarded as a 
reductio ad aosurdum of the whole style of thinking, 
" the next phenomenon appearing in the philosophic 
" firmament must be a Hume or a Fichte " (Meth. of 
Div. Govern., 4th Edit. App. pp. 536-539). In now 
holding that this fear has been realized, it is not need- 
ful to maintain that Mr. Mill is in every respect like 
either the great Scottish sceptic or the great German 
idealist, any more than to assert that these two are like 
each other. Mr. Mill is not so original a thinker as 
Hume, nor does he like him profess scepticism. He 
does not possess the speculative genius of Fichte, and 



RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 217 

lie defends his system in a niucli more sober manner. 
But it can be shown that his philosophy comes very 
nearly to the positions taken up by Hume, when Hume 
is properly understood ; and in maintaining that mind 
is a series of feelings aware of itself, and that matter is 
a possibility of sensations, he has reached conclusions 
quite as visionary as those of Fichte. As Hume brought 
out fully the results lying in the philosophy of Berkeley 
— as one of the offshoots of the philosophy of Locke, and 
as Fichte carried to their logical consequences certain of 
the fundamental principles of Kant, so Mr. Mill, and 
we may add Mr. Herbert Spencer, are pursuing to their 
proper issues the doctrine floating in nearly all our later 
metaphysics, that we can know nothing of the nature 
of things. 

Mr. Bain speaks complacently of " the great doctrine 
" called the Eelativity of Knowledge, which has risen 
" by slow degrees to its present high position in philo- 
" sophy." But unfortunately — I should rather say for- 
tunately — no two defenders of the doctrine have agreed 
as to the sense in which they hold it ; in fact I can see 
no point in which they meet except the Comtian posi- 
tion, that the knowledge of the actual nature of things 
is beyond the reach of man. Mr. Mill remarks very 
properly (p. 5), that the phrase "relativity of knowledge " 
admits of a great variety of meanings, and that when a 
philosopher lays great stress upon the doctrine, " it is 
" necessary to cross-examine his writings, and compel 
" them to disclose in which of its many degrees of 
" meamng he understands the phrase." 



2 1 8 EEL A TIVITY OF KKO WLEDGE. 

There is a doctrine sometimes passing by this name, 
which will recommend itself to all sober thinkers : who 
will admit — (1.) that Ave can know objects only so far as 
we have faculties of knowledge ; (2.) that we can know 
objects only under the aspects presented to the faculties ; 
and (3.) that our faculties are limited in number and in 
range, so that not only do we not know all objects, we 
do not know all about any one object. These posi- 
tions have been disputed by none except some of the 
Alexandrian Neo-Platonists in ancient times, and a few 
German defenders of the Absolute Philosophy in modern 
times. A doctrine embracing these positions has been 
known and acknowledged under such designations as 
that of " the limited knowledge of man," and should 
not be expressed by so ambiguous a phrase as " the 
relativity of knowledge/' which is applied to a very 
different theory. That theory has of late years assumed 
four different forms. 

I. There is the form given to it by Sir W. Hamilton. 
He thus unfolds it (Metaph. i. 148) : " Our knowledge is 
" relative, — 1st, because existence is not cognisable ab- 
" solutely and in itself, but only in special modes ; 2d, 
" because these modes can be known only if they stand 
" in a certain relation to our faculties." Mr. Mill thus 
comments : " Whoever can find anything more in these 
" statements than that we do not know all about a 
" thing, but only so much as we are capable of knowing, 
" is more ingenious or more fortunate than myself." 
But surely it is desirable to have even this much al- 
lowed and clearly enunciated ; only I think it unfortunate 



RELA TIVITY OF KNO W LEDGE. 2 1 9 

that two such inexplicable phrases as ' absolutely ' and 
' in itself should have been introduced. Sir William 
gives a third reason, and here the error appears. " 3d, 
" Because the modes, thus relative to our faculties, are 
" presented to, and known by the mind only under modi- 
" fications determined by these faculties themselves." 
This doctrine is thoroughly Kantian hi itself and in its 
logical consequences. It makes the mind look at things, 
but through a glass so cut and coloured that it gives a 
special shape and hue to every object, " Suppose that 
" the total object of consciousness in perception is = 12 ; 
" and suppose that the external reality contributes 6, 
" the material sense 3, and the mind 3, — this may enable 
" you to form some rude conjecture of the nature of 
" the object of perception" 1 (Metaph. ii. p. 120). This 
doctrine very much neutralizes that of natural realism, 
which Hamilton seems, after the manner of Eeid, to 
be so strenuously defending. To suppose that in per- 
ception or cognition proper we mix elements derived 
from our subjective stores, is to unsettle our whole con- 
victions as to the reality of things; for if the mind 
adds three things, why not thirty things, why not three 
hundred, till we are landed in absolute idealism, or in 
the dreary flat into which those who would float in that 
empty space are sure in the end to fall, that is, absolute 
scepticism. By assuming this middle place between Eeid 

1 Sir William Hamilton has used very unguarded language as to human 
nescience ; hut I have reason to believe that he thought himself misunder- 
stood, and I am inclined to think that he had some means of satisfying 
himself that he held by the reality of things. There is a point here on 
which it is hoped some of his pupils may be able to throw light. 



220 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

and Kant, this last of the great Scottish metaphysicians 
has been exposed to the tire of the opposing camps of 
idealism and realism, and it will be impossible for the 
school to continne to hold the position of their master. 

It required no great shrewdness to foresee the logical 
consequences that would be drawn, and so I take no 
credit for resolutely opposing the doctrine from the 
time of its publication. It should.be allowed that 
sensations, feelings, impressions, associate themselves 
with our knowledge, but every man of sound sense 
easily separates them ; and it should not be difficult for 
the philosopher to distinguish between them, to distin- 
guish between our intuition of a tooth and the pain of 
toothache, between the perception of a landscape and 
the aesthetic emotions which it calls up. Following the 
spontaneous convictions of assurance and certitude in 
the mind (see k.), which all but the sceptic allow specu- 
latively, and which even the sceptic must actually pro- 
ceed upon in defending his scepticism, we should hold — 
(1.) that we know the very thing as appearing, and not 
a mere appearance without a thing to appear ; and (2.) 
that our knowledge is correct so far as it goes, and is 
not modified by the subjective forms of the mind. I 
have been striving in these chapters to show that we 
immediately know a self and extended objects beyond. 
But we have the same grounds for affirming that our 
knowledge is correct as for asserting that we have 
knowledge. In the event of man's intuitive knowledge 
being mistaken or fallacious in any point, it is certain 
he could never discover it to be so with his present 



RELA TIV1TY OF KNO WLEDGE. 221 

faculties. Our perceptions of sense, consciousness, and 
intuitive reason all combine in a consistent result, and 
we must receive the whole or reject the wdiole. Hamil- 
ton declares that " no attempt to show that the data of 
" consciousness are (either in themselves or in their 
" necessary consequences) mutually contradictory, has 
" yet succeeded." " An original, universal, dogmatic 
" subversion of knowledge has hitherto been found 
" impossible" (App. to Eeid's Works, p. 746). That 
there should be such consistency in intuitive truth that 
the acutest human intellects have not been able to de- 
tect a contradiction, is not the primary proof, but is a 
confirmation of its truth. That there should be such 
consistency in total error, or in a mixture of truth and 
error, is scarcely believable : w^e could account for it 
only on the supposition that it w r as produced by a mis - 
chievous deity, who wished so to deceive us that we 
could never discover the deception, — a supposition con- 
tradicted by the circumstance that the whole constitu- 
tion of our minds and of things is fitted to impress us 
with the importance of veracity, showing that the 
Creator and Euler of our world is a God of Truth. 

II. Mr. Mill has enunciated the doctrine in a second 
form, and accepts it as expressing " a real and impor- 
" tant law of our mental nature. This is, that we only 
" know anything by knowing it as distinguished from 
" something else ; that all consciousness is of difference ; 
" that two objects are the smallest number required to 
" constitute consciousness ; that a thing is only seen to 
" be what it is by contrast with what it is not" (p. 6). 



222 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

He tells that the employment of the phrase to express 
this meaning is sanctioned by high authorities, and he 
mentions Mr. Bain, " who habitually uses the phrase 
' relativity of knowledge' in this sense." It is quite 
true that the doctrine, that all knowledge consists in 
comparison, has appeared again and again in speculative 
philosophy ; but as destroying the simplicity of our 
mental operations, and reversing the order of nature, it 
has wrought only mischief. 

The mind, as I apprehend, begins its intelligent acts 
with knowledge, and, we may add, with beliefs, and then 
it can go on to compare the things known and believed 
in, and thereby widens the domain both of knowledge 
and belief. It commences, w T e may suppose, with a 
perception — which is knowledge — of an external object, 
and a consciousness — which is knowledge — of self as 
perceiving the object. Then it remembers, and in doing 
so has a belief in the object which has been perceived. 
In all this there is no comparison, but having this, the 
mind can forthwith institute a comparison and pro- 
nounce a judgment. Thus, having a knowledge of body 
in the concrete, the mind can then, when a purpose is 
to be served by it, declare that body exists, and that it is 
extended ; and having a knowledge of self, it can assert 
that it exists, and that it is under grief or joy — as our 
experience may be at the time. Eemembering an event 
as happening in time past, it can declare that the event 
is real, and the time real. But while such judgments 
are involved in our primary cognitions, I rather think 
that they come in later life : the child, I rather think, 



RE LA Tl VITY OF KNO WEED GE. 2 2 3 

as knowing its own existence and never doubting it, is 
not at the trouble of asserting it. But the child on 
perceiving two objects successively, or it may be simul- 
taneously, delights to discover a relation between them. 
Such judgments follow so immediately on the cognitions, 
that it is not necessary to distinguish them from one 
another except in scientific psychology. But if meta- 
physicians lay down an opposite doctrine, and draw 
consequences from it, it is absolutely necessary to 
correct the statement. 

I suppose Mr. Mill would represent the mind as be- 
oinnino; with sensations. We have then a sensation. 
Is there comparison in this ? I cannot discover that 
there is. Xo doubt, upon another sensation rising up, 
we may compare the one with the other and discover 
an agreement or difference. But in order to this com - 
parison there is memory ; and memory, in recalling the 
sensation, must bring it up prior to the comparison. 
But Mr. Mill may say that we have two sensations 
simultaneously, — say a sensation of resistance by one 
sense, and a sensation of colour by another, and w 7 e de- 
clare them at once to agree or to differ. But could we 
not have the sensation of resistance or the sensation of 
colour though each came alone? Even when they 
come simultaneously, we are able to compare them, be- 
cause we know so much of each. We ever proceed on 
a supposed knowledge of the objects when we compare 
and decide. When I say that 2 + 2 = 4, it is because 
I know what is meant by the terms. If I say Ben 
Nevis is a few feet higher than Ben Macdhui, it is 



224 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

because I know somewhat of the height of each moun- 
tain. If I say that Aristotle's Induction w T as not the 
same as Bacon's ; that Comte's Positive Method differs 
essentially from Bacon's Inductive Method ; that Locke 
was not a follower of Hobbes ; that Condillac had no 
right to proclaim himself a disciple of Locke ; that 
Eeid met Hume in a more sagacious manner than Kant 
did ; that Brown vainly endeavoured to combine the 
Sensational School of France with the British Associa- 
tion School and the School of Beid ; and that a good 
Inductive Logic must combine certain principles of 
Whewell with those of Mill, — I do so because I think 
I know something of the philosophic systems of which 
I speak, and am thus able to compare or to contrast 
them. 

But Mr. Mill may refer me to the philosophy of 
Hamilton, which declares that in the very first act of 
consciousness we discover the relation of the ego and 
the non ego. My readers, however, will have seen by 
this time that I am not bound to follow Hamilton, who, 
in fact, though without meaning it, prepared the way 
for a farther doctrine from which he would have turned 
away with the strongest aversion. I believe that in our 
conscious sense -perceptions we know both the self and 
the not- self in one concrete act ; and of course we have 
in all this the materials for a judgment; but I doubt 
much whether the infant actually pronounces the judg- 
ment. But then it is said that our knowledge of the 
object is an apprehension of the relation of the object 
or sensation to the perceiving mind. Now I believe 



RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 225 

that a relation is formed in the very act of knowledge. 
But my knowledge does not consist in the perception 
of the relation ; on the contrary, the relation may arise 
simply from the knowledge. I apprehend the President 
of the United States of America ; as I do so, I have 
constituted a relation between myself and him ; but 
there may have been no previous relation ; and if I 
declare the relation, it is by a consequent and subse- 
quent act. I strive to rise to a contemplation of the 
Divine Being ; there is no doubt a relation of my mind 
to the object viewed ; but the relation consists in my 
contemplation. When the Divine Being looks down 
on His works and pities those who suffer, it is not be- 
cause the Creator in all this is dependent on His crea- 
tures ; the viewing of them by Him with regard and 
commiseration constitutes the particular and interest- 
ing relation. It is high time to lay an arrest on that 
style of representation, so frequent in the present age, 
which would make us perceive a relation before per- 
ceiving the things related, and make the very Divine 
knowledge, so far as we can comprehend it, depend on 
creature relations. 

I take exception, on like grounds, to another part of 
the same doctrine : " That a thing is only seen to be 
" what it is by contrast with what it is not." I admit 
that where we can discover contrasts, our notions are 
rendered more distinct and vivid. But I cannot allow 
that we should not have known a sensation, say the 
feeling of a lacerated limb, to be painful, unless we had 
contrasted it with a pleasurable one ; on the contrary, 

p 



226 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

I maintain that in order to contrast the two we must 
have experienced them in succession. I cannot believe 
that we should never have known body as extended, 
unless we had previously known something as unex- 
tended; or that no one could know and appreciate moral 
good unless he had been acquainted with moral evil. 

The doctrine I am expounding in this volume makes 
the relations to be in the things compared, and not the 
creation of the mind as it compares them. The oppo- 
site doctrine reverses the order of the mind's procedure, 
and, logically followed out, unsettles the foundation of 
knowledge. It makes us discover relations between 
things in themselves unknown, and it leaves us stand- 
ing on a bridge of which we do not know that it lias a 
support at either end. If we know a thing only in 
relation to another thing, and this only in relation to 
some other thing, as we thus ever chase the thing with- 
out catching it, we are made to feel as if we had only a 
a series of strings put into our hands, at which we have 
to pull for ever without their bringing anything but 
other strings. 

Mr. Mill's theory obliges him to accept the special 
doctrine I am now examining in its very lowest form. 
The school of Kant, both in its German and British mo- 
difications, supposes that the mind has a rich furniture 
of forms and categories, out of which can be fashioned 
an ideal world of a very lofty character. But the school 
of Mill, admitting no a priori elements, and limiting the 
comparative capacities of the mind, can furnish no such 
glorious creation. Mr. Mill gives us the power of dis- 



MELA TI VITY OF KNO WLEDGE. 2 2 7 

covering only the relations of co- existence and succes- 
sion, and of resemblance and difference. He says that 
" equality is but another word for the exact reseni- 
" blance, commonly called identity, considered as subsist- 
" ing between things in respect of their quantity." And 
then, in explaining what is implied in quantity, " When 
" we say of two things that they differ in quantity, just 
" as when we say they differ in quality, the assertion 
" is always grounded upon a difference in the sensations 
" which they excite" {Logic, B. i. c. iii. § 11, 12) : thus 
making us know nothing of either quality or quantity 
or number, except as denoting agreements in the sensa- 
tions forming the series which we call mind. Mr. Bain 
goes down to a still lower level, when he tells us, in a 
passage already quoted (p. 202), that cognisance of dif- 
ference and cognisance of agreement exhaust the essence 
of knowledge: that all we can know of a ring is its 
agreement with certain things, and its differences from 
other things ; which other things, of course, can be known 
only as they agree with, or differ from, yet other things. 
Knowledge can have no resting-place when driven from 
one thing to another in this shuttle-cock process. It 
falls through, by being placed between such instabili- 
ties. The way to meet all this, and put knowledge on 
its proper basis, is by showing that we have an original 
knowledge of self, and of objects, such as a ring, beyond 
self; and that, proceeding on this, we are able to discover 
not only resemblances and differences, but various other 
important relations, which enable us to combine every 
one thing known with others as also known in a com- 



228 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

pact structure, in which every one part binds all the 
others, and helps to support the whole. 

III. Mr. Mill would especially apply the phrase, 
" relativity of knowledge," to a third doctrine, being, in 
fact, his own theory of the mind. " Our knowledge of 
" objects, and even our fancies about objects, consist of 
" nothing but the sensations they excite, or which we 
" imagine them exciting in ourselves." " This know- 
" ledge is merely phenomenal." " The object is known 
" to us only in one special relation, namely, as that 
" which produces, or is capable of producing, certain 
" impressions on our senses ; and all that we really 
" know is these impressions." " This is the Doctrine of 
" the Eelativity of Knowledge to the knowing mind, in 
" the simplest, purest, and,, as I think, the most proper 
" acceptation of the words " (pp. 7-14). I confess I can 
see no propriety in applying to such a theory a phrase 
which had been appropriated by Sir William Hamilton, 
or by some of us who had criticised him, to a different 
doctrine. I do not see that it has any right to claim 
the title of ' knowledge,' or that it can get ' relations,' 
when it has no tilings to bring into relation. The 
theory is simply that we know sensations, and possi- 
bilities of sensations, while we cannot be said to know 
what sensations are. But I have no interest in giving 
the phrase any one special application rather than 
another — I believe it to be vague and ambiguous — in 
fact, not used by any two philosophers, I rather think 
by no one philosopher, at different places, in one and 
the same sense ; and I think it should be altogether 



BEL A TIVITY OF KXO WLEDGE. 2 2 9 

banished from speculation. And as to the doctrine to 
which Mr. Mill would specially apply it, I need not 
enter upon the consideration of it here, as I have been 
examining it all throughout this volume. But there is 
a fourth form of the general theory, defended by an 
illustrious member of the same school, which demands 
a notice. 

IY. Mr. Grote, in his exposition of Plato's philosophy 
(Art. Thewtetus), has developed a theory of relativity, 
which he ascribes to the Sophists, at least to Protagoras, 
and which he himself is prepared to accept. It is the 
doctrine of Homo Mensura, which, construed in its 
true meaning, is said to be, " Object is implicated with, 
" limited or measured by, Subject: a doctrine proclaiming 
" the relativeness of all objects perceived, conceived, 
" known or felt— and the omnipresent involution of the 
" perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, Subject : 
" the Object varying with the Subject. ' As things ap- 
" pear to me, so they are to me : as they appear to you, 
" so they are to you.' This theory is just and important 
" if rightly understood and explained" (vol. ii. p. 335). 
" So far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and 
" implication between Subject and Object, with actual 
" multiplicity of distinct subjects — denying the reality 
" either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute 
" and separate Object — I think it true and instructive " 
(p. 340). Proceeding on this general doctrine, he reaches 
another : " What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and 
" is often Falsehood, to another : that which governs the 
" mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is 



230 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

" treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere. Each 
" man's belief, though in part determined by the same 
" causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined 
" by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks 
" of Truth, he means what he himself (along with others, 
" or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth ; 
" unless he expressly superadds the indication of some 
" other persons believing in it" (p. 360). 

I have looked from time to time into the Platonic 
and Aristotelian discussions on the subject, but I con- 
fess I have never been able to discover what was the 
precise philosophy of the Sophists, or whether indeed 
they had a philosophy, or whether they were anything 
more than instructors of youth, professing to teach 
wisdom — without knowing what wisdom is. So far as 
any of them, such as Protagoras, had a philosophic 
system, I think it probable that they meant it to be 
that which has been elaborated by the British Section 
of the school of Comte. But I have here to do not 
with the Greek Sophists, but with Mr. Grote. I am 
surprised to find him repeating the juggle, which has so 
often been exposed, arising from the ambiguity of the 
phrase ' Subject and Object/ No doubt, if you use the 
terms as correlative, meaning by 'subject' the mind 
contemplating an object, and by ' object' a thing con- 
templated, then the subject implies the object, and the 
object the subject, as the husband implies the wife, and 
the wife the husband. But as we cannot argue from the 
husband implying the wife that every man has a wife, 
or from the wife implying a husband that every woman 



RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 231 

has a husband, so we cannot argue from the mere ex- 
istence of a mind that there must be an external thing 
to think about, nor from the bare existence of an object 
or thing that there must be a mind to think about it. 
As to the allegation that the subjective mind necessarily 
mixes its own shapes and colours with the things 
knowm, I have already examined it when discussing the 
first form of the theory of relativeness. There is, there 
can be no proof advanced in its behalf — that is to show 
that the mirror does not correctly reflect the object pre- 
sented to it. We have the same grounds for believing 
in the accuracy of our primitive knowledge as we have 
for believing in the existence either of the subject or 
the object. 

But the fatal part of the doctrine lies in the assertion, 
that truth varies with the individual, and with the cir- 
cumstances in which he may be placed : a tenet which, 
if held by the Sophists, deserves all the reprobation 
heaped upon it by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, — and, 
I may add, that the defence of it, in the further light 
we now enjoy, is worse than the original offence. By 
truth, I mean what philosophers in general have under- 
stood by it — the conformity of our ideas to things. 
There is no truth where there is no correspondence of 
our notions to realities. I admit that human knowledge 
never comes up to the extent of things. I allow that 
human knowledge is often partial, that is, is only partly 
correct, and may have error mixed up with it. But 
truth, so far as it is truth, is the agreement of thoughts 
with things. To illustrate this, I will not trouble the 



232 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

school with transcendental or religious truth. I appeal 
to judgments pronounced on more common and familiar 
affairs. Were any one to affirm that there never had 
been such a country as ancient Greece, such a man as 
Socrates, or such a sect as the Sophists ; that Queen 
Victoria is incapable of cherishing the memory of de- 
parted friends, that Louis Napoleon is a man of guile- 
less transparency and openness of character, or that 
President Lincoln was a man given to crooked and dis- 
honest policy ; that Mr. Grote was utterly illiterate, had 
never written, and could not write a history of Greece, 
and had never been favourable to vote by ballot, — I 
would say of this person, not that he had got what is 
truth to himself, but that he had not reached truth at 
all. Were I to allow myself to think that a certain 
London banking-house of high repute is on the point of 
bankruptcy, and that those who manage it are a band 
of rogues and robbers, I should in the very act be guilty 
not only of error but of sin ; and I am sure that were 
I to give expression to such a thought, I should be 
justly exposed to punishment. 

Mr. Grote represents his doctrine as forming the 
basis of the principle of toleration, and the opposite 
doctrine as fostering intolerance (p. 362). I reverse 
this account, and declare that the person who avows 
that he cannot distinguish between truth and error, is 
not in circumstances to exercise the virtue of tolerance ; 
for he has not discovered an error which he is bound to 
tolerate ; and Mr. Grote's principle would lead him to 
refuse toleration, if ever he did reach positive truth. 



RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 233 

The principle of toleration, as I understand it, is, that I 
am bound to tolerate what I believe, what I may know, 
to be error ; that the power of punishing error as error 
has not been put into my hands, has in fact been mer- 
cifully withheld from me by One who claims to be 
Himself the Judge. I am quite sure that there is a God 
who rules this world in justice and love, and yet I feel 
that I must bear even with the " fool who says in his 
heart, There is no God." This is my idea of toleration, 
which I reckon a much deeper and juster one than that 
held by those who say that truth varies with the indi- 
vidual, the age, and the circumstances. 

But then Mr. Grote tells us " no infallible objective 
" mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, re- 
" cognised by all, has yet been found" (p. 360). I 
admit freely that we cannot obtain what a certain school 
calls an absolute criterion of truth ; for I admit that the 
word ' absolute ' is about the most unintelligible in the 
language, whether as used by those who favour or op- 
pose the doctrine it is employed to designate. I allow, 
further, that it is in vain to search for any one criterion 
which will settle for us what is truth in all matters. 
But we have tests quite sufficient to determine for us 
what is truth and what is error in many matters, both 
speculative and practical; these I shall endeavour to 
unfold in a future chapter (see xix.) I have intuitive 
evidence of my own existence ; and evidence from testi- 
mony of the existence of India, which I never saw ; and 
evidence from induction and deduction of the existence 
of the law of gravitation, — and I declare of any one who 



234 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 

denies any of these that he is in error, and this however 
strong his beliefs may be. To believe without evidence, 
and not to believe when we have evidence, may both 
be sinful when our belief or unbelief involve duties 
which we owe to ourselves, to our fellow-men, and to 
God. 



CHAPTER XL 

man's power of conception as a test of truth. 

The word ' conceive,' with its derivatives ' conceivable' 
and ' inconceivable/ is one of the most ambiguous in 
the philosophic nomenclature of this country. When I 
say I cannot conceive the distance of a star which re- 
quires hundreds of thousands of years to transmit its 
light to our earth, I use the term in the sense of ' image' 
or ' represent.' When I affirm that I have a conception 
of the animal kingdom, I mean that I have a general 
notion of beings possessing animation. When I declare 
that I cannot conceive that God should be unjust, I 
signify that I cannot so believe or decide. These three 
senses are at once seen not to be the same when the 
difference is pointed out. AVe cannot easily imagine 
the distance of a fixed star, but we decide on the evi- 
dence produced, or believe on the authority of astro- 
nomers, that it is at the distance it is said to be. We 
cannot image the class ' animal kingdom,' for it includes 
innumerable objects, yet we can intellectually think 
about it, that is, about objects possessing the common 
attribute of animal life. We cannot be made to decide 



236 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 

or believe that Cleopatra's Needle should be in Paris 
and Egypt at the same time, yet with some difficulty we 
can simultaneously image it in both places. 

It could easily be shown that the phrase is used in 
all these senses in philosophy, as well as in our current 
literature. " By conception," says Stewart [Elem. c. iii.), 
" I mean that power of the mind which enables us to 
" form a notion of an absent object of perception." Sir 
William Hamilton professes to use the word in the 
same sense as the German Bcgriff, that is, for the gene- 
ral notion formed by an indefinite number of objects 
being joined by the possession of a common attribute. 
"With or without avowing it, philosophers have also 
employed it in the third sense. Hamilton often ex- 
plains conceive by " construe in thought," which must 
denote an act of judgment ; he must employ it in this 
sense when he says it is inconceivable that space should 
have limits. Dr. Whewell's arguments in favour of 
necessary truth are valid only when he uses it in the 
signification of judging, as when he says, " we cannot 
conceive reasoning to be merely a series of sensations" 
(Phil. hid. Sciences, i. 44). 

The question arises, and must now be settled, in which 
of these senses, or in what other, is the word employed 
when man's power or impotency of conception is sup- 
posed to be a test of truth. It is clear that it cannot 
be employed in the first -mentioned sense. Man's capa- 
bility of imaging an object is no proof of its existence : 
I can picture a hobgoblin without supposing it to be 
a reality. Man's incapacity to image or represent an 



AS A TEST OF TRUTH. 237 

object is no proof of its non-existence ; a blind man 
cannot have an idea of colour, but this does not prove 
even to him that colour has no existence. Xor can it 
be used in the second signification above intimated. I 
can form a notion of a class of mermaids without being 
convinced that mermaids were ever seen by any human 
being. In these senses of the words there is much con- 
ceivable by man which has no existence, much inconceiv- 
able by man which has an existence. Conceivability 
and inconceivability can be employed as a test of truth 
only in the third meaning of the term, as signifying 
" construe in thought" (whatever that may mean), judge 
or decide. 

Both the defenders and opposers of intuitive truth 
have been in the way of going from the one of these 
meanings to the other. Hamilton uses the phrase both 
in the first and third of these significations without per- 
ceiving that they are not the same ; and it is very much 
because of this ambiguity that he is able to make it 
appear that there is a contradiction in human thought. 
He says, on the one hand, that we cannot conceive 
space or time as without bounds ; which must mean, 
when properly interpreted, that we must always give 
a boundary in the image we form of it. But then he 
tells us, on the other hand, that we are altogether 
unable to conceive space or time as bounded ; that is, 
when rightly understood, we cannot be made to judge 
or decide that it has bounds. He has constructed a set 
of opposed propositions as to space, time, and infinity, 
the seeming contradiction arising very much from the 



238 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 

double signification of the word ' conceive ' (see Art. on 
" Unconditioned" in Discussions). But the philosopher 
who has made the most frequent use of the impossibility 
of conceiving the opposite as a test of truth is Dr. 
Whewell. He tells us that necessary truths are those 
" in which we cannot, even by an effort of imagination. 
" or in a supposition, conceive the reverse of that which 
" is asserted." " Necessary truths are those of which 
" we cannot distinctly conceive the contrary" (Phil. 
Ind. Sc, i. 55, 59). The phrase 'imagination' and the 
phrase ' distinctly ' might lead us to think that by 
' conceive ' we are to understand ' image,' yet we must 
attach a different meaning to it when he tells us more 
accurately of necessary truths that we " see" them — 
which must mean 'judge' them — " to be true by thinking 
about them, and see that they could not be otherwise " 
(lb., p. 20). But so loosely does he use this test, that 
he declares that laws acknowledged to be discovered bv 
experiment, such as the laws of motion and of chemical 
affinity, are such that it is inconceivable that they 
should not be true. " For how, in fact, can we conceive 
" combinations otherwise than as definite in kind and 
" quantity ?" " We cannot conceive a world in which 
" this should not be the case" (lb., i. 400). When the 
defenders of fundamental truth fall into such ambiguity 
of phraseology, and apply their test so unsatisfactorily, 
there is some excuse for those who criticise and oppose 
them when they take advantage of their mistakes. 

I say ' some excuse,' for I cannot allow that this is 
an entire justification of Mr. Mill when he uses the 



AS A TEST OF TRUTH. 239 

word, as I shall show he does, in so many different 
senses ; and when, in criticising Hamilton and Wliewell, 
he employs it in a way they would not have allowed. 
Mr. Mill is aware that, when Sir William Hamilton is 
wishing to bring out his full meaning, he uses such 
phrases as "think" and "construe in thought;" and 
Dr. Whewell, while he also uses the word " think," is 
careful to represent Conceptions as modifications of 
Fundamental Ideas, which he enumerates and classifies. 
Mr. Mill always employs the phrase in a vague manner, 
and often in more than one signification. He must 
use it in the sense of ' image' or ' picture' when he says, 
" We cannot conceive a line without breadth ; we can 
" form no mental picture of such a line" {Logic, B. n. 
c. v. § 1). This is all true, but it is also true that we 
— can form an abstract notion of such a line. He states 
that Dr. Whewell's idea of necessary truth is " a pro- 
" position, the negation of which is not only false, but 
" inconceivable." But then, in criticising this test, he 
uses the word in quite a different sense : " When we 
" have often seen and thought two things together, and 
" have never in one instance either seen or thought of 
" them separate, there is, by the primary law of associa- 
" tion, an increasing difficulty, which in the end becomes 
" insuperable, of conceiving the two things apart " 
(lb., § 6). It is clear that while Dr. Whewell uses the 
phrases as applicable to a proposition declared to be 
true, Mr. Mill employs it in the sense of mental pictures 
joined by association. This is one other instance of an 
amphiboly, which we have noticed before, and which 



240 MAN'S POWER OF CONCEPTION 

will require to be noticed again in examining Mr. Mill's 
attempt to explain necessity of thought by association 
of ideas. 

He tells us, " The history of science teems with incon- 
" ceivabilities which have been conquered, and supposed 
" necessary truths, which have first ceased to be thought 
" necessary, then to be thought true, and have finally 
" come to be deemed impossible" (p. 150). And then 
he gives us once more his famous case of persons not 
being able to conceive of antipodes, being " merely the 
effect of a strong association." But let us understand 
precisely in what sense our forefathers had a difficulty 
in conceiving the existence of antipodes. It is evident 
that they could have little difficulty in imagining to 
themselves a round globe with persons with their feet 
adhering to it all around. Their difficulty lay in decid- 
ing it to be true ; and the difficulty was increased by 
the very vividness of the picture of men, as they would 
have said, with their feet upward and their head down- 
ward. It is clear that Mr. Mill, when he applies it to 
such a case, must be using the word in the sense of 'judge' 
and ' believe.' But let us understand on what ground 
our ancestors felt a difficulty in yielding their judgment 
and belief. Not because of any supposed intuition or 
necessary truth, — I am not aware that they ever ap- 
pealed to such ; not even because of a strong association : 
but because the alleged fact seemed contrary to a law of 
nature established by observation. A gathered experi- 
ence seemed to show that there was an absolute up and 
down, and that heavy bodies tended downwards, and 



AS THE TEST OF TRUTH. 241 

thus, and not on any a priori grounds, did they argue 
that there could not be antipodes, as persons so situated 
would fall away into a lower space. As a narrow ex- 
perience had created the difficulty, so it could remove 
it by giving us a view of the earth as a mass of matter, 
causing human beings to adhere to it over its whole 
surface. And such a case does not in the least tend to 
prove, that truths which are seen to be truths at once, 
and without a gathered experience, could ever be set 
aside by a further experience : that a conscious intelli- 
gent beiug could be made to regard himself as non- 
existing ; that he could believe himself as having been 
in existence before he existed ; or that he could be led 
to allow that two straight lines might enclose a space 
in the constellation Orion. 

It is in the highest degree expedient, at the stage to 
which mental science has come, that the word 'con- 
ceive/ and its derivatives, should be abandoned alto- 
gether in such a connexion ; as being fitted to confuse our 
ideas and mislead our judgments. The greatest and 
wisest philosophers have not appealed to the possibility 
or impossibility of conception as tests of truth or false- 
hood, but have pointed to other and clearer and more 
decisive criteria} 

1 The printing of this work had proceeded thus far, when I observed 
that Mr. M., in 6th edition of Logic, just published, has been obliged, in 
defending himself against Mr. Spencer, to notice that ' conceive ' might 
signify 'to have an idea' or 'to have a belief (i. 303). But he himself 
continues to take advantage of the ambiguity, which is greater than he 
yet sees. I have been labouring for years to make metaphysicians per- 
ceive the ambiguity. 



CHAPTER XII 

SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 

Me. Mill freely admits the existence and the veracity 
of intnitive perceptions. But he has not inquired into 
their nature, their mode of operation, their laws, their 
tests, or their limits. What he has failed to do must 
be undertaken by others ; and in the process it will be 
seen that intuition has quite as important a place in 
the mind as sensation, association, or any of Mr. Mill's 
favourite principles, and that it must be embraced and 
have a distinct place allotted to it in a sufficient theory 
of our mental operations. 

Our intuitions are all of the nature of perceptions, in 
which we look on objects known or apprehended : on 
separate objects, or on objects compared with one an- 
other. Sometimes the objects are present, and we look 
on them directly, by the senses and self- consciousness. 
In other cases they are not present, but still we have 
an apprehension of them, and our convictions, whether 
beliefs or judgments, proceed upon this apprehension. 
A very different account has often been given of them. 
According to Locke, the mind in intuition looks at 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 243 

ideas, and not at things. According to the theory ela- 
borated by Kant, and so far adopted by Hamilton, it is 
possessed of a priori forms, which it imposes on objects. 
Such views are altogether indefensible, and have in 
fact hindered the ready reception of the true doctrine. 
Making our intuitions mere ideas or forms in the mind, 
they have very much separated them from realities. 
The intuitions I stand up for are all intuitions of things. 
In opposition to 1ST. Comte and his school in all its 
branches, I hold that man is so constituted as to know 
somewhat of things, and the relations of things. What 
we know of things, with their relations, on the bare in- 
spection or contemplation of them, constitutes the body 
of intuitive truth, and the capacity to discover it is called 
intuition. Taken in this sense, the exercise of intuition 
is not opposed to experience, but is in fact an experience : 
only it is not a gathered experience ; it is a singular ex- 
perience at the basis of all collected experiences. 

Our intuitive perceptions are all, in the first instance, 
individual or singular. Thus, by the external senses, 
we observe an extended and coloured surface before us, 
or by the internal consciousness we experience ourselves 
in a certain state of thought and feeling. Our very in- 
tuitive judgments or comparisons are singular. On 
finding that a particular rod, A, is of the same length 
as another rod, B, and that B is of the same length as a 
third rod, C, we at once declare that A is equal to C. 
But we can generalize these intuitive judgments, and 
then they become maxims or axioms. We see that 
what is true of the rods A, B, C, would also be of the 



214 SELF EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 

rods D, E, E, or of any other objects found equal to 
one another, and we feel ourselves entitled to declare 
that ' things which are equal to the same thing are equal 
to one another/ As the generalization is the result, not 
of an intuitive, but a discursive process, it is possible 
that error may creep into it, that the generalized ex- 
pression of our original perceptions may be mutilated 
or exaggerated. But on the supposition that the gene- 
ralization has been properly conducted, the maxim is as 
certain as the individual perception is allowed to be. 

By standing up for this distinction between what we 
may call our spontaneous and our generalized intuitions, 
we can answer an objection urged against the existence 
of necessary truth by Mr. Mill. " The very fact that 
" the question is disputed, disproves the alleged impos- 
" sibility. Those against whom it is needful to defend 
" the belief which is affirmed to be necessary, are un- 
" mistakable examples that it is not necessary" (p. 150). 
But what is the dispute ? It is commonly not as to the be- 
lief, but simply as to whether it is intuitive, which, as Mr. 
Mill knows and asserts, is not to be settled by intuition. 
Take only one example : the sums of equals are equals ; 
there is no dispute as to the truth of this. What Mr. 
Mill's school objects to is, that it should be represented 
as intuitive. But again, what the upholders of necessary 
truth maintain is, not that every man must hold specu- 
latively by intuitive truth, that is, hold by it in the 
generalized form given it by philosophers ; but that all 
believe in, and spontaneously act upon, their individual 
primitive perceptions. It is quite possible for Mr. Mill 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 245 

to maintain that the law of cause and effect is not 
necessary or universal, and that there may be a pheno- 
menon without a cause in the Dog-star ; but meanwhile 
it will be found that on any given occurrence presenting 
itself, he will look for something as producing it. 

If we look carefully into the nature of the intuitive 
perceptions of the mind, they will be found to be of 
three kinds. Some of them are of the nature of Primitive 
Cognitions : the object is now present, and we look upon 
it. It is thus we are conscious of self as existing in a 
particular state. This being self-evident, we cannot be 
made to regard ourselves as non-existent, and not in 
that particular state. In other exercises our intuitions 
are of the nature of Primitive Beliefs : the object is not 
present, but we contemplate it, and discover that it is 
of such a nature. It is thus that we believe of space, 
that it does not cease when our eye is no longer able to 
follow it : this appears from the very nature of space ; 
and having such a conviction, we cannot be made to 
believe that space, at the point at which it ceases to be 
invisible, should come to a termination. Again, some of 
our intuitions are of the nature of Primitive Judgments, 
in which by bare inspection we discover relations be- 
tween things apprehended. Thus we are told first of 
one man that he died at the age of fifty, and then of 
another man that he died at the age of fifty, and we at 
once declare that the two men died at the same age ; 
and this being evident from the contemplation of the 
things, we cannot be made to decide otherwise. 

The truth reached by intuition in these its three 



246 SELF EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 

forms is of course limited, — is confined, indeed, within 
very stringent boundaries. It is narrowed, first of all 
by the original inlets, which are the outward and inward 
senses ; and secondly, by the limited capacity of man to 
discover what is involved in this primitive stock. What 
intuition may do of itself is best seen in mathematical 
demonstration ; in which every step taken is seen to be 
true at once, on the bare contemplation of the figures or 
numbers ; and by which we reach a body of truth of 
immense scientific value. But the main service of in- 
tuition consists in its furnishing a point from which 
experience may start, and a foundation on which to 
build. Our original perceptions lie at the basis of all 
our acquired ones. I allow that our acquired ones, 
obtained by a gathered experience, carry us far beyond 
our primitive perceptions. But in fact intuitions, for 
example those of sense and consciousness, mingle with 
all our mental operations, and upon them we must fall 
back in the last resort, when required to specify the 
ground on which experience rests. 

Keeping these explanations and distinctions in view, 
it should not be difficult to find tests of intuition. The 
primary mark I hold to be Self-Evidence. The evidence 
is in the objects, and is discerned by the mind on the 
bare contemplation of them. From the mere inspection 
of consciousness we perceive self in some action or under 
some affection. From the simple apprehension of 2 + 2 
we see that it makes 4. And wherever there is Self- 
Evidence there will also be Necessity. But let us ob- 
serve carefully what this necessity consists in. It is 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 247 

not a fatalistic necessity imposed upon us from without, 
and for anything we know in an arbitary manner. It 
is necessity arising solely from the nature of things as 
the same is perceived by the mind. 1 This conviction 
of necessity may assume two forms, a positive and a 
negative. On the bare contemplation of 2 + 2 I see 
that it must make 4 : this is the positive form. I am 
further constrained to decide that it cannot be other- 
wise, that 2 + 2 cannot be 3, or 5, or any other number : 
this is the negative form. These two forms depend on 
each other, or rather they both depend on the Self- 
Evidence ; and we may in argument of any kind em- 
ploy the one or other as may suit our purpose. And 
as is the nature of the original perception, so is the pre- 
cise nature of the conviction of necessity. We have 
seen that our intuitions may be of the nature of cogni- 
tions, of beliefs, or of judgments; and whatever the 
intuition be, we must adhere to it, and cannot be made 
to give our assent to the opposite. Thus, if our intuition 
be a cognition of an object as existing, we cannot be 
made to acknowledge it as non- existing : if I know 
self as thinking, I cannot be made to allow that it is 
not thinking. Again, if our intuition be a belief, such 

1 Mr. Herbert Spencer, following in this respect Sir William Hamilton, 
stands up for Necessity as a test of ultimate truth, but overlooks Self- 
Evidence, the evidence in the thing looked at. " No matter what he calls 
" these indestructible relations [of Consciousness, using consciousness in 
" a very vague and perverted sense], no matter what he supposes to be 
" their meanings, he is completely fettered by them. Their indestructi- 
" bility is the proof to him that his consciousness is imprisoned within 
" them" {Fortn. Rev. No. v.) I have given a more pleasant account of 
them. The necessity is not a fetter or a prison, but a conviction arising 
from an immediate perception of the nature of the thing. 



248 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 

as that I saw a particular person yesterday, I cannot be 
made to believe that I did not see him. The same is 
true of our judgments : deciding that two straight lines 
cannot enclose a space, I cannot be made to allow that 
they can form a closed figure. Thus understood, the 
necessity of conviction (and not the mere incapacity of 
conceiving) becomes a criterion of fundamental truth, 
clear and certain, and not difficult of application. 

To these some have added Universality. But the 
phrase has been used in two different significations. 
As employed by some it means the universality of the 
truth. In this sense the universality is involved in 
the necessity , we cannot be made to believe that two 
straight lines should enclose a space at any time or in 
any world. Thus understood, the test of universality 
is not different from that of necessity ; but as present- 
ing the conviction under a very important aspect, it 
may often be usefully employed in determining whether 
a truth is intuitive. But Universality may also mean 
being entertained by all men. This property of intui- 
tive truth may be more appropriately designated by 
Catholicity or Common Consent. This quality does 
belong to all primary truth, and where it is found it 
may be regarded as a presumption that the truth is 
intuitive. But it is not a proof ; for it may spring not 
so much from any inborn principle as from the unifor- 
mity to be found in the experience of all men. All 
men expect that the sun will rise to-morrow, not from 
any intuitive principle, but from the gathered observa- 
tions of the past carried forward to the future. 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 249 

These two then, Self-Evidence, and Necessity with 
implied Universality, are the decisive tests of intuitive 
truth. All intuitive truths possess these characteristics ; 
no others do. The question now to be discussed is, Can 
these .marks be produced by Association of Ideas, or 
by Experience, the two principles from which Mr. Mill 
gets all our general convictions ? 

(1.) " As for the feeling of necessity, or what is termed 
a " necessity of thought, it is of all mental phenomena 
" positively the one which an inseparable association is 
" the most evidently competent to generate" (p. 299). In 
answer to this it can be shown, in the first place, that 
in many cases of immediate and necessary conviction we 
have not two ideas to be associated. This holds of our pri- 
mitive cognitions and primitive beliefs. Take the con- 
sciousness which the infant has of a sensation, or rather 
of self as sentient. Here we cannot point to two objects 
which have been often together : we have only one ob- 
ject, the sentient self as existing, and we cannot be made 
to know it as not existing or not sentient. Again, I 
remember that I was under a peculiar sensation of pain 
two days ago : I never had the same feeling before ; 
the object is one, and there has been no repetition, and 
therefore no association can have been formed ; and yet 
I have the most perfect assurance that I existed two 
days ago under that sensation, and I cannot be made to 
believe otherwise. These are cases of intuition allowed 
by Mr. Mill (see e, p), but in which association cannot 
generate the conviction. 

In other cases, I admit that there is a combination of 



250 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 

two ideas or two objects, that is, those in which we in- 
stitute a comparison or pronounce a judgment. But 
even in such the judgment is pronounced not in con- 
sequence of the mere association, but on a comparison 
of the things brought together. What Mr. Mill means 
by the feeling of necessity, which can be generated by 
his examples, is evident from his examples. " Many 
" persons who have been frightened in childhood can 
" never be alone in the dark without irrepressible ter- 
" rors. Many a person is unable to revisit a particular 
" place, or think of a particular event, without recalling 
" acute feelings of grief or reminiscences of suffering" 
(p. 265). This is a very glaring example of mistaking 
the point to be proven. Mr. Mill is aware what those 
who hold necessary truth mean by it. " Necessary," says 
Mr. Mill, " according to Kant's definition, is, that of 
which the negation is impossible." But the necessity 
which he looks at and accounts for is of a very different 
character ; it is not a necessity of conviction, of belief, 
or judgment, but is a mere association of two ideas or 
thoughts, so that the one never comes up without the 
other. He explains his meaning : "When an association 
" has acquired the character of inseparability — when the 
" bond between the two has been thus firmly riveted, 
" not only does the idea called up by the association 
" become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the 
" idea which suggested it, but the facts or phenomena 
" answering to those ideas, come at last to seem inse- 
" parable in existence : things which we are unable to 
" conceive apart, appear incapable of existing apart" 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 251 

(p. 191). The word ' conceive' has here come in with all 
its ambiguity, and the two things denoted by it, having 
an idea, and judging or deciding, are here represented 
as being one. But the two are very different. The 
fright in childhood may long continue to raise up terror, 
but cannot of itself create conviction ; as may be seen in 
the case of multitudes who experience the fear but 
have never believed in ghosts. When Pascal was cross- 
ing a bridge in a carriage, the two leaders took fright 
and plunged into the Seine ; the shock broke the traces, 
and the carriage remained on the brink of the precipice; 
ever after he felt as if there was an abyss on his left 
hand, and had a chair placed there to tranquillize his 
mind. But this association, while it raised the painful 
idea, did not convince his judgment that there was 
actually a river ever running at his left hand. I never 
pass a particular spot without being reminded of a 
youthful companion whom I met there for the last 
time before his removal from this world ; but this asso- 
ciation of my friend and the spot has not convinced 
me that the two have any real connexion. The mother 
never thinks of a particular churchyard without remem- 
bering that her boy sleeps there ; but she does not there- 
fore think that her child will be there for ever ; on the 
contrary, she may firmly believe that he will rise again. 
(2 .) Just as little can experience, I mean a gathered 
experience, create the self- evidence and its consequent 
necessity. A truth reached by an accumulation of 
instances cannot be self-evident, for the evidence is 
collected from the uniformity of many, perhaps of in- 



252 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY 

numerable cases. Neither is it accompanied with any 
conviction of necessity. We do not affirm of a general 
law thus discovered that the opposite of it is impossible, 
and we allow that there may be exceptions. Some per- 
sons are so situated that they see crows daily, and they 
have never seen them with any other colour than black ; 
they have sufficient evidence of the general law that 
crows are of this colour, and when the idea of a crow 
comes up before them, it will always be in a sable hue : 
but it is not self-evident that crows are black ; and they 
do not decide that they must be of this colour, or that 
there cannot possibly be white crows in any other world 
which God has made. 

We have seen iu a former chapter that the mind is 
endowed with a capacity of observing relations. Some 
of these are discovered by a process of lengthened ob- 
servation. It is thus we know that all matter attracts 
other matter, and that the elements of bodies have 
certain chemical affinities which can be expressed in 
numerical proportions. But there are other relations 
which can be discerned immediately. In saying so, I 
do not affirm that they are noticed independently of 
things compared ; I mean that they are discovered on 
the contemplation, the bare contemplation, of the objects, 
and without a gathered experience or an induction of 
instances. Thus, on comparing my conscious self of the 
present moment with the remembered self of yesterday, 
I at once, and without any mediate proof, declare an 
identity of person. A triangle being a figure with three 
angles, I need no experiments to convince me that one 



THE TESTS OF INTUITION. 253 

of the angles being a part is less than the whole, and 
that the three angles make np the whole. I may never 
have tried whether I could enclose a space by two 
straight lines : I do not require to try it, for I see it at 
ouce ; and I would declare of any apparent or professed 
attempt to make them form a closed figure, that it must 
involve some deception, and that the two lines cannot 
be straight. 

Mr. Mill derives what are usually reckoned intuitive 
truths by " simple enumeration without a known excep- 
tion ;" a method which Bacon declares to be ' puerile' and 
useless, as the next iustance may prove an exception. 
" The principles of number and geometry are duly and 
" satisfactorily proved by that method alone, nor are 
" they susceptible of any other proof" (Logic, B. ill. 
c. xxi. § 2). This makes the evidence for mathematical 
axioms the same in kind as that which the Hindu has 
for water being always liquid ; as that which we have 
for crows being black all over the universe ; and for the 
alternation of day and night continuing for ever. AVe 
see now how he should be obliged in logical consistency 
to maintain that two and two may make five in other 
worlds. I meet this by showing that, there is an essential 
difference between the two classes of cases. In the one 
we see nothing in the nature of things to necessitate the 
law ; we adhere to it simply on the ground of the number 
of instances ; and we can readily be made to believe tl\at 
the law is limited in range, and that there are exceptions. 
But in the other class the relation is in the very nature 
of the things ; we discover it at once by looking at 



254 SELF-EVILEXCE AXD NECESSITY 

the things ; we believe it to hold wherever the things 
exist, and we cannot be made to decide otherwise. In 
order to account for the conviction of necessity and 
universality which attaches to mathematical truth, Mr. 
Mill refers to the circumstance that geometrical curves 
admit of being distinctly painted in the imagination, so 
that we have " mental pictures of all possible combina- 
tions of lines and angles " {Logic, B. II. c. v. § 5). But 
what, I ask, makes he of algebraic demonstrations, 
where there can be no such painting of the imagination, 
while yet there is the same necessity ? And I call atten- 
tion to the circumstance that mental pictures do not 
constitute an accumulation of instances, or tend in the 
least to bring the case under the law of simplex cnume- 
ratio. They do, however, serve a purpose. They enable 
us to perceive more clearly the nature of the objects, 
and to conceive the "possible combinations of angles 
and figures," so that we see the certainty and necessity 
of the truth. Supposing, he says, that two straight lines 
after diverging could again converge, " we can transport 
" ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a 
" mental image of the appearance which one or botli 
" the lines must present at that point, which we may 
" rely upon as being precisely similar to the reality." The 
clearness of the image does help us, but it is simply in 
the way of giving us an apprehension of the " reality," 
and thus enabling us to pronounce a judgment on which 
we may " rely." 

By means of these tests we can without much dim- 
cult v distinguish between truths which are intuitive, 



THE TESTS OF IXTUIT10X. 

and truths which are reached by a gathered experience. 

nave seen that Mi Mill proceeds on these crit 
(see fj, 0, i). And if any one will take the trouble to 
look back upon the chapter in which I have collected 
his "Admissions," he will see that Self-Evidence, and 
Kece--::- with Universalis .. sanction, and justify 

all the intuitive principles he has avowed But as not 
following out these criUria consequentially, he rejects 
as intuitive, and labours to establish otherwise, truths 
which can stand these tests quite as clearly and 

as those acknowledged by him. Hence the 
heterogeneous character of his theory, which looks as if 

ood altogether on sensation, and was reared by asso- 
ciation, but requires to be buttressed on all sides by in- 
tuition to keep it from falling. It is only by logically 
carrying out these tests that we can construct a con- 
sists: : system of philosophy, in which we give t 
intuition what belongs to intuition, and to expert 
what belongs to experience. Let us now inquire 
whether our conviction as to causation can stand the 
tests of intuition. 



CHAPTEE XIII. 

CAUSATION. 

On this subject a much sounder doctrine than that 
entertained by most metaphysicians has been laid down 
by Professor Bain, who, however, has neglected to un- 
fold all that is in the mental phenomenon which he has 
noticed. "As regards muscular exertion, there is a 
" notable specialty, a radical difference in kind, signified 
" by such phrases as ' the sense of power/ ' the feeling 
" of energy put forth/ ' the experience of force or re 
" sistance/ This is an ultimate phase of the human 
" consciousness, and the most general and fundamental 
" of all our conscious states. By this experience 
" [observe, not a gathered experience] we body forth 
" to ourselves a notion of force or power/'' He be- 
lieves that " the combined movements of locomotion 
are original or instinctive" (Senses dnd Intell, pp. 98, 
267). Here, then, we have a perception, original and 
intuitive, of things exercising power. We are imme- 
diately conscious of power exerted, and we find it pro- 
ducing an effect. Again, things become known to us 
as exercising power upon us, and we know an effect as 



CAUSATION. 257 

proceeding from a cause. This perception of power 
exercised by us, and upon us, is the primary cognition 
of things on which all our judgments as to causa- 
tion are founded. Our knowledge both of self and 
of external objects is of things effecting and being 
effected. 

Mr. Mill tells us in his Logic, that he has no inten- 
tion of entering into the merits of the question of cau- 
sation " as a problem of transcendental metaphysics." 
And yet in his logical treatment of the subject he is 
ever introducing, I think unfortunately, metaphysical 
speculations. In the discussion he has confounded (in 
this respect like some of the Scottish metaphysicians) 
the principle of causation with that of the uniformity 
of nature. When we say that nature is uniform, we 
mean that nature constitutes a course or system ; that 
there is in it a determinate number of agents, or rather 
a fixed amount of energy, actual or potential, operating 
according to laws and in an arranged constitution. That 
there is an invariable uniformity in nature, is discovered 
by a long experience. It is certainly not an obvious 
truth forced upon us by an early and easy observation. 
Judging by first appearances, it looks as if nature often 
acted unsystematically, or was swayed by influences out 
of its sphere. The mother finds her child in health to- 
day, sick to-morrow, better the third day, and dead the 
next ; so far from showing a uniformity, it seems rather 
to indicate a change of agency, springing either from an 
unknown fatality or the will of a supernatural being. 
It is only as the result of long and patient research, 



258 CAUSATION. 

conducted independently in the various departments of 
nature and of history, that we reach the reasonable con- 
viction that there is a fixed system constituted amidst 
these seeming irregularities. 

Now it is, in fact, of this uniformity of nature that 
Mr. Mill is treating in his chapter on the " Evidence of 
Universal Causation." He is right in saying of it, " There 
" must have been a time when the universal prevalence 
" of that law throughout nature could not have been 
" affirmed in the same confident and unqualified man- 
" ner as at present." He is further right, so far as the 
uniformity of nature is concerned, when he says that 
the reasons for our reliance on it " do not hold in cir - 
" cumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible 
" range of our experience. In distant parts of the 
" stellar regions, where the phenomena may be entirely 
" unlike those with which we are acquainted, it would 
" be folly to affirm confidently that this general law 
" prevails, any more than those special ones which we 
" have found to hold universally on our own planet. 
" The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise 
" called the law of causation, must be received not as a 
" law of the universe, but of that portion of it only 
" which is within the range of our means of sure ob- 
" servation, with a reasonable degree of extension to 
f 1 adjacent cases." In this passage he identifies " the 
uniformity in the succession of events" with "the law 
of causation." But these are not the same. It is quite 
conceivable that there may be worlds in which there is 
a universal causation, and yet no self-contained system 



CAUSATIOK 259 

of natural causes. Some, or many, or in fact all of the 
phenomena might be produced by agents acting from 
above or beyond the phenomena themselves, — say by 
the Divine Being, or angels, or demons. In such a 
world spring might follow winter one year, and be pre- 
vented from following it the next by the action of a 
supra-mundane influence ; and no one would be able 
from the past to anticipate the future. In this state of 
things there would be no uniformity of physical agen- 
cies, and yet there would be an invariable causation. 
Now the grand metaphysical question is not about the 
uniformity of nature, but about the relation of cause 
and effect. There is a momentary discovery of the 
difference of the two, and yet a studious identification 
of them in the following passage : — " There was a time 
" when many of the phenomena of nature must have 
" appeared altogether capricious and irregular, not 
" governed by any laws, nor steadily consequent upon 
" any causes. Such phenomena, indeed, were com 
" monly in that early stage of human knowledge as- 
" cribed to the direct intervention of the will of some 
" supernatural being, and therefore still to a cause." 

It is admitted that the great body of mankind, whe- 
ther they are or are not persuaded of the existence of a 
uniform system of nature, believe as to every effect, as 
to every new thing produced, or change upon an old 
thing, that it must have had a cause, whether natural 
or supernatural. The question is, Is this belief in- 
tuitive ? 

This conviction can stand the tests of intuition. On 



260 CAUSATION. 

the bare contemplation of a new phenomenon, that is, 
of a new thing appearing, of a thing which did not 
exist before, we declare that it has had a producing 
cause. It certainly appears in very early life, before 
there can be a lengthened or wide observation or enume- 
ration of instances. It is strong in very primitive 
states of society, long before mankind had observed an 
invariable uniformity in the occurrence of natural phe- 
nomena. It can be shown that it is necessary and uni - 
versal. Mr. Mill indeed tells us, "I am convinced that 
" any one accustomed to abstraction and analysis, who 
" will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose, will, 
" when his imagination has once learned to entertain 
" the notion, find no difficulty in conceiving that in 
" some one for instance of the many firmaments into 
" which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, 
" events may succeed one another at random, without 
" any fixed law ; nor can anything in our experience or 
" in our mental nature constitute a sufficient, or indeed 
" any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case." 
The phrase, " fixed law," here employed, is ambiguous ; 
it may mean a mere natural or physical law, such as 
that of attraction. And I acknowledge at once that it 
is quite possible to apprehend and to believe that there 
may be worlds in which new phenomena, or changes on 
old phenomena, may be produced, without the operation 
of that law of gravitation which seems to act everywhere 
in our mundane system. But the real question is, would 
not the mind insist, and this according to " a fixed law" 
of our " mental nature," that the event must have a 



CAUSATIOX. 261 

cause in an agent physical or spiritual ? "VTe may ob- 
serve that the old misleading phrase, ' conceive/ is once 
more casting up. I admit we can have the idea of, that 
is, image :: jurselves, a new phenomenon without any 
necessary precedent. But I hold that we cannot be 
made to judge, decide, or believe, that in any firmament 
there could be a new event, — say a world springing into 
being with no cause to produce it. 

The mental phenomenon, the conviction and its at- 
tached necessity, Mr. Mill would explain by the ass. - 
ion of ideas. But then, in order to save himself from 
obvious and pressing difficulties, he is obliged to lay down 
very stringent precautions as to when association can 
generate a feeling of necessity. In order to produce the 
inseparable association, the phenomenon must be " so 
- linked in our experience, that we never perceive 
'• the one without at the same time, or the immediately 
' ; succeeding moment, perceiving the other." Again. u No 
" frequency of conjunction between two phenomena will 
" create an inseparable association if counter associations 
'• are being created all the while" (p. 266}. By help of 
these two principles he tries to avoid the objection which 
might be urged to his mode of accounting for the convic- 
tion of necessity. But he is seen to be involved in hope- 
perplexities when these laws are applied to causation. 
For neither of them would allow the necessary convic- 
fcion to be formed as to cause and effect from mere ex- 
perience. For it is not the case that we never perceive 
a cause without perceiving an effect, or that we never 
observe an effect without also observing a cause. On 



262 CAUSATION. 

the contrary, the effects of causes operating, and the 
causes of effects falling under our notice, are very often 
concealed from us. Of how few of the occurrences 
happening in the circle of our experience, or in the 
times in which we live, are we able to estimate the con- 
sequences ? In a large proportion of the physical effects 
which come under our notice, the cause is not discovered 
at the time, and is only found out in the end by a pro- 
cess of elaborate experiment, fitted to distract instead of 
aiding association ; and in the case of a large number of 
the occurrences of our personal experience, or recorded 
in history, we never do rise to the discovery of the 
causes. Again, as to the other precautionary rule, we 
find that in the case of cause and effect there is a 
constant formation of " counter associations/' by reason 
of the complexity of the conditions which meet in the 
cause, and of incidents which attach themselves to the 
effect, and of the combination of each of these with a 
host of concomitant circumstances to disturb the forma- 
tion of an inseparable association. A friend dies : no 
doubt there has been a physical cause of the occurrence, 
but how many things prevent us from discovering or 
even inquiring about it ; and finding little satisfaction in 
the contemplation, we dwell rather on the regard we 
had for the departed, on his excellent qualities, on the 
loss we have suffered ; or if we think of what led to it, 
we prefer referring the whole to the appointment of 
God. That amidst all these complications, and in spite 
of appearances to the contrary, mankind should ever 
have clung to the belief that there is a cause, natural or 



causation: 263 

supernatural, to every event, is a proof that the convic- 
tion is deeply seated in our nature. 

When Mr. Mill confines his attention to the physical 
and logical nature of causation, he throws light upon 
the subject. " The statement of the cause is incomplete 
" unless in some shape or other we introduce all the 
" conditions." " In practice, that particular condition 
" is usually styled the cause, whose share in the matter 
" is superficially the most conspicuous, or whose re- 
u quisiteness to the production of the effect we happen 
" to be insisting upon at the moment." " The real cause 
" of the phenomenon is the assemblage of all the con- 
" ditions." There is new and important truth in this 
statement. But I am not sure that Mr. Mill has got 
a full view of the facts. In material nature there is 
always need of the action of two or more agents in 
order to an effect. If a ball moves in consequence of 
another striking it, there is need of the one ball as well 
as the other, and the cause, properly speaking, consists 
of the two in a relation to each other. But not only 
is there a duality or plurality in the cause, there is the 
same (Mr. Mill has not noticed it) in the effect. The 
effect consists not merely of the one ball, the ball 
struck and set in motion, but also of the other ball 
which struck it, and which has now lost part of its mo- 
mentum. By carrying out this doctrine, we can determine 
what is meant by 'condition' and 'occasion' when 
the phrases are applied to the operation of causation. 
When we speak of an agent requiring a ' condition,' an 
1 occasion,' or ' circumstances,' in order to its action, we 



264 CAUSATION. 

refer to the other agent or agents required, that it 
may produce a particular effect. Thus that fire may 
burn, it is necessary to have fuel, or a combustible 
material. In order that my will may move my arm, it 
is needful to have the concurrence of a healthy motor 
nerve. So much for the dual or plural agency in the 
cause. But there is a similar complexity in the effect, 
and we need a like phrase to designate the part of it 
which we do not require to consider at the time. Thus 
the steam which has raised a certain weight has ex- 
pended meanwhile a certain amount of force ; but per- 
sons striving merely to have the weight raised care 
nothing for the other, and may call it 'incidental ;' which 
incidental part, however, may be the essential element 
in the view of the engineer who requires to generate 
the steam. In the proper enunciation of the cause and 
the effect — the invariable and unconditional cause and 
effect — there should be a statement of all the concurring 
antecedents, and all the involved consequents, including 
the conditions in the cause, and the incidents in the effect. 
By carrying out this doctrine consistently, we are able 
to give (which Mr. Mill has not done) its proper place 
to the 'Agent' and 'Patient;' the distinction between 
which has been noticed in some form or other by most 
philosophers from the time of Aristotle. The agent and 
patient are certainly not to be identified with the cause 
and effect ; but they are to be found in the cause, that 
is, in the assemblage of circumstances necessary in order 
to the production of the effect. These circumstances or 
agencies must concur, in short, must operate on each 



CAUSATION. 265 

other, in order to action and change. Tims, in order 
to the production of water, there must be both oxygen 
and hydrogen ; the two act on each other according to 
their nature and laws ; and both are changed and appear 
in the product. That which we consider as acting may 
be called the Agent, that which we regard as acted on 
may be considered as the Patient. It should be observed 
and remembered, that the agent under one aspect is 
always a patient under another, and the patient may 
also be viewed as an agent ; for that which acts is 
always acted on, and that which is acted on always 
acts ; and action is always equal to reaction. The 
account now given enables us to settle a question 
which has often been started, but never determined 
satisfactorily. The question is, Is the effect always 
posterior in time to the cause, or may it not be con- 
temporaneous ? The answer is, that the complex effect 
always follows the complex cause ; but that the con- 
current agents which constitute the cause may be re- 
garded as acting on each other simultaneously. The 
oxygen and the hydrogen influence each other con- 
temporaneously, and are followed by the production of 
water as the effect. 

The reader may compare the statement now offered 
with that given by Mr. Mill in his chapter " Of the Law 
of Universal Causation." Mr. Mill has not seen that 
as the cause consists in an assemblage of conditions, so 
the effect consists in an assemblage of consequences. 
In the agents concurring in the cause there is a real 
distinction between agent and patient, whereas he says 



266 CAUSATION. 

the distinction vanishes on examination, or rather is 
found to be merely verbal. He has discussed, but 
avowedly does not know how to settle the question as 
to whether the cause precedes the effect. He has also 
noticed the circumstance, that in some cases when the 
cause ceases the effect also seems to cease, whereas in 
others the effect appears to remain ; but he has not been 
able to give a full explanation of the phenomenon. The 
effect remains when the assemblage of circumstances 
which constitute the cause abides. It is thus a book 
remains on the table as long as the table is in a posi- 
tion to uphold it. It is thus oxygen and hydrogen 
abide in water till an element with a stronger affinity 
with one of them succeeds in drawing it off. In other 
cases the concurrence of agencies acting as the cause is 
ever liable to be broken up, and the effect ceases when 
the complex cause has disappeared. It is thus that the 
book is upheld in my hand, only so long as I stretch 
out my arm : thus that the room is illuminated by day 
only so long as the sun shines, and by night only so long 
as the lamp continues to burn. In all cases a change 
implies a new agent, or a new concurrence of agencies. 

But we are now in the heart of our author's logical 
discussions. Mr. Mill's Logic has never been subjected 
to a careful review on the part either of his supporters 
or opponents. It deserves such an examination because 
of its excellencies, and it requires it because of its errors, 
which many students are accepting along with the 
truths. I undertake this review in the immediately 
succeeding chapters. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

Formal Logic is usually represented as dealing with 
the Notion, Judgment, and Reasoning. Mr. Mill has 
no separate exposition of the Notion. He treats instead, 
of Names : as if Names did not stand for Thoughts, the 
nature of which should have been previously investi- 
gated. This is surely a defect in an elaborate Logical 
Treatise. In his controversial work he has given us his 
theory of the Notion or Conception. It will be neces- 
sary to examine it. 

The Notions, that is, apprehensions of things, which 
the mind can entertain, are of three sorts : — First, There 
is the Singular Concrete Notion, such as Homer, Virgil, 
Dante, Milton, this man, this dog, that daisy, that book. 
This notion is singular, as it embraces a single object. 
It is concrete, as it contemplates the object as possess- 
ing an aggregate of qualities. The consideration of the 
nature of this notion does not, properly speaking, come 
under Formal Logic, which has to do only with Discur- 
sive Thought ; that is, thought in which there is a pro- 
cess from something given or allowed to something 



268 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

founded upon it. It is furnished to us by intuition, 
primarily by the senses and consciousness, and does not 
imply any logical operation. But then it comes into 
Logic when it is combined with the abstract and general 
notion in the proposition and argument. Thus, when 
we say, ' Locke was an independent thinker,' the sub- 
ject is a singular concrete notion compared with a 
general notion in the predicate. Logic, therefore, can- 
not overlook this notion, but it may hand over the 
special discussion of its origin and validity to psycho 
logy or metaphysics. Mr. Mill gives us a correct enough 
account of it, though he does not specially investigate 
its nature : " A concrete name is a name which stands 
for a thing" (B. I. c. ii. 4). 

Second, There is the Abstract Notion. It is the appre- 
hension of a part of an object as a part, say of the head 
of a horse as the head of a horse. More technically it 
is the apprehension of an attribute. " An abstract name 
is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing" (lb.) 
In this latter sense the part cannot exist separate from 
the whole : thus transparency cannot exist apart from a 
transparent object, such as glass or ice. But though an 
abstract quality cannot exist apart from an object, it is 
not to be regarded as a nonentity or a fiction of the 
mind. Bationality cannot exist apart from a rational 
being, but it has a real existence in a rational being, 
such as man. 

On account of the defective view which he takes of 
the intellectual faculties of man, Mr. Mill has not been 
able to furnish an adequate account of the Abstract No- 



THE LOGICAL FOTIOK 269 

tion. Speaking of the notion of length without breadth, 
" According to what appears to me the sounder opinion, 
" the mind cannot form any such notion ; it cannot con- 
" ceive length without breadth" (B. I. c. viii. 7). And 
in his recent work, " The existence of Abstract Ideas — 
" the conception of the class qualities by themselves, and 
" not as embodied in an individual — is effectually pre- 
" eluded by the law of Inseparable Association" (p. 314). 
The ambiguous word ' conceive' has once more cast up 
without his telling us in what sense he employs it, I 
should say that in these passages he uses it in the sense 
of ' image/ in which signification the statement is true. 
I believe that length cannot exist except in an extended 
object which has also breadth, and I am sure that I can 
image length only in an extended object. He adds, that 
the mind " can only, in contemplating objects, attend to 
" their length, exclusively of their other sensible quali- 
" ties, and so determine what properties may be predi- 
" cated of them in virtue of their length alone." This 
is not a sufficiently comprehensive account of the Abs- 
tract Notion ; but it implies that there is more than a 
mere image. If we inquire carefully into its nature, we 
shall find that as a thought it implies not only attention 
but a comparative act. We apprehend the attribute to 
be an attribute of the concrete object, thus comparing 
the part and whole. This apprehension is the Abstract 
Notion, and we can compare the attribute apprehended 
with other attributes, or with concrete objects of various 
kinds, and make affirmations or denials. Tims, on per- 
ceiving a cone of sugar as a concrete object, we can in 



270 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

abstract thought fix on the figure, and from the con- 
templation of it we might by a further abstraction fix 
on the conic sections, and by a process of reasoning- 
evolve their properties. In all this we should be deal- 
ing, not with mere hypotheses, but abstracted realities ; 
and the conclusions we reach will be found true of all 
cones, and of all sections of the cone, including the 
elliptic figures in which the planets move. 1 

Third, There is the General Notion, such as man, 
poet, animal. We are so constantly forming notions of 
this sort, that it should not be difficult to evolve the 
processes involved in it. The two first steps are, — (1.) 
that we observe a resemblance among objects ; (2.) that 
Ave fix on the points of resemblance. The first is accom- 
plished by the mind's power of perceiving agreements, 
and the second by an operation of abstraction. No ab- 
solute rule can be laid down as to which of these pro- 
cesses is the prior. I believe that in most cases there 
is first a perception more or less vague of a likeness, 
and then the separate consideration of the points of 
likeness. But in other cases we seem rather to fix pri- 
marily on an attribute, and conjoin by it all the objects 
which we discover to possess it. Thus, in zoology the 
naturalist fixes on the possession of a backbone, and 

i Regarding Logic as the Science of the Laws of Discursive Thought, as 
above defined, the Abstract Notion is clearly embraced in it, as in it Ave 
draw an attribute out of the concrete object given, and we must endeavour 
to unfold the Laws of Thought involved in it. The following may serve 
provisionally till a better list be furnished : — I. The Abstract Quality im- 
plies a Concrete Object. II. When the Concrete Object is real the Abs- 
tract Quality taken from it is also real. III. When the Abstract is a 
Quality, it is not to be regarded as having an independent existence ; its 
existence is in a Concrete Object. 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 271 

makes it the bond of a class of animals. But there is 
more in generalization than either or than both of these 
steps. (3.) The consummating step is, that we constitute 
a class which embraces all the objects possessing the 
common attribute or attributes. Till this step is taken 
there is no generalization. When this step is taken the 
general notion is formed. Let it be observed that there 
is here an operation beyond the other two. In the first 
step we must have observed or contemplated more or 
fewer objects, and perceived them to resemble each 
other ; still the number was limited. In the second 
step we fixed on a quality or qualities common to the 
objects noticed. But in the final step the number of 
objects is indefinite, and must include not merely those 
we have observed and compared, but all others pos- 
sessing the mark or marks fixed on. On seeing only 
half a dozen red deer I may have been forcibly struck 
with their resemblance, and may have been able to fix on 
their points of likeness, — such as their shape and their 
noble antlers. But when I take the decisive step and 
form the class red deer, that class must include not 
only those I have seen, but all others with that form 
of body and horns ; not only these six deer, but all 
other deer now living, and all deer that ever lived 
or shall live ; not only so, but all imaginable deer, 
the deer sung of by all the poets, and the deer that 
may be created by the ever active imagination. A 
notion is not general unless it embraces all the objects 
possessing the mark or marks fixed on. 

Now this consummating step has not been noticed, 



272 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

or at least has not had its appropriate place allotted to 
it, by most psychologists and logicians. Dr. Brown 
dwells very fondly on the feeling of resemblance, as he 
calls it (he should have said the observation of the 
relation of resemblance), but takes no notice of the all- 
important act by which the species is made to embrace 
all the objects having the resemblance. This specially 
intellectual step was from time to time before the mind 
of Hamilton, as when he says, that "concepts have 
" only a potential, not an actual, universality ; that is, 
" they are only universal, inasmuch as they may be 
" applied to any of a certain class of objects." But with 
an occasional glimpse of the truth, he loses sight of it 
immediately after, and he talks of a mysterious " syn- 
" thesis in consciousness," wherein " the qualities, which 
" by comparison are judged similar, and by attention 
" are constituted into an exclusive object of thought, — 
" these are already, by this process, identified in con- 
" sciousness ; for they are only judged similar, inas- 
" much as they produce in us indiscernible effects" 
{Logic, Lect. viii.) His whole exposition is confused 
and unsatisfactory, and it issues in his finding a con- 
tradiction in the general notion. He loses his consis- 
tency and clearness in endeavouring to find some sort 
of reconciliation between nominalism and conceptualise. 
Mr. Mill has unfolded no elements in the general no- 
tion except the attribute and the name. " We create 
" an artificial association between those attributes (to 
" which we wish to devote our exclusive attention) and 
" a certain combination of articulate sounds, which 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 273 

" guarantees to us when we hear the sound, or see 
" the written characters corresponding to it, there will 
" be raised in the mind an idea of some object pos- 
" sessing those attributes, in which idea those attri- 
" butes alone will be suggested vividly to the minds, 
" our consciousness of the remainder of the concrete 
" idea being faint." " The association of that particular 
" set of attributes with a given word is what keeps 
" them together in the mind by a stronger tie than that 
" with which they are associated with the remainder of 
" the concrete image" (p. 322). There is a great over- 
sight here. There is no reference to the discovery of 
resemblances among objects as constituting the com- 
mencement of the whole process. He ascribes to the 
name what is done by the possession of common quali- 
ties. " For a class is absolutely nothing but an in- 
" definite number of individuals denoted by a general 
" name. The name given to them in common is what 
" makes them a class." But what makes the name 
applicable to the indefinite number of objects ? What 
enables us, when we discover a new object, to say 
whether it is or is not entitled to the name? The 
answer to these questions will force us to look beyond 
the name to the like attributes in the objects, as making 
the objects pass under the same name, as enabling us to 
understand what is denoted by the name, as being the 
meaning of the name, and, in fact, constituting the bond 
which joins the objects in a class. There is a passage 
in which he has a glimpse of the consummating step, 
and indeed of the whole process. " The only mode in 

s 



274 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

" which any general name has a definite meaning, is by 
" being a name of an indefinite variety of things, 
" namely, all things known or unknown, past, present, 
" or future, which possess certain attributes" (Logic, 
I. v. 3). This language does point to something else 
than the name as bringing together " the indefinite num- 
ber of individuals in the class :" it points to the pos- 
session of " certain attributes" in the " indefinite variety 
of things ; " and it implies, though it does not just 
state, that the class must include all the objects pos- 
sessing these attributes. This account, consequentially 
followed out, makes the common notion embrace three 
elements : objects resembling each other ; points of re- 
semblance ; and the inclusion of all objects having these 
points. But Mr. Mill habitually loses sight of some of 
these essential characteristics, and ever falls back upon 
the attribute and the name. This omission in the 
theory of the notion comes out in positive error in the 
account of the judgment and reasoning. 

According to the exposition now given, the Class- 
Notion always includes both objects and attributes, 
objects having a resemblance, and common attributes 
possessed by them. So far as it embraces objects, it 
is said to have Extension. So far as it contains attri- 
butes, it is said to have Comprehension or Intension. 
This distinction was indicated in the Port-Royal Logic, 
and was enunciated in several logical works published 
in the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. 1 It has been elaborated with great 

i In particular, I have found it in a Compend of Logic, prepared and 
printed (there is no evidence of its having been published) for use of the 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 275 

care, at times with an excess of refinement, by Sir 
William Hamilton. That every general notion should 
have both these aspects, follows from the account I have 
given of its formation and constitution. In every 
General Notion there must be objects compared ; this 
constitutes the Extension. There must also be marks 
to bring the objects together under one head ; this is 
Comprehension. The former is got by observation and 
comparison, the latter by abstraction. We see that as 
the one rises the other falls, and that as the one falls 
the other rises. As we multiply the marks or attri- 
butes, there must be fewer objects possessing them. As 
we multiply the objects, they must have fewer common 
marks. Hence the rule, that the greater the Extension, 
the less the Comprehension, and the greater the Com- 
prehension, the less the Extension. 

Upon this distinction the remark is, " that the Ex- 
" tension is not anything intrinsic to the concept ; it is 
" the sum of all the objects, in our concrete images of 
" which the concept is included : but the comprehension 
" is the very concept itself; for the concept means 
" nothing but our mental representation of the sum of 
" the attributes composing it" (p. 333). It is clear, that 
of the three constituents of common notions he gives 
the chief, or rather exclusive, place to the attributes. 
" All men, and the class man, are expressions which 
" point to nothing but attributes ; they cannot be inter- 
Scottish Universities, by order of a Parliamentary Commission, 1795 ; in 
an Introduction to Logic" (2d edit., 1722) by Gershom Carmichael of Glas- 
gow University ; and again in a Compend of Logic by Francis Hutcheson, 
which was used in Glasgow College till towards the close of last century. 



276 THE LOGICAL NOTIOX. 

" preted except in comprehension" (p. 363). In oppo- 
sition to this, I maintain that the Extension of the 
notion is quite as important an aspect of it as the Com- 
prehension ; that every common notion may be inter- 
preted in Extension as well as Intension ; that in the 
class there must be objects to combine as well as attri- 
butes to combine them ; and that a mental representation 
must be inadequate which does not embrace the objects 
as well as the sum of the attributes possessed by them. 
The Universal Xotion is of objects possessing common 
attributes, the notion including all the objects possess- 
ing the attributes. We see here, in Mr. Mill's logical 
doctrine, a taint at the fountain, which will be found 
running through the whole stream. 

" General concepts, therefore, we have, properly 
" speaking, none." " I consider it nothing less than a 
" misfortune that the words Concept, General Xotion, 
" or any other phrase to express the supposed mental 
" modification corresponding to a class name, should 
" ever have been invented. Above all, I hold that 
v nothing but confusion ever results from introducing 
" the term Concept into Logic ; and that instead of the 
" Concept of a class, we should always speak of the 
" signification of a class name" (pp. 321, 331). But 
surely it is desirable to have a word to express the 
" mental modification" when we contemplate a " class," 
and Conception or General Xotion seems appropriate 
enough. I also think it desirable to have a phrase to 
denote, not the " signification of a class name," but the 
thing signified by the class name ; and the fittest I can 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 277 

think of is Concept. Mr. Mill would replace Abstract 
and General Idea by " the connotation of the class 
name." I reckon the epithet ' connotation' a very good 
one for some purposes. It was used by the schoolmen ; 
it was a favourite one with Mr. James Mill ; and 
has had a clear meaning attached to it. " A connota- 
" tive term is one which denotes a subject and implies 
" an attribute." Thus, ' white' is connotative ; * it de- 
" notes all things white, as snow, paper, the foam of the 
" sea, etc. ; and implies, or, as it was termed by the 
" schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness." But 
while ' connotative ' is an expressive enough epithet, 
applied to certain predicates, it does not bring out what 
is contained in the class-notion. ' Horse,' for example, 
is a general notion, embracing an indefinite number of 
objects ; but all this is not expressed by applying the 
phrase ' connotative.' " It denotes a subject ;" but 
what is the subject ? This question is left unanswered. 
It can be answered only by saying that it consists of all 
the objects possessing the attributes ; and as to the 
phrase "signification of the class name," it leaves it 
unsettled what the thing signified is. I am inclined to 
think that the words Conception and Concept serve a 
good purpose ; they express the signification of the 
class name. 1 

The General Notion bein^ formed in the way ex- 
plained, we fix it and preserve it, and think of it by 

1 The following are some of the Laws of Thought involved in the General 
Notion : — I. The Universal implies Singulars. II. When the Singulars are 
Real the Universal is also Real. III. The Reality in the Universal consists 
in the possession of common attributes by all the objects embraced in it. ., 



278 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

means of a Sign. The Sign may be one or other of two 
sorts. Lauding the founder of his School, Mr. Mill 
says, " It is a doctrine of one of the most fertile thinkers 
" of modern times, Auguste Comte, that, besides the 
" logic of signs, there is a logic of images, and a logic of 
" feelings. In many of the familiar processes of thought, 
" and especially in uncultured minds, a visual image 
" serves instead of a word" (p. 329). Omitting the 
consideration of the logic of feelings as not coming 
specially before us, the doctrine attributed to Comte as 
so " fertile" a thinker was long ago proclaimed by 
Aristotle, and has floated ever since, in a more or less 
correct form, in logic and speculative philosophy. Ac- 
cording to Aristotle, a notion is not the same as a 
phantasm, but it is never found without a phantasm. 1 
The expression of Mr. Mill is much more loose. He 
talks of a " logic of images ;" whereas it is not a logic, 
but a notion entertained by means of an image. He 
speaks of the image being a " visual sensation" and 
" visual appearance ;" whereas it may be a phantasm 
by any of the senses, — it may be of a smell, or a taste, 
or a touch, or a sound. 

I believe that the General Notion is kept before the 
mind primarily by the phantasm. In every such no- 
tion the objects are indefinite — are innumerable; and 
so the human mind (whatever angelic minds may do) 
cannot image them all : but it images one as a sign of 

i Distinguishing between Notions, vorj/xara, and cpavrdafxaTa, Aristotle 
says (see Anim. III. 7), NoTj/xara rivl hiolaet rod /xr) cpavTaafxara elvai, ij 
ovde ravra (pavrdafxara, dXX' ovk dvev (pavTaa/xaTuv. 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 279 

the others. The attribute, or aggregate of attributes, 
cannot be imaged apart from objects, but we labour to 
fashion an object which may give prominence to the 
one attribute, if there be only one, or combine them if 
there be many. This, I am persuaded, is the original 
and spontaneous agency by which we carry with us and 
compare our concepts. Mr. Mill has a glimpse of this, 
and nothing more, when he says that " in uncultured 
minds a visual image serves instead of words." The 
more correct expression would be, that in cultured 
minds the word often comes to serve the purpose of the 
image and to supersede it. I believe we naturally 
resort to the image ; but the image is always felt to 
be inadequate. Hence the common remark, that we 
cannot have an adequate idea, that is, in the sense of 
image, of a class. Suppose the notion to be ' quadruped :' 
when we think about the class, we may, and do com- 
monly, image some sort of beast with four limbs ; but 
if the limbs be those of a horse, they cannot be those of 
a dog, and if they be those of a dog, they cannot be 
those of the horse ; and if they be different from either, 
they cannot be those either of the horse or the dog. 
All this does not prove that we cannot in thought form 
a general notion, or that we cannot legitimately employ 
it in judgment and reasoning ; it merely shows that 
the image, as being single, is not equal to the indefinite 
number of objects, and, as being concrete, cannot be 
identical with the attribute, which is abstract. The 
fact is, the image, or, as I prefer calling it, with Aristotle, 
the phantasm, is a mere sign, — one for the many, that 



280 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

one being as far as possible a type of the many. The 
mind spontaneously forms such representations, and de- 
lights to do so ; and when it can have them, the think- 
ing is rendered much more vivid and pleasant, and is 
more readily accompanied with excitement and emotion. 
But when the generalizations are very high, when the 
abstractions are very refined, and the common attributes 
are very numerous, or not very definitely fixed, it be- 
comes all but impossible to construct a phantasm which 
will represent the class. We can form a pretty fair 
representative image of quadruped, but what phantasm 
could stand for such complex notions as civilisation, 
liberty, politics, art, and science ? In striving to com- 
pass such notions, we naturally resort to artificial sym- 
bols, particularly language. If there be a word suitable 
to express the thought, it will employ it ; if there be not, 
it will labour to invent one. But so far from images 
serving instead of words, the words serve our purpose 
as being images. It has been remarked by metaphysi- 
cians that most names were originally of individual 
objects. An individual object, or the image of it, was 
first taken to represent the class ; and then the name of 
the individual, as a sound or a written character ad- 
dressed to the eye, was used as a briefer and more con- 
venient symbol. The advantage of such verbal signs, 
which are always, be it remarked, in a sense phantasms 
addressed to the eye or ear, is, that they do not distract 
us with the peculiarities of individual objects, and allow 
us in thinking to proceed only on the common qualities 
of objects. All this renders the notion less lively and 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 281 

emotional — unless indeed by those who resort to word- 
painting to raise up a phantasm — but at the same time 
better fitted for the conducting of rigid thought. The 
most perfect artificial signs for the limited end in view, 
are those employed in algebra, in which meaningless 
letters denote quantities known or unknown, and we can 
employ them according to the settled laws of reasoning 
in quantity without thinking of what they stand for, 
till we reach the result, when we translate the sign into 
what it signifies. When we lose sight for the time of 
what the sign stands for, this is what constitutes, pro- 
perly speaking, Symbolical Thought. But it is always 
to be understood that the sign does stand for a notion, 
and has always a tacit reference to it ; that we can pre- 
dicate of the sign only what we could legitimately pre- 
dicate of the notion; and that in passing it on from 
premisses to conclusion in a chain of reasoning, we must 
be sure that we proceed on principles which are appli- 
cable to the thing signified. And in order to determine 
whether we are or are not making a proper predication, 
we can always, and should often, require that the sign 
should be translated into the notion, and the notion 
compared with the thing. 1 

1 The following are some of the Laws of Thought involved in the nse of 
Signs as Instruments of Thought :— I. Every Logical Term stands for a 
Notion, which may be a Singular Concrete, an Abstract, or a Universal. 
II. According as it stands for one or other of these, so is it to be inter- 
preted. III. We can predicate of the Sign only what might be predicated 
of the Notion. IV. In order to determine whether we are making a pro- 
per predication as to the Sign, we may demand at any time that the Notion 
be substituted for it. V. In order to determine whether we are making a 
proper predication as to the Notion, we must inquire what is the nature 
of the Things from which it has been formed. 



282 THE LOGICAL X0T10X. 

A distinction of some importance may be drawn be- 
tween two kinds of Concepts. In the one the class is 
determined by a single attribute, or by it together with 
the attributes implied in it. Such are the classes de- 
signated by adjectives, as generous, faithful, virtuous, — 
pointing to one quality of an object, along with those 
that may be involved in that quality. It is to these 
phrases that the epithet f connotative' is specially ap- 
plicable ; they denote an attribute, and connote objects 
possessing it. In other cases the Comprehension of the 
class consists of an aggregate of attributes. Thus, we 

CO O ' 

cannot fix on any one attribute of the class Man, and 
derive all the others from it, Eationality is one quality, 
but he has many others : 

" Men define a man 
The creature who stands frontward to the stars, 
The creature who looks inward to himself, 
The tool-wright, laughing creature. 'Tis enough ; 
We'll say instead the inconsequent creature man, 
For that 's his specialty. What creature else 
Conceives the circle, and then walks the square?" 

The one kind of notions I would be inclined to call, 
when it is necessary to draw the distinction between 
them, the Generalized Abstract, because in it we seize 
on a single quality, and put all the objects possessing 
it into a class. The other I call the Generalized Con- 
crete, because in it we bring together, by certain resem- 
blances, individuals with their aggregate of qualities. 
It was to the latter that the schoolmen appropriated 
the phrase Species ; I think they would scarcely have 
applied it to the Generalized Abstract such as 'rational' 



THE LOGICAL NOTION. 283 

or ' irrational.' The Generalized Concrete evidently in- 
cludes all natural classes, such as reptiles, fishes, birds, 
mammals, in the animal kingdom, and rosacese, crucifera?, 
solanacese in the vegetable kingdom; the objects em- 
braced in these have all a number of common qualities. 

It is of importance to keep these distinctions in view 
in considering the nature of Definition. In defining the 
Generalized Abstract Notion, we have only to bring out 
the one common quality, and the work is completed. 
But in attempting to define the Generalized Concrete, 
we cannot fix on any one quality as being the essential 
one ; and it often happens that the common attributes 
are so numerous, that it would be vain and presumptu- 
ous to attempt to specify all of them. Thus, no one 
can tell what are the properties embraced in horse, dog, 
metal, mineral. It fortunately, I believe providentially, 
happens that we have in nature classes called Kinds, 
the nature of which has been so well expounded by 
Mr. Mill. In these, one of the Marks is an invariable 
accompaniment, and therefore a sign of the others ; and 
in specifying it we have truly fixed the significates of 
the notion, that is, comprised all the objects embraced 
in it and excluded others. Thus it is a good definition 
to say, " Man is a rational animal," for all his other 
special attributes are conjoined with rationality. If we 
call the attribute fixed on the Differentia, the others 
may be represented as Propria, if we wish to retain, 
after amending it, the distinction of Porphyry between 
Differentia and Proprium. 

Mr. Mill has offered some valuable remarks on De- 



284 THE LOGICAL NOTION. 

finition, but from overlooking the distinction between 
the Extension and Comprehension of a Notion, he has 
not given us a thoroughly scientific account of the 
logical process. Sir William Hamilton is right in say- 
ing, after older logicians, that it is effected according to 
the Comprehension of a Notion ; that is, it reflectively 
brings out the Marks by which those who spontaneously 
formed the concej)t combined the objects. From over- 
looking Extension Mr. Mill has omitted Division, a 
subject which ought to be discussed in all logical 
treatises. Logical Division proceeds according to the 
Extension of a Notion, and spreads out the co-ordinate 
species of a genus, according to marks added, so that 
the species exclude one another, and together make up 
the genus. 



CHAPTER XV. 

LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

Theee is no part of Logic which has greater need of 
being thoroughly cleared up than that which relates to 
Judgment. In particular, first, what precisely are the 
things compared, and in regard to which the affirmation 
or denial is made ? In the common logical treatises we 
are said to compare two notions and declare their agree- 
ment or disagreement. Mr. Mill has made an im- 
portant correction of this statement : " Propositions 
" (except when the mind itself is the subject treated of) 
" are not assertions respecting our ideas of things, but 
" assertions respecting the things themselves. In order 
" to believe that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the 
" idea of gold and the idea of yellow, and something 
" having reference to these ideas must take place in my 
" mind ; but my belief has not reference to the ideas, 
" it has reference to the things" {Logic, I. v. 1). " Do 
" we never judge or assert anything but our mere 
" notions of things ? Do we not make judgments and 
" assert propositions respecting actual things" (p. 346). 
There is truth here. But is the whole truth set forth ? 



286 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

The judgment is pronounced in regard to objects, but 
then, it must be of objects of which we have a notion. 
The judgment is not pronounced of our notions as mental 
phenomena, but neither can it be of things of which 
we have had no notion, — of such we can make no pre- 
dication. He tells us again and again, " The judgment 
is concerning the fact, not the concept." But then he 
is obliged to allow, " that in order to believe that gold 
" is yellow, I must, indeed, have the idea of gold, and 
" the idea of yellow, and something having reference to 
these ideas must take place in my mind ;" and he adds, 
that in order to belief, " a previous mental conception 
of the facts is an indispensable condition." I ask, 
should not this indispensable condition have a place in 
the full statement of the nature of propositions ? There 
is a sentence in which he has got at least a momentary 
view of the correct doctrine : " The real object of belief 
" is not the concept, or any relation of the concept, but 
" the fact conceived" (p. 348). Yes, the facts conceived 
are what we compare. If we could get philosophers to 
reserve the word ' conception' for the mental operation, 
and apply the word ' concept' exclusively and consis- 
tently, not to the mental product as Hamilton does, but 
to the things conceived, then the proper account of Judg- 
ment, when we have a class-notion, would be, the act 
in which we compare two concepts. This account em- 
braces the full mental operation, and throws us back 
first upon the notions that we may judge of them, and 
these throw us back on the things from which the 
notions have been formed. 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 287 

This leads me to notice another misapprehension of 
our author's. Here, as all throughout his Logic, he 
makes us look to names rather than to thoughts. But 
surely Locke has shown, in that third book of his Essay, 
which Mr. Mill so commends, that names should ever 
carry us back to ideas, which ideas, as Bacon had pre- 
viously shown, should ever carry us back to things. 
Logic has to do primarily with Thought as employed 
about Things, and with Names only secondarily and 
incidentally, as being the expression of Thoughts. It is 
thus only that we can employ the laws of thought, 
which are fixed, to enable us to examine and correct 
language, which is variable. But Mr. Mill reverses 
this order, and makes Logic deal primarily with the 
proposition or expression, and not with the judgment 
or comparison (p. 357). 

But the important and unsettled question is, What is 
the precise relation between the two Concepts or Terms 
in Judgment ? "When it is said to be an agreement or 
disagreement, the language is far too vague for philo- 
sophic purposes. Sir William Hamilton vacillates in 
the account given by him. His common representation 
is that the relation is one of whole and parts. " We 
" may articulately define a judgment or proposition to be 
" the product of that act by which we pronounce, that, 
" of two notions thought as subject and as predicate, 
" the one does or does not constitute a part of the other, 
" either in the quantity of extension or in the quantity 
" of comprehension" {Logic, I. p. 229). In other places 
the relation seems rather to be spoken of as one of equa- 



288 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

lity, and he would interpret "all men are mortal" as 
" all men = some mortals." Again, he seems to make 
the relation one of identity ; for he says that the law of 
identity " is the principle of all logical affirmation and 
definition" (lb. p. 80), and he speaks of the two notions 
being " conceived as one" (lb. p. 227). 

It is not very easy, amidst Mr. Mill's criticisms of 
others, to find his own theory. He tells us, " Existence, 
" Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Eesemblance, one 
" or other of these, is asserted or denied in every pro- 
" position without exception." But then he explains 
away the affirmations and denials as to Existence and 
Causation ; for Existence, that is, noumenon, is unknown 
and unknowable, and Causation is unconditional se- 
quence. There remain only three relations, and the 
judgment is a recognition of a relation " of a succession, 
a co- existence, or a similitude between facts" (p. 353). 
But he has a way of still further reducing the number 
of relations. For propositions which assert a resem- 
blance, such as ' this colour is like that colour,' " might 
" with some plausibility be brought within the descrip- 
" tion of an affirmation of sequence, by considering it 
" as an assertion that the simultaneous contemplation of 
" the two colours is followed by a specific feeling, termed 
" the feeling of resemblance." And as to the allegation 
that the propositions of which the predicate is a general 
name, affirm or deny resemblance, he says, that what is 
declared is the possession of " certain common peculi- 
arities," " and those peculiarities it is which the terms 
" connote, and which the propositions consequently 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 289 

" assert, not the resemblance" {Logic, i. v. 6). By this 
subtle but not satisfactory process, in which, as usual, 
he reaches simplicity by overlooking the peculiarities 
of the phenomenon, he makes propositions to declare 
" that a certain attribute is either part of a given set of 
" attributes, or invariably co-exists with them" (p. 361). 
His final reduction is thus expressed : " Propositions in 
" which the concept of the predicate is part of the con- 
" cept of the subject, or, to express ourselves more phi- 
" losophically, in which the attributes connoted by the 
" predicate are part of those connoted by the subject, 
"are a kind of Identical Propositions : they convey no 
" information, but at most remind us of what, if we un- 
" derstood the word which is the subject of the propo- 
" sition, we knew as soon as the word is pronounced. 
" Propositions of this kind are either definitions, or parts 
" of definitions. These judgments are analytical : they 
" analyse the connotation of the subject-name, and 
" predicate separably the different attributes which the 
" name asserts collectively. All other affirmative judg- 
" ments are synthetical, and affirm that some attribute, 
" or set of attributes, is, not a part of those connoted by 
" the subject-name, but an invariable accompaniment 
" of them" (p. 359). This analysis accords thoroughly 
with Mr. Mill's psychological theory, and helps to prop 
it. It makes all judgments relate to attributes, and 
simply to proclaim either an identity, or co-existence 
among them, — which attributes are in the end sensations, 
or possibilities of sensation. But it is not in accordance 
with the revelations of consciousness, which show us 

T 



2C0 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

that the mind pronounces judgments not as to abstract 
attributes, but as to things with attributes ; and not only 
of identity and co- existence, but of whole and parts, of 
resemblance, of space, of quantity, and active property 
(see supra, pp. 202, 203). 

Much clearness, as it appears to me, may be intro- 
duced into this subject by distinguishing three classes 
of judgments, corresponding to three classes of notions : 

(1.) There are judgments in which the objects com- 
pared are Singular Concretes ; as when by the eye I see 
two marbles and judge them to be of the same size, or 
by the ear hear two sounds and declare one of them to 
be louder than the other. In the order of time these 
are the first judgments pronounced by the mind. It is 
by a succession of them, that is, by observing resem- 
blances among a number of individual objects that we 
form the General Notion. It is to these, as I understand 
his doctrine, that Dr. Mansel applies the term Psycho- 
logical Judgments (Proleg. Log., p. 63). I have already 
expressed my opinion, that the' relations which the 
mind can perceive among objects are very numerous 
and diversified — much more so than Mr. Mill supposes. 
What is the nature and what the best classification 
of these comparisons ; these are very important ques - 
tions in psychology, but do not specially fall under the 
science which treats of discursive thought, 

(2.) There are judgments in which we compare Abs- 
tracts, by which I do not mean mental states or modi- 
fications, but tilings abstracted. For example, ' Honesty 
is the best policy,' where both ' honesty' and ' the best 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 291 

policy' are Abstracts, being neither Singular Concretes 
on the one hand, nor Common Concepts on the other, 
that is, they do not denote separately existing things, 
such as ' this man,' nor an indefinite number of objects, 
like ' man.' Under this fall all definitions such as 
'Logic is the science of the laws of thought.' Here 
both the subject, 'Logic,' and the predicate, ' the science 
of the laws of thought,' are not independently existing 
things on the one hand, nor do they embrace indefinite 
objects on the other. In this same class I place judg- 
ments regarding space, time, and quantity, such as ' the 
zenith is the point of the visible hemisphere directly 
over the head of the observer;' ' mid- clay is 12 o'clock 
in the day ;' and '2 + 2 = 4/ Here both the terms are 
abstract. We never met with such separate things 
as 2 + 2 or 4 ; nor can we describe either 2 + 2 or 4 
as a class embracing objects ; in fact we cannot say 
of such abstract notions that they have Extension. 

In all such judgments the relation is one of identity 
or of equality. The judgments are convertible or sub- 
stitutive ; that is, we can change the position of the 
terms, or substitute the one for the other, without any 
change ; in fact we can make either term the subject 
or the predicate, as may suit our purpose. Thus we 
reverse the order given above, and say, ' the science of 
the laws of thought is logic ;' 'the point of the visi- 
ble hemisphere directly over the head of the observer is 
the zenith;' '12 o'clock in the day is mid-day;' and 
'4 = 2 + 2.' Great clearness is introduced into this part 
of Logic by separating these judgments, in which we 



292 LOGICAL JUDGMEXT. 

compare Abstracts, from those in which we compare 
Singulars or Concepts. 

(3.) A more important, but a more complicated, class 
of judgments remains for consideration. It consists of 
those in which there is an attributive, and in fact, or by 
implication, a Concept or a class-notion. This lan- 
guage requires to be explained. When we say, { this cow 
ruminates,' we have abstracted an attribute and ascribed 
it to the animal In this proposition the subject is 
singular. But in judgments of this kind the subject 
may be a class-notion ; thus we say, ' cows ruminate,' 
meaning that the whole class do so. A judgment of 
this description is called attributive. One of the terms 
is, properly speaking, the subject, and the other the 
predicate. And the terms cannot be converted simply ; 
in other words, the predicate cannot be made the sub- 
ject without limitation. Because all cows possess the 
attribute of rumination, we cannot say all ruminating 
things are cows. 

All Attributive judgments are judgments in Com- 
prehension, but they may also be made judgments in 
Extension. Tor we may reckon ' ruminant ' as a class 
embracing not only the cow but other animals, such as 
the sheep and the deer. It will be admitted that this 
is always possible. On the other hand, I do not affirm 
that this is always done. In by far the greater num- 
ber of propositions the primary and uppermost sense is 
in comprehension. Thus, when we say ' larks sing,' we 
probably mean not that larks are among the class of 
siuging birds, but that they have the capacity of singing. 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 293 

But we may always interpret in Extension the proposi- 
tion which is primarily in Comprehension. This follows 
from the account given in last chapter, of the mutual 
relation and dependence of the two. When we have a 
mark, we may always form a class, embracing the objects 
possessing the mark. The mind in its discursive opera- 
tions tends to go on from Comprehension to Exten- 
sion. When the predicate of a proposition is a verb, as 
in the example just given, the thought is in Compre- 
hension. But then we have also adjectives and com- 
mon nouns as predicates. When we say the ' man 
hoards money,' the thought is in Comprehension ; but 
we also say that ' he is penurious,' and the thought is 
rising to Extension ; and when we say ' he is a miser,' 
the thought is in Extension as well as Comprehension, 
for we have established a class, ' miser/ to which we 
refer the individual. Mr. Mill seems to get a momen- 
tary view of this ; for while he holds that all judgments 
(except where both the terms are proper names) are 
really judgments in Comprehension, he allows that "it 
" is customary, and the natural tendency of the mind, 
" to express most of them in terms of Extension." The 
" tendency" to do this must surely proceed from some 
law of thought as applied to things ; and the possibility 
of doing it surely implies an intimate relation between 
the Comprehension and the Extension. In not a few 
propositions the uppermost thought is in Extension. 
Thus, when the young student of Natural History is 
told that 'the crocodile is a reptile,' his idea is of a 
class, of which he may afterwards learn the marks. As 



294 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

in the other cases, the mind tends to generalize the 
attribute, and make the proposition one in Extension, 
so in this case it should go on to translate the idea 
in Extension into one in Comprehension. That pro- 
positions can always be interpreted in both ways, is 
a clear evidence of the indissoluble connexion of the 
operations. 

It appears then that in all judgments belonging to 
this head the relation is always one of Comprehension, 
and may also .and always be one of Extension likewise. 
This cannot be said of the second class, or those in which 
we compare mere Abstracts. We cannot call such attri- 
butive ; thus there would be no propriety in saying that 
4 is an attribute of 2 + 2. Nor can such judgments be 
intelligently explained in Extension. At this point we 
see that Sir William Hamilton has fallen into error, from 
looking merely, in his Logic, to the Conception or Gene- 
ral Notion, and overlooking the Abstract Notion. He 
makes all logical propositions capable of being inter- 
preted both in Extension and Comprehension. But 
when we affirm that 4 X 4 = 1 6, we have no General 
Notion, and the phrases Extension and Comprehension 
are not applicable. In all cases, however, in which the 
predicate is a formed class-notion or Concept, the pro- 
position should be interpreted both ways. Not only so, 
but when the predicate is merely attributive, it is still 
possible to interpret the proposition in both ; and we 
shall see in next chapter that in reasoning its upper- 
most meaning is always in Extension rather than Com- 
prehension. 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 295 

At this point we see the error of Mr. Mill, as at the 
other we saw that of Sir William Hamilton. Mr. Mill 
maintains that " the supposed meaning in Extension is 
" not a meaning at all, until interpreted by the meaning 
" in Comprehension ; that all concepts and general 
" names which enter into propositions require to be 
" construed in Comprehension, and that their Compre- 
" hension is the whole of their meaning." Again, " The 
" Extension of a concept is not, like the Comprehension, 
" intrinsic and essential to the concept ; it is an exter- 
" nal and wholly accidental relation of the concept, and 
" no contemplation or analysis of the concept itself will 
" tell us anything about it" (pp. 362, 364). There is an 
accumulation of mistakes in this statement, all arising 
from the inadequate view taken by him of the elements 
involved in the General Notion. We have seen that in 
the General Notion there are objects as well as attri- 
butes ; objects to combine as well as attributes to com- 
bine them. In all propositions falling under this head 
the Extension has quite as distinct a meaning (it con- 
notes objects) as the Comprehension (which denotes 
attributes) ; and both are " intrinsic and essential to the 
concept." Extension is involved in every concept, and 
should always be noticed when we are using the con- 
cept, and brought out into distinct view when we ana- 
lyse it. Even in cases in which the primary sense of 
the predicate is attributive, we may also turn it into a 
class-notion and explain it in extension ; and we shall 
see that we always do so think it when we use the pro- 
position as a premiss in an argument. 



296 LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 

Looking upon all judgments of this class as having 
both Extension and Comprehension, we can obtain from 
any given proposition a set of what have been called by 
Kant Syllogisms of the Understanding, and by Hamil- 
ton Immediate Inferences, or what I call Implied or 
Transposed Judgments. Thus, the judgment being- 
given, ' All men are responsible,' we can by Extension 
derive such judgments as the following : — that man is 
a species in the genus responsible ; that some respon- 
sible beings are men ; that any one man is responsible ; 
that it is not true that no men are responsible ; or 
that some men are not responsible ; that men of 
genius are responsible with their genius ; and that God 
who calls men to account is calling to account respon- 
sible beings. Again, by Comprehension we can say, 
that responsibility should always accompany our notion 
of man ; that responsibility exists, being found in man 
who really exists ; that no man is irresponsible ; that 
irresponsible beings cannot be men ; and since responsi- 
bility is to God, man being responsible is responsible to 
God. These implied judgments bring us to the very 
verge of mediate reasoning. By subalternation we 
declare that all men being responsible, some men are 
responsible : there is but a step between this and me- 
diate reasoning, in which we argue that all men being 
responsible, the New Zealanders who are men, that is, 
some men, are responsible. These Transposed Judg- 
ments appeared in the old Logic under the heads of 
Opposition and Conversion ; and in the New Analytic 
they have been drawn out fully in Archbishop Thomson's 



LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 297 

Laws of Thought (p. iii., where, however, they are not 
drawn by Extension and Comprehension). It is a 
defect in Mr. Mill's work, professedly A System of Logic, 
Ratiocinative and Inductive, that it does not discuss 
such topics. 



CHAPTEE XVI. 

REASONING. 

In order that they may reason, and reason validly, it 
is not necessary that persons be logicians. Man reasons 
spontaneously. The logician reflects upon the natural 
operation, and seeks to unfold its nature and its laws ; 
and he strives also to lay down rules fitted to guide 
and guard us as we reason. The grand question to be 
determined in scientific logic is, what is the regulating 
principle of spontaneous ratiocination ? On this subject 
there is a general agreement, and yet considerable diver- 
sity of opinion, among logicians. Almost all admit that 
the principle (when the conclusion is affirmative) may 
be expressed, ' Things which agree with one and the 
same agree with one another.' But this form is too 
vague, for it does not specify the nature of the agree- 
ment. And so logicians have endeavoured to make the 
statement more definite. According to the Dictum of 
Aristotle, the things must agree in being both under 
some higher class or genus. The form has sometimes 
been put, ' Things are the same which are the same 
with a third.' Mr. Mill expresses it, ' Things which 



REASONING. 299 

co -exist with the same co- exist with one another.' The 
distinctions which have been drawn in the two last 
chapters in regard to the Notion and Judgment will be 
found, if followed out, to throw light on some of these 
points. 

First, There are simple cases of reasoning in which 
the terms are Singular or Abstract : — 

Thomas a Kempis was the author of the ' Imitation of Christ ;' 
Gerson was not Thomas a Kempis ; 
.'. Gerson was not the author of the ' Imitation of Christ.' 

Or the unfigured syllogism of Hamilton : — 

Sulphate of iron is copperas ; 
Sulphate of iron is not sulphate of copper ; 
. \ Sulphate of copper is not copperas. 

In the same class may be placed all reasoning in 
which the propositions are definitions or substitutive : 
as, ' Logic is the science of the laws of thought ; Ethics 
is the science of the laws of our moral nature ; therefore 
Logic is not Ethics.' Under this head I put all quan- 
titative reasoning ; as, ' A = B ; B = C ; therefore A = C 
In such examples none of the notions is properly a 
class-notion or attributive. As none of them has quan- 
tity or extension, so we cannot speak of a minor or 
major term, or of a minor or major premiss. The 
division into figures has no place ; for, as any one 
will at once see on trial, the middle term may be 
made, as we please, the subject or the predicate of 
either premiss. The regulating principle in all such 
cases is either, ' Things are the same which are the 
same with a third/ or ' things which are equal to the 



300 REASONING. 

same are equal to one another.' Much confusion is 
avoided by allotting reasoning of this description to a 
separate head. As there is no class-notion the Dictum 
cannot be the regulating principle. 

Second, There is more complex reasoning in which 
there is an attributive predicate or a class-notion. In 
this the old Aristotelian Dictum remains, after all dis- 
cussion, the fundamental regulating principle : ' What- 
ever is predicated of a class may be predicated of all 
the members of the class.' No other proposed Dictum 
has lived beyond the age of its inventor. I am con- 
vinced that the same fate awaits that propounded by 
our author (Logic, II. i-iv.). 

The " really fundamental axiom of ratiocination," as 
announced by him is, " Things which co-exist with the 
same thing, co- exist with one another;" and "a thing 
" which co-exists with another thing, with which other 
" a third thing does not co -exist, is not co-existent 
" with that third thing." But the phrase ' co-exist,' if 
limited to co-existence in respect of time or space, does 
not include most important cases of reasoning ; and if 
widened beyond this it becomes meaningless. When 
we argue that the man having committed murder de- 
serves punishment, the premisses and the conclusion 
have reference, not to space or time, but to far different 
relations. When we infer from A being equal to B, and 
B to C, that A is equal to C, we are not making affir- 
mations about co-existence. In explanation, he tells 
us (p. 202, footnote, 6th ed.), " the co-existence meant 
is that of being jointly attributes of the same subject." 



REASONING. 301 

This statement is still vague, and is not adequate, for it 
does not specify what is " the same subject," and it 
does not bring out that the attribution involves Ex- 
tension : but it contains partial truth, and it has a 
meaning, which we can examine. 

This new Dictum gives him the following universal 
formula : — 

Attribute A is a mark of Attribute B ; 
A given object has the mark A ; 
.•. The given object has the attribute B. 

But what does this first premiss mean when we trans- 
late it from abstractions into concrete realities ? As 
there cannot be an Attribute existing separately or 
apart from objects, it must mean, ' Whatever objects 
have the attribute A have the attribute B.' And what 
is this but the major premiss of the old syllogistic for- 
mula? The second premiss requires an explanation. 
" A given object has the mark A :" this object may be 
one object or a class of objects. In order to give the 
formula a meaning, we must interpret it, ' Whatever in- 
dividual or class has the attribute A has the attribute 
B ; a given object or class C has the attribute A ; there- 
fore it has the attribute B.' The new Dictum and new 
Syllogistic formula are just bad versions of the old ones. 
I call them bad versions, for the phrase " co-exist" does 
not bring out the precise relation of the terms on which 
the thought proceeds ; and the phrase, " Attribute A," 
requires to be interpreted in order to have a relevant 
signification. 

But he has given us another form, which he represents 



302 REASONING. 

as " an universal type of the reasoning process. ' We 
" find it resolvable in all cases into the following ele- 
" ments : Certain individuals have a given attribute ; an 
" individual or individuals resemble the former in certain 
" other attributes ; therefore they resemble them also in 
" the given attribute" (lb. II. in. 7). It may be observed 
that the phrase ' co-exist' has disappeared, and another 
and equally vague one has taken its place ; it is a 
" resemblance" in certain attributes, and in other attri- 
butes. It is allowed that this is not " conclusive from 
the mere form of the expression." By itself it would 
sanction fallacious reasoning quite as readily as valid. 
' All men have immortal souls ; the brutes resemble 
them in certain attributes (as instincts and bodily 
organs) ; they must also have immortal souls.' We shall 
see immediately that Mr. Mill allows that the syllogism 
is an admirable test of the validity of reasoning, which, 
it is conceded, this alleged " universal type" is not. It 
wants the essential testing element, the general rule 
that guarantees the conclusion, and which in the 
syllogistic formula is embodied in the major pre- 
miss, — the necessity of which is pressed on us by the 
Dictum. 

But may there not be reasoning in Comprehension as 
well as in Extension? In answering this question it 
should be admitted fully, that reasoning in Extension 
may always be translated into reasoning in Compre- 
hension. The reason of this is very obvious : it follows 
from the account given of the nature of the Concept. 
Extension always implies Comprehension ; that is, the 



REASONING. 303 

objects in the class are joined in the class by the posses- 
sion of common marks : 

He who lias intelligence and free agency is responsible ; 
Man has intelligence and free agency ; 
. \ Man is responsible. 

This reasoning in Extension may be put in Compre- 
hension : 

Responsibility is an attribute of all who have intelligence and 

free agency ; 
Intelligence and free agency is an attribute of man ; 
. \ Responsibility is an attribute of man. 

Mr. Mill maintains that all reasoning is in Compre- 
hension, and not in Extension. " All propositions into 
" which general names enter, and consequently all rea- 
" sonings, are in Comprehension only. Propositions 
" and reasonings may be written in Extension, but they 
" are always understood in Comprehension" (p. 363). I 
have granted that, so far as propositions are concerned, 
spontaneous thought is chiefly in Comprehension. In 
simple affirmation and denial, we commonly mean to 
do nothing more than declare or deny that an object 
or class of objects has or has not a certain attribute, 
but without turning the predicate into a class-notion, 
or inquiring whether there may or may not be other 
objects, which have or have not the same attribute. 
When we say that 'the horse is warm-blooded,' we 
may be looking exclusively to the attribute, without 
caring, at the time, whether there are other warm- 
blooded animals. But it seems to me to be different 
in regard to reasoning, the uppermost thought in 
which is always in Extension. It seems to me to be 
so when, not knowing whether the horse is or is not 



304 REASONING. 

warm-blooded, we call in a middle concept, and argue 
' that the horse being a mammal, and all mammals 
being warm-blooded, the horse must be so.' Here we 
place the horse in the class mammal, and mammals 
among warm-blooded animals, and thus reach the 
conclusion. Again, to take an example of negative 
reasoning (falling naturally into the second figure) : 
AVhen we argue that ' the rat, not bringing forth its 
young by eggs, is not a reptile,' we find in thought 
that the class rats, not being in the class of animals 
winch bring forth their young by eggs, cannot be in 
the class reptiles, which always bring forth their 
young by eggs. Here, as in all other cases, we under- 
stand the attributive terms — such as bringing forth 
their young by eggs — as class-notions in order to draw 
a conclusion. This is seen very clearly when we have 
to determine whether our conclusion should be uni- 
versal or particular ; that is, of the whole class, or a 
part. We argue (in the third figure) that ' as the con- 
nexion of soul and body, though incomprehensible, is 
yet to be believed, that therefore — not all things, but- — 
some things to be believed are incomprehensible ; and 
how do we reach this conclusion ? Because in thought 
we have made a class of ' things to be believed/ and 
found that in this class are things incomprehensible. 1 

Such considerations convince me that our sponta- 
neous reasoning is in Extension. I allow that Sir AY. 



J Mr. Kidd, in his very able work, A Delineation of the Primary Prin- 
ciples of Reasoning, shows, p. 121, " The conception of a class is present 
in every instance of reasoning." 



REASONING. 305 

Hamilton has furnished a valuable contribution to Logic 
by exhibiting the forms of reasoning in Comprehension. 
But I look on these as secondary and derived, and not 
entitled to the same primary rank as those in Exten- 
sion. Most logicians— teachers and taught — have shrunk 
from his 108 Modes as being an oppressive burden on 
the mind, both on its memory and its intellectual appre- 
hension. I am inclined to think that all the purposes 
of Logic will be accomplished by retaining the old forms 
of reasoning in Extension, and showing how, when any 
end is to be served, they can be turned into the forms 
of Comprehension. As to Mr. Mill, he has got a 
partial and imperfect view of reasoning in Comprehen- 
sion, but has not taken the trouble of showing us how 
his theory is adequate to explain the processes of spon- 
taneous reasoning. 

He utters an emphatic denial regarding the syllogistic 
form and its rules, that they are not " the form and the 
" rules according to which our reasonings are neces- 
" sarily, or even usually, made." But all wise logicians 
have allowed that in spontaneous reasoning persons 
have not before them the Dictum of Aristotle, and still 
less the modes and figures of the syllogism. The 
former of these is the regulative principle of reasoning, 
and the latter are expressions constructed to test the 
validity of ratiocination. What I maintain is that the 
mind in all reasoning grasps the three notions, that is, 
things apprehended, and the relation between them. 
We see a new kind of leaf that never fell under our view 
before, and we notice that it is netted in its veins, and we 

u 



306 REASONING. 

infer that the plant on which it grew must be dicoty- 
ledonous : we do so on the principle, gathered probably 
from botanical books, that all netted-veined plants are 
dicotyledons; and we see the relation of ' this plant, hav- 
ing netted leaves, and being dicotyledonous.' But we do 
not enounce the Dictum, nor do we spread out major, 
minor, and conclusion. We leave all this to logicians, who 
construct a reflex science out of a spontaneous process. 

He makes two most important admissions in favour 
of the syllogistic analysis. One is that all reasoning 
can be reduced to the formula of the syllogism ; and the 
other, that this formula is admirably fitted to expose 
invalid reasoning. The value of the syllogistic form, 
and of the rules of using it correctly, is said to consist 
" in their furnishing us with a mode in which those 
" reasonings may always be represented, and which is 
" admirably calculated, if they are inconclusive, to bring 
" their inconclusiveness to light." But I ask, how does 
it happen that all our reasoning can be reduced to this 
form ? How is it that it comes to test so admirably the " 
conclusiveness and inconclusiveness of all reasoning ? 
It is surely strange that there is a rule to which all 
reasoning is conformable, and which acts as a criterion 
of all reasoning, and yet is not the natural law of 
reasoning. I believe that all arguments can be made to 
take this form, because it is the right one. I believe it 
is a crucial test of the soundness or unsoundness of all 
arguments, because it is the law of thought, springing 
from the mental constitution with which our Maker has 
endowed us. 



REASONING. 307 

I suppose Mr. Mill would account for the conform- 
ableness of all reasoning to the syllogistic form, and for 
its aptness to act as a test, by saying that, though all 
reasoning is naturally in Comprehension, it can be 
represented in Extension. But if this be so, it would 
show, I think, that propositions and reasoning must, 
contrary to what Mr. Mill alleges, have a meaning in 
Extension as well as in Comprehension. And if reason- 
ing be naturally in Comprehension, we should expect 
that formulas drawn out on that principle must be 
better fitted than those derived from Extension to ex- 
hibit the validity or in validity of arguments. Mr. Mill 
has, unfortunately, not favoured us with a development 
of the forms of reasoning according to Comprehension. 
We are therefore not in a position to say whether these 
would or would not be superior, as a means of testing 
inference, to those furnished in the old Logic. I am 
convinced that such forms, constructed even by so clear 
a thinker as Mr Mill, would have a more artificial, a 
more twisted and translated look, and would be far less 
fitted to expose fallacies in reasoning. I rather think 
that we should have to translate them back into Ex- 
tension before we could fully recognise their meaning. 
Looking upon reasoning as proceeding naturally by 
classification, rather than attribution, I maintain that 
the great body of logicians, from Aristotle downwards, 
have acted properly in drawing out their formulas 
according to Extension, and that it is when they are 
thus drawn out that they are most easily understood 
and readily applied. Mr. Mill has made a most im- 



308 REASONING. 

portant admission (p. 429) : — " The propositions in Ex 
" tension, being, in this sense, exactly equivalent to the 
" judgments in Comprehension, served quite as well to 
" ground forms of ratiocination upon : and as the validity 
" of the forms was more easily and conveniently shown 
" through the concrete conception of comparing classes 
" of objects, than through the abstract one of recognis- 
" ing co-existence of attributes, logicians were perfectly 
" justified in taking the course which, in any case, the 
" established forms of language would doubtless have 
" forced upon them." The two circumstances, that the 
validity of the forms is more easily and conveniently 
shown by comparing " classes," and that the established 
forms of language, which are expressions of the natural 
processes of the mind, would have forced an expression 
according to classes on logicians, is surely a presump- 
tion, if not a proof, that the forms in Extension are the 
development of spontaneous thought. 

" I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing in- 
" ferences from our personal experience, and not from 
" maxims handed down to us by books or tradition, we 
" much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars 
" directly, than through the intermediate agency of any 
" general proposition." JSTow, nearly all philosophers 
have allowed that the mind begins its observations with 
particulars, or, to use a better phrase, singulars. Hav- 
ing observed a number of individuals, it can reach a 
general conclusion ; but it is only by a process which 
the logician should fully unfold. Having observed or 
heard that crows everywhere are black, we conclude 



REASONING. 309 

that the crow which we hear, without seeing, is black. 
But we can argue thus only on the condition that the 
induction is such as to justify the general proposition 
that all crows are black. The syllogism is so admirable 
a means of bringing to light the inconclusiveness of fal- 
lacious reasoning, just because it requires the general 
proposition to be expressed in one of the premisses. 

" All inference is from particulars to particulars ; 
" general propositions are merely registers of such infer- 
" ences already made, and short formulae for making 
" more." He thinks that the error of the syllogistic 
theory arises from not distinguishing between " the in- 
" f erring part and the registering part, and ascribing to 
" the latter the functions of the former." Now I admit 
that the general proposition may be the record or regis- 
ter of a previous induction. And if there has been 
reasoning in the process of induction by which this has 
been reached, there must have been a prior general pro- 
position got by an earlier induction, or given by in- 
tuition. But in any given argument we do not look to 
the previous accumulation of particulars, but to the 
register embodied in a general proposition. The gene- 
ral proposition is certainly no part of the inference, but 
it is an essential part of the assumption from which we 
infer the conclusion, and should therefore have a dis- 
tinct place allotted to it in the premisses. Mr. Mill has 
a partial view of the truth when he says (lb. c. iv), " In 
" drawing this inference we conform to a formula which 
" we have adopted for our guidance in such operations, 
" and which is a record of the criteria by which we 



310 REASONING. 

" thought we had ascertained that we might distinguish 
" when the inference could and when it could not be 
" drawn." In any given argument, as an argument, all 
that we have to do is to look to this register, or record, 
or general proposition. If doubts arise as to its accuracy, 
we must go back on the processes by which we reached 
it ; and if there be reasoning in the processes, we must 
test them in the same way. But our record being 
settled, the general proposition in which it is announced 
is implied in the argument, and should therefore haye 
a place in the formula of reasoning. We haye already 
noticed that " universal type of the reasoning process," 
according to which we find that ' certain indiyiduals haye 
a giyen attribute, and that an indiyidual or indiyiduals 
resemble the former in certain attributes, and therefore 
resemble them in the giyen attribute.' We remarked 
upon the yagueness of this type as leaying us in doubt 
as to what are the " certain attributes" which entitle us 
to infer the presence of the " giyen attribute." It is the 
general proposition embodied in the major premiss, 
which spreads out the rules which, when we take the 
minor premiss along with it, entitles us to draw the 
conclusion. 

But it is asked, if all reasoning implies a major pro- 
position, where do we get our first major, that with 
which we start ? Aristotle did not oyerlook this ques- 
tion, and he answered it. He tells us again and again 
that the beginning of demonstration cannot be demon- 
stration, and that all demonstration carries us back to 
Intuitive Pieason (i/ov?, see Anal. Post, I. 3, 22, 23). 



REASONING. 311 

In certain acts of reasoning, primitive perceptions, such 
as ' the effect has a cause/ give us the one proposition, 
and ordinary observation the other, and the two neces- 
sitate the conclusion. But in far the greater number of 
arguments the general proposition is the result of a 
gathered observation. The criteria of these gathered or 
inductive general laws will come under our notice in 
next chapter. 

" The child, who, having burnt his finders, avoids to 
" thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or in- 
'•' ferred, though he has never thought of the general 
" maxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that he 
" has been burnt, and on this evidence believes, when 
" he sees a candle, that if he puts his finger into the 
" flame of it, he will be burnt again. He believes this 
'• in every case which happens to arise ; but without 
" looking, in each instance, beyond the present case. 
" He is not generalizing ; he is inferring a particular 
'•' from particulars. In the same way, also, brutes 
" reason." " Not only the burnt child, but the burnt 
" dog dreads the lire." I am inclined to think that in 
these cases, that of the child and the dog, the process 
is very much one of the association of ideas and feel- 
ings. The fire and the sensation have been together, 
and upon the fire presenting itself there is a tendency 
to a feeling which causes shrinking. There is really 
no conclusion from observed, from remembered, from 
gathered particulars. Should the fire only once have 
burnt the child it will turn away from it, possibly 
without remembering the previous case, certainly with- 



312 REASONING. 

out an induction of particulars, or an inference from 
them. 

I have called attention to the circumstance that 
while Judgment and Association are not the same, 
they do yet conspire in their action (pp. 181, 182, 206, 
207). I have now to apply this remark to reasoning 
and suggestion. Inference is not to be confounded with 
mere association. In all reasoning there is comparison, 
there is the perception of a relation between things 
about which we reason. Thus we argue, ' A deer, being 
horned, is ruminant.' Here the mind grasps the three 
concepts and their relation : ' deer/ ' being horned,' 
' are among ruminant animals.' Unless there be a 
positive perception of the connexion of the things 
there is no reasoning. Herein is argument at once dis- 
tinguished from association, which does not imply any 
connexion between the things which have been to- 
gether in the mind, any comparison, or any observed 
relation. But while the two mental operations are not 
the same, association greatly helps reasoning. In all 
inference there is a discovered relation, and the related 
things may often have been together, and thus the one 
tends to suggest the others. Some think that it is a 
native law of the mind that correlated things, such as 
like things, and cause and effect, call up each other. 
However we may account for it, whether from things 
being often together or an original tendency, correlated 
things come up simultaneously, altogether independent 
of our observing the relation. Indeed it is often the 
circumstance that they have come up together which 



REASONING. 313 

invites or constrains ns to notice the connexion. Now 
all this helps ns to condnct the operation of reason- 
ing. Thus fire suggests the burning sensation, and we 
collect cases till we reach the general truth that fire 
burns, and then the process may become one of infer- 
ence. It is in this way we are to account for the 
readiness, the rapidity, and for what is often called 
the unconsciousness of the reasoning process. The 
laws of association call up correlated objects, and the 
mind perceives the correlation and draws the infer- 
ence. Thus 'deer' suggests 'horned;' and having heard 
that horned animals are ruminant, ' horned' suggests 
' ruminant ; ' and perceiving the class relation of the 
terms, we draw the conclusion that horned animals are 
ruminant. 

I believe that very much of what some regard as rea- 
soning in the brute creatures arises from mere associa- 
tion, without the relation of the things being discovered. 
In like manner the laws of suggestion operate in chil- 
dren to excite fears and expectations, before there are 
those observed relations which must enter into reasoning. 
All our lives we act on impulses produced by mere asso- 
ciation, without any accompanying argument. A loud 
noise will raise up fear, without our having inferred 
that it proceeds from a cause implying danger. The 
person who has been seriously hurt by a horse or dog- 
can never look on a horse or, dog without a feeling of 
tremor. In such mental action I admit that there is 
no class-notion, no general proposition, no regulating 
principle of Extension. But just as little is there an 



314 REASONING. 

induction of particulars, or attribution, or reasoning in 
Comprehension ; there is no such process as ' Attribute 
A being a mark of Attribute B, and C having the mark 
A.' But then it is one aim of intellectual teaching, and 
one very special end of Logic, to raise us above the ani- 
mal state and the infant state ; to keep us from being 
driven along passively by more casual associations ; and 
train the mind to look narrowly into the relations of 
things that pass before it, and of which it must have 
some conception, that it may thereby reach sound con- 
clusions which can be justified. In all such pro- 
cesses of real reasoning, it will be found that there is a 
general proposition involved, and this should have a 
place in the formula which systematizes the spontane- 
ous operation. 

But Mr. Mill tells us that " in every syllogism con- 
" sidered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there 
" is a petitio principii" But did any one ever maintain 
that the syllogism is " an argument to prove the con- 
clusion?" It has usually been represented as the form 
to which the argument can be reduced. The petitio 
principii is a fallacious mode of reasoning; but the 
syllogism cannot with any possible propriety be repre- 
sented as a mode of reasoning, valid or fallacious, for it 
is not reasoning, but the formula of reasoning. I sup- 
pose Mr. Mill meant to affirm that all reasoning in 
syllogistic form involves a petitio. If so, then he is 
caught in inextricable toils, for he admits that all 
reasoning can be reduced to syllogistic form, which 
seems to imply that it involves a begging of the ques- 



REASONING. 315 

tion. The petitio princvpii is a fallacy in which one of 
the premisses is either the same as the conclusion, or 
depends upon it. But in reasoning, according to the 
syllogistic analysis, the conclusion follows, not from one 
of the premisses, but from the two, or rather from the re- 
lations between the things compared and the premisses. 
It is when the relations predicated in the two proposi- 
tions are brought before the mind that we see the force 
of the inference. We wish to determine — what we are 
not expressly told in the gospels — -whether the Baptist 
was a priest : give us only one premiss, as, that ' the Bap- 
tist was the son of a priest/ or, that ' the sons of priests 
were priests/ and we can infer nothing ; but place the 
two together, and the conclusion is necessitated. The 
one of these premisses is a particular fact, the other is 
a general proposition, and both are necessary to the 
validity of the conclusion. Both premisses are, in the 
reasoning, assumptions — they must be given or granted ; 
but neither of them is an assumption of the conclusion ; 
the two are assumptions which warrant the conclusion. 
As to whether the assumptions are or are not warranted, 
this is to be determined by a previous investigation, to 
be tested by the criteria of induction, intuition, or 
reasoning. And it should be for ever pressed on Mr. 
Mill, that the objections he brings against the Dictum 
of Aristotle are quite as applicable to his own. " Things 
" which co-exist with one and the same thing co- exist 
" with one another ; " this is quite as much a truism as 
the old Dictum, while it is much more vague ; and 
reasoning proceeding upon it must be quite as liable to 



316 REASONING. 

the charge of being a begging of the question, as 
reasoning according to the syllogistic formula. 

It should not be omitted that Mr. Mill does not enter 
upon any special consideration of the nature of Con- 
ditional Keasoning, whether Hypothetical or Disjunctive. 
This is a great defect in a work which professes to give 
us a full Logic of Inference. There are very important 
questions started as to the regulating principle of Con- 
ditional Arguments, and these should be discussed in 
every logical treatise worthy of these advanced times. 
He tells us, in his " Examination of Hamilton," that a 
Hypothetical Judgment is " a judgment concerning 
judgments ;" but he does not attempt to enounce the 
principle which connects the 'judgment' with the 
'judgments' with which it is concerned. He further 
lets us know that he looks on a Disjunctive Judgment 
as compounded of two or more Hypotheticals, but he 
does not inform us what is the relation of these Hypo- 
theticals to one another (pp. 454, 455). I confess I 
should like to see his attributive theory of reasoning 
tried by its application to Conditional, and specially to 
Disjunctive reasoning. When we argue that 'the 
season when a particular event took place not having 
been spring, summer, or autumn, must have been 
winter,' we seem to proceed on the principle of Division, 
which is made according to the Extension and not the 
Comprehension of a concept. But I allude to these 
topics here, not in order to discuss them, but to show 
that as Mr. Mill has avoided the discussion, he cannot 
be said to furnish a full system of Logic. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

SECONDARY LOGIC ; OR THOUGHT AS DIRECTED TO 
PARTICULAR CLASSES OF OBJECTS. 

I AM inclined to justify Mr. Mill in introducing into 
the science other topics besides those treated of in what 
we may call Primary Logic. The effort made by certain 
purists to exclude such matters as Demonstration, In- 
duction, and Evidence generally, must fail, and ought to 
fail. It is of vast moment to have these subjects dis- 
cussed in a scientific manner, and Logic is the field for 
the discussion ; and our definitions of the science are too 
narrow if they exclude them, and should be so widened 
as to give them an acknowledged place. In treating of 
such topics, or at least two of them, Induction and 
Evidence, our author occupies a far more distinguished 
place than he does in Formal Logic. Still, even in this 
department, his work, while possessed of great merits, 
may be charged with grave errors, springing, I believe, 
from his mistaken views of fundamental truth. 

I have commented already (Chap, xii.) on his account 
of Necessary Truth generally. His defective appreciation 
of intuition has led him to an erroneous exposition of 



3 1 8 SECONDARY LOGIC. 

the nature and office of Mathematical Definitions and 
Axioms (Logic, II. v.-vii.) Definitions are represented 
as hypotheses, and the necessity of the truths derived 
from them consists in the relation between the supposi- 
tion and the conclusions drawn from it, " Axioms are 
" experimental truths ; generalizations from observation. 
" The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a 
" space — or in other words, Two straight lines which 
" have once met, do not meet again, but continue to 
" diverge — is an induction from the evidence of our 
" senses." 

I reckon these views as radically erroneous. Defini- 
tions are Abstracts, that is, things abstracted from 
known concrete realities. ' A line is length without 
breadth,' that is, we consider the length without regard- 
ing the breadth. ' A superficies has breadth and length 
without depth/ that is, in all reasoning we agree to 
look to the length and breadth without taking the depth 
into account. But Mr. Mill tells us " there exist no 
real things exactly conformable to the definition;" 
there exist no lines without breadth, no surfaces with- 
out depth. I admit that there can be no such lines or 
surfaces with a separate or independent existence. But 
still they have a reality ; they have a reality in extended 
obj ects — which have, besides, length and breadth. Man's 
mind is so constituted that he can think about them, 
and draw deductions from them. But he tells us, " A 
line, as defined by geometers, is wholly inconceivable," 
where the word that covers so much confusion appears 
once more, and in his latest edition. We certainly cannot 



SECONDARY LOGIC. 319 

image such a line, but we can image an extended object, 
and think about its length. I believe that all further 
mathematical truths are derived from Definitions. But 
when I say so, I do not mean that they are obtained 
from ideas in the mind, but from things abstracted from 
concrete realities, and having a reality in existing con- 
crete objects. As there is a reality in the things defined, 
so there is also a reality in all the conclusions logically 
drawn from them. The deductions derived two thou- 
sand years ago from the definition of the ellipse, are 
found to be realized in the planetary bodies, so far as 
they move in elliptic orbits. I cannot see how this 
should follow, unless the thing defined had been a 
reality. 

Mr. Mill thinks that demonstrative truths follow 
from Postulates and not Definitions. We postulate that 
there may be a line with length without breadth, and 
get deductions from our assumptions. True, in all 
deduction the premisses are assumptions, but in 
mathematical definitions the assumptions are abstracted 
realities. Here, as in so many other departments, his 
acuteness has given him a partial view of the truth, 
and he says that " our reasonings are grounded upon 
matters of fact in our definitions." When I say that 
mathematical demonstration is founded upon definitions, 
I mean upon the matters of fact or things defined, 
which no doubt are postulated, but postulated as 
realities, giving us corresponding realities in all legiti- 
mate deductions from them. To support his confused 
theory, he is obliged to give a twofold view of defini- 



320 SECONDARY LOGIC. 

tions. The definition of a triangle, he says, obviously 
comprises not one but two propositions perfectly distin- 
guishable. The one is, ' There may exist a figure 
bounded by three straight lines ; ' and the other, ' this 
figure may be termed a triangle.' But there is no 
advantage secured, in the way of clearing our thoughts 
or otherwise, by drawing such a distinction ; for demon- 
stration relates throughout not to the word, but the 
thing, a figure bounded by three straight lines. He 
argues that definitions, as such, are the premisses only 
in the reasonings which relate to words, and that if we 
take any other view, " we might argue correctly from 
true premisses, and arrive at a false conclusion." Thus 
let the definition be, ' A dragon is a serpent breathing 
flame,' out of this we may carve the following syllogism : 
' A dragon is a thing which breathes flame; but a 
dragon is a serpent : therefore, some serpents breathe 
flame/ — " in which both premisses are true, and yet 
the conclusion false." But surely the premisses are 
here true or false according to what we understand as 
to the objects compared. If we are speaking through- 
out of imaginary things, the conclusion is true in the 
same sense as the premisses are. If we are speaking 
of actually existing things, both the premisses and the 
conclusion are false. 

After what I have said in regard to necessary truth 
(Chap, xii.), it is not necessary to dwell on his theory of 
Mathematical Axioms. They are represented as mere 
generalizations of an outward experience. I believe, 
indeed, that in the axiom in its generalized form there 



SECONDARY LOGIC. 321 

must be generalization. But they are not generaliza- 
tions of an outward or sensible experience. On the 
bare contemplation of a whole object, say a table, we 
declare it to be larger than a part of it, say its 
leg. I do so at once on the mere sight or thought 
of the object as known to me, and not from any 
induction of particulars falling under my experience in 
time past. Perceiving that I would do the same in 
every like case, I may generalize the judgment and put 
it in the form of an axiom, that 'the whole is greater 
than its part/ But this general truth is not the gene- 
ralization of a lengthened experience ; it is not reached 
by our having observed a thousand times or ten thousand 
times that a whole thing is greater than a part of the 
same thing : we see it at once on the bare inspection of 
any one thing; our conviction could not be made stronger 
by multiplying examples ; and we cannot allow that 
there should be an exception. I may have observed of 
ten thousand plants with netted leaves that they have 
all sprung from two seed-lobes, and I feel justified in 
laying down the general rule, that ' netted-leaved plants 
are dicotyledonous ; ' but the law is reached by a gathered 
experience. I do not assert that it can Tiave no excep- 
tions ; and when I learn that there is a tribe of plants 
(including Arum, etc.) which have netted leaves, and 
yet spring from one seed-lobe, I may wonder at the fact, 
but I do not say that it is impossible. But the mind 
having discovered, from its knowledge of the nature of 
things, that the whole is greater than a part, I cannot be 
made to allow that there is anywhere an exception. 

x 



322 SECONDARY LOGIC. 

To apply these remarks to mathematical truth : In 
proceeding with its demonstrations, the mind pronounces 
its judgments immediately on the objects defined being 
presented to it, and it does not need the axiom in its 
generalized form ; indeed it feels the force of the reason- 
ing quite as clearly before as after the maxim is an- 
nounced. In learning geometry, the beginner seems to 
discover the truth of the axiom from the judgment 
pronounced in a given case, rather than to recognise the 
validity of the argument in the particular example by 
the maxim. Still the axiom is the expression of the 
regulating principle of reasoning, and it serves important 
purposes to enunciate it at the commencement of the 
demonstration. It is one of the greatest defects of Mr. 
Mill's work on Logic, that in consequence of mistaking 
the nature and functions of definitions and axioms he 
has not been able to give a correct account of the Method 
employed in Demonstration. That Method I call the 
Joint Dogmatic and Deductive. I call it Dogmatic, for 
it begins with assumptions, with truths not proven, 
with truths perceived hj intuition; and I call it Deduc- 
tive, for it draws other truths from its assumptions. 
The criteria of its assumptions are the tests of intuitive 
truth, that is, Self- Evidence and Necessity ; the criteria 
of its deductions are the forms of reasoning. 

Mr. Mill's Book on Induction is far the most valuable 
part of his Logic ; it contains the best exposition which 
we have of the Method of Induction in our own or in 
any other language. His Canons of Causes are a great 
improvement upon the Prerogative Instances of Bacon, 



SECONDARY LOGIC. 323 

and are an advance upon the rules proposed by Sir J. 
Herschel. But, while he has admirably expounded the 
functions of Prerogative Instances or Canons in physical 
science, he does not seem to see what is the precise 
logical purpose, that is, the purpose in thought, served 
by them. Induction consists of two parts : the gathering 
of individual facts, which, however numerous, must 
always be limited ; and the derivation from them of a 
law announced in a general proposition. In the first of 
these, there is no special exercise of reasoning ; the 
whole is the work of observation and trained sagacity. 
But in the derivation of the law from the scattered and 
incomplete facts there is inference. Now, what is it 
that justifies the inference ? If there be any truth in 
the Aristotelian or syllogistic analysis, there must be a 
general principle involved, which, when the reasoning 
is put in syllogistic form, becomes the major premiss. 
Now, such rules as these, involved in the Prerogative 
Instances of Bacon, and the Canons of Mr. Mill, are the 
general propositions which supply the major premiss ; 
and the particular set of facts give us the minor premiss ; 
and the two necessitate the conclusion. I drank brandy 
on Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday, and had a head- 
ache the succeeding mornings ; I drank no brandy on 
Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, and had no 
headache on the following days. When I conclude 
that my drinking brandy was the cause of the headache, 
I have, as my major premiss, such a general proposition 
as the Canon of Difference : ' If, in comparing cases in 
which the effect takes place with other cases in which 



324 SECONDARY LOGIC. 

it does not take place, we find the latter to have every 
antecedent in common with the former except one, 
that one circnmstance is the canse, or a part of the 
cause;' and as my minor premiss, the facts as constitut- 
ing such a case ; and the conclusion follows syllogistically. 
The excellence of Mr. Mill's Canons is, that they are 
the simplest and most complete yet enunciated of the 
general principles which guide us in rising from the 
collection of individual facts to the causes. Had Mr. 
Mill clearly perceived that there is reasoning in all 
induction, he would have heen prevented from reversing 
the natural order by representing the reasoning process 
as an induction. 

But the discovery of causes is not the sole end of 
science. In some departments the object is to resolve 
the compounds of nature into their elements. This is 
one of the main ends sought in chemistry, and also in 
psychology. There should, therefore, be Canons of 
Composition 1 as well as Canons of Causes. 

1 In the absence of an attempt by any Logician to supply them, Ave may 
give the following : — (1.) We have decomposed a compound when we have 
decomposed it in separation from all other substances. (2.) Having found 
the elements of a compound in one case, we have found them in all. A 
caution requires to be added, that the elements reached are to be regarded 
as such merely provisionally. The first rule theoretically guards against 
a mistake, which is difficult to avoid in practice. The second shows that 
one decisive experiment may settle the whole question of the decomposition 
of a substance. Hence it is that in Chemistry we may not require a large 
induction, such as is necessary in Natural History and many departments 
of Natural Philosophy. As Chemistry did not exist in the days of Bacon, 
he does not seem to have contemplated the possibility of so rapid a method 
of reaching a law ; and his rules as to the necessity of a wide induction, and 
the gradual rising from particulars to minor, middle, and major axioms do 
not apply to this science, at least in its present advanced stage, — though I 
rather think they did at its earlier stages, before the nature of chemical 



SECONDARY LOGIC. 325 

In another important group of sciences, those called 
the Classificatory by Dr. Whewell, the end sought is not 
the discovery of Causes or of Composition, but of Classes; 
that is, Natural Classes. 1 I mention these things to 
show that, while Mr. Mill has given us the best exposi- 
tion we yet have of the Logic of Induction, he has by 
no means completed the investigation. Much remains 
to be done by other men and by other ages. 

There has been an important discussion between Dr. 
Whewell and Mr. Mill as to whether we may now expect 
more from the Method of Induction or of Deduction. 
Mr. Mill maintains that in most departments of science 
our hope of discovery lies more in Deduction than in 
the Induction of Bacon. On the other hand, Dr. Whewell 
holds that, whatever may be the case with the social 
sciences, in the physical sciences discoveries may be 
expected to be made in time to come, as they have been 

affinity had been ascertained. The caution guards as against concluding, 
when we have reached certain components, we must have got the ultimate 
elements. Every chemist allows that these sixty elements are to be es- 
teemed such, merely till there has been a successful decomposition of them. 
1 The following Canons of Classes may serve till better are furnished :— 
(1.) We have found the resemblance among the objects in many and varied 
cases. (2. ) We must be in circumstances to say that if there be exceptions 
we should most probably have fallen in with them. These two rules will 
prevent us from drawing rash generalizations from a few cases, or cases con- 
fined to a limited region. But in order to determine whether the class is or 
is not a Natural Class, we require a more important rule. (3.) The class 
may be regarded as a natural one when it is one of Kinds ; that is, when 
the possession of one mark is a sign of a number of others. Thus we may 
reckon Mammal as a Natural Class ; for though founded on the single cir- 
cumstance of the animals belonging to it suckling their young, it is found 
that this characteristic is a sign of others,— as, that they are warm-blooded, 
and that their heart has four compartments. Such Orders as Ranunculacese, 
Cruciferae, Rosacese, are obviously Natural Classes, for the plants included 
in each have a number of resembling points. 



32G SECONDARY LOGIC. 

in time past, by a patient induction. Much confusion 
lias crept into this controversy from the circumstance 
that these two eminent men have not come to an agree- 
ment as to what is involved in the processes about which 
they dispute. According to Mr. Mill, the Deductive 
Method consists of three operations : the first, one of 
direct induction ; the second, of ratiocination ; and the 
third, of verification {Logic, III. xi.) Now, of these three 
steps, the first, the direct induction of particulars, and 
also the third, the verification by facts, are essentially 
inductive ; they consist in collecting facts, with the view 
of determining the law of the facts. What Mr. Mill 
calls Deductive, I am inclined to designate the Joint 
Inductive and Deductive Method. In those departments 
of science which are yet in their infancy, we must trust 
mainly to a careful collection of facts, and allow the 
facts to suggest the law, at which we may not yet be 
able even to guess. But in advanced sciences in which 
laws have been established, and are ready to form the 
general or major proposition, advances may be expected 
mainly from the combination of Deduction with Induc- 
tion. Dr. Whewell and Mr. Mill have both done much 
to unfold the steps of this Joint Method. But much yet 
remains to be done, by showing what is the separate 
province of each, and how they may be combined so as 
best to yield the wished-for results in the different 
departments of science. 



CHAPTEE XVIII 

LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS : THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 

In this country Formal Logic is dealt with in four 
different ways at this present time. 

I. By some it is reckoned antiquated and exploded, 
and never referred to without a sneer. Though these 
persons are not likely to attend to me, or favour me 
with an answer, yet I beg to ask them whether it would 
not be very desirable to have a Logic to unfold the laws 
of thought, and direct thought in its various walks — in 
which it is so apt to err ? If they can be induced to 
reply candidly in the affirmative, I would then invite 
them to look into what earnest and able thinkers have 
done ; and I would show them how the Aristotelian 
Logic has cast up again and again, in spite of all 
efforts to suppress it ; and that no other Logic has 
stood longer than a single age : in particular, no one 
now sets any value on the attempts that were made to 
construct a logical science by the school of Locke and 
the school of Condillac. 

II. There are those who accept the Aristotelian Logic 
without criticism or modification. Most of these are 



328 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

inclined to accept it in the form in which it is put by 
Whately, who, by his new and fresh illustrations and 
examples, threw such life into the bones which had 
become dry. The mastering of Whately's Elements is 
certainly a most profitable gymnastic to all young men, 
and is fitted to exercise a salutary influence upon their 
intellectual habits, which is likely to continue with 
them all their lives. But those who have a taste for 
the study ought not to content themselves with such an 
elementary exposition; they should go on to make them- 
selves acquainted with the discussions in our day in 
regard to logical forms ; and neither young nor advanced 
students must be allowed to forget that we have now a 
Logic of Induction quite as important as the Logic of 
Deduction. 

III. There is a British modification of the Logic of 
Kant which has able supporters, the leader having been 
Sir W. Hamilton, who has had able and learned fellow- 
workers in Dr. Mansel and Archbishop Thomson. The 
Logic of this school has many excellencies. It has 
allotted a distinct and intelligible province to the science, 
which is described as that of the Laws of Thought. It 
has so defined the department as to make it embrace 
the Concept and the Judgment, as well as Eeasoning. 
Sir W. Hamilton has revived the distinction between 
the Extension and Comprehension of the Concept, and 
has evolved and applied it in a more scientific 
manner than was ever done before. Not satisfied with 
the Dictum of Aristotle as the one and universal re- 
gulating principle of reasoning, the school is seeking to 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 329 

enunciate a wider Canon, and important minor rules 
derived from it. It lias successfully shown that 
reasoning may be put in the form of Comprehension as 
well as Extension. It has subjected all the forms of 
reasoning, Categorical and Conditional, to a sifting 
examination, which has introduced greater scientific 
accuracy into the technicalities of Primary Logic. 
With unsurpassed acuteness and erudition, Dr. Mansel 
has introduced us to important Aristotelian and scho- 
lastic distinctions. Archbishop Thomson has given us 
an admirable chapter on Language as the instrument of 
thought, has clearly expounded the distinction between 
Substitutive and Attributive Judgments (though he has 
not seen what is the precise nature of the forms), and 
drawn out a comprehensive scheme of Immediate In- 
ferences, 

But on the other hand the Logic of the school is 
tainted throughout with the false metaphysics of Kant, 
and should not be accepted without important ex- 
planations and modifications. It proceeds all along on 
the principle that there are subjective forms in the 
mind itself, which impose on objects as we think about 
them, much that is not in the objects themselves. From 
this general error there arise several particular ones. 

(1.) The school represent Logic as an a priori 
science. Now this doctrine cannot be allowed without 
an important explanation which changes the whole 
theory. It is all true that the mind in logical thought 
proceeds according to native principles. But the princi- 
ples, as general rules, are not before consciousness. It is 



330 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

upon the bare inspection and comprehension of the case be- 
fore it that the mind proceeds in the exercises of thought. 
It being understood that a crocodile is a reptile, and that 
all reptiles bring forth their young by eggs, we at once 
conclude that the crocodile must do so ; but without 
having consciously before us the Dictum, that whatever 
is predicated of a class may be predicated of all that 
is contained in the class. It needs objects to call the 
native capacities of the mind into exercise. Not only 
so, but the exercises are always individual. It is by a 
process of generalization that we derive the general 
law from the individual cases ; and as there may be 
oversights and inaccuracies in the generalization, so 
there may be discussions and disputes about the ex- 
pression of the general law. The laws of thought may 
be in the mind a priori, but we cannot discover and 
unfold them a priori. In order to find the general 
principles of logical thought, and to construct a science 
of Logic, there must be a careful and extensive observa- 
tion of thought as directed to objects, and various 
classes of objects. 

(2.) Kant represents Logic as " making abstraction of 
" all content of the cognition of the understanding and 
"of the difference of objects, and having to do only 
" with the form of thought." Sir W. Hamilton makes 
a like statement : " Logic is conversant with the form 
of thought to the exclusion of the matter" {Logic, 
I. 1 5). ISTow this account contains both a truth and 
an error. It is quite true that Logic does not look to 
the objects of thought, but to thought : but it is 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 331 

equally true that thought must be employed about 
objects. If Logic, then, considers thought, it must con- 
sider thought as employed about objects, — only it con- 
siders the thought and not the objects. Taking this 
view, we see that we are warranted (though, perhaps, 
Kant was not, according to his principles) in adopting the 
division of the science, which we shall explain further 
on in this chapter, into Universal and Particular Logic. 

(3.) From the same mistaken view of thought, the 
whole school represent the Xotion or Conception as 
being formed by the mind, according to a priori laws, 
not altogether independent of objects, but imposing on 
objects what is not in them. Hamilton speaks of " an 
" act of thought as the recognition of a thing as coming 
' under a concept f and again, " Thought is a know- 
" ledge of a thing through a concept or general notion, 
" or of one notion through another" (lb. p. 43). This 
language proceeds on the idea that there is a concept 
prior to the thing, above the thing, and ready to be 
imposed upon it, so as to shape and colour it. But 
surely the correct statement is not that thought is 
through a concept, but that a concept is a thought 
formed on the contemplation of things. The General 
Xotion is fashioned by the mind on the apprehension 
of objects, by putting together the objects, real or poten- 
tial, having common properties. 

(4.) The whole Kantian school omits the Abstract 
Xotion in the construction of logical science. Sir W. 
Hamilton, indeed, gives a brief but correct account of it 
in his Metcqjhysics (Lect. xxxv.), showing that it implies 



332 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

comparison, and that " there is nothing necessarily con- 
nected with generalization in abstraction." Bnt in his 
Logic, the laws which he lays down apply only to the 
Concept or General Notion. This omission not only 
leads to a defective acconnt of Simple Apprehension in 
the first part of Formal Logic, but makes him overlook 
a class of judgments and a species of reasoning in which 
the terms are abstract. 

(5.) In consequence of neglecting to give the Abstract 
Notion a separate place, Sir W. Hamilton and Archbishop 
Thomson have been led to represent every Notion as 
having Extension and Comprehension. Now, these are 
properties exclusively of the General Notion. The 
Abstract Notion, say tranquillity, cannot be said to 
have Extension, for it denotes not objects, but an 
attribute. 

(6.) In a previous chapter I have shown that Sir W. 
Hamilton has not unfolded fully nor accurately the 
nature and the relations of the things compared in 
Logical Judgment. He represents the comparison as 
between two conceptions or concepts as mental pro- 
ducts, whereas it is between concepts as things con- 
ceived. He vacillates in the account which he gives of 
the relation discovered between the concepts, speaking 
of it at times as being identity, at other times as that 
of whole and parts, and in some places as equality. 

(7.) One of Sir W. Hamilton's supposed improve- 
ments in Formal Logic consists in his insisting that the 
predicate should always be quantified ; that is, declared 
to be either universal or particular. Thus the proposi- 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 333 

tion, ' All men are mortal,' he would write, ' All men 
are some mortals.' He defends this on the general 
principle, that whatever is in thought should be un- 
folded in the statement which professes to express 
thought. I admit the principle, but I do not admit 
that it requires the predicate to be quantified. For I 
have endeavoured to show that in by far the greater 
number of propositions the uppermost thought is in 
Comprehension, and we do not think at all of the Ex- 
tension. When we say ' the clog barks/ we mean that 
the dog is engaged in the act of barking, and we may 
not think of a class of barking animals ; we certainly 
do not trouble ourselves with inquiring whether there 
are or are not other animals that bark. Even in propo- 
sitions in which the Extension is in the thought, we do 
not always settle whether the subject is or is not co- 
extensive with the predicate. Thus, when we say ' Man 
is rational,' we may not have determined whether there 
are or are not other rational beings besides man. It is 
sufficient to lead us to form the judgment that man has 
the attribute rationality, or that he is in the class 
rational, whether this class include other beings or not. 
I hold that in the vast majority of propositions the 
predicate is not quantified in thought. I urge, further, 
in opposition to the doctrine, that in those propositions 
in which the terms are abstract, the predicate, properly 
speaking, has no quantity or extension, for it is not a 
class-notion. When we say that 3X3 = 9, neither 
subject nor predicate has an indefinite number of objects 
embraced in it. I admit that in reasoning, Avhen the 



334 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

predicate is known to be distributed, we can convert 
the subject into the predicate, and the predicate into 
the subject, without any change, and draw a conclusion 
which we should not otherwise be entitled to do. Thus 
when we have it demonstrated, both that ' all equilateral 
triangles are equiangular,' and that 'all equiangular 
triangles are equilateral/ we can, upon a given triangle 
being found equilateral, declare it to be equiangular. 
Such cases are worthy of special notice, and might have 
a separate place allotted them in logical treatises, but, 
being so limited, should not be allowed to change the 
whole analytic of reasoning. 

(8.) The new Canon of Eeasoning adopted by the 
school is very vague. It is thus stated in the Outlines 
of the Laws of Thought : " The agreement or disagree - 
" ment of one conception with another, is ascertained 
" by a third conception, inasmuch as this, wholly or 
" by the same part, agrees with both, or with only one 
" of the conceptions to be compared" (§ 93). Now, the 
phrase ' agree' is not explicit ; it does not specify what 
the concepts agree or do not agree in. This defect may 
be remedied by distinguishing between those cases in 
which the terms are singular or abstract, and those in 
which one at least is general. In the former the regulat- 
ing principle is ' things which are the same with, or equal 
to, one and the same thing, are the same with, or equal to 
one another.' In the latter, in which we have a general 
conception, the main regulating principle is, I believe, 
the Dictum, which the founder of Logic propounded. 
While this is the main law of thought, I am convinced 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 335 

that there may be others involved, such as that of whole 
and parts, and of division in all disjunctive reasoning. 
A thorough analytic of logical forms should unfold all 
these laws, and give each its separate place. 

(9.) Sir "W. Hamilton places reasoning in Compre- 
hension on the same level as reasoning in Extension, 
or rather he gives it a prior and higher position. I have 
stated my reasons for thinking that reasoning is primarily 
in Extension. It may, indeed, always be translated 
into the forms of Comprehension, and it is desirable 
that students should know how to do this, and do it 
when any purpose is to be served by it. But it is not 
necessary to burden the mind with the numerous modes 
which appear when we insist on always quantifying the 
predicate, and join on the same footing reasoning in 
Comprehension and reasoning in Extension. 

IY. There is a large class who accept implicitly the 
Logic of Mr. Mill. x These consist chiefly of persons 
who are disgusted with the scholastic Logic as being so 
abstract and technical, and are not prepared to give 
their adherence to the Kantian reformation, as they feel 
that its forms keep us too far removed from things. 
Xow, I rejoice to proclaim that there are remarks, 
as true and important as they are fresh, scattered 
throughout Mr. Mill's treatise. In Book First he has 
many useful observations on Naming, which make us 
regret the more that they are indissolubly mixed up 

1 I should here have referred to the very able attempts of Prof. De 
Morgan and the late Prof. Boole to give us a mathematical theory of 
reasoning. But it would take us altogether out of our present line of 
thought to discuss it thoroughly, and I think it better not to enter upon it. 



336 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

with sensational metaphysics. His Book on Induction 
is by far the most valuable part of his work, though it 
is much injured by doubtful speculations as to the 
nature of our belief in causation. 1 There are practical 
lessons of much utility conveyed in his Book on 
Fallacies, only it is to be regretted that in pointing out 
with so much keenness and relish the errors of the old 
philosophy, he leaves unnoticed the still more glaring 
fallacies of the nescience and association schools. His 
closing Book is very defective as a full Logic of the 
mental and social sciences, more particularly in not 
estimating what is involved in man's essential freedom ; 
but is of value as the commencement of a discussion 
which must grow in interest and importance. I pro- 
pose to sum up the defects of the work as gathered from 
the survey taken in the last four chapters. 

(1.) He denies that Logic is entitled to be regarded 
as a separate science. " So far as it is a science at all, 
" it is a part or branch of Psychology ; differing from 
" it on the one hand as a part differs from the whole, 
" and on the other, as an Art differs from a Science " 
(p. 388). Now, there is no doubt that Logic is closely 
connected with Psychology, is in fact largely dependent 
on it for some of its elementary truths. The same may 
be said of Metaphysics, or the science of the laws of 

1 I regret to see that in the later editions Mr. Mill is crowding his "work 
with still more of metaphysical discussion. Students would feel it to be a 
great advantage to have his book on Induction in a separate form, and 
with the discussions on Intuitions left out. This would leave them at 
liberty to get their Formal Logic elsewhere, and to resort to his complete 
work when they want to know his theory of the mind and his other 
opinions. 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 337 

intuition ; of ^Esthetics, or, as I prefer calling it, Kalo- 
logy, the science of the laws of the Feelings ; and 
Ethics, the science of the laws of our motive and 
moral nature. It is no doubt one part of the office 
of Psychology to gather from an observation of the 
operations of the mind the laws of discursive thought, 
as it is also to find out the laws of our immediate 
perceptions, of our emotional and moral nature. But 
having ascertained that there are such laws, and shown 
how they act in the mind, it does not seek in a special 
way to formalize them, to inquire into their relation to 
external things, or to apply them to scientific or practical 
ends. Psychology leaves all this very appropriately 
to the other mental sciences, which are no doubt her 
daughters, but have their separate households, where 
they are married to their different objects, each with 
its own alliances. In particular, Logic strives to give 
a strictly scientific form and expression to the mode of 
the mind's procedure in apprehending, judging, and 
reasoning, and in gathering laws and causes ; and from 
these it draws rules for the guidance of thought in its 
various walks of investigation. Logic has the proper 
characteristics of a science ; it is systematized truth, 
systematized natural truth. 

(2.) He does not give its proper place to the element 
of thought. No doubt he has done great service to the 
study, by calling our attention to the objects of thought, 
which the scholastic and Kantian logicians had very 
much declined to look at. But Logic has not to do 
with things as things. This it leaves to other, and what 

Y 



338 LOGICAL DISCUSSIOXS : 

have been called material, or real, or what in such a 
connexion might be called objective, sciences. Logic 
has to do not with objects, but with thought as employed 
about objects. If this distinction is not kept constantly 
in view, the logician is ever tempted to mix up physical 
or psychological questions with those that properly be- 
long to Logic. 

(3.) He makes Logic treat of Names, Propositions, 
and Arguments, and not, as our more philosophical 
logicians make it, with Simple Apprehension, Judg- 
ment, and Eeasoning. Every one allows that Appre- 
hensions may be expressed in Names, Judgments in 
Propositions, and Eeasoning in Arguments, and that 
Logic should look to these incidentally, as the expres- 
sion of thought. But the science should deal primarily 
and throughout with the laws of thought, always as 
applied to things, leaving the laws of language to a 
special department of science now being formed. It is 
to be remembered, that as a term may consist of one 
word, or twenty words, we cannot by merely looking at 
words so much as know what the term is ; and that we 
cannot make an intelligent predication in a proposition 
without knowing the meaning of the terms : all which 
shows that Logic should expound thought rather than 
names. Xor is it to be forgotten that the laws of 
thought constitute the fixed element, while the names 
or phrases differ not only in their sound, but in what 
they express and embrace in different languages. And 
then the forms of language are often defective, and not 
unfrequently erroneous, and need to be amended by the 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 339 

invariable and, I believe, unerring laws of thought ; 
which we should endeavour so to analyse and formalize 
as to aid the advancing Science of Language, — which 
will again, as it makes progress, greatly help the Science 
of Thought. 

(4.) In looking at language instead of thought, he has 
given a very imperfect account of the topics usually ex- 
pounded in the first part of Formal Logic, that which 
deals with Simple Apprehension. Instead of examining 
the various classes of apprehensions, and carefully dis- 
tinguishing them, he confines his own attention and 
that of his readers to the name and its connotation, 
without regard to the notion which the name expresses, 
or bringing out accurately what things, or aspects of 
things, the notion embraces in its different forms. 

Owing to his defective psychology, he has no ade- 
quate idea of the capacity of the mind to discover 
relations among things, and he has failed to give us a 
full or accurate exposition of the relation of the two 
apprehensions in logical Judgment. He makes us look 
not at the act of comparison, which is surely the 
primary and main element, but at the attribute con- 
noted, overlooking, in the General Notion, the class of 
objects combined by the attribute, and the mental con- 
cept combining them. 

(5.) The error goes up into his analysis of reasoning, 
and makes him give a very partial exhibition of the 
process, in which he sees only the attribute, and over- 
looks the general conception and general proposition, 
which are involved in the validity of the inference. 



340 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

(6.) Mr. Mill has given us the most valuable contri- 
bution since the days of Bacon to one important depart- 
ment of Logic, that which treats of Induction. But 
still there are very grave mistakes in his exposition of 
the topics that fall under Particular or Secondary Logic. 
These spring from his erroneous theory of Demonstra- 
tion, more particularly of the nature, functions, and 
value of mathematical definitions and axioms ; from 
his mixing false metaphysics with his logical exposition 
of causation ; from his not seeing that the discovery 
of the Decomposition of compounds and of Natural 
Classes are among the ends aimed at in science, and 
requiring Special Canons : and finally, from an im- 
perfect view of the nature of the phenomena of the 
mind, which it is the office of Psychology to co-ordinate, 
and for the aid of which Logic should furnish a method. 

It now only remains to gather from this discussion 
what is the Province of the science of Logic. It has to 
do with thought : but what is meant by thought in 
such an application ? It must evidently be so ex- 
plained as not to include the motive exercises of the 
mind, and to exclude intuition, in which we perceive 
objects or truths at once, and which has always been 
allotted to Metaphysics. By thought, in the technical 
sense in which the word is used in Logic, is meant Dis- 
cursive Thought, in which we proceed from something 
given or allowed to something else derived from it. It 
implies a process, which must have laws. In order to 
construct the science of Logic, we must endeavour to 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 341 

gather the laws of thought, by a careful observation of 
the operations of thought. 

Kant has a twofold division of the science, as Logic 
of the universal or of the particular use of the under- 
standing. " The first contains the absolutely necessary 
" laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the 
" understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to 
M the understanding, without regard to the difference of 
" objects on which it may be employed. The Logic of 
" the particular use of the understanding contains the 
" laws of correct thinking upon a particular class of 
objects" (Kritik of Pare Reason, Meiklejohn's trans., 
p. 46). This language is not unexceptionable, more 
particularly as pointing to laws independent of the ob- 
servation of objects ; and it is doubtful whether Kant, 
in consistency with his account of the science, which 
" makes abstraction of all content of the cognition, that 
is, of all relation of cognition to its object" (lb. p. 49), 
could adopt such a division. But if we take the proper 
view of thought, as always engaged with objects, then 
we can accept and justify the arrangement. We have, 
first, a Universal, or, as I prefer calling it, a Primary 
Logic (identical with what is commonly designated 
Formal Logic), conversant with the laws of thought, not 
independent of objects, but ivhatever be the objects. We 
have, secondly, a Particular, or, as I would call it, 
Secondary Logic, considering the operations of thought 
as directed to particular classes of objects, say to intui- 
tive perceptions, as in Demonstration; and the collection 
of scattered facts, external or internal, as in Induction. 



342 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS': 

Under the first head Logic treats of Simple Appre- 
hension, Judgment, and Seasoning, which, no doubt, all 
look to objects, but are the same for all objects. It has 
to consider, first, our apprehensions. Some of these are 
of objects singular and concrete, what we may call Per- 
cepts, as being immediately perceived by the mind. 
Some of them, again, are of Abstracts, or parts considered 
as parts of a whole, more particularly of attributes of 
objects. Others are of Concepts, or of things having 
common attributes, and joined in a class which em- 
braces all the objects possessing the attributes. All 
Concepts have both Extension and Comprehension. 
Logic does not deal immediately with the formation of 
Percepts, which are intuitive ; but it evolves the 
laws involved in the construction of Abstracts and Con- 
cepts. In Judgment we compare two of these Per- 
cepts, Abstracts, or Concepts. This process also has 
laws, such as, when the things compared are Abstracts 
the relation is one of identity or of equivalence ; and, 
when there is a general notion the relation is both of 
Comprehension and Extension. There are also laws 
involved in Eeasoning, in which we compare two of our 
apprehensions by means of a third. These are derived 
very much from the nature of the apprehensions com- 
pared. Thus, in cases in which we compare Abstracts, 
the regulating principle is that of identity or equality, 
" things which are the same with a third, or equal to a 
third, are the same with, or equal to one another." But 
when there is a class -notion involved — and there is so 
wherever there is attribution, — then we must proceed ac- 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 343 

cording to the class -notion, and the regulating principle 
is, ' whatever is predicated of a class may be predicated of 
all that is contained in that class.' TThile these are the 
main ruling principles involved in all cases of reasoning, 
there may also be other principles implied in all cases, 
or in special cases. Thus the principle of whole and 
parts is involved when we include an individual in a 
class, or a species in a genus. The Comprehension of 
the Xotion is to be taken aloncr with us, when we trans- 
late reasoning in Extension, so as to make Comprehen- 
sion the uppermost thought. A principle of Division, 
that the co-ordinate sub-classes must make up the class, 
is involved in all Disjunctive Seasoning : thus when 
we argue that this man, being either a knave or a fool, 
and not being a fool, must be a knave, it is implied 
that knave and fool make up the class to which this man 
must belong. 

Taking this view of Logic, we do not separate it so 
entirely from realities as the scholastic logicians did, 
and as the Kantian logicians still do. It has not, in- 
deed, to do with things directly. Many of Mr. Mill's 
discussions would lead us to think that it has, and we 
are thus involved in questions which can be settled 
only by the sciences — material or mental, — which deal 
with objects. Logic has to do not with objects, but 
with thought as directed to objects. This account makes 
it quite competent for Logic to consider not only Appre- 
hension, Judgment, and Eeasoning, which are the same 
for all objects, but also Thought as directed to parti- 
cular classes of objects. The great body of thinkers in 



344 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS: 

modem times have felt that Logic ought to embrace 
other topics besides those treated of in Formal Logic, 
in particular that it ought not to exclude the Method of 
investigation propounded by Bacon. The exposition I 
have given makes it include not only Induction but 
other modes of discovering truth. 

It may consider thought as proceeding in the way of 
Demonstration. Here all that is assumed in start- 
ing, and all that is assumed throughout, must be seen to 
be true intuitively. The Method of Investigation is 
what I call the Joint Dogmatic and Deductive. It is 
Dogmatic, in that it assumes ; but then it should assume 
only what is seen to be true on the bare contemplation 
of the nature of objects. It is Deductive, in that it 
derives other truths from these assumptions by a pro- 
cess of reasoning. But this Method is applicable only 
within a very limited range, only so far as we have an 
immediate intuition of the nature of things. In most 
walks of investigation Demonstration is not available. 
What we have before us are individual and scattered 
facts, falling under the senses or the consciousness. It 
is out of these that we must gather the law. So far as 
we observe and co-ordinate the facts with the view of 
rising to their law, whether this be a class, or a cause, 
or the constitution of compound objects, the Method 
pursued is the Inductive. In this process we gather the 
facts and tabulate them, and, without 'anticipating' 
nature, we allow the facts to suggest the law, which is 
accepted only when it embraces and explains all the 
facts. But as science advances, by this method we 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 345 

reach laws, which may he regarded as at least provision- 
ally established, and we inquire — in certain departments 
with the powerful aid of Mathematics — what conse- 
quences would follow from these laws ? Another, and a 
very powerful Method, now becomes applicable. I call 
it the Joint Inductive and Deductive, in which we in- 
quire what results must follow from certain supposed 
laws, and then compare these with facts got by observa- 
tion or experiment. In all our advanced sciences this 
must now be the principal mode of investigation. 

I am inclined to think that Whately is right when 
he represents Logic as both a Science and an Art. It 
is a science, inasmuch as it is a systematized body of 
natural truth. It is reared by the observation and co- 
ordination of the spontaneous operations of discursive 
thought. But it may also become an art, or a body of 
precepts drawn out to enable us to accomplish a par- 
ticular end, that is, to think correctly, and expose con- 
fused thought or invalid reasoning;-. It should aim at 
nothing less than the discovery of the laws of thought 
operating in the mind as it contemplates objects. When 
Ave have accurately apprehended and expressed them, 
we may then apply them to test and correct actual 
thought. For this purpose we may derive from them 
rules, and put these in various formulae, which admit 
of a ready and useful application to our everyday think- 
ing, and to scientific investigation. In particular, Logic 
is of great use in clearing our notions ; it shows what 
notions are singular and what universal ; what concrete 
and what abstract ; and guards us against using a general 



3-16 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS : 

term as if it were a singular concrete. It cannot tell 
us what judgments are true and what false (this must 
be done by the departments of knowledge which deal 
with objects), but it tells us what is the precise relation 
between the Percepts, Abstracts, and Concepts com- 
pared, and thus places our notions in such a light that 
we are better able to say whether a given proposition is 
true or false. Again, the syllogistic analysis lets us see 
that in reasoning we have to look to the relation of 
three notions, Percepts, Abstracts, or Concepts ; and 
that when one of the notions is a Concept, we always 
need by implication a general proposition ; and the 
formulas derived from this analysis unfold the various 
possible forms of reasoning, and enable us to test our 
own inferences and those of others. In the Secondary 
(but not less important) Logic, there can be tests laid 
down, such as those of self- evidence, necessity, and 
catholicity, sufficient to decide readily and certainly 
what truths are intuitive, and so entitled to become 
assumptions in Demonstration ; while the processes of 
deduction from intuitive truth may all be tested by the 
syllogism. The Canons of Causes enunciated by Mr. 
Mill settle for us, when we are entitled to argue that we 
have discovered the cause of a given phenomenon ; and 
I hope that in due time we shall have Canons of Decom- 
position and Canons of Classes, to determine when we 
have reached the elementary constitution of bodies 
(provisionally), and when we have discovered natural 
classes. We have already some Canons of Historical 
Investigation to aid us in finding whether the evidence 



THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC. 347 

is sufficient to establish the alleged facts, and these 
Canons should be adopted into Logic, and made as suc- 
cinct and comprehensive as possible. Logic has thus a 
wide and most important field as an art ; it furnishes 
guiding rules and tests in every path of inquiry. It is 
thus fulfilling some of the old pretensions made in its 
behalf. I do not like the phrase, ' Art of Thinking,' for 
men think spontaneously, without any science or art ; 
but Logic supplies rules to guard against confused and 
erroneous thinking. It is in a special sense the ' Science 
of Method ;' that is, of the Method to be pursued in 
discovering scientific and historical truth. It is the 
' Science of Sciences,' not because superior to other 
departments of knowledge, but because it supplies rules 
to guide and guard in every other science. 



CHAPTEK XIX. 

WHAT IS TRUTH ? CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 

It is very evident that Mr. Mill has a pleasure in 
seeing himself and his opinions reflected in the convic- 
tions and writings of young men. On the other side, 
the youth who give themselves up to his guidance seem 
as if they could look only straight before them in the 
path in which he leads them, and as if they were in- 
capable of taking a comprehensive view of things lying 
on either side. As, however, they will be obliged to do so 
sooner or later, it might be as well if they now stopped 
for a little, in order to look round them and inquire 
whither he is leading, and where he is to leave them ? 
"What have we left us according to this new philosophy ? 
We have sensations ; we have a series of feelings aware 
of itself, and permanent, or rather prolonged ; and we 
have an association of sensations, and perceived resem- 
blances, and possibilities of sensations. The sensations 
and associations of sensation generate ideas and beliefs, 
which do not, however, either in themselves or their 
.mode of formation, guarantee any reality. W T e have an 
idea of an external material world ; but Mr. Mill does 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 349 

not affirm that there is such a world, for there are laws 
of the series of feelings which would produce the idea, 
whether the thing existed or not ; and our belief in it 
may be overcome, — just as our natural belief in the sun 
rising is made to give way before the scientific convic- 
tion that it is the earth that moves. He thinks he is 
able by a process of inference to reach the existence of 
other beings besides ourselves. But the logic of the 
process is very doubtful. I believe that neither Mr. 
Mill nor any other has been able to show how from 
sensations, individual or associated, we could ever legiti- 
mately infer the existence of anything beyond. "What 
he claims to have found is, after all, only other ' series 
of feelings.' 

But have we not, it is said, a body of scientific truth, 
for which Mr. Mill has done as much as any living man, 
by showing how it may be best arranged. I acknow- 
ledge that in the view of those who believe in the reality 
of things, and who further believe in a Gocl who made 
and arranged, and still upholds them, this systematized 
truth is a glorious body, — like the sun itself, with a 
central solidity which keeps it firm, while it holds other 
bodies circling round it, and with a gloriously illumi- 
nated atmosphere, scattering light and heat all around. 
But what is all this when interpreted in philosophic 
accuracy ? It is simply possibilities of sensations, 
coming in groups, and in regular succession, and with 
resemblances which can be noticed. And is this the 
sum of what has been gained by the highest science of 
the nineteenth century ? As we contemplate it, do we 



350 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

not feel as if the solid heart of truth and the radiating 
light were both gone, and as if we had left only a series 
of systematic vibrations in an unknown ether ? Does 
this satisfy the convictions and the longings of man ? 
Does not the intelligence declare that it has something 
deeper than this ? Does not the heart crave for some- 
thing higher than this ? And when the youths, who 
are led on so pleasantly by the clear enunciations of Mr. 
Mill, stop at any time to inquire what he has given 
them, must they not feel that they are, after all, in 
darkness, with only a camera obscura displaying figures 
before them, always according to sternly scientific laws ? 
If they are satisfied with this, are they not in the act 
abnegating the deeper capacities, and refusing to follow 
the higher aspirations of their souls, which, for want 
of proper exercise, will become dry, and shrunk, and 
withered ? And if they are not satisfied — as our higher 
minds will certainly not be, — how piteous must be the 
wail of disappointment and anguish coming from the 
depths of their bosoms, as they crave for truth on the 
one hand, and feel that they can never catch it on the 
other ? I do fear for the consequences, when our pro- 
mising youths awake, and in despair of attaining truth, 
are tempted to plunge into deeper and yet deeper dark- 
ness. Fortunately such a state of things — the deeper 
instincts of human nature being so strong — cannot con- 
tinue for any length of time ; and however lamentable 
may be the experience and history of individuals, the 
hour of thickest darkness will be found to excite the 
cry for the returning light. 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 351 

" By nature/' says Aristotle, " man is competently 
" organized for truth ; and truth in general is not beyond 
" his reach." Truth is usually defined as the agreement 
of our ideas, or apprehensions, with things. Profound 
thinkers have assumed, or laboured to prove, that, on the 
one hand, man has ideas ; that, on the other hand, there 
are things ; and that man can reach ideas which cor- 
respond with things. Let us inquire ay hat view must 
be taken of truth by those who follow out Mr. Mill's 
system to its consequences ? 

Mr. Mill acknowledges that we have ideas. But he 
takes great pains to show that these originate in sensa- 
tions, and grow out of sensations, according to the laws 
of the association of sensations. I am not sure whether 
he acknowledges the existence of material things out of, 
and independent of, sensations. He often uses language 
which seems to imply that he does ; but his system all 
tends the other way. This is certain, that even if body 
exists we can never know anything of it, except as " the 
possibility of sensations." All that we know of objects 
is the sensations which they give us, and the order of 
the occurrence of those sensations. " There is not the 
" slightest reason for believing that what we call the 
" sensible qualities of the object are a type of anything 
" inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its own nature. 
" A cause does not, as such, resemble its effects ; an east 
" wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor is heat like the 
" steam of. boiling water : why then should matter 
" resemble our sensations ? " {Logic, I. ill. 7). Then as 
to the internal world : all that we know of it is a series 



352 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

of feelings, with a prolongation in time, which again is 
identical with a series of muscular sensations (supra, 
p. 133). I suppose he would further say — though I do 
not remember any passage in which he does say it, — 
that we do not know what is the nature of these sensa- 
tions. As things are thus unknown, and must be un- 
known with our present faculties, and in the condition 
in which we are placed, so man seems to be precluded 
from reaching any truth beyond the consciousness of 
present sensations, and the possibility of other sensations. 
But some have defined truth as the accordance, not 
of our own ideas with things, but of our ideas with one 
another. This is a view which I do not think worth 
the pains of defending. It is quite compatible with the 
existence of a universal system of delusion and deception, 
provided always that this system were consistent with 
itself. Give a mathematician such a false assumption 
as that matter attracts other matter inversely according 
to the distance (and not the square of the distance), and 
he might construct from it an imaginary world, every 
part of which would be in agreement with every other, 
but no part in accordance with the reality of things. 
It is imaginable that the truth which man discovers is 
all of this description : a consistency between an un- 
founded hypothesis, and the results following from it 
according to the laws of our ideas. Some ideal philo- 
sophers would be content with such a view of truth. 
But then they think that this consistency is given by 
the laws of reason, and that man can actually reach 
truth, not it may be in congruity with phenomenal things, 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 353 

but, with the principles of reason — some of them would 
say absolute and eternal reason. But truth thus under- 
stood is, according to our author's system, quite as much 
beyond the reach of man as truth in the other sense. 
For any accordance that there may be between our 
ideas might be produced, not by independent reason, or 
consequential reasoning, but by the association of ideas, 
by the laws of contiguity or resemblance. When two 
phenomena have been very often experienced in con- 
junction, and have not, in any single instance, occurred 
separately, either in experience or in thought : " When 
" the bond between the two ideas has thus been firmly 
" riveted, not only does the idea, called up by association, 
" become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the idea 
" which suggested it, but the facts or phenomena answer- 
" ing to these ideas come at last to seem inseparable in 
" existence : things which we are unable to conceive 
" apart appear incapable of existing apart" (p. 191). 
Thus 2 and 2 having been associated in our experience 
with 4, we give them a relation in the nature of things ; 
but if 2 and 2 had been followed by the appearance of 
5, we should have had a like assurance of 2 + 2 and 5 
being equal. Truth in Mr. Mill's philosophy is not 
even a logical or rational consistency between ideas ; it 
can be nothing more than an accordance of our ideas 
with sensations, and laws of the association of sensation ; 
which sensations come we know not whence, and are 
associated by resemblances, existing we know not how, 
or, more frequently by contiguity, implying no relation 
of reason, no connexion in the nature of things ; and 



354 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

very possibly altogether fortuitous, or absolutely fatal- 
istic. 

We see now the issues in which the doctrine of the 
relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr. Mill, lands us. 
The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid and Apol- 
lonius and Newton may hold good only within our ex- 
perience, and "a reasonable distance beyond." The 
mathematics taught in Cambridge may differ in their 
fundamental principles from those taught in the corre- 
sponding university of the planet Jupiter ; where two 
and two may make five, where two straight lines may 
enclose a space, and where the three angles of a triangle 
may be more than two right angles. Mr. Mill is ex- 
ceedingly indignant at Dr. Mansel for maintaining that 
the Divine morality is not to be measured by human 
morality, declaring that " it is simply the most morally 
pernicious doctrine now current" (p. 90). But I can 
discover no ground on which the rebuker can stand, in 
pronouncing such a judgment on Dr. Manser's applica- 
tion of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. Any 
one with half the acuteness of Dr. Mansel could show 
that if two and two may make five, it is also suppos- 
able that lying may be a virtue, and veracity a vice, in 
other worlds ; and that God (if there be a God) may 
commend deceit in the constellation of the Plough, even 
as He encourages truthfulness in our world ; and this 
doctrine, I rather think, is quite as " morally per- 
nicious" as any now current, and certainly much more 
so than that entertained by Dr. Mansel, who holds 
resolutely (whether consistently or not) by an absolute 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 355 

morality, which does not change with times or circum- 
stances. 1 

Some represent Mr. Mill as falling back upon the 
position of Berkeley. And I suppose we may reckon 
Mr. Mill as favouring all the negative statements of 
Berkeley ; hut he has discarded all those grand views 
and elevating sentiments which render Iris system so 
attractive to certain minds. No consistent thinker can 
stay at the place taken up by the Irish metaphysician ; 
he had to give way before the Scotch one, — who used 
the arguments against the independent existence of 
matter, to undermine our belief in the independent 
existence of mind. 2 Our author's system, both in its 

1 " We can point to a doctrine which cannot be less morally pernicious 
than Mr. Mansel's, than which none indeed can be more morally pernicious." 
" If in some other world two and two may make five ; in some other 
world what we regard as virtue may be vice, and our wrong may come 
forth there as right" {London Quarterly Revietv, Jan. 1866). A very able 
contributor to that periodical has anticipated Mr. Mill in many of his ob- 
jections to Hamilton's philosophy, but rejects Mr. Mill's philosophy as a 
substitute. 

2 Some are looking with extreme anxiety to the course which the pupils 
of Hamilton may adopt at this crisis in the history of philosophic thought. 
It is clear, from their published writings, that Dr. Cairns and Dr. Calder- 
wood will be prepared to defend natural realism, and the veracity of our 
native convictions. But what line is to be taken by those who occupy 
chairs of philosophy, and have students under them ? I am convinced that 
they cannot now stand where their illustrious master endeavoured to 
stand,— half way between Reid and Kant — between realities and forms. 
Are they to fall back on an intuitive perception of things and necessary 
truth ? Or, abandoning the position taken by Hamilton, and defended by 
him in many a brave fight, are they to betake themselves to the lines occu- 
pied by Kant or by Berkeley, and which have been found so utterly un- 
tenable ? If they take the latter course, it will be seen by every shrewd 
observer that they cannot stand one hour before the keen play of Mr. 
Mill's musketry, or Mr. Spencer's heavier artillery. Those of their pupils 
who may try to stand on the sliding-scale, will only thereby be made to 
fall more rapidly to the base — where the school of Mill will welcome 
them. 



356 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

premisses and conclusion, has many striking analogies 
to that of Hume. Does the one begin with sensations, 
these are very much the same as the impressions of the 
other. The later metaphysician is only following the 
elder, in labouring to show we get our ideas out of 
sensations and impressions, by means of association. 
They concur in not knowing very well what to make of 
time and space ; but neither allows them any separate 
reality. Both hold that there is no such thing as sub - 
stance ; that all we can know of mind is, that it is a 
bundle of states or a series of feelings, to which we give 
some sort of unity or permanence, not justifiable by 
reason or any higher principle; and that body is an 
unknown something, from which we suppose we get our 
sensations. Both deny that we have any intuitive 
conviction as to cause and effect ; and both make the 
relation between these to consist in invariable or uncon- 
ditional conjunction, within the limits of experience. 
Both admit some sort of original power : Hume stands 
up for innate instincts ; and Mr. Mill for an ultimate 
belief in memory ; and it should be added that neither 
knows very well what to make of these inborn princi- 
ples. Both derive our motives originally from sensations 
of pleasure and pain ; and both, it is well known, were 
clear and eloquent expounders of the utilitarian theory 
of morals. Nor is it unworthy of being mentioned, that 
both point not unobscurely to changes, which they think 
ought to be made, in the marriage relation. It should 
be admitted, that with these prominent points of corre- 
spondence there are also points of difference. Hume's 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 357 

account of the relations which the mind of man can dis- 
cover, is much more comprehensive than that of Mill. 
On the other hand, it is pleasant to find that the writer 
of this century assumes a higher moral tone than the 
writer of the last ; both, however, concurring in over- 
looking or despising the special Christian graces. But 
the main difference lies in this, that Hume discovers 
flagrant contradictions in human intelligences ; whereas 
the other maintains that the most certain principles 
reached by us, being all the product of circumstances, 
might have to give way before new circumstances or in 
other conditions. Hume had to say, that " the intense 
" view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections 
" in human reason has so wrought upon me and heated 
" my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and 
" reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more 
" probable or likely than another." The modern author 
is saved from all such contradictions ; for if one set of 
experiences showed him that two and two make four, and 
another that two and two make five, he would proclaim 
both true in the different conditions. The consequence 
is, that the one is an avowed sceptic or professed pyrrho- 
nist — at least in many parts of his writings — delighting 
to play off one dogmatist against another ; whereas the 
other is a supporter of the doctrines of nescience and 
relativity, holding that we can never reach truths which 
may not be modified or set aside in other times and cir- 
cumstances. I am not sure which of the issues is the 
more blank : I rejoice that I do not feel myself required 
to make a choice between them. 



358 WHAT IS TRUTH? 

I hold that human intelligence begins with truth, 
and if it proceeds properly it ends with truth ; which 
may at times be mysterious, but never contradictory ; 
which may be indefinitely enlarged, but cannot be up- 
turned or reversed. In the course of these discussions 
we have gathered the means of trying the supposed 
verities proffered for our acceptance. There is to us no 
one absolute criterion of all truth ; but there are tests 
of the various kinds of truth, both of those with which 
we start, and of those which we reach in our progress. 
Of Intuition itself we have tests in self- evidence, neces- 
sity, and universality. Of Eeasoning we have stringent 
tests in the forms of the syllogism. By these two com- 
bined we can try Demonstration, which consists in a 
union of intuition and deduction. We have tests, too, 
of truths reached in physical, in psychological, and in 
historical investigation, by the - Collection of Facts. 
These are to be found in the Canons of Induction and 
in the Canons of Verification ; which we may confi- 
dently expect to be more and more perfected in their 
formalization and expression as the separate depart- 
ments of knowledge make progress. 

It is admitted that these criteria demand that we 
leave unanswered many questions which the questioning 
mind of man can put. Whatever alleged truth cannot 
stand such tests should be regarded as unsettled, and 
allowed to lie for the present in the land of darkness. 
As we use the criteria we shall be led to see that there 
are very stringent limits set to man's power of acquiring 
knowledge. But we shall see at the same time how wide 



CRITERIA OF TRUTH. 359 

is the field of inquiry, and even of certainty, thrown 
open to us. Geology can carry us back in the history 
of our earth to periods removed from us by millions of 
years. Astronomy, aided by mathematics, lets us know 
of the existence of bodies millions of miles away ; and, 
aided by chemistry, gives us an insight into the com- 
position of the atmosphere of a body so far removed 
from us as the sun. Nor is it to be forgotten that, by 
the observation of the evidences of design in nature, 
combined with the principle of cause and effect, and our 
moral convictions, we can rise to a most reasonable belief 
in the existence of an Almighty and All-Perfect God. 
Man should ever claim this wide field as an inheritance, 
and allow no one, on any pretence, to deprive him of it. 
And having such an inheritance he should be glad and 
grateful, — the more so as, attending always to the tests 
appointed to guide and guard, he can indefinitely widen 
and extend his possessions. 



CHAPTEE XX. 

UTILITARIANISM. 

In specifying the influences under which Mr. Mill's 
opinions were formed, I might have referred to Jeremy 
Bentham and his utilitarian theory, as having not a 
little swayed the opinions of the young thinker, either 
directly, or indirectly through his father, who was a 
friend of Bentham's. But in this treatise I meant to 
look more to Mr. Mill's general philosophic system than 
his specially ethical views ; and however eminent as a 
jurist, Bentham had no name as a metaphysician. Our 
author's philosophy is essentially a combination of that 
of Mr. James Mill and of M. Comte, — however, the 
utilitarianism of the older Mill and of Bentham 
thoroughly fits into the system. It would require a 
volume instead of a chapter to discuss historically, 
psychologically, and ethically the utilitarian theory. 
We can touch here only on a few points intimately 
connected with the preceding discussions. 

I. Can Mr. Mill's psychological theory account for 
the peculiar idea and conviction which we have in 
regard to moral srood and evil? He admits that the 



UTILITARIANISM. 361 

mature man in the advanced stages of society has a 
conscience and moral ideas : let us inquire how he 
generates them. And first, let us try to ascertain what 
he makes the original motive powers or springs of action 
in the mind of man. " The utilitarian doctrine is, that 
" happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as 
" an end" (p. 51). It is clear that he makes, as every 
other philosopher does, the desire of personal pleasure 
a primary motive to action. But I am not sure whether 
he makes the desire of promoting the happiness of other 
beings also an originating appetence in man. There- 
are passages which look as if he did, or at least wished 
to be regarded as doing so. In rearing his theory he is 
ever appealing to " the social feelings of mankind ; " 
and he maintains with Bentham, that man is urged to 
the ' greatest happiness' principle both " by interest and 
sympathy" (pp. 45, 47). " The idea of the pain of 
" another is naturally painful ; the idea of the plea- 
" sure of another is naturally pleasure" (Dis., p. 137). 
I am sure that the great British moralists who lived 
at the beginning of last century, have succeeded 
in demonstrating that man is riot in his nature and 
constitution an utterly selfish being, but is capable 
of being swayed by a desire to promote the welfare 
of others ; and the arguments of Shaftesbury, Hutche- 
son, and Butler have been repeated and strengthened by 
the Scottish school of philosophers generally, including 
Beid, Stewart, and Brown, and by M. Cousin, and the 
Eclectic school of France. But these writers have 
shown that the same facts and arguments which lead 



362 UTILITARIANISM. 

us to admit an original principle of sympathy, require 
us also to call in a cognitive and a motive moral power. 
He allows as a psychological fact that virtue may 
become " a good in itself, without looking to any end 
beyond it," and that the mind is not in a right state 
unless it love virtue " as a thing desirable in itself" 
(p. 53). In indignantly repelling the objections of Dr. 
Sedgwick, he maintains, " It is a fact in human nature 
" that we have moral judgments and moral feelings. We 
" judge certain actions and dispositions to be right, 
" others wrong : this we call approving and disapproving 
" them. We have also feelings of pleasure in the con- 
" templation of the former class of actions and disposi- 
" tions — feelings of dislike and aversion to the latter ; 
" which feelings, as everybody must be conscious, do not 
" exactly resemble any other of our feelings of pain or 
" pleasure. Such are the phenomena ; concerning their 
" reality there, is no dispute." He then seeks to account 
for the phenomena by his famous principle of the 
chemistry of the association of ideas. " The only colour 
" for representing our moral judgments as the result of 
" a peculiar part of our nature, is that our feelings of 
" moral approbation and disapprobation are really 
" peculiar feelings. But is it not notorious that peculiar 
" feelings, unlike any others we have experience of, are 
" created by association every day?" (Dis. pp. 139, 140.) 
He instances the desire of power, the feelings of ambi- 
tion, of envy, of jealousy, and of the miser towards his 
gold. Now, as to some of these appetencies, I believe 
them to be natural. We see them working strongly in 



UTILITARIANISM. 363 

certain individuals, showing that they are elements of 
their inborn character. We see them descending here- 
ditarily from father or mother, to son or daughter or 
grandchild ; and we find them stronger in certain 
families and races than in others. As the love of power 
is a native appetence by which men may be swayed, 
surely the conscience and the felt obligation to do that 
which is right may be the same. 

But our present question is one not so much of mere 
appetency or desires as of moral perceptions, judgments, 
and sentiments. I grant that persons may be led by mere 
prudence to attend to the duties of an outward morality, 
and by a kindly disposition to relieve distress, altogether 
irrespective of a moral sense. But there is a very 
special obligation felt in regard to those actions which we 
call moral, and which does not bear on other parts of our 
conduct ; we are convinced that we ought to attend to 
them, and that if we neglect to do so our conduct is blame- 
worthy. Whence the very peculiar and profound ideas 
denoted by the phrases ' obligation/ ' ought/ ' blame- 
worthy.' Take the perception of conscience, that deceit 
is a sin. Take the conviction, that we are not at liberty 
to tell a lie when we might be tempted to do so. Take 
the judgment, that the person who has committed the 
act is guilty, eondemnable, punishable. Take the feel- 
ing of remorse, which rises when we contemplate our- 
selves as having told a falsehood. We have here a series 
of mental phenomena quite as real and quite as worthy 
of being looked at, as our very sensations, or beliefs of 
the reality of the past in memory, or our expectation of 



364 UTILITARIANISM. 

the future. I am convinced that as these last are ad- 
mitted to be ultimate (see p, a, t), so are the others 
also. " This instinct/' says Isaac Taylor, " flushes in 
" the cheek of every sensitive child, and it prevails 
" over the laborious sophistications of the philosopher. 
" This belief is cherished as an inestimable jewel by the 
" best and purest of human beings ; and it is bowed to 
" in dismay by the foulest and the worst ; its rudiments 
" are a monition of eternal truth, whispered in the ear of 
" infancy ; its articulate announcements are a dread fore- 
" doom ringing in the ears of the guilty adult. You say 
" you can bring forward a hundred educated men, who, 
" at this time, will profess themselves to be no believers 
" in a moral system ; but I will rebut their testimony 
" by the spontaneous and accordant voices of as many 
" millions of men as you may please to call for on the 
" other side." 

I have already examined the general theory which 
generates a new idea by means of an association of 
sensations, and have shown how little truth there is 
in it (pp. 180-186). Give us mere sensations, say of 
sounds, or colours, or forms, or of pleasure and pain, 
and they will never be anything else in the reproduc - 
tion of them than the ideas of sounds, colours, forms, 
pleasures, or pains, — unless, indeed, there be some new 
power introduced, and this new element in itself, or in 
conjunction with the sensations, be fitted to produce a new 
idea, and that very idea. In none of its applications is 
the theory seen to fail so utterly, as in the attempt thus 
to produce our moral perceptions. Provided we once 



UTILITARIANISM. 365 

had the ideas, the laws of association might show how 
they could be brought up again ; how in the reproduc- 
tion certain parts might sink into shadow and neglect, 
while others came forth into prominence and light ; and 
how the whole feeling, by the confluence of different 
ideas, might be wrought into a glow of intensity ; but 
the difficulty of generating the ideas, such ideas, ideas so 
full of meaning, is not thereby surmounted. The idea 
I have of pain is one thing, and the idea I have of 
deceit, that it is morally evil, condemnable, deserving of 
pain, is an entirely different thing — our consciousness 
being witness. On the supposition that there is a 
chemical power in association to create such ideas as 
those of duty and merit, sin and demerit, this chemical 
power would be a native moral power ; not the product 
of sensations, but a power above them, and adapted to 
transmute them from the baser into the golden sub- 
stance. 

It will be needful at this place to correct a misappre- 
hension into which Mr. Mill has fallen. He repre- 
sents the intuitive school of morals as holding that 
" the principles of morals are evident a priori" (p. 3). 
Now I admit that influential members of the school 
have used language fitted to warrant this statement. 
But there are others, and these the wisest defenders of 
intuition, who have given a different account. Our in- 
tuitions are perceptions of individual objects or in- 
dividual truths ; and in order to reach an axiom or 
" principle of morals," there is need of a discursive pro- 
cess of generalization. Our author makes the intuitive 



366 UTILITARIANISM. 

agree with the inductive school, in holding that " the 
" morality of an individual action is not a question of 
" direct perception, but of the application of law to an 
" individual case." The proper account is that the law 
is generalized out of our direct perceptions. On the bare 
contemplation of an ungrateful spirit, the conscience at 
once declares it to be evil, apart from the conscious 
apprehension or application of any general principle. 
The enunciation of the law is a reflective and not a 
spontaneous process, and is undertaken when we wish 
to construct a code of morals or a science of ethics. 
This representation saves the intuitive theory of morals 
from many of the specious objections urged against a 
different version. Our moral intuitions are not a priori 
forms, which the mind imposes on objects, but imme- 
diate perceptions of qualities in certain objects, that is, 
in the voluntary dispositions and actions of intelligent 
beings. Taking this view of them, I believe they can 
stand the tests which settle what truth is intuitive. 
They are self-evident : on the simple apprehension of 
disinterested love we declare it to be good and com- 
mendable. They may be described, if we properly 
explain the statement, as necessary: give us a correct 
representation of a deed of intentional deceit for a selfish 
end, and we condemn, and cannot be made to commend 
it. They have, in a sense, even catholic consent 
in their favour : all men will condemn deceit if it is 
properly laid before them, but the deceit may be so 
painted as that we do not see its true nature, and 
then we give our approval, — not of the deceit, but of its 



UTILITARIANISM. 367 

accompaniments. Mankind can be so deceived as to 
give diverse judgments on moral actions, only by the 
blinding influence of sin, disguising and distorting the 
real nature of things. 

II. Does utilitarianism embrace sufficient sanctions 
to induce us to approve virtue and condemn vice ? 
Our author labours to show that the motives usually 
supposed to lead to virtue are left untouched by this 
theory. But this is not the question, the main question ; 
and if any defender of a priori morals had been guilty 
of such an ignoratio elenchi, we can conceive that the 
acute logician would have exposed it with extraordinary 
zest. The question is not about sanctions which other 
systems may employ, but it is, Does utilitarianism con- 
tain within itself a body of motives, or motive powers, 
fitted to lead to virtuous conduct ? If it does not, if it 
is obliged to make us look elsewhere for motives, then 
it is without one of the essential constituents of an 
adequate theory of morals. Utilitarianism bids us seek 
to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number. ' But why should I strive to attain this end V 
asks the inquiring youth. Practically, and in reference 
to his future conduct, theoretically, and as interested in 
the science of ethics, he insists on a reply. 'Why 
should I give up my immediate ease and comfort and 
expected enjoyments, and restrain my strong native 
impulses and indulged habits in order to look after 
others, who may be quite able to look after them- 
selves?' 'Or why, at the best, may I not content 
myself with attending to the feelings and immediate 



368 UTILITARIANISM. 

wishes of the few persons in my family or circle, with 
whose welfare my own is bound up, or of the single 
person to whom I am attached ? ' As he presses these 
questions he will not be satisfied to be told that other 
ethical systems have sanctions, and that utilitarianism 
leaves them where it found them. 

But let us look at those sanctions with which it is 
said the theory does not meddle. AYe may find, as to 
some of the guarantees or sureties to which we are re- 
ferred, that their credit is undermined, and that they are 
rendered bankrupt, by the principles of the new philo- 
sophy. Mr. Mill tells us, that if persons believe that 
there is a God, they may still have the motives derived 
from their religion to induce them to practise morality. 
This starts the question, what religion has our author's 
system left us ? It is clear that utilitarianism deprives 
us of one of the arguments which has been felt by pro- 
found thinkers to carry the greatest weight, that derived 
from the moral law in the heart arguing a moral law- 
giver. Xor is it to be forgotten, that our greatest 
moralists have not been in the way of appealing first to 
the Divine power or will, as a motive to lead us to do 
good, but have rather sought, by the principles of an 
independent morality, to show that we ought to obey 
God. We may omit entering further into this inquiry 
at present, as the whole subject of the relation of Mr. 
Mill's philosophy to natural theology will come to be 
discussed in next chapter. But we must look here at 
some other sanctions which it is supposed utilitarianism 
has left untouched. 



UTILITARIANISM. 369 

" The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard 
" of duty may be, is one and the same, a feeling in our 
" own mind ; a pain more or less intense attendant on 
" violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral 
" natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking 
" from it as an impossibility ; " and " the ultimate sanc- 
" tion, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) 
" being a subjective feeling in our own minds," he thinks 
that utilitarianism has as powerful a sanction as any 
other theory can have (pp. 40, 41). But it is not fair to 
represent those who hold the opposite theory as making 
the ultimate appeal, standard, and sanction, to be in 
" feeling," in mere " subjective feeling," a " feeling of 
pain " attendant on the violation of duty. It cannot be 
said to consist in " feeling," except we use the phrase in 
so wide and loose a sense as to include all mental opera- 
tions, and the native principles of action from which 
they spring. It should not be represented as a mere 
" subjective feeling," for it points to and implies an 
objective reality, a real good and evil in the voluntary 
acts of intelligent beings, independent of our sense of it, 
being in fact the object to which the sense looks. Still 
less should it be regarded as a mere " feeling of pain ; " 
it has been shown again and again by moralists, that the 
feeling of pain rises in consequence of a prior percep- 
tion of the evil of sin. According to our most esteemed 
moralists, the mind, in looking at moral good and evil, 
is exercising a higher attribute than mere feeling or 
emotion. By some it is represented as a Sense looking 
to and discerning a moral quality — as the eye discerns 

2 A 



370 UTILITA RIANISM. 

colour and surface. More frequently it is described as 
Reason, or as analogous to Reason, and the Moral 
Reason, which perceives at once the good and the evil, 
and distinguishes between them, declaring the doing of 
the one and the avoiding of the other to be obligatory 
on all intelligent beings, and the one to be of good 
desert and rewardable, and the other of evil desert and 
punishable ; and the feeling of pleasure or pain is the 
consequent and not the essence of the conviction. 

But then the feeling, which is the essence of con- 
science, is " all encrusted over with collateral associa- 
" tions, derived from sympathy, from love, and still 
" more from fear ; from all the forms of religious feeling ; 
" from the recollections of childhood and of all our past 
" life ; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, 
■' and occasionally even self-abasement." " Its binding 
" force consists in the existence of a mass of feeling, 
: ' which must be broken through in order to do what 
" violates our standard of right, and which, if we do 
" nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have 
"to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse " 
(p. 41). He reckons this complicated feeling as furnish- 
ing quite as strong a sanction, and one quite as likely 
not to be violated, as that which might be awakened by 
a distinct moral faculty. Xow, I concede at once, that 
other and secondary motives may and should gather 
and cling round our primary conviction of duty, to aid 
and strengthen it. But meanwhile, as the centre, and 
in the last resort, as the support of them, there should 
be recognised obligations of morality. The intelligent 



UTILITARIANISM. 371 

youth, when lie comes to rise beyond his educational 
beliefs, and to think for himself, will not be satisfied 
with the mere existence of the mass of feeling ; he will 
ask, Is it justifiable, is it binding ? If satisfied on this 
point, then he will feel himself called on to encourage 
all these associations, and to live under their influence. 
But if not satisfied, if taught they have no obligation in 
reason or the nature of things, then why should he not 
uncoil them, as he does some other hereditary prepos- 
sessions ; or even if he should be inclined to retain 
them, will they not be apt to give way before the strong 
and seductive temptations which are ever assailing him ? 
Let it be observed of many of these associations which 
have been gathered, and sentiments which have been gen- 
dered, that they have been generated in individuals, or 
grown up in a state of society, entertaining and cherish- 
ing the belief that there is an independent rule of duty. 
Such, for example, are our " religious feelings ; " such, 
too, our "remorse;" such our "self-abasement," — they 
arise mainly from the promptings of a conscience, which 
carries with it its own authority and its own sanctions. 
Bemove the support which bears them — as the stake 
bears up the vine — and they will speedily fall, or rather 
will never rise to any height. Let the school beware 
lest, in striving to destroy the inborn sense and native 
perceptions of good and evil, they be not doing as much 
as within them lies to cut down the tree that lias borne 
the fruit ; or, to use a still more familiar image, to kill 
the hen that has laid the golden eggs. And as to the 
" recollections of childhood and of our past lives," and 



372 UTILITA RIA XISM. 

the feelings of " sympathy " and "self-esteem," and " the 
desire of the esteem of others/' these can foster virtuous 
sentiment and lead to virtuous conduct only where 
there is a high moral and religious standard in the family, 
and in the community, and may tend the opposite 
way in other states of society; as, for instance, that 
which existed in ancient Rome in the decline of the 
empire, or among the educated classes in France in the 
age before the Revolution, or which may be found in 
certain circles in Paris at this present time. The vessel, 
which is sailing along gracefully with its present struc- 
ture, may be speedily dissolved and its crew wrecked, 
when a magnet (to refer to a well-known fable) has 
been applied, which draws out the bolts that kept the 
parts together. 

I deny that the two kinds of sanction are on the 
same footing and of equal strength. The one sort is 
derived from a mere agglomeration of feelings, which are 
generated by associations created independently of our 
choice, and mainly by outward contiguities. Some of 
these, such as those mentioned by Mr. Mill, may be 
laudable, and may tend to promote virtuous conduct. 
But others, though arising from like associations, pro- 
duced by the same circumstances, may be of an opposite 
character. Such are the fears which spring from a 
degraded superstition with its horrid ceremonials ; such 
are the animal lusts that may grow up along with a 
purer love ; such are the jealousy, malice, and envy 
gendered by the rivalries of trade and fashion ; such are 
the expectations excited when large pleasure and profit 



UTILITARIANISM. 373 

to ourselves or others may be had by one bold deed of 
selfishness ; and such is the despair awakened when 
there has been a failure in the favourite ends of a man's 
life. These feelings, growing from the same root of 
associations and circumstances, will tend to moral evil 
as the others do to good ; and surely it is of moment to 
have a moral obligation above either, and calling on us 
while we allow the one to disallow the other. How 
vastly inferior must be the sanction supplied by this 
conglomeration of associations to that which the higher 
moral theory furnishes, when it declares that certain 
affections, such as gratitude, and love, and justice, are 
themselves good, and that certain other affections, 
such as ingratitude, and malice, and deceit, are evil in 
their very nature ; that the mind is organized to discern 
the distinction between good and evil, just as it dis- 
covers the difference between truth and error; that 
the moral power by which it does this is not only in 
the mind, but claims to be supreme there ; that it 
implies and points to a God who is the guardian of the 
law, and will call every man to account for the deeds 
done in the body, whether they have been good or 
evil. 

III. Does utilitarianism furnish a sufficient test of vir- 
tuous acts and of virtuous motives ? It tells us that a good 
deed is one tending to promote the greatest happiness 
of the greatest number. But in the complicated affairs 
of this world, the most far-sighted cannot know for cer- 
tain what may be the total consequences of any one 
act ; and the great body of mankind feel as if they were 



374 UTILITARIANISM. 

looking out on a tangled forest, and need a guide to 
direct them. Utilitarian moralists, like Bentham, may 
draw out schemes of tendencies for us ; but the specific 
rules have no obliging authority, and, even when under- 
stood and appreciated, are difficult of application, and 
are ever bringing us into cross avenues into which we 
may be led by self-deceit. With no other standard 
than ultimate tendency, the timid will ever be afraid to 
act as never clearly seeing their way, while the bold will 
ever be tempted at critical junctures, and in order to 
gain ends which are dear to them, and which they have 
identified with the good of their country, — as when 
Julius Caesar crossed the Eubicon, and Louis Xapoleon 
ventured on his coup cTetat, — to commit crimes in the 
name of virtue. I am aware that on any theoretical 
system men will commit sin ; but on this system they 
will commit crimes of the highest order, and justify 
themselves as they do so, on the ground of the great 
advantages to be secured by themselves and others. 

Mr. Mill's defence of the theory proceeds on the 
principle, that there may be a distinction drawn be- 
tween the virtuousness of the act and the virtuousness 
of the agent. " He who saves a fellow-creature from 
" drowning does what is morally right, whether his mo- 
" tive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble ; 
" he who betrays the friend that trusts him, is guilty of a 
" crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to , 
" whom he is under greater obligations" (p. 26). The 
test of a virtuous act is beneficial tendency, but what, is 
the test of the virtuous motive ? Is it, too, beneficial 



UTILITARIANISM. 375 

tendency ? Is the agriculturist who improves the soil, 
so as to make it feed more men and cattle than it did 
before, or the master manufacturer who sets up a large 
public work which gives food to thousands, necessarily 
virtuous, and this in proportion to the good done, and 
though in the depths of his heart he may be influenced 
1 >y no other consideration than the love of gain ? We 
do run a considerable risk in these times of the pre- 
valence of a cosmopolitanism, originating in a deeper 
selfishness, and prosecuted in a spirit of self-righteous- 
ness, and going on to overwhelm and supersede the 
gentler and the humbler private and domestic virtues, 
which our fathers so valued before utilitarianism was 
heard of. But Mr. Mill is too wise a man to make 
beneficial tendency a test of excellence in the agent. 
" The motive has nothing to do with the morality of the 
action, though much with the worth of the agent." He 
tells us that it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian 
mode of thought to conceive it as implying so wide a 
generality as the world or morality at large, and he says 
of M. Comte, that " he committed the error which is 
" often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of 
" utilitarian moralists : he required that the test of con- 
" duct should also be the exclusive motive to it" {Comte 
and Posit., p. 138). It is not very clear what constitutes 
a virtuous agent, according to our author. . The follow- 
ing statement is sufficiently vague, and yet it is the 
clearest I can find on a point which should not be left 
in uncertainty for a moment : " The great majority of 
" good actions are intended not for the benefit of the 



3 7 6 UTILITA RIA NISM. 

" world, "but for that of individuals, of which the good of 
" the world is made up : and the thoughts of the most 
" virtuous man need not on these occasions travel he 
" yond the particular persons concerned, except so far 
" as is necessary to assure himself that in benefiting 
" them he is not violating the rights, that is, the legiti - 
" mate and authorized expectations, of any one else" 
(l >. '2 7). There is some truth here, hut it is surely far from 
being the full truth. The impelling motive of an action 
entitled to be called virtuous is love, leading us to per- 
form that which is right ; that is, according to moral law, 
the law of God. The love is a well- spring ready to 
burst forth, and the law is the channel provided in 
which the stream may flow. Without the love there is 
no virtue ; and without the love regulated by law there is 
in > virtue — in the agent. It is to the credit of M. Comte 
that, separating himself from cold utilitarianism, he- 
reckoned love as of the essence of excellence : but it is 
an evidence of the narrowness and bigotry which so 
distinguished him, that he does not see that he has de - 
rived this principle from Christianity, which he repre- 
sents as deriving all its motives from the selfish fear of 
hell and hope of heaven. 

And what makes an action sinful according to this 
philosophy ? It is still more difficult to find what is the 
answer to that question. Sin is quite as much a fact of 
consciousness and of our moral nature as even virtue. 
' Thou shaft not kill ;' ' Thou shaft not commit adultery;' 
' Thou shaft not steal ;' ' Thou shalt not bear false wit- 
ness,' — these laws are clear, and the violation of them is 



UTILITARIANISM. 377 

sin according- to Scripture, and according to conscience. 
But what is sin according to utilitarianism ? It is 
acknowledged not to be the mere omission to look to 
the general good. What then does it consist in ? Mr. 
Mill speaks of " reproach" being one of the checks on 
evil ; but when is reproach justifiable ? Not knowing 
what to make of sin, the system provides no place for 
repentance. The boundary line between moral good 
and evil is drawn so uncertainly, that persons will ever 
be tempted to cross it without allowing that they have 
done so, — the more so that they are not told what they 
should do when they have crossed it, 

IV. Does utilitarianism embrace all the virtues ? In 
answering this question, it should at once be allowed 
that the system contains an important body of truth ; 
it errs only so far as it professes to embrace and unfold 
the whole of morals. It is a duty devolving on all to 
promote the happiness of their fellows. So far as the 
system recommends this, it can have nothing erroneous, 
— it should be added that it has nothing original. But 
even at this point where it is supposed to be strongest, 
it is found to fail when we narrowly examine it. For 
whence can utilitarianism draw its motive and obliga- 
tion to constrain us to look after the general happiness ? 
He says, " No reason can be given why the general hap- 
" piness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he 
" believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness " 
(p. 52). But it would need more acuteness than even 
Mr. Mill is possessed of to show that this principle re- 
quires us to promote the best interests of others. It is 



378 UTILITARIANISM. 

proper to refer to this here ; but I need not dwell upon 
it, as I have urged it under another head. 

Utilitarianism has a special merit in all questions of 
jurisprudence. The reason can be given. The end of 
legislation is not the maintenance of the law of God, 
but the promotion of the interests of the nation. But 
even in this department a higher morality has a place, 
though only a negative one. The governing power is 
not entitled to enact what is in itself sinful, on the pre- 
tence of adding to the pleasures of the community. 
The people of this country are right in their religious 
and moral instincts when they declare that on no 
pretence whatever should the Government take upon 
itself the licensing of places of prostitution, even on the 
pretence of regulating them, and restraining the evils 
that flow from them. Nor is the magistrate at liberty 
to punish an act unless it be sinful ; for example, he 
would not be justified in punishing a person, who, with- 
out meaning it, had brought infectious disease into a 
city, whereby ten thousand inhabitants had perished ; 
whereas he would be required to inflict a penalty for 
the theft of a very small sum from a rich man who 
never felt the loss. Why the difference ? Plainly be- 
cause the former act is not a sin, that is, implied no 
evil disposition, whereas the other does. But while 
the civil government should punish only when sin has 
been committed, and has thus to look to the moral law, 
it does not punish sin as sin, but as inflicting injustice 
on others, and injurious to the best interests of society. 
The utilitarian theory, as developed by Bentham, has. 



UTILITARIANISM. 379 

consequentially and historically, been the means of 
alleviating the harshness of our penal code, and giving 
a more benignant aspect to legislation generally. 

Mr. Mill has given a contribution to public ethics in 
his treatise on Liberty. The work is stimulating in its 
spirit, but at the same time far from being satisfactory 
in its results. It might have been expected in a re- 
newed discussion on such a subject, after all that has 
been written during the last two centuries, that we 
should have had some principles laid down to guide us 
as to the moral limits to be set to the expression of 
sentiment, and the attempt to create a public feeling 
against what we believe to be evil. A gentleman, let 
me suppose, settles in my neighbourhood, of polite man- 
ners, of cultivated mind, and apparently of general bene - 
ficence. But he has a wife and a mistress, and maintains 
that he is justified in having both, and might allowably 
have more. What is to be my demeanour towards him ? 
Am I to ask him to my house, and introduce him to my 
sons and my daughters ? Am I never to speak against 
him and his conduct, never to warn my family against 
being influenced by his example ? Am I to hasten to 
elect him to places of honour and trust in the parish or 
in the town ? Or, if I decline thus to countenance him, 
am I to be declared intolerant ? Eising beyond such 
personal to public questions, am I not to protest against 
a public evil, and seek to create a public sentiment 
against it ? If I am not at liberty to do this, Mr. Mill 
is laying clown a doctrine of liberty which is interfering 
with my liberty. Such questions as these start points, 



380 UTILITARIANISM. 

on which many anxious to cultivate a spirit, not only 
of toleration, but what is far higher, of charity, are 
anxious to have light, which is not vouchsafed in this 
treatise. 

The spirit which it is fitted to engender is that of 
' individualism ;' and when it has had time to produce 
its proper fruits, it will be found to have raised up a body 
of young men who reckon it a virtue to be peculiar in 
their opinions, and rather commendable to be eccentric. 
The spirit of hero-worship produced indirectly by 
German pantheism, and directly by the writings of 
Carlyle, has happily lost its sway over our young men, 
and is now to be found, in some of the remains of it, 
only among literary gentlemen of respectable middle 
age. But we are sure to be flooded in the coming 
generation with something still more intolerable, in 
ambitious youths each affecting to strike out a path of 
his own, in opinion and sentiment, speculative, practical, 
and religious. This spirit, as it runs to excess, will be 
(juite as deleterious, and will be more foolish and offen - 
sive, than the old habit of subjection to authority or 
reverence for the great. The genuine temper is not a 
prostration before antiquity or before genius on the one 
hand ; but just as little is it a love of novelty or a 
love of change on the other : it is a love of indepen - 
dence, which, believing that truth in all important mat- 
ters is attainable, sets out earnestly in search of it ; not 
rejecting the old because it is old, or accepting the new 
because it is new, but willing to take light from what- 
ever quarter it may come. 



UTILITARIANISM. 381 

While giving to utility an important place, I deny 
that it is the only thing to be looked at as a good, 
as a test, or as a standard. Take the duties we 
owe to God, the love and reverence we should cherish 
towards Him, and the worship we should pay Him in 
private and in public. Surely man's moral nature justi- 
fies him in holding that there are such duties : but on 
what foundation can utilitarianism rest them \ Is it on 
beneficial tendency to the individual or to society I So 
far as the individual is concerned, the salutary influence 
is produced on his spirit only when he pays the ser- 
vice, because it is right. If he is constrained to render 
it from any other motive, it will rather chafe and irri- 
tate, and end in unbelief and rebellion. And as to 
worship paid to God merely for the good of the com- 
munity, it is the very consummation of public hypo- 
crisy — which in the end would deceive no one. Th<- 
defenders of the utilitarian theory, in the form given to 
it by Bentham, have never attempted to build upon it 
a code of religious duties. I believe that any attempt 
of this description would only show that the foundation 
was not broad or deep enough to bear such a super 
structure. The same may be said of not a few of the 
duties we owe to our fellow-men. Take gratitude for 
undeserved favours. I would not choose to found it on 
the mere desire to promote our own happiness or that 
of the person from whom the benefit has come : in order 
to be a virtue, it must spring from a sense of the duty 
we owe to the benefactor. 

There are symptoms of a renewed attempt being made 



382 UTILITARIANISM. 

in our age to construct a morality without a godliness. 
I speak of it as a renewed attempt, for it has been tried 
before. In the second century, when paganism was 
losing its hold of educated minds, and young Christianity 
was advancing with such rapid strides, an attempt was 
made by the Neo -Platonic School of Alexandria to 
construct a theology, and, by the Stoic School of Eome 
a morality, higher than that of the Bible. Every stu- 
dent of history knows how these schemes were soon 
seen to terminate in a humiliating failure. The Neo- 
Platonic ecstasy evaporated into empty air, and the 
Stoic self-sufficiency hardened into offensive pride ; and 
neither offered any effectual resistance to the triumph- 
ant march of a religion suited in every way to the 
wants of man's nature. Analogous projects have been 
devised and are being recommended in our day. For 
some time past the God of the Bible has been repre- 
sented as not sufficiently pure — as being too anthropo- 
morphic ; and mystic thinkers have sought to picture 
to us a God of a more spiritual and ethereal character. 
This style of thinking in Germany has issued from, or 
culminated in, a shadowy pantheism, which, followed 
to its logical and practical consequences — as it will be 
in this country — must identify God with the evil as 
w T ell as with the good, or in fact make evil only a form 
of good. And now it looks as if we are to have persons 
presenting to us a morality higher and broader than that 
of the New Testament. 

After speaking hi very exalted terms of the doctrines 
and precepts of Christ, Mr. Mill asserts " that man}' 



UTILITARIANISM. 383 

" essential elements of the highest morality are among 
" the things which are not provided for, nor intended to 
" be provided for, in the recorded deliverances of the 
" Founder of Christianity, and which have been entirely 
" thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis 
" of those deliverances by the Christian church. And 
" this being so, I think it a great error to persist in at- 
" tempting to find in the Christian doctrine that com- 
" plete rule for our guidance, which its author intended to 
" sanction and enforce, but only partially to provide." " I 
" believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved 
" from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side by 
" side with Christian ethics to produce the moral regene- 
" ration of mankind" {Liberty, pp. 91-92). Now, it may 
be admitted that the precepts of the Word of God do not 
contain specific directions as to what mankind should 
do in the infinitely varied positions in which they may 
be placed. The Christian system first shows the sinner 
how he may be delivered from the burden of past sin, 
which so weighs him clown in his efforts after regenera- 
tion. It then furnishes motives to induce him to per - 
form the duties which devolve upon him. It enjoins, as 
the regulating principle of our conduct, love to God and 
love to man. It lays down many and varied precepts 
as to how we should feel and what we should do, in 
very many and varied situations, and supplies numerous 
warnings against evil, and examples of good. Speaking 
as unto wise men, it leaves the rest to ourselves, to the 
motives which it has called forth, and the royal law 
of love, which is its grand moving and ruling principle. 



384 UTILITARIANISM. 

^\Ir. Mill is not very specific as to what lie supposes 
the code of Christian morality to be deficient in. 
He complains of our " discarding those secular standards 
" (as for want of a better name they may be called) 
" which heretofore co-existed with and supplemented 
" the Christian ethics." But 1 believe this has been pro 
vided for in such passages as these, scattered every 
where : " Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever tilings 
" are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever 
" things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatso 
" ever things are of good report ; if there be any virtue, 
" and if there be any praise, think on these things." 
Narrow Christians may have overlooked some of these 
graces and virtues ; but in order to correct them, we do 
not require to go beyond the Scriptures themselves. 
He fixes on one department of duty which he supposes 
to be neglected in the Word of God, and that is the 
duty we owe to the State : " In the purely Christian 
ethics, that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed 
or acknowledged." I am amazed, I confess, at this 
charge. The history of ancient Israel, recorded in the Old 
Testament, exhibits the most fervent patriotism in every 
page. How nobly does it burst forth in the exclamation 
of the Psalmist, " If I forget thee, Jerusalem," etc. 
Paul has caught the same spirit : " Brethren, my heart's 
desire and prayer for Israel is, that they might be saved." 
We find it burning and flaming in the bosom of our 
Lord himself: "0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would 
" I have gathered thy children together, even as a 
" hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye 



UTILITARIANISM. 385 

" would not." The Word of God requires obedience 
from the subject : " Eender therefore to all their dues ; 
tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, 
fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour." But he 
adds, " It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience ; 
" it inculcates submission to all authorities thought 
" established, who indeed are not to be actively obeyed 
" when they command what religion forbids, but who 
" are not to be resented, far less rebelled against, for 
" any amount of wrong to ourselves." I admit that the 
Bible does not give minute rules as to when subjects may 
claim the right to refuse obedience, — nor do I know of 
any moral code that does. But it prescribes the function 
of governors : " A minister of God to thee for good," 
" sent for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the 
praise of them that do well." I do believe that Chris- 
tians are not at liberty to rebel merely because of wrong 
done to themselves personally. But when the governor 
commands what is evil in itself, when the government 
ceases to fulfil its proper office, Christians have thought 
themselves entitled, always with excessive reluctance, to 
resist, and have drawn their warrant from the Word of 
God. So at least thought the Huguenots of France, and 
the Puritans of England, and the Covenanters of Scot- 
land, and the Bishops at the Bevolution Settlement; and 
their descendants, who have inherited the blessings 
secured through them, have been proud of the example 
they set. 

Mr. Mill and his school have, unfortunately, not drawn 
out this code of morality, which is to be purer and nobler 

2 B 



3S6 UTILITARIANISM. 

than the Christian. But we may gather what it would 
be from occasional statements. With perhaps some few 
additions, it would probably be such as we find in 
the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, the 
Eoman emperor who so rigorously opposed the progress 
of Christianity. Mr. Mill says of his writings, that 
" they are the highest ethical product of the ancient 
mind/ 5 and that they " differ scarcely perceptibly, if 
they differ at all, from the most characteristic teachings 
of Christ" (76. p. 49). Surely Mr. Mill forgets that 
Jesus began his public teaching by " preaching the 
" gospel of the kingdom of God, and saying, The time is 
" fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand : repent 
" ye, and believe the gospel" (Mark i. 14, 15) ; that the 
first beatitude and the second beatitude in the Sermon 
on the Mount are, " Blessed are the poor in spirit ; " 
" Blessed are they that mourn;" and the prayer com- 
manded is that of the publican, " God be merciful to 
me a sinner." I have met with no such injunctions, no 
such spirit, in the Meditations of Antoninus. This work 
of the heathen emperor was much read by the moral 
school of divines last century; and the precepts en- 
joined were those they recommended. We know the 
result. The self-righteous system, whether recommended 
by the stoic moralists in ancient times, or by the 
rationalists of last century, was favourably regarded by 
a few persons belonging to the middle class, mostly in 
comfortable worldly circumstances, and not in a position 
to be much in fear of poverty, or the deeper trials of 
life. In them it produced or favoured a spirit of self- 



UTILITARIANISM. 387 

sufficiency and pride, which tended to make their 
characters hard and unlovely, and exposed them often 
to grievous falls, from which it could not lift them. 
And as to the great body of the people of all classes, 
but especially the poor, the tried, and the unfortunate, 
they turned away from it with loathing, as not adapted 
to their wants and circumstances, pretending, as it did, 
to keep up by their own strength those who felt that 
they needed higher support, and providing no means of 
raising the lapsed or comforting the mourner. I do not 
allow that it would be an elevation of morality to set 
aside the peculiar Christian graces of penitence, meek- 
ness, and humility, and to substitute for them a sense of 
honour, a sense of our own merits, and a spirit of self- 
sufficient independence. 



CHAPTEE XXI 

NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

The School of M. Comte, both in its French and 
British departments, is essentially a Sect, separated 
from other philosophies, and with very narrow sym- 
pathies. It has been made so partly by the circum- 
stance that its adherents were at first few, and had to 
meet not only with opposition but with contempt from 
the leading metaphysicians of the age ; but it is so es- 
sentially, because it has cut itself off from the streams 
which flow down from the past, and, like a pool, it has 
no connexion with anything beyond itself. Though no 
longer a small body, and though by their intellectual 
power and perseverance they have compelled their op- 
ponents to respect them, the disciples have still the ex- 
clusiveness of a sect : they read one another, they quote 
one another, and they criticise one another, they are in- 
capable of appreciating any other philosophy. The two 
articles of their creed, and the two points that unite 
them, are the theory of nescience, and that of the steps 
by which knowledge has made progress. I have been 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 389 

examining the first all throughout this work. Before I 
close I must notice the other. 

The famous lav/ of sociology, as developed by M. 
Comte, is about as rash a generalization as was ever 
made by a Presocratic physiologist, a mediaeval school- 
man, or a modern German speculator. It realizes the 
description given by Bacon of empiricists, who are re- 
presented as rising at once from a limited observation 
of facts to the highest and widest generalizations. The 
theory contains a small amount of truth, which it has 
misunderstood and perverted. In the early ages of the 
world, and in simple states of society at all times, man- 
kind are inclined to see God or the gods as acting with- 
out any secondary instrumentality, in operations which 
are found subsequently to take place according to natural 
law. The reason of this is very simple, and very ob- 
vious, and has often been noticed : it is that mankind 
are prompted by the native principle of causation to 
seek for a cause to every event, while they have not so 
large an experience as to enable them to discover the 
uniformity in the cosmos. This state of society con- 
stitutes what M. Comte calls the Theological Era ; 
which, however, does not imply that men are more dis- 
posed to see God in His works, and to worship, love, and 
obey Him, than in other ages ; but simply that they 
believe Him to act or interpose by a free operation, 
independent of all physical causation. 

As observation widens and intelligence advances, men 
learn to abstract and generalize upon the phenomena of 
nature. They are apt to do so in the first instance — as being 



390 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

the easiest method — by mere mental force or inward cogita- 
tion. Not having learned to perform experiments, they 
cannot distinguish between the various subtle powers 
and elements which operate in nature, nor to make what 
Bacon calls the necessary " rejections and exclusions." 
Generalizing the obvious facts, they represent the sun 
and stars as moving daily round the earth, and, as they 
find they cannot thus explain the whole phenomena, 
they give a special motion to the moon and planets, and 
call hi eccentrics and epicycles. Or, abstracting what 
seems common in the obvious operations of earthly 
agents, they represent the components of the universe as 
being the fiery, the aerial, the aqueous, and the solid 
powers ; and speak of certain bodies being in their very 
nature light and others heavy. This is what is called the 
Metaphysical Era. Not that mankind are then inclined 
to cultivate metaphysics in any proper sense of the term, 
or more than any other department of inquiry ; but 
simply that they hasten to grasp the operations of nature 
within and without them by mental acts, and have not 
learned — what it required a Bacon to tell us — that in- 
vestigation must proceed gradually, and by means of 
enlarged observation and careful experiment. So far 
from being in any peculiar sense a metaphysical age, it 
sought to penetrate into all the departments of nature, 
and inquired into the origin and structure of the uni- 
verse, and the movements of the celestial bodies. It did 
enter upon metaphysical subjects, but it was as it rushed 
into physiological and astrological speculations ; and it 
discussed them all in the same spirit. The Presocratic 



XATURAL THEOLOGY. 391 

schools, for example, did inquire into the nature of 
knowing, and being, and the human soul ; but it was as 
they inquired into the primary principle or elements of 
the universe. They satisfied themselves with a few 
common observations, and then proceeded to apply 
thought to them. In pure metaphysical questions they 
distinguished in a rude way between Sensation and 
Reason, and when this division was found insufficient, 
they called in a vague intermediate principle called 
Opinion or Faith. Such ages have no special title to be 
called the Metaphysical Era : they treat physics and 
metaphysics in the same undistinguishing and uncertain 
manner. Nor are they to be regarded as necessarily 
non-theological ages. No doubt there were curious 
questions started, which could not be settled, as to the 
relation between these rapidly generalized and abstract 
powers, and the gods who ruled in heaven. There were 
thus stirred theological questions which tended to under- 
mine the old superstitions, and to prepare the way for a 
better era. It was at this time — ' the fulness of time ' 
— that Christianity was introduced as a seed into a soil 
ploughed to receive it. 

In the natural advancement of intelligence, especially 
after the great awakening of thought in the sixteenth 
century, it was felt that the old methods were waxing 
old, and must soon vanish away. These methods are 
happily described by Bacon as the ' Rational' so presump- 
tuous, the 'Empirical' so narrow, and the ' Superstitious' 
which made religion accomplish what could be clone only 
by science. At this time there appeared such men as 



392 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

Galileo practising careful experiment, and Bacon himself 
to expound the general principles of the true mode 
of procedure — of which method the Positive Philosophy 
is merely a monstrous outgrowth. This Era should be 
called the Inductive. It may be quite as metaphysical 
as the previous ones, only it will conduct the investiga- 
tions in a new spirit and mode, that is, according to the 
Method of Induction. This new spirit (though the 
method was not yet properly understood) sprang up in 
the seventeenth century, and was fostered by such men 
as Descartes, who taught us to look into the mind to 
discover its operations, and by Locke, who appealed to 
experience. Since that time an inductive mental science, 
distracted from time to time by an ambitious a priori, 
or by a narrow empirical philosophy, has run parallel to 
physical science. Nor is this era necessarily an untheo- 
logical one. Never were questions of divinity discussed 
so keenly as in the ages when the inductive spirit sprang 
up, and was applied to the study of the human mind. 
And I believe that there is as much, and as intense, 
religious feeling in our country at this present time as 
there ever was in any country since man appeared on 
the earth ; and sooner or later there will be a tremen- 
dous reaction against the present attempt to deaden the 
religious instincts among our young men by a cold 
unbelief. No doubt educated men cannot now see the 
constant interpositions of Gocl which were noticed in 
early ages ; but it is because they take an enlarged and 
enlightened view of the course of nature, which they re- 
gard as ordered by God in infinite wisdom, and as the 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 393 

expression of His will, and not requiring to be inter- 
fered with. It is all true that men with a proud and 
self-dependent spirit may now find it easier to dis- 
believe in a personal God, and to band over the universe 
to unconscious natural law. But the truth is, persons 
who do not like to retain a pure and holy God in their 
hearts, had at all times an outlet. That outlet was fur- 
nished in ancient times by superstition, which degraded 
the Divine character, and in modern times by infidelity, 
which denies His existence or His constant operation. 

It is a pleasant circumstance to reflect upon, that 
nearly all the great philosophers of ancient and modern 
times have been anxious to show that their systems 
favour religion. There is every reason to believe that 
the Ionian physiologists recognised the Divine existence 
and the Divine agency : certainly Anaxagoras, who 
seems to have been the greatest of them, allotted the all- 
important place in his system to the Divine Intelligence. 
The founder of the Eleatic School, Xenophanes, while he 
ridiculed the popular mythology, represented God as the 
essential existence. We know little of the Pythagorean 
system, but it is clear that it had a Zeus as the centre 
of the order which it delighted to unfold. The two 
great truths which Socrates held by firmly, amidst his 
doubts and his love of dialectic, were the providence of 
God, and the tendency of virtue in the government of 
God to promote happiness. When Plato rises above 
the intellectual gymnastic which he so delighted to 
exercise, it is to merge his philosophy in a theology in 
which the God is represented as for ever contemplating 



394 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

eternal ideas, and developing all things according to 
them. Even Aristotle, cold though he be in his 
references to divine subjects, falls back on God as the 
principle and ground of all things. In the Stoic system 
there was a fiery deity, who pervaded all nature, and 
continued unchanged amidst the periodical conflagration 
of all things. Cicero wishes everywhere to be thought 
a pure theist ; and the later Latin Stoics; such as 
the philosophic emperor, were more religious than the 
Greek founders of the school. Mediaeval scholasticism 
consisted essentially in the application of Logic to 
Theology. In the reaction of the sixteenth and seven- 
teenth centuries, philosophic thinkers delighted to show 
that their systems could bear up and confirm true 
religion. Bacon excluded final causes from physics, but 
gave them and formal causes a place in the higher field 
of metaphysics, which stand next to and support theo- 
logy at the apex of the pyramid. Descartes maintained 
that the mind has an idea of the infinite and perfect, 
which implies the existence of an infinitely perfect 
Being. Locke wrote much on religious subjects, and in 
the Fourth Book of his Essay, he shows that his system 
leads to a reasonable belief in the existence of a sjriritual 
Being. The founders of the German School, Leibnitz 
and Kant, embraced the existence of God as essential 
parts of their philosophies, and in this they were followed 
by the ideal pantheists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. 
The Scottish School, from Hutcheson to Hamilton, in- 
cluding Brown, has been at great pains to expound and 
defend the great truths of natural religion. 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 395 

It is surely an ominous circumstance, that in this the 
nineteenth century there should arise a system of philo- 
sophy, supported by very able men, and with very ex- 
tensive ramifications and applications, especially in 
social science, but which contains within it no argument 
for the Divine existence, or sanctions to religion. The 
founder of the school was an avowed, indeed a rabid, 
atheist ; and I am not aware that any of his French 
followers have made any profession of religion, — most 
of them are favourers of a materialism, which does not 
admit of a spiritual God. 1 The British branch of the 
school seems, with one accord, and evidently on a system, 
to decline uttering any certain sound on the subject ; 
they certainly do not pretend that their philosophy, em- 
bracing though it does, all mental, moral, and social 
problems, requires us to believe in the existence of God, 
in the immortality of the soul, or a day of judgment. 
Mr. Mill's method of dealing with the subject is uniform, 
and evidently designed. Though fond of uttering 
opinions on most other topics, he declines saying what 
are his convictions, or whether he has any convictions, 
in regard to religious truth. He satisfies himself with 
declaring, that if you believe in the existence of God, or 
in Christianity, I do not interfere with you. He does 
not pretend that his philosophy does of itself give any 
aid or sanction to religion ; but if we can get evidence 
otherwise, he assures us that he does not disturb us. 



i A vigorous opposition is being offered to the prevailing Materialism 
by a number of able French writers, as M. Cousin, M. Eemusat, and 
M. Janet (see his Materialisme Contemporain) . 



396 XATURAL THEOLOGY. 

Without saying that it has convinced him, he speaks 
with great respect of the argument from design in favour 
of the Divine existence, and advises us to stick by it, 
rather than resort to a priori proof. The advice is a 
sound one. The greater number, even of metaphysicians, 
are in doubts whether there has ever been an a priori 
argument constructed by Ansehn, by Descartes, by 
Leibnitz, or by Clarke, which can of itself prove the 
existence of God, apart from the observation of the traces 
of wisdom and goodness in the Divine workmanship. 
The reaction against the argument from final cause, 
which has been fostered by the German metaphysics for 
the last age, is far from being a wise or a healthy spirit 
and sentiment. The proof from design is that which 
ever comes home with most force to the unsophisticated 
mind. 

But the important question is not about our author's 
personal predilections and convictions, but is, — Does his 
philosophy undermine the arguments for the existence 
of Deity, and the immortality of the soul, and a day of 
accounts ? It is clear that many of the old proofs cannot 
be advanced by those who accept his theory. The 
argument from catholic consent can have no value on 
such a system. That derived from the moral faculty in 
man, so much insisted on by Kant and Chalmers, is no 
longer available when it is allowed that the moral law 
has no place in our constitution, and that our moral 
sentiments are generated by inferior feelings and associ- 
ated circumstances. But then, he tells us, that the 
Design argument " would stand exactly where it does " 



XATURAL THEOLOGY. 397 

(p. 210). I doubt much whether this is the case. I see 
no principles left by Mr. Mill sufficient to enable us to 
answer the objections which have been urged against it 
by Hume. Kant is usually reckoned as having been 
successful in showing, that the argument from design 
involves the principle of cause and effect. We see an 
order and an adaptation in nature, which are evidently 
effects, and we look for a cause. Has Mr. Mill's doctrine 
of causation left this proof untouched ? Suppose that 
we allow to him that there is nothing in an effect which 
of itself implies a cause ; that even when we know that 
there is a cause, no light is thereby thrown on the nature 
of that cause ; that the causal relation is simply that of 
invariable antecedence within the limits of our ex- 
perience ; and that beyond our experience there may be 
events without a cause, — I fear that the argument is 
left without a foundation. And there are other questions 
pressing on our notice, and demanding an answer. Can 
God be shown to be infinite on the principles of this 
philosophy ? If so, what are these principles ? If God 
exists as a designer, is He also a moral governor ? Will 
He call His creatures to account, and reward those who 
do good, and punish those who do evil ? Is this world the 
only world to us, or is there another ? It is clear that the 
argument drawn from the abiding, the substantial, and 
spiritual nature of the soul is entirely cut off by a philo- 
sophy which makes mind a mere series of feelings. The 
more convincing argument from God's justice calling His 
responsible creatures to account, can have little or no 
force in a system which admits no independent morality. 



398 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

I should like, I confess, to have the proof and the 
doctrine of natural religion drawn out according to this 
philosophy. The argument for the being of a God 
founded on any native principles is unavailable, but we 
are allowed to weigh the a posteriori evidence. It is 
conceivable that the adherents of the system may thread 
their way through the series of feelings and possibilities 
of sensations, and as they do so discover traces of what, 
if done by man, would be reckoned design and benefi- 
cence : but whether these phenomena within our expe- 
rience entitle us to argue that there is a Being beyond 
who has caused them, is a question in regard to which 
some are waiting for light, to come from the head of the 
school or some other quarter. Those who believe that 
an effect of itself implies a cause, have no hesitation in 
concluding that the design in nature implies a designer ; 
and those who look on man as having a moral nature, 
and constrained by inward principles to believe in 
infinity, can clothe the designer with moral and infinite 
perfections. But there are not a fe*w, both of those who 
oppose and those who support Mr. Mill, who cannot see 
that his system warrants us in reaching any such result. 
And there is the more puzzling inquiry, whether there 
is proof that the thread or prolonged throb of conscious- 
ness exists after its external bodily conditions or possi- 
bilities have been evidently dissolved by death. These 
are questions which some of our youths, who have com- 
mitted themselves to this philosophy, are sporting with 
in utter levity, and which are wringing the hearts of 
others till feelings more bitter than tears burst from 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 399 

them : and what are they to do in this transition state, 
with the old undermined and the new not yet con- 
structed ? 

I have carefully refrained throughout this work from 
urging any argument from consequences, or from reli- 
gious considerations, against the philosophy I am ex- 
amining. I have, to the best of my ability, and with 
an anxious desire to reason fairly, met my distinguished 
opponent on the ground of consciousness, and of legiti- 
mate inference from it. But neither he nor I, neither 
those who follow nor those who oppose him, can avoid 
looking at the results. Scepticism, as Hume delights to 
show, can produce no mischief in the common secular 
affairs of life, because there man is ever meeting with 
circumstances which keep him right in spite of his 
principles or want of principles. But it is very different 
in those questions which fall to be discussed in higher 
ethics and theology. A man will not be tempted by 
any sophistry to doubt the connexion of cause and 
effect when he is thirsty and sees a cup of water before 
him ; in such a case he will at once put forth his hand 
and take it, knowing that the beverage will refresh him. 
But he may be led by a wretched sophistry to deny the 
necessary relation of cause and effect when it would 
lead him upward from God's works to God Himself, or 
to seek assurance and peace in Him. Hence the im- 
portance of not allowing fundamental truth to be 
assailed : not because the attack will sway any one in 
the common business of life, but because it may hold 
back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and re- 



400 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

ligious. I put no question as to the religious convic- 
tions of its supporters ; but I may surely ask — What is 
the religion left us by the new philosophy ? 

M. Comte provided a religion and a worship for his 
followers. He had no God, but he had a ' Grand Etre/ 
in Collective Humanity, or " the continuous resultant of 
all the forces capable of voluntarily concurring in the 
universal perfectioning of the world" — being in fact a 
deification of his system of science and sociology. In 
the worship he enjoined he has nine sacraments, and a 
priesthood, and public honours to be paid to the Collec- 
tive Humanity ; but with no public liberty of conscience, 
or of education, in sacred or indeed in any subjects. The 
religious observances were to occupy two hours every 
day. Mr. Mill tells us, " Private adoration is to be ad- 
" dressed to Collective Humanity in the persons of worthy 
" individual representatives, who may be either living or 
" dead, but must in all cases be women ; for women, being 
" the sexe aimant, represent the best attribute of huma- 
" nity, that which ought to regulate all human life, nor can 
" Humanity possibly be symbolized in any form but that 
" of a woman. The objects of private adoration are the 
" mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing seve- 
" rally the past, the present, and the future, and calling 
" into active exercise the three social sentiments — vene- 
" ration, attachment, and kindness. We are to regard 
" them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian angels, 
" ' les vrais anges gardiens/ If the last two have never 
" existed, or if, in the particular case, any of the three 
" types is too faulty for the office assigned to it, their 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 401 

" place may be supplied by some other type of womanly 
" excellence, even by one merely historical" (Comte and 
Posit, p. 150). The Christian religion surely does not 
suffer by being placed alongside this system, which is 
one of the two new religions which this century has 
produced — the other being Mormonism. The author 
clung more and more fondly to this faith and ceremonial 
as he advanced in years. His English followers are 
ashamed of it, and ascribe it to his lunacy, — as if he had 
not been tinged with madness (as his poor wife knew) 
all his life, and as if his whole system had not been 
the prod ict of a powerful but constitutionally diseased 
intellect. 

He denounces his English followers, because they did 
not adopt his moral and social system ; he characterizes 
the conversion of those who have adopted his positivity 
and rejected his religion as an abortion ; and declares 
that it must proceed from impotence of intellect, or in- 
sufficiency of heart, commonly from both ! {Polit Posit, 
tome I. pref. p. xv. ; in. p. xxiv.) There is a basis of 
wisdom in this complaint. All history shows that man 
is a religious, quite as certainly as he is a feeling, and 
a rational being. But what has the British School 
provided to meet man's religious wants ? As yet they 
have furnished nothing. But Mr. Mill, who always 
weighs his words, and who is too skilful a dialectician 
to say more than he means, evidently points to some- 
thing which is being hatched, and may some day burst 
forth. While he has the strongest objection to the 
system of politics and morals set forth in the Politique 

2 C 



402 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

Positive, he thinks " it has superabundantly shown the 
" possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even 
" without the belief in a Providence, both the psycholo- 
" gical power and the social efficacy of a religion : making 
" it take hold of human life, and colour all thought, feel- 
" ing, and action, in a manner of which the greatest 
" ascendency ever exercised by any religion may be but 
" a type and foretaste " ( TJtil., p. 48). More specifically in 
his latest work he says, that " though conscious of being 
in an extremely small minority," — a circumstance which 
is sure to catch those ' individualists' who are bent on 
appearing original — " we venture to think that a religion 
" may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion 
" without a God may be, even to Christians, an in- 
" structive and profitable object of contemplation" 
(Gomte and Posit., p. 133). He tells us, that in order to 
constitute a religion, there must be " a creed or convic- 
tion," " a belief or set of beliefs," " a sentiment connected 
with this creed," and a " cultus." I confess I should like 
excessively to see this new religion, with its creed and 
its cultus, fully developed. It would match the theolo- 
gies, with their ceremonial observances, projected by doc- 
trinaires in the heat of the French Eevolution. There 
is no risk of the British School setting up a religion and 
a worship so superbly ridiculous as that of M. Comte, 
but I venture to predict that when it comes, it will 
be so scientifically cold, and so emotionally blank, as to 
be incapable of gathering any interest around it, of ac- 
complishing any good — or, I may add, inflicting any 
evil. 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 403 

Leaving the religion to develop itself in the future, 
let us ascertain what we have without it in the philoso- 
phic system. Within, we have a prolonged series of 
feelings ; without, we have a possibility of sensations ; 
both regulated by the most unbending laws of necessity, 
within the limits of experience and a reasonable distance 
beyond ; and beyond that beyond — if there be such — a 
land of darkness and eternal silence. This is the cold 
region into which thought, as it moves on in its orbit, has 
brought us, in the third quarter of the nineteenth cen- 
tury. And is this, then, what is left us after all the 
dialectic conflicts, and as the result of all the scientific 
discoveries of the last two thousand five hundred years 
that have elapsed since reflective thought was awakened ? 
We know how keenly some patriotic and high-minded 
Frenchmen feel when they are obliged to contemplate 
the present state of their country, and to confess how 
great the humiliation implied in the bloody revolutions 
through which they have passed, ending in a military 
despotism, which restrains on all hands liberty of thought 
and action. I am sure that a like feeling will rise up in 
many noble and hopeful minds when they are made to 
see that all these discussions, philosophic and religious, 
in the past, that all these throes and convulsions of 
opinion and sentiment have left us only a series of feel- 
ings and a possibility of sensations, beginning we know 
not with what, and carrying us we know not whither, — 
all that we are sine of being, that the sensations and 
feelings are conveyed along pleasantly or unpleasantly, 
and ranged into companies suitably or unsuitably, and 



404 NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

our very beliefs generated, by a 4 fatalistic law of con- 
tiguity and resemblance. Some may be content with 
this lot, as being caught in the toils and despairing of 
an escape : but there will be others — I venture to say 
nobler and better — who feel that they must be deli- 
vered from this mental bondage at all hazards, and will 
hasten to attempt it even at the risk of new conflicts 
and new revolutions. It should not after all be so diffi- 
cult for humble and sincere men to escape from this net 
which sophistry would weave around them. Let them 
follow those intuitions and ultimate beliefs, the exist- 
ence and the veracity of which Mr. Mill has acknow- 
ledged — while he has declined to pursue them to their 
consequences ; let them gather around them a body of 
acquired observations with their appropriate sentiments ; 
and, as they do so, they will reach a body of truth, 
practical, scientific, and religious, sufficient to stay the 
intellect and satisfy the heart, — while what still remains 
unknown will only incite to further explorations, and 
lead to new discoveries. 



APPENDIX. 

Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy. — See p. 13. 

I have taken exception to certain doctrines of Hamilton in the 
Method of Divine Government (m. d. g.) ; in the North British 
Review, Nos. liv. and lix. (]sr, b. r.) ; in Dublin University Magazine, 
Aug. 1859 (d. u. m.) ; in Intuitions of the Mind (i. m.) ; in Super- 
natural in Relation to Natural (s. N.) ; in Appendix to Stewart's 
Outlines (s. o.) ; and now in this work (d. 7. t.) 

1. His Method. — n.b.r. liv. 427 ; lm. 96 ; d.f.t. 34. 

2. His ambiguous use of Consciousness. — n.b.r. liv. 428 ; 

D.u.M. 159, 160 ; lm. 96; d.f.t. 25-30. 

3. His omission among the Reproductive Powers (Metaph. 

vol. ii.), of the Recognitive Power by which we 
believe the remembered event to have fallen under our 
notice in time past. — d.u.m. 160 ; d.f.t. 174. 
4 His view of Time and Space. — n.b.r. liv. 429 ; lm. 
178, 179. 

5. His doctrine of Unconscious Mental Operations. — d.u.m. 

161, 162; d.f.t. 196-198. 

6. His unsatisfactory way of appealing to Faith without ex- 

plaining its nature. — n.b.r. lix. 150, 151 ; lm. 
168-173 ; s.n. 355. 

7. His view of all Knowledge implying Comparison. — lm. 

207-210 ; d.f.t. 222. 

8. His defective view of the Relations which the mind can 

discover. — d.u.m. 162, 163; lm. 211. 



406 APPENDIX. 

9. His doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. — m.d.g. 
536-539; n.b.r. liv. 428-429; d.tj.m. 163, 164 ; 
i.m. 109, 340-341; s.o. 132 ; d.f.t. 218-221. 

10. His doctrine of Nescience. — m.d.g. 520 ; n.b.r. liv. 

430-431 ; i.m. 342-345; d.f.t. 219. 

11. His defective doctrine as to our idea of the Infinite. — 

m.d.g. 534 ; n.b.e. liv. 430, lix. 150, 154, 156 ; 
i.m. 193-197; s.n. 141. 

12. His axiom that truth lies between two extremes. — i.m. 

304, 338. 

13. His doctrine of Substance. — i.m. 146, 148. 

14. His doctrine of Causation. — m.d.g. 529, 530 ; n.b.r. 

liv. 430 ; d.u.m. 164. 

15. The application by Dr. Mansel of the doctrine of Relativity 

to Moral Good and Evil. — n.b.r. lix. 157 ; s.n. 356, 
357. 

16. His view of the Theistic Argument. — m.d.g. 520 ; n.b.r. 

liv. 431, lix. 152; s.n. 355; s.o. 140. 



EDINBURGH : T. CONSTABLE, 
PRINTER TO THE QUEEN, AND TO THE UNIVERSITY. 



WORKS BY DR. M'COSH 



Eighth Edition. 

THE METHOD OF THE DIVINE GOVEENMENT, 
PHYSICAL AND MOEAL. 

" It is refreshing to read a work so distinguished for originality and 
soundness of thinking, especially as coming from an author of our own 
country." — Sir "William Hamilton. 

" Dr. M'Cosh's work is of the compact cast and thought-eliciting com- 
plexion which men do not willingly let die ; and we promise such of our 
readers as may possess themselves of it much entertainment and instruc- 
tion of a high order, and a fund of solid thought, which they will not soon 
exhaust." — Hugh Miller, in ' Witness.'' 

" This work is distinguished from other similar ones hy its heing hased 
upon a thorough study of physical science, and an accurate knowledge of 
its present condition, and by its entering in a deeper and more unfettered 
manner than its predecessors upon the discussion of the appropriate 
psychological, ethical, and theological questions. The author keeps aloof 
at once from the a priori idealism and dreaminess of German speculation 
since Schelling, and from the one-sidedness and narrowness of the empiri- 
cism and positivism which have so prevailed in England. In the pro- 
vinces of psychology and ethics he follows conscientiously the facts of 
consciousness, and draws his conclusions out of them commonly with 
penetration and logical certainty." — Dr. Ulrici, in Zeitschrift fiir 
Philosophie. 

THE SUPEENATUEAL IN EELATION TO THE 
NATURAL 

" A work whose scientific value as a contribution toward the defences 
of the faith it would be difficult to overrate." — Patriot. 



THE INTUITIONS OE THE MIND. 

New and Improved Edition. 

" I have given an approving notice of Dr. M'Cosh'* Intuitions of the 
Mind in my Jahrbiicher fiir Deutsche Theologie (1861). I value it for 
its large acquaintance with English Philosophy, which has not led him 



to neglect the great German works. 1 admire the moderation and clear- 
ness, as well as comprehension, of the author's views. While entertain- 
ing a great respect for the Masters of the Scottish Philosophy, such as 
Sir W, Hamilton, this has not restrained his independent judgment, or 
kept him stationary." — Dr. Dorner of Berlin. 

" The undertaking to adjust the claims of the sensational and intuitional 
philosophies, and of the a posteriori and a priori methods, is not only 
legitimate, but accomplished in this work with a great amount of success." 
— Westminster Beviev), April 1865. 

" No philosopher before Dr. M'Cosh has clearly brought out the stages 
by which an original and individual intuition passes first into an articu- 
late but still individual judgment, and then into a universal maxim or prin- 
ciple ; and no one has so clearly or completely classified and enumerated our 
intuitive convictions, or exhibited in detail their relations to the various 
sciences which repose on them as their foundations. The amount of 
summarized information which it contains is very great ; and it is the 
only work on the very important subject with which it deals. Never was 
such a work so much needed as in the present day. It is the only scien- 
tific work adapted to counteract the school of Mill, Bain, and Herbert 
Spencer, which is so steadily prevailing among the students of the pre- 
sent generation." — London Quarterly Review, April 1865. 

" Though treating of the intuitions of the mind, and thus labouring in 
that particular division of philosophy which is most liable to degenerate 
into imaginative, or at best merely speculative notions, Dr. M'Cosh pre- 
serves a clear, calm, and sober intelligence. The history of many philo- 
sophic opinions, and the peculiarities of many philosophical schools, are also 
passed in review in the notes to the work, in a concise yet thorough man- 
ner ; and the criticisms that are made upon several of the celebrated 
theories of the past are candid and exhaustive." — Dr. Shedd, in Intro- 
duction to Second American Edition. 

" When the original edition of this work appeared, we characterized it 
in terms of strong recommendation, such as we rarely bestow on any 
work, and pointed out at some length its distinctive merits. We will 
just say here, that, in regard to all the greatest issues between Mill and 
Hamilton, indeed all the great issues raised by either of these eminent 
authors, or their respective philosophical schools ; and in regard to nearly 
every great issue raised between the philosophic scepticism and ther~~~ 
Christian philosophy of our day, Dr. M'Cosh quite generally takes the 
right side." — Princeton Review, Oct. 1865. 



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